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Judicial Opinion Summary — Construction of a Hindu Will (Bachcha Chowdhury)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit originated on 12 August 1912 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga, Behar. The plaintiffs were presumptive reversioners of Bachcha Chowdhury (who died in 1865), a landholder of Mouzah Subhankarpur in Tirhoot. The principal defendant was Musammat Sasiman Chowdhurain, the surviving widow; a co-widow, Musammat Subast Chowdhurain, predeceased the suit but had executed on 12 February 1887 an instrument bequeathing her half-share to Musammat Sasiman.

The litigation concerned the nature of Musammat Sasiman's title to immoveable properties that had belonged to the deceased and to other immoveables purchased by the widows. The plaintiffs alleged purchased properties were bought with money saved from the usufruct of the deceased's immoveables. Central to the dispute was the correct construction of a testamentary document executed by Bachcha Chowdhury on 5 June 1864 (described in the record as an atainama but treated as a Hindu will).

Procedurally: the trial Judge (decree dated 9 April 1914) declared for the plaintiffs (reversioners). Musammat Sasiman appealed to the High Court, which dismissed her appeal by decree of 23 February 1917 (Roe J. giving the leading judgment, Chapman J. concurring). The case was then brought to the Judicial Committee whose opinion is summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the proper construction of the testamentary document (the will of 5 June 1864) executed by Bachcha Chowdhury — specifically, whether the will vested in Musammat Sasiman (and the other widow) a full, absolute, heritable and alienable proprietary interest in the immoveable properties, or only the limited estate of a Hindu widow under the Mithila school of Hindu law (i.e., without the general power of alienation except for necessity)?
  2. Whether immoveable properties purchased by the widows were acquired from money saved from the usufruct of the deceased's immoveable properties (this issue was stated but the Judicial Committee considered it unnecessary to decide if the will conferred full proprietary rights).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Arguments

  • The Musammats (the widows) took no greater interest in the deceased's immoveable properties than that allowed to a widow of a separated and childless husband under the Mithila school of Hindu law — i.e., a limited interest without general power of alienation except for necessity.

Musammat Sasiman and Supporting Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments

  • Musammat Sasiman (and those claiming under her) contended that the will conferred upon the widows a full, absolute, and heritable proprietary interest with full rights of alienation (they relied on the words in the will describing the widows as having "full power and all proprietary rights").

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as Recorded in the Opinion)
Mahomed Shumsool v. Shewukram (1874) L.R. 2 I.A. 7 When construing a Hindu's will, it is proper to consider ordinary Hindu notions and wishes about devolution of property; there is an assumption that Hindus generally desire to retain ancestral estates in the family and that women do not generally take absolute estates with power to alienate. The Board, applying that consideration and the document as a whole, held that expressions in that will gave a life interest to the devisee widow but not an absolute estate with power of disposal, despite some standalone expressions that might have suggested otherwise.
Mussammat Kollany Kooer v. Luchmee Pershad (1875) 24 W.R. 395 Where language of a will plainly indicates it, the testator may intend to make an absolute gift (words such as "shall be (maliks)" and "entire estate shall devolve upon them" can indicate absolute ownership). Romesh Chunder Mitter J. considered the words to give an absolute estate to widow and daughter, concluding there was no contrary indication in the will.
Punchoo Money Dossee v. Troyluckco Mohiney Dossee (1884) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 342 Describing a woman as "malik" in a will does not necessarily import an intention that an absolute or proprietary interest was intended to pass to her. The Calcutta High Court held that the description "malik" alone is not conclusive of an absolute proprietary intention.
Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1897) L.R. 24 I.A. 76 Words of gift that the donee shall "become owner (malik) of all my estate and properties" confer an heritable and alienable estate in the absence of contextual indication to the contrary. The Board held that such words conferred an heritable and alienable estate when context did not indicate a different intention.
Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (1907) L.R. 35 I.A. 17 The word "malik" carries a presumption of absolute ownership; to cut down its full proprietary implication something must be found in the context. The Board observed the presumption and noted that in the underlying proceedings the Subordinate Judge had held the devisee took a Hindu widow's estate (incompetent to alienate), and the High Court held that under Hindu law a widow has no power to alienate unless expressly conferred; the Board commented that the words relied on did not suffice to show an intention to confer power of alienation.
Amarendra Nath Bose v. Shuradhani Dasi (1909) 14 C.W.N. 458 The expression "malik like myself" in a will indicates an intention to confer an absolute interest; but the word "malik" by itself does not necessarily indicate more than a limited interest. Mookerjee J. held that the fuller expression indicated the testator's intention to give an absolute interest, while noting the word "malik" alone might not suffice.
Fateh Chand v. Rup Chand (1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 183 Where a will states that after death the devisee shall be "owner in possession (malik-o-quakiz) of the entire property," that can confer full ownership in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intention. The Board held that the quoted words conferred full ownership upon the devisee because nothing in the will indicated a different intention.
Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab (1921) L.R. 49 I.A. 1; 24 Bom. L.R. 651 The term "malik" when used to describe the position of a devisee or donee can describe an owner with full proprietary rights including a full right of alienation, unless context or surrounding circumstances indicate otherwise; the meaning depends on setting, subject-matter, and locality. The Board's decisions (as cited) support the view that "malik" tends to denote full proprietary rights unless context qualifies it; their Lordships in the present case relied on this principle while emphasizing context-specific meaning.
Gokuldoss Gopaldoss v. Rambux Seochand (1884) L.R. 11 I.A. 126 Observation that drafting of wills and documents outside Presidency towns is often simple and inartificial, with limited conveyancing terminology. The Judicial Committee cited this to support caution in treating regional vernacular words as technical conveyancing terms.
Mahomed Ibrahim Hossein Khan v. Ambika Persad Singh (1911) L.R. 89 I.A. 68 Similar observation on the simple drafting style of documents in much of India, relevant to interpretation. The Judicial Committee cited the observation to justify interpreting words in their local and practical context rather than treating them as technical conveyancing terms.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Judicial Committee proceeded in a structured way:

