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Structured Summary of the Opinion: Application to Excuse Delay in Filing Petition for Certificate to Appeal to the Privy Council

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application to excuse delay in filing a petition for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The High Court delivered judgment in the second appeal on 11 February 1921. Act XXVI of 1920, which came into force on 1 January 1921, reduced the period for leave to appeal to the Privy Council from six months to three months (ninety days). After allowing time for obtaining a copy of the judgment, the three-month period expired on 3 July 1921. The petition was actually filed on 16 July 1921 — some thirteen to fourteen days late.

The applicants explained the delay by reference to erroneous legal advice: their local pleaders had told them the limitation period was six months. The matter was first addressed by single judges in the High Court: Chief Justice Macleod (Macleod, C.J.) held the delay should not be excused; Shah, J. dissented and would have excused the delay. On 23 November 1921 a Division Court refused to excuse the delay (the Chief Justice's opinion prevailing under clause 36 of the Letters Patent). An appeal was filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. That appeal was heard by a Bench of Marten, Pratt and Fawcett, JJ.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delay of approximately thirteen to fourteen days in presenting the petition for a certificate to appeal to the Privy Council should be excused under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act (i.e., whether "sufficient cause" was shown).
  2. Whether an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies from the Division Court's order (dated 23 November 1921) refusing to excuse the delay — in other words, whether that order was a "judgment" within the meaning of clause 15 and therefore appealable.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' Arguments

  • The applicants relied on honest and reasonable reliance on advice received from their local pleaders (they were told the period was six months, the pre-amending practice).
  • The applicants argued that due to the recent change in law (Act XXVI of 1920) and the practical delay in that change becoming widely known in practice and legal literature, their local pleaders could reasonably have been unaware of the reduced ninety-day period.
  • The applicants asserted they acted in good faith and with due diligence: they obtained copies of the judgment and decree before deciding on appeal and they consulted a High Court pleader (Mr. Thakor) as soon as they realised there might be an issue.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents emphasised that the applicants should have consulted competent High Court pleaders (whom the applicants had employed earlier) rather than rely on local pleaders; had they done so they would have received correct advice and filed in time.
  • The respondents contended the applicants failed to take steps incumbent on them to ascertain the last day for presenting the petition and that the rights of the successful party — the finality that accrued on the expiry of the statutory period — should not be disturbed.
  • There was a preliminary objection that no appeal lay from the Division Court's order under clause 15 of the Letters Patent unless that order could be properly characterised as a "judgment."

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishnasami Pandikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar Quoted (Sir Lawrence Jenkins): duty of a litigant to know the last day to present an appeal; burden lies on litigant to adduce distinct proof of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. Relied on by Macleod, C.J. to support the conclusion that applicants had not proved sufficient cause and therefore delay should not be excused.
The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company Definition of "judgment" by Couch C.J.: decision which affects the merits by determining some right or liability. Adopted and followed by this Court as a test for whether an order refusing to excuse delay is a "judgment" appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Charandas v. Chhaganlal The case is cited in relation to what constitutes a "judgment" and as an example of interlocutory orders not being judgments. Used to distinguish interlocutory orders (e.g., refusing directions in a chamber summons) from orders that finally determine rights; not treated as binding against appealability where the order finally concludes litigation.
Ramchandra v. Mahadev Held that an order by a single Judge refusing to excuse delay for an appeal is a "judgment" within clause 15 and that an appeal lies from such an order. Treated as a controlling precedent by Marten, J.; the Court followed Ramchandra to hold that the Division Court's order was appealable under clause 15.
Miya Mahomad v. Zorabi Example where an order directing issue of commission for examination of witnesses was held not to be a judgment. Distinguished from the present case because such orders do not finally end litigation.
Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar Full Bench of Madras interpreted clause 15 broadly. Marten, J. noted the present application falls within the tests adopted by the Madras High Court and cited this authority in that connection.
Sonachalam Pillai v. Kumaravelu Chettiar Reconsideration by Madras High Court of clause 15 interpretation. Referenced as part of the Madras High Court line of authorities supporting a broad view of clause 15.
Mowla Buksh v. Kishen Pertab Sahi Calcutta High Court's more restricted approach to what is a "judgment" (context: Privy Council Department). Distinguished on the basis that the Calcutta practice involves a separate Privy Council Department, unlike the present Court.
Manly v. Patterson Another Calcutta case illustrating a restricted approach. Also distinguished for the same reasons as Mowla Buksh.
Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry v. Kalisunderi Debi Privy Council held that a decision by a Judge refusing to transmit for execution an order in Council was a "judgment" within clause 15 because it exercised judicial discretion and would entirely conclude rights. Used to support the proposition that orders refusing transmission/execution or otherwise finally concluding rights are appealable under clause 15.
Lutf Ali Khan v. Asgur Reza Held no appeal lies from an order granting a certificate of appeal to the Privy Council. Distinguished: Marten observed the present appeal is from a refusal (not a grant) and the practical distinction is sufficient.
Kishen Pershad Panday v. Tiluckdhari Lall Held no appeal lies from refusal to extend time for finding security for costs in a Privy Council appeal. Considered by Marten but not followed as binding; distinguished on facts and reasoning.
Gobinda Lal Das v. Shiba Das Chatterjee Decision refusing to enlarge time for preferring an appeal; treated as supporting non-appealability in some High Courts. Marten preferred Ramchandra and other authorities over this view and favoured appealability; Fawcett also rejected the argument that the appeal was a "dead" proceeding.
In re Coles and Ravenshear English authority historically holding mistake of counsel insufficient as a ground for extension of time (later characterised as based on obsolete practice). Marten discussed the evolution of English authorities and concluded In re Coles and Ravenshear is no longer authoritative for current English practice; the Court relied on later English and Indian decisions instead.
International Financial Society v. City of Moscow Gas Company English authority in the line regarding counsel mistakes and extension of time. Discussed in the context of English developments; used to show the historical shift in English practice.
Baker v. Faber English case where mistake by counsel was accepted as sufficient ground for extension under an alternative rule. Referred to as representing the modern English practice supportive of excusing certain mistakes by counsel; cited favorably for the applicants.
Rumbold v. London County Council and Scott Full Court of Appeal reconsidered the law and supported a more liberal approach to extension of time; Baker v. Faber approved. Marten relied on the shift in English authority to justify leniency where counsel or practitioner error is involved.
Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram Privy Council decision illustrating indulgence in India in matters of time and extension where good faith/due diligence present. Marten and Pratt cited it as supporting a more indulgent Indian approach to excusing delays compared to stricter English rules.
Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum Privy Council affirmed that High Court may excuse delay where appellants acted bona fide and with due diligence; time occupied by review petition may be allowed. Fawcett and Marten relied on it as directly analogous authority supporting excusal of delay for bona fide, diligent litigants misled by advice or mistake.
Dattatraya v. Secretary of State Held that relying on erroneous advice of a pleader could constitute sufficient cause for delay; the litigant acted in good faith. Marten invoked this case as a close Indian precedent favouring excusal when pleader's error is bona fide.
Ram Ravji Jambhekar v. Pralhaddas Subkarn Privy Council observation that ignorance of law or ill-advice of a pleader does not necessarily establish want of good faith. Quoted in support of the proposition that mistakes by pleaders do not automatically deprive litigants of relief under Section 5.
Jaipal Kunwar v. Indar Bahadur Singh Principle that Court of Appeal should be slow to overturn exercise of discretion by a lower Court. Pratt, J. referenced the rule but observed it is not absolute and a divided Division Court opinion makes it easier to substitute appellate discretion.
Highton v. Treherne Master of the Rolls' remarks favouring exercise of discretion where bona fide mistake (not due to misconduct or negligence) occurred; Court has jurisdiction to enlarge time. Pratt quoted this to support a principled, not absolute, approach to excusing delay in cases of bona fide mistakes.
Krishna Ayyangar v. Nallaperumal Pillai Privy Council held High Court had impliedly extended time for appeal. Fawcett used it to argue that an appeal presented after statutory time is not necessarily "dead" until Court refuses admission; supports appealability and remedial discretion.
Anjora Kunwar v. Babu Judgment (Aikman, J.) noting that Indian law is not as strict as In re Coles and Ravenshear where erroneous advice by legal adviser is concerned. Fawcett cited it to underline that Indian courts show more indulgence to litigants misled by their advisers.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion records multiple layers of reasoning from different judges. The analysis can be divided into three main parts: the single-judge opinions (Macleod, C.J. and Shah, J.), the Division Court result (where the Chief Justice's view prevailed), and the Letters Patent appeal (Marten, Pratt and Fawcett JJ).