  1. Characterization of the instrument: The Committee accepted that the document described as an atainama should be regarded as a Hindu will and that resolving the case turned on its proper construction.
  2. Translation issue: The Committee noted a minor discrepancy between the official translation and an alternative suggested by Roe J. (particularly the vernacular word translated as "gave" which should have been "give", and the form of the word rendered as "all proprietary rights" — "malkiyat" or similar). The Committee held that while Roe J.'s suggested translation did not materially differ from the official translation, if there were any material differences the official translation must be accepted because the Judicial Committee had no means to verify a vernacular translation except by remitting the case for inquiry. No such remittal was necessary here.
  3. Meaning of the operative words: The Committee focused upon the clause (as officially translated) that the Musammats "shall have, in every way, full power and all proprietary rights over all the moveable and immoveable properties." The vernacular term rendered as "all proprietary rights" ("malkiyat" or similar) was treated as importing the power of a landholder ("malik"), i.e., full proprietary rights.
  4. Survey of authorities: The Committee reviewed a series of precedents illustrating two complementary rules:
    • There is a presumption that words like "malik" or similar will import full proprietary rights (including alienation) unless the context or surrounding circumstances indicate a contrary intention.
    • Conversely, the word "malik" or equivalent does not absolutely and automatically create a proprietary alienable estate in every context; the surrounding language and circumstances must be considered.
    The Committee emphasized the context-specific nature of interpretation: meaning depends on the setting, subject, and locality of the testator's usage.
  5. Application to the present will: After considering the language of the will, the translation, and the cited authorities, their Lordships concluded they could not construe the testator's declaration that the Musammats "shall have, in every way, full power and all proprietary rights" as meaning anything less than that the widows should hold full and complete proprietary rights as proprietors, including full rights of alienation. In short, they inferred that that was what the testator intended.
  6. Disposition of subsidiary issues: Because the Committee concluded the will conferred full proprietary rights, it was unnecessary to examine whether the properties allegedly purchased by the widows had been acquired from the usufruct of the deceased's properties.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Judicial Committee allowed the appeal and concluded that the will vested the Musammats (the widows) with full and complete proprietary rights over the moveable and immoveable properties of Bachcha Chowdhury, including the full right of alienation. The Committee advised that the appeal should be allowed with costs and the suit should be dismissed with costs.

Consequences for the Parties:

  • The decree in favour of the plaintiffs (reversioners) made by the Subordinate Judge and sustained by the High Court was reversed by the Judicial Committee.
  • Musammat Sasiman (and those taking under the will) were held to have received full proprietary and heritable rights, including the power to alienate, as expressed by the terms of the will.
  • The suit seeking a declaration that Musammat Sasiman had no power to alienate was dismissed; costs were awarded to the successful appellant.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established interpretive principles — notably the presumption that words importing "malik" or equivalent convey full proprietary rights unless context negates that inference — and emphasizes that interpretation depends on context, subject-matter, and the locality/drafting style of the instrument. The opinion does not purport to establish a new general rule beyond these principles; it applies them to the specific language of the will before the Court.

    Mussammat Sasiman Chowdhurain v. Shib Narayan Chowdhury

    1. The suit in which this appeal has arisen was brought on the 12th August, 1912, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Darbhanga in Behar by the plaintiffs, who are the presumptive reversioners of Bachcha Chowdhury deceased, who in his lifetime was a landholder in and a resident of Mouzah Subhankarpur in Tirhoot. Bachcha Chowdhury died in 1865. The principal defendant is Musammat Sasiman Chowdhurain, who is the surviving widow of Bachcha Chowdhury. His other widow was Musammat Subast Chowdhurain; she died before suit. Bachcha Chowdhury died possessed of considerable moveable and immoveable properties, which, on his death, came into the possession of his widows. Part of Bachcha Chowdhury's immoveable property was ancestral, and the remainder of it had been purchased by him.