Macleod, C.J. (single-judge view refusing to excuse delay)

  • Facts: judgment dated 11 February 1921; period under Act XXVI of 1920 was three months; petition filed 16 July 1921 (after expiry).
  • He emphasised the duty of litigants to know the last day to present appeals and cited Krishnasami Pandikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar to illustrate that burden rests on the applicant to prove sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.
  • He found the applicants had not taken all steps incumbent on them: they had available Bombay (High Court) pleaders whom they employed up to the second appeal yet consulted only local pleaders about limitation. Given Thana's proximity to Bombay, he expected the applicants to have consulted their High Court pleader and held the mistake was not a ground to deprive opponents of rights accrued by expiration of limitation.
  • Conclusion: discretion under Section 5 should not be exercised; delay not excused; opponents to get costs in both applications.

Shah, J. (single-judge dissent excusing the delay)

  • Calculated delay as approximately fourteen days after allowing for time to obtain judgment copies.
  • Accepted applicants' explanation that they were honestly under the impression the period was six months because the amending Act of 1920 had only recently come into force and changes take time to be generally known; new Act would not immediately appear in standard text-books.
  • Held that reasonable diligence existed: consulting local pleaders in the mofussil was not negligent; there was no suggestion of delay after obtaining correct information from Mr. Thakor; thus sufficient cause existed under Section 5.
  • Concluded he would excuse the delay, but accepted the Chief Justice's contrary view prevailed in the Division Court.

Marten, J. (Letters Patent appeal — primary opinion recorded)

  • Preliminary issue: whether an appeal lies from the Division Court's order under clause 15. Marten reviewed conflicting High Court authorities and treated Ramchandra v. Mahadev and Couch C.J.'s definition as controlling for this Court; held the Division Court order refusing to excuse delay was a "judgment" because it finally determined the rights between the parties and therefore was appealable under clause 15.
  • On the merits, Marten framed the question as a judicial discretion under Section 5 — whether sufficient cause exists. He emphasised the explanatory provision to Section 5 that being misled by any "order, practice or judgment of the High Court" may be sufficient cause.
  • Addressed whether this appeal should be treated as merely an appeal from a single judge (the senior Judge whose opinion prevailed). Marten rejected the contention that the dissent of the junior Judge could be disregarded; he held the appellate Court may consider both judges' opinions and substitute its own discretion when warranted.
  • Considered diligence and good faith: observed (and agreed with Shah, J.) that the 1920 amendment was recent and not instantly known to all practitioners; local pleaders might honestly believe in the old six-month period; applicants had employed High Court counsel in earlier stages but it was not negligent for them to rely on local advice on this specific point.
  • Surveyed English authorities and concluded the English position had moved toward permitting extensions in some circumstances of counsel error; in India the practice is more indulgent and Privy Council precedents (e.g., Brij Indar Singh; Sunderbai) supported excusing delays where bona fide reliance and due diligence existed.
  • Applied Indian precedents such as Dattatraya v. Secretary of State to hold that reliance on erroneous advice of a pleader can amount to sufficient cause.
  • Conclusion: he would have allowed the application to excuse delay (Application No. 615 of 1921) and remit the certificate application (No. 631 of 1921) to the Division Court for determination; proposed an order to discharge the Division Court order of 23 November 1921, allow Application No. 615, and remit No. 631 to the Division Court (with a specified treatment of costs).

Pratt and Fawcett, JJ. (concurrence)

  • Pratt, J. agreed that the Division Court order refusing to extend time under Section 5 is a "judgment" under clause 15 and was bound by Ramchandra v. Mahadev. He also agreed that the discretion should be reviewable in the present circumstances and accepted the view that applicants acted bona fide and with due diligence; he agreed with the proposed order.
  • Fawcett, J. concurred generally with the judgments delivered and added observations supporting the view that an appeal is not a "dead" proceeding until the Court has declined to admit it under Section 5; he cited decisions (including Sunderbai) to support excusing delay where bona fide reliance and diligence appear.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent appeal was allowed. The Division Court order of 23 November 1921 refusing to excuse delay was discharged. Application No. 615 of 1921 (to excuse delay) was allowed; Application No. 631 of 1921 (for a certificate of appeal to the Privy Council) was remitted to the Division Court for determination on its merits. Costs directions were proposed to be treated as costs in application No. 631 and to be dealt with by the Division Court.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties: the order refusing to excuse the delay was set aside; the applicants obtain relief from the appellate Bench in respect of the delay and are permitted to have their petition for a certificate considered on its merits by the Division Court.
  • The Court affirmed that an order refusing to excuse delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act can be a "judgment" appealable under clause 15 of the Letters Patent when the order finally determines rights between the parties.
  • The opinion confirms that, under Section 5 and relevant precedents, Indian courts may be inclined to excuse short delays (here about thirteen to fourteen days) where the applicants acted in good faith, exhibited due diligence, and were misled by bona fide advice — especially where the change in law was recent and not yet widely known. The Court relied on Indian and Privy Council authorities to support a more indulgent approach than some older English authorities.
  • The opinion remits the certificate application to the Division Court for consideration on its merits and leaves detailed costs to be dealt with by that Court; the judgment does not purport to lay down any absolute new rule but applies and reconciles existing authorities to the facts before it.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: Appeal allowed.

    Nagindas Motilal v. Nilaji Moroba Naik .

    Macleod, C.J:— This is an application for excuse of delay in filing the petition for a certificate for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. This Court delivered judgment in Second. Appeal No. 647 of 1919 on February 11, 1921. The period prescribed for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was three months under Act XXVI of 1920 which came into force on January 1, 1921. Allowing for the time required for obtaining the copy of the judgment, the three months expired on July 3, 1921. By that time the successful party obtained a valuable right, namely, the finality of the decision of this Court in his favour. The petition was actually filed on July 16, 1921. The excuse which one of the applicants sets forth for proving that there was sufficient cause for delay is the wrong advice given to him by his pleaders, whom he consulted with regard to the question of limitation for an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council and who told him that the period was six months.

    2. The petitioners attach considerable importance to this suit in the trial Court before the Second Class Subordinate Judge of Bhiwandi, they instructed Mr. Shingne, a pleader practising in the High Court. In the District Court in first appeal they engaged the services of Mr. Coyajee, advocate, in addition to those of Mr. Shingne. In this Court Mr. Coyajee argued the second appeal. I think, therefore, under these circumstances, the petitioners should have consulted Mr. Shingne as to what was the period of limitation for filing a petition for leave to appeal to the Privy Council. Instead of doing so, they asked the opinion of their local pleaders whom they could not trust to conduct the case in the lower Courts. These two pleaders have made their affidavits admitting that they had advised the petitioners that the period of limitation was six months. It was only when Mr. Thakor was consulted in July 1921 that the petitioners were told that the proper period was three months and those three months had already expired. Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Krishnasami Pandikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar(1) said at p. 28:—

    “It is the duty of a litigant to know the last day on which he can present, his appeal, and if through delay on his part it becomes necessary for him to ask the Court to exercise in his favour the power contained in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, the burden rests on him of adducing distinct proof of the sufficient cause on which he relies.”

    3. It seems tome that in this particular case the petitioners have not proved sufficient cause for delay so as to deprive the opponents of the rights that they had acquired by the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed by the law. Ordinarily, if a litigant asks the advice of a person learned in law and gets wrong advice, the Court is not anxious that he should have to suffer owing to the fault of his legal adviser. But in every application of this nature there are two parties to be considered. The opponent has as much right to have the hardships of the case considered in his favour as the applicant. I do not think that the applicants did every thing that was incumbent on them to do in order to ascertain what was the last day on which they could present their petition. Thana, where the petitioners reside, is only twenty miles from Bombay and for that reason they were able to employ a Bombay pleader throughout but apart from that, although the local pleaders should know the law, Bombay pleaders were the proper persons to consult if an appeal to the Privy Council was contemplated. The petitioners were perfectly well aware that they had lost their case on the plea of res judicata which had been argued in three Courts. There was no reason therefore, if they were dissatisfied with the decision of the High Court, why they should not have presented their petition well within the three months prescribed. For these reasons I do not think that this is a case in which the Court should exercise the power contained in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. In my opinion the delay should not be excused.

    4. Opponents to get costs in both the applications.

    Shah, J.:— I regret that on a point of this character I find myself unable to agree with the Chief Justice. In this case the application was filed on July 16, 1921, the judgment of this. Court having been delivered on February 11, 1921. The copy of the judgment was applied for on March 16, 1921. It was ready for delivery on May 6 though in fact it was delivered later. Deducting the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the judgment, it would appear that according to the period of limitation prescribed by Act XXVI of 1920 for such an application, the application should have been filed by July 2, 1921. Thus there has been a delay of fourteen days.

    5. The case for the applicants is that they were honestly under the impression that the time allowed for such an application was six months, that they consulted their local pleaders on this point, the petitioners being residents of Thana, and that they were told by them that the period was six months. In connection with this point it must be remembered that until the amending Act of 1920 the period prescribed was six months and though no doubt the amending Act came into force on January 1, 1921, it is a matter of common knowledge that it took some time before the curtailed period of limitation came to be generally known. I also think it is necessary to bear in mind that ordinarily the new Act would not be available in any of the books on the Indian Limitation Act that may be referred to for the purpose. Under the circumstances, the local pleaders might honestly, though mistakenly, be under the belief that the period was six months. At any rate the point to be considered to my mind is whether in spite of reasonable diligence, the applicants were under the honest impression that the period was six months, when they consulted Mr. Thakor, their pleader for the purpose, of this application in July, or whether they had been guilty of any negligence in getting the necessary information. I cannot say that any omission to consult the Bombay lawyers whom they had originally engaged up to the second appeal would amount to negligence on their part in inking the necessary inquiry on a point of this character. It seems to me that if a litigant in the mofussil consults his local pleaders on a point of this character and if he is advised in a particular way though mistakenly, I think he would be honestly under the impression that the time was six months. It is not suggested in this case that if they were under that impression they were dilatory in consulting Mr. Thakor, whom they ultimately engaged for this petition, early in July, or that rafter they got the correct information from Mr. Thakor who ultimately presented this application on their behalf, there was any unreasonable delay in filing the application. It seems to me that under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, we have to see whether sufficient cause is shown within the meaning of that section for the purpose of condoning the delay of fourteen days. In considering this I fully recognise that the litigants who fail to present their appeal or application for leave to appeal within time, allow a valuable right to accrue to the respondents by their omission. But it seems to me that in the present case the petitioner have not been guilty of negligence and so far as the affidavits show they cannot be said to be lacking in due diligence, I think it would not be consistent with justice to hold that the petitioners have not shown sufficient cause. Having regard to the facts established in this case it would be fair to hold that sufficient cause is shown within the meaning of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. I would excuse the delay. But as in the end the opinion of my Lord the Chief Justice prevails according to law, it is not necessary to decide as to whether the certificate applied for should be granted.

    [The opinion of the Chief Justice having prevailed under clause 36 of the Letters Patent, and the application having been rejected, an appeal was filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, which was heard by a Bench consisting of Marten, Pratt and Fawcett, JJ.]

    Marten, J.:— This is an appeal under, clause 15 of the Letters Patent from the decision of the Division Court on November 23, 1921, refusing to excuse the delay of the applicants in the presentation of their petition for a certificate of appeal to the Privy Council. The learned Judges who constituted the Court disagreed as to whether the delay should be excused. Accordingly under clause 36 of the Letters Patent the opinion of the senior Judge prevailed, which was to the effect that the delay should not be excused. Consequently it became unnecessary to decide whether the certificate should be granted. I should state that one consolidated rule had been granted both in the above application to excuse delay and in the above petition for certificate. They were respectively Civil Applications No. 615 of 1921 and No. 631 of 1921, and both of them were before the Division Court. Similarly the present appeal before us is headed in both the above applications, although that does not appear from page a of the Appeal Paper Book before us and it would seem from the notice of appeal sent to the present respondents by the office that only Civil Application No. 615 of 1921 is specially mentioned viz., the application to excuse delay.

    6. Now this Letters Patent appeal was filed on January 23, 1922, and the delay of over two years which has ensued in bringing the appeal to a hearing is serious and, so far as I am aware, most unusual. We have called for a report on this matter, which can be marked for identification as Exhibit Z. But it is admitted that the appeal was originally brought within time, and no contention has been raised before us that there has been any subsequent laches on the part of the applicants which would disentitle them from obtaining the relief which they claim.

    7. The only preliminary objection taken by the respondents is that no appeal lies from the decision of the Division Court on November 23, 1921. This depends on whether the above decision was a “judgment” within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It should he borne in mind that by the High Court's judgment of February 11, 1921, the decision of the trial Judge had been restored, and that of the first appellate Court reversed, with the result that the plaintiff and others succeeded in the claim for rent which they had advanced-in respect of the suit lands. The effect, therefore, of the decision of November 23,1921, refusing to excuse the delay and consequently refusing to entertain the petition for the necessary certificate of appeal to the Privy Council amounted to a final decision so far as this High Court was concerned, and put an end to the litigation between the parties. The only remedy then open to appellants was to apply direct to the Privy Council for special leave to appeal. But as such special leave will not, as a rule be granted, unless there is some substantial question of law or general interest involved, presumably the applicants would not be in so strong a position as if they would rely before us on section 110 of the cpc. The question, therefore, whether the applicants can still rely before us on S. 110 is or may be one of practical importance.

    8. Now there are a considerable number of decisions in the various High Courts in India as to what constitutes a judgment. The decisions of those Courts are not uniform, and with respect I do not propose to discuss them all, nor to attempt to reconcile them. So far as this Court is concerned, the meaning attributed tot he expression “judgment” by Couch C.J in The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company(2) has been approved and followed. (See Charandas v. Chhaganlal(3). So also in this Court we have a case closely in point in Ramchandra v. Mahadev(4). This was decided by Mr. Justice Heaton and Mr. Justice Shah in 1917, and the head-note runs as follows:—

    “An order pawed by a single Judge refuting to excuse the delay for an appeal presented beyond the time allowed by law is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Amended Letters Patent; and an appeal lies from the order under the clause.”

    9. No doubt it does not appear from the report that any authorities were cited to the Court. But the judgment of Mr. Justice Heaton shows clearly the grounds on which the order was made, and I will read it:—

    “It happened that this appeal was presented beyond the time allowed by law and that an application was made by the appellant to a single Judge of this Court to excuse the delay. That Judge refused to excuse the delay and here I pause to remark that this order bad the effect of dismissing or rejecting the appeal and that it was an order of a final character, not of an interlocutory character. The appellant appealed to a Bench of this Court against that order and the Bench excused the delay, the result of which was that the appeal was admitted and has now come on for hearing. It is argued that the order of a single Judge refusing to excuse the delay is not a judgment with, in the meaning of clause 15 of the Charter of this High Court and that therefore no farther appeal lay. But seeing, as I have said, that the order had the very drastic effect of dismissing or rejecting the appeal, it seems to me it must be taken to fall within the meaning of the word judgment as used in clause 15, and I think therefore that there is no objection to our disposing of this appeal on its merits.”

    10. I will only add by way of explanation that under the Court's practice at that time, applications to excuse delay were heard ex parte, and that is how the question of jurisdiction was not raised until the hearing of the appeal itself. That practice has now been altered, having regard to Krishnasami Pandikondar v. Ramasami Chettiar and that is why in the present case both applications were heard together.

    11. No doubt there are other decisions in our High Court showing that merely interlocutory orders on matters of procedure and otherwise are not judgments within the meaning of clause 15. For instance, in Miya Mahomad v. Zorabi(5) an order directing the issue of commission for the examination of witnesses was held not to be a judgment. Similarly is Charandas v. Chhaganlal an order refusing directions in a Chamber Summons taken out in third party proceedings was held not to be a judgment. But decisions of that description seem to me essentially different from the one we have here, for they can in no way be said finally to end or determine the litigation. In Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar(6) a Full Bench of the Madras High Court interpreted clause 15 in a wide sense, and authorities have recently been reconsidered in that Court in Sonachalam Pillai v. Kumaravelu Chettiar(7). For the present purpose it is sufficient to say that the present application to us falls well within the tests adopted by the Madras High Court.

    12. On the other hand the Calcutta High Court has taken a more restricted view. If, however, Mowla Buksh v. Kishen Pertab Sahi(8) and Manly v. Patterson(9) are considered, it will be found that importance is attached to the fact that in that Court there is what is called a Privy Council Department, and it would seem that the presiding Judge of that Department was regarded more as an officer of the Privy Council than as a Judge of the High Court when hearing any applications with reference to Privy Council appeals. In our High Court we have no such Department, and it is quite clear that in dealing with any such applications we sit as Judges of the High Court and in no other capacity.

    13. But in Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry v. Kalisunderi Debi(10) there was an appeal to the Privy Council, and it was there held that a decision by the Judge appointed to dispose of matters relating to appeals to Her late Majesty in Council, refusing to transmit for execution Her order restoring a decree was a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and was appealable to the High Court. There at page 493 it was said:—

    “These learned Judges held (and their Lordships think rightly) that whether the transmission of an order under S. 610 would or would not be a merely ministerial proceeding, Mr. Justice Pontifex bad in fact exercised a judicial discretion, and bad come to a decision of great importance, which, if it remained would entirely conclude any right of Kalisunderi to an execution in this suit. They held, therefore, that it was a judgment within the meaning of S. 15.”

    14. No doubt that was a case of an execution of the decree of the Privy Council, and not one of an application for leave to appeal, but the decision is none the less useful.

    15. The respondents relied on Lutf Ali Khan v. Asgur Reza(11) where it was held that no appeal lay from an order granting a certificate of appeal to the Privy Council. But the present appeal is not one from the grant of a certificate, but from the refusal of it, and the practical distinction between the two is sufficient to distinguish that case.

    16. In Kishen Pershad Panday v. Tiluckdhari Lall(12) it was held that no appeal lay from a refusal to extend the time for finding security for costs in a Privy Council appeal; and in Gobinda Lal Das v. Shiba Das Chatterjee(13) a similar decision was arrived at, where the Court had refused to enlarge the time for preferring an appeal. I have considered these and certain other authorities which were, cited to us to the best of my ability. In the result I am of opinion that the decision of this Court in Ramchandra v. Mahadev was correct and ought to be followed, and that consequently an appeal lies in the present case from the order of the Division Court. In the result, therefore, I would overrule the preliminary objection.

    17. I will now proceed to deal on its merits with the application to excuse the delay. I have already stated that the judgment of the High Court restoring the decision of the trial Judge is, dated February 11, 1921. The petition for a certificate of appeal to the Privy Council from this judgment was presented on July 16, 1921. Under the practice existing upto January 1, 1921, this petition would have been well within the time of six months then allowed. But that period of six months was cut down to ninety days by Act XXVI of 1920, which was passed in September 1920 and came into operation on January 1, 1921. After making, therefore, allowances for certain periods which the applicants were entitled to deduct for getting copies of the judgment and decree, they were thirteen or fourteen days out of time under this new practice.

    18. The question before us is whether this delay should be excused. The applicant Pranjivandas relies strongly on the fact that he consulted his local pleaders and was told by them that he had six months in Which to appeal, and it was not until July 1921 when he consulted his High Court Pleader Mr. Thakor that he was told that the local pleaders' advice was erroneous. Now I think it clear that the question whether this delay can be excused is a matter of judicial discretion. Under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, an application for leave to appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period of limitation, when the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. Then there is the following explanation:—

    “The fact, that the appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period of limitation, may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.”

    19. In the present case, the application in question came before a Bench of two Judges for the exercise of their joint discretion. They differed. The senior Judge thought that the discretion of the Court ought to be exercised by refusing to excuse the delay. The Junior Judge took the contrary view. Consequently under clause 36 of the Letters Patent the opinion of the Senior Judge prevailed, and the application failed.

    20. It is now argued before us that in effect the present appeal is an appeal from the discretion of a single Judge, viz., senior Judge, and that as a matter of law the fact that the junior Judge dissented should not be taken into consideration Consequently it was urged that we cannot interfere with the exercise of the discretion of the senior Judge, unless it is shown by the applicants that there was some material error of law or of fact or some want of the exercise of his discretion. Neither party cited to us any authority bearing directly on this point. For the purpose of this case, therefore, I must regard the matter as one of first impression. The opinion which I have formed is that we ought not to accede to the arguments presented to us by the respondents on this point, and that we ought not to treat this appeal as if it was one merely from the decision of, a single Judge. The Court here was composed of two Judges and not one. Having regard to their difference of opinion it was necessary that the application should formally be disposed of in one way or another. In Letters Patent appeals we find the mode adopted is that the opinion of the senior Judge is to prevail. In other appeals the method adopted is to confirm the decision appealed from though the Bench has power to refer a point of law to a third Judge (See for instance Section 98 of the CPC). On the other hand, clause 15 of the Letters Patent expressly provides for a further appeal where the Judges of a Division Court are divided in opinion.

    21. If, then, the argument presented to us was to succeed, it would mean that, in matters involving a discretion, the ultimate decision would not rest with the last appellate Court, but would depend upon the accident which of the two Judges in the Division Court was the senior. Consequently in the present case the ownership of the 112 acres in dispute would ultimately depend not so much on the exercise of the discretion of the Court as a whole, but on the question whether Judge A or Judge B was the senior of the two.

    22. In my opinion, therefore, it is open to us to consider the judgment of the junior Judge as well as of the senior Judge in deciding what is the proper order to make on this application. I have read both judgments carefully. The decision of the senior Judge is based mainly on this that the applicants ought not to have been content with consulting two local pleaders. They ought to have consulted a High Court pleader and I think it follows that in the opinion of the learned Judge the applicants would have been given correct advice if they had applied to a High Court pleader.

    23. Now I quite recognize that one has to bear in mind here the rights of both parties, and not to be led away by sympathy for a legal practitioner's error into interfering unduly with the rights which his opponent's client has already obtained under an existing decree. But in considering the rights of the parties, one must bear in mind the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act which in effect may result in an extension of the prescribed period. I also think that the explanation to S. 5 has a bearing on the intention of the Legislature as to the class of cases for which this relief was intended. The words “practice of the High Court” in that section are to my mind wide words. I think they extend in common pa lance to all the habits and customs or the Court in dealing with the litigation before it. For instance, in England the two standard works—The Annual Practice and the Yearly Supreme Court Practice—contain all the corresponding Rules which are found in our Code of Civil Procedure and in our High Court Rules and a great deal else besides. I think then it may not unfairly be said that the limit of time for an appeal in this High Court is part of the practice of the Court, even though in the present case that practice may be regulated by a Statute, viz., the Indian Limitation Act. In England this limit of time is found in the Rules of the Supreme Court itself and so for the matter of that is the time for presenting this present appeal. Under rule 8 of the Appellate Side Rules at p. 37 of the 1920 Edition that time is sixty days from the date of the decision appealed against, unless the Court in its discretion, on good cause shown, excuses the delay. But even if the period for an appeal is not strictly speaking part of the “practice” of the Court within the meaning of the explanation to S. 5, it is closely analogous to it, and consequently this explanation is a useful guide in the present case.

    24. Now it is quite clear that up to January 1, 1921, the practice of our Court was that a would-be-appellant had six months in which to present his petition for the necessary certificate of appeal to the Privy Council. Does it necessarily follow that when this period was out down to ninety days, the fact would at once be known to all competent legal practitioners? On this point Mr. Justice Shah says:—“It is a matter of common knowledge that it took some time before the curtailed period of limitation came to be generally known.” And this is borne out by the evidence before us, from which it appears that in other cases even High Court pleaders were not aware of the changes effected, and the delay was excused by the Court.

    25. Speaking from my own recollection of practice at the bar, I am well aware of the difficulty of reading immediately any changes which may be effected by Statute or by Rules, and of the practical danger of one's re-collection of the past practice prevailing over some cursory glance at a new amending rule. Till the changes that are effected appear in the authorized reports, or Statutes, or in the latest text hooks, there is often a risk of a slip being made, however careful a lawyer may be, for his former books of reference are only misleading.

    26. In the present case, of course, the applicant himself could not know what the practice or the law on the point was. He could only take legal advice. With great deference to the contrary opinion which prevailed in the Division Court, I am of opinion that he cannot be blamed for being content with the advice of his two local pleaders on that point, and for not consulting a High Court pleader. It was not as if any doubt arose in the minds of the local pleaders. They advised, and advised correctly, on the practice as it had existed up to with in a few months prior to that date and if they were not aware of any statutory change, it would not occur to them to go to the expense of taking a High Court opinion on a matter on which no doubts were present to their minds.

    27. I pass by the circumstances that at the first hearing before the Division Court, some erroneous facts as to Mr. Shingne's position in the case, and as to the date of the supply of the Bombay Law Reporter Statutes were stated to the Court. They were corrected in the subsequent application for a review, which application was dismissed.

    28. But it was strongly urged before us in reliance on In re, Coles and Ravenshear(14), that a mistake of counsel is not a sufficient reason for extending the time in which to appeal. I recognise that the mere fact that it is counsel who makes a mistake does not necessarily protect his client against the consequences of his blunder, but on the other hand the fact that the mistake is one made by counsel is not necessarily fatal to his client.

    29. During the course of the argument I told respondents' counsel that there were cases on the other side of the line in England, and that in particular I remembered a strenuously contested case where my client was out of time with an appeal owing to a mistake of his solicitor as to the effect of the Rules, and where the Appeal Court extended the time and subsequently allowed the appeal on its merits.

    30. Since the argument I have refreshed my memory of the English authorities, and I find that In Re Coles and Ravenshear, can no longer be relied on as it is based on practice which is now obsolete. That case was decided Tinder R.S.C Order 58, rule 15, as it then stood, but which Rule was altered in May 1909 by the addition of the words “Subject and without prejudice to the power of the Court of Appeal under O. 64, r. 7”. The reason for the alteration was this. Certain authorities ending with Re Coles and Ravenshear had decided in effect that special circumstances were required to justify the Court extending the time under O. 58, r. 15 and that the mistake of one's own counsel was not a special circumstance (see International Financial Society v. City of Moscow Gas Company(15). On the other hand the general power of extension of time given to the Court by the other Rule, viz., O. 64, r. 7, did not require any special circumstance, and consequently it was held in other cases, such as, Baker v. Faber(16), that a mistake by one's own counsel might be a sufficient excuse if the application was made under this other Rule. This led to the Full Court of Appeal (viz., all six Judges) considering the matter afresh in January 1909 in Rumbold v. London County Council and Scott(17). That was a case where the delay arose from the illness of counsel. The Full Court excused the delay under Order 64, rule 7, and held that Baker v. Faber was rightly decided, and that In re. Coles and Ravenshear was decided under Order 54, rule 15. Shortly afterwards, viz., in May 1909, Order 53, rule 15, was altered by making it expressly subject to Order 64, rule 7, in the way I have already mentioned.

    31. So the result is that Baker v. Faber approved as it is by the Full Court of Appeal in Rumbold v. London County Council and Scott and not In re. Coles and Ravenshear represents the present English practice. In Baker v. Faber the plaintiff had been wrongly advised by counsel that he had three months within which to appeal, whereas in fact he had only eight days. So it is closely in point here and in favour of the applicants.

    32. Therefore so far as the English authorities at present stand, they favour the applicants' contentions rather than the respondents. I recognise, however, that the English Rules were confusing, as different periods applied to final and to interlocutory appeals, and it was often difficult to say whether any particular appeal was a final or an interlocutory appeal having regard to the way in which the rules were drafted.

    33. But however that may be, we have to decide this case according to the law and practice of India and not of England, and in my judgment it is clear that in India litigants are treated with more indulgence in the matte of time than in England. The decisions of the Privy Council in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram(18) and Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum(19) are clear illustrations of this. The explanation to Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act is another.

    34. Nor if the tests of due diligence and good faith are adopted as in Section 14 of the Indian Limitation Act do the applicants fail to satisfy those tests. On the contrary, in my judgment, the applicants acted in good faith, and with due diligence, and were guilty of no negligence. When they presented their petition for a certificate, they were within time by some two months and a half under the old practice. The fact that they waited to obtain copies of the judgment and decree before deciding on such an important matter as the presentation of an appeal to the Privy Council, can hardly be said to be in their disfavor.

    35. In Dattatraya v. Secretary of State(20) which is a decision of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fawcett, the plaintiff acting on the erroneous advice of his pleader had preferred an appeal to the High Court, when it should have been presented to the District Court. This led to his being out of time when he applied to the right Court. Under the circumstances it was held that the plaintiff had shown sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal in time, for in acting on the advice given to him by his pleader, he had acted in good faith. There the learned Chief Justice says:—

    “I think that the appellant was entitled to rely upon the advice of his pleader that the appeal lay to the High Court and a party cannot be said to be acting without good faith because he relies upon a person whose status entitled him to give advice to litigants. It may be that the pleader ought to have known that the appeal lay to the District Judge. But there again some questions may appear to be so entirely free from doubt to one person, that only one opinion is possible, and yet another may equally well come to a different conclusion. I do not think it can be said that the appellant has acted in such a way that he should be debarred from his right to appeal. In Ram Ravji Jambhekar v. Pralhaddas Subkarn(21) their Lordships say: We feel unable to accept the argument for the appellant that because the mistake made in filing the suit at Cawnpore was an error of law, that the suit was not a bona fide one. It was a stupid, though not an unaccountable, blunder; but the ignorance of law, or the ill-advice of a pleader, does not, in our opinion, necessarily or prima facie establish a want of good faith.”

    36. Similarly in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram it was held by the Privy Council that the time occupied in filing a review petition ought to be allowed, although that application for a review was founded on an erroneous view of the law.

    37. Speaking for myself, I should like to adopt what the learned Chief Justice has said in Dattatraya v. Secretary of State and to apply his observations to the present case. That no doubt was a case where a mistake was made by a pleader as to the then existing law. Here the mistake arises from a different cause, viz., the ignorance of recent change in the law. Personally I am disposed to think that the latter is the more excusable error of the two. But whether that be so or not my conclusion on all the, facts of this case is that the delay ought to be excused here, as it was in Dattatraya v. Secretary of State. Consequently I would allow the appeal so far as it relates to Application No. 615 of 1921.

    38. A further question is whether we ought to deal now with the other application No. 631 of 1921, namely, for a certificate of appeal to the Privy Council. Counsel on either side take different views as to whether this application is before us, the applicants contending in the affirmative and the respondents in the negative.

    39. I think it clear that the memorandum of Appeal No. 7 of 1921 which was filed by the applicants extends to both applications. But I recognise that page of the appeal paper book and the copy of notice of appeal which were drafted by the office were not as lucid as they might have been. However, counsel on both sides agree that it is now open to us to remit the application No. 631 of 1921 to the Division Court for hearing on its merits. That, then is the course which I think may be adopted.

    40. I would, therefore, suggest that our order should be to the following effect, viz:

    “Discharge the order of the Division Court of November 23, 1921. Application No. 615 of 1921 to excuse delay allowed. Application No. 631 of 1921 for a certificate of appeal to the Privy Council remitted to the Division Court for determination on its merits. Costs of both parties in both applications to date throughout to be costs in application No. 631 for a certificate and to be dealt with by the Division Court.”

    Pratt, J.:— As to the preliminary objection that no appeal lies I feel no doubt that the order refusing to extend time under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act is a ‘judgment’ under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The word was defined by Couch C.J in The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company as a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. That definition has been adopted by this Court in Miya Mahomed v. Zorabi and in Charandas v. Chhaganlal and approved by the Privy Council in Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry v. Kalisunderi Debi. Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry's case was an even stronger case than the present for the appeal there was from an order refusing to transmit for execution an order in Council and the Privy Council held that even if the proceedings were ministerial it was sufficient that the Judge had exercised a judicial discretion and that his decision would conclude the rights of the party in execution. So here a judicial discretion has been exercised and a decision taken which makes the judgment of the lower Court conclusive of the rights of the parties.

    41. I think the Calcutta cases where an order granting leave to appeal were held not to be a judgment may be distinguished on the ground that such an order does not import a decision of any right but the leave was merely a step enabling the parties to go to Privy Council.

    42. I am not prepared to follow Kishen Pershad Panday v. Tilukdhari Lall or Gobinda Lal Das v. Shiba Das Chatterjee as these cases do not seem to be consistent with Hurrish Chunder Chowdhry's case

    43. The precise point that we have before us has been decided in the affirmative in the case of Ramchandra v. Mahadev and 1 think that decision is correct and binds us.

    44. On the question whether the discretion to refuse delay was rightly exercised I am not oblivious of the rule enunciated by the Privy Council in Jaipal Kunwar v. Indar Bahadur Singh(22) that the Court of appeal should always be slow to revert the decision of a lower Court made in the deliberate exercise of a discretion entrusted to it by law. But the rule is not absolute and the fact that there was a difference of opinion between the Judges of the lower appellate Court is a circumstance which makes it easier for us to substitute our discretion for that of the lower appellate Court if we think it was wrongly exercised.

    45. The appellant applied thirteen days after time had expired in ignorance of the reduction of the period of limitation by Act XXVI of 1920 from six months to ninety days. The appellant was misled by the advice of a local pleader but I cannot agree with the learned Chief Justice that he was guilty of negligence in no it consulting a High Court pleader in Bombay. A party upcountry Would naturally take the advice of his local pleader as to the time for filing an appeal. I do not think it can be suggested that a District Court pleader is not competent to advise on a point of limitatation. It is true that the pleader is the party's agent and if the pleader is negligent the party must suffer. But I think that even a diligent pleader might overlook an obscure section in an amending Act which had come into force only a few months before he was consulted.

    46. No doubt a mistake of law is per se no ground for excusing delay. But here occur the additional factors of a recent change of law and no want of diligence. The Privy Council in Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram have recognized the practice of Courts in India to treat the diligence of the party as the chief test for the guidance of the Court's discretion under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act.

    47. The English Courts at one time followed a stricter rule in cases where wrong advice has been given by counsel see International Financial Society v. City of Moscow Gas Company and In re Coles and Ravenshear, . But that rule has been relaxed as pointed out by my learned brother Marten in Rumbold v. London County Council and Scott, and I would in this connection quote the remarks of Brett M.R in Highton v. Treherne, (23) which seem to me to express the rule favoured by the Privy Council in Brij Indar Singh's case. The Master of the Rolls said:—

    “In cases where a suitor has suffered from the negligence or ignorance or gross want of legal skill of his legal adviser he has his remedy against that legal adviser, and meantime the suitor must suffer. But where there has been a bona fide mistake, not through misconduct nor through negligence nor through want of reasonable skill, but such as a skilled person might make, I very much dislike the idea that the rights of the client should be thereby forfeited. It seems to be obvious that the Court has jurisdiction to enlarge the time under some circumstances. Therefore why not on the present occasion? It has been said that when the time for appealing is part, the person who would be respondent has a vested right to retain his judgment. But obviously it is not an absolute right, and I am perfectly confident that the practice of all the Courts has been to treat it as not an absolute right, though the Courts are chary of enlarging the time When the time allowed by the rule has run out”.

    48. This judgment also disposes of the argument based on the right accruing to the successful litigant when the time for appealing has expired.

    49. I agree in the proposed order.

    Fawcett, J.:— I concur generally with the two judgments just delivered.

    50. On the question whether the appeal lies, I have only to add a few remarks.

    51. In Gobind Lal Das v. Shiba Das Chatterjee the finality of a decision under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act is challenged on the ground that an appeal presented after the prescribed period of limitation has expired, is a dead one, and that an order refusing to excuse the delay in presenting it is therefore not one involving any question of the rights and liabilities of the parties but a proceeding in respect of a matter which had already come to a termination by operation of law. With great respect I do not think this argument is a sound one. Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act says that an appeal though not presented in proper time, “may be admitted” if the delay is excused for sufficient cause; and the general provision in S. 3 for the dismissal of appeals preferred after the period of limitation is subject to the provisions (inter alia) of S. 5. That being so the appeal cannot be considered to be dead until the Court has definitely decided that it should not be admitted. The appeal meanwhile is merely defective, or (to use the analogy of life and death) sick and not dead. A somewhat similar case is the presentation of a memorandum of appeal insufficiently stamped. The Court has a discretion under section 149 of the cpc to give time for making up the deficiency of Court-fees; and the appeal in such a case is not dead, but only liable to be rejected under Order 7, r. 11- as applied by S. 107, sub-section (2), if the Court refuses to exercise its discretion in favour of the appellant under section 149 of the cpc. Again in Krishna Ayyangar v. Nallaperumal Pillai(24), the Privy Council held that the High Court had impliedly extended the time for appeal, and such an idea is entirely inconsistent with the proposition that the appeal, when presented, was a dead one. For these reasons, I think we should follow the ruling in Ramchandra v. Mahadev(25) in preference to the contrary view taken in Gobinda Lal Das v. Shiba Das Chatterjee.

    52. On the question whether the delay should be excused under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, I think the ruling of the Privy Council in Sunderbai v. Collector of Belgaum is applicable here. The report of that case contained in 46 I.A p. 15 shows (see p. 18) that this High Court had excused the delay, being satisfied that the appellants had acted bona fide and with due diligence; and Privy Council say in their judgment that (p. 23):—

    “the High Court, after hearing the parties and considering the affidavits which were filed, were rightly satisfied that the defendants (i.e, the appellants) had sufficient cause for not having preferred their appeal to the Court of the District Judge within the period of limitation. The fact that the defendants had acted on mistaken advice as to the law in appealing to the High Court in 1910 did not preclude them from showing that it was owing to their reliance on that advice that they bad not presented the appeal to the Court of the District Judge within the prescribed period of limitation.

    53. In my opinion in the present case it has been shown that the delay of the appellants was bona fide due to mistaken legal advice, and that there was no failure of proper diligence on their part. On this point I have nothing to add to the judgments of my learned brothers, except to draw attention to the judgment of Aikman, J. in Anjora Kunwar v. Babu(26), that the law in India is not so strict in regard to erroneous advice on the part of a legal adviser as the view taken in In re Coles and Ravenshear.

    54. I also concur that this is a case where the Court can properly interfere with the discretion that has been exercised by the learned Chief Justice. As to the disposal of the application for a certificate I think the case is similar to one arising under Order 41, rule 23, the application having been disposed of on a preliminary point as to its admissibility. I concur, therefore, in the proposed order.

    55. Appeal allowed.

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