    2. Musammat Subast, shortly before she died, executed, on the 12th February, 1887, an instrument by which she bequeathed her half-share in the property to Musammat Sasiman.

    3. The suit relates to the nature of the title of Musammat Sasiman to the immoveable properties of which her husband, Bachcha Chowdhury, had died possessed, and to the nature of her title to other immoveable properties which she and Musammat Subast, or one of them, acquired by purchase, it being alleged by the reversioners that those immoveable properties which were acquired by the Musammats were purchased by them with moneys saved from the usufruct of the immoveable properties of which Bachcha Chowdhury had died possessed. The object of the suit is to obtain a declaration that Musammat Sasiman neither had nor has any power to alienate any of the immoveable properties. Her right, if any, to alienate, except for necessity, depends upon the nature of her title. Musammat Sasiman and some of the other defendants are appellants here. The plaintiffs and others of the defendants are the respondents.

    4. The Hindu family to which Bachcha Chowdhury had belonged was governed by the law of the Mithila school of Hindu Law. Bachcha Chowdhury had separated from that family. The suit and this appeal depend upon the true construction of a testamentary document which, although described as an atainama (deed of gift), must be regarded as a Hindu will, which Bachcha Chowdhary made on the 5th of June, 1864. On behalf of the plaintiffs it is contended that the Musammats took no greater interest in the immoveable property which had belonged to Bachcha Chowdhury in his lifetime than that allowed by the law of the Mithila to the widow of a separated and childless husband. On behalf of Musammat Sasiman and those claiming under her it is contended that she and Musammat Subast took in that property under the will a full, absolute, and heritable interest as proprietors, with full rights of alienation, and not merely the interest of Hindu widows under the law of the Mithila. If her contention as to the construction of the will is correct, this suit must fail, and should be dismissed, and it would not be necessary to consider whether the immoveable properties which were purchased by the Mussammats, or either of them, were purchased with moneys derived by them after their husband's death from the usufruct of the immoveable properties which were left by him.

    5. According to the official translation of the will of the 5th June 1864 (15th Jeth, 1217, F.S.), Bachcha Chowdhury stated that:

    I am Bachcha Chowdhury, resident of Mouza Subhankarpur, pargana Hati, zila Tirhoot.

    6. He then mentioned lands, some of which were ancestral lands, and others of which he had purchased, and stated, as was the fact that:

    the ancestral and purchased properties are held and possessed by me, without participation or interference on the part of any person-

    and proceeded:

    I, the declarant, have no issue; I have, to obtain bliss in the next world, caused to be sank several ponds, and have constructed a temple of Sri Murli Manoharji within the compound of my own house, at a considerable cost; I often remain ill, although at present I am well, still on account of having no child, and placing no certainty in life, I intend to go on pilgrimage to Kashi and other places. Therefore I, the declarant, of my own accord and free will, in order to avoid future disputes and to perpetuate my name, gave moauzas in entirety or in part, both ancestral and purchased, thika properties, Bud all goods, and assets, articles of copper and silver, elephant, oxen, she-buffaloes, and all other properties, to both my first and second wives, Musammat Subast Chowdhurain and Musammat Sasiman Chowdhurain, who after my death will be heirs to all the moveable and immoveable properties It is desired that the said Musammats by holding possession and occupation of all the moveable and immoveable properties should pay the Government revenue thereof, and they should collect rent of, and keep watch over, mouzas either in entirety or in part and scattered lands, orchard, oxen, and elephant, etc., and they should give alms and charities. The said Musammats, after my death, shall have, in every way, full power and all proprietory rights over all the moveable and immoveable properties, and they should, under the deed executed by me, pay, annually, Rs. 360 to Musammat Lachhmi Chowdhurain, widow of my brother Dular Chowdhury, until her death for her maintenance, and by this deed the said Musammats should get their names recorded in the Government Sherista in the columns of proprietors. To this I, the declarant, neither have nor shall have any objection. I have, therefore, given into writing these few words by way of a deed of Atainama so that they may be of use when required.

    7. Their Lordships have quoted from the translation which was made of the will by the official translator in India, but it is admitted on behalf of the parties to this appeal that the vernacular word which has been translated as "gave" should have been translated as "give."

    8. The important words in the will which, in the official translation, have been rendered as giving to the Musammats after the testator's death in every way, full power and all proprietary rights, are in the vernacular Kuli o Kuh haqug Malkiyat har bal akhtear Mosammat Majkuran Ko hasil hai, and were understood by the trial Judge as a declaration by the testator of the rights which the Musammats would have in the properties by inheritance after his death, and not as giving them any greater right in the properties, or implying that they should have any greater right, such as a right of alienation, except for necessity. The trial Judge, by his decree of the 9th April 1914, made a declaration in favour of the plaintiffs as reversioners. From that decree Musammat Sasiman appealed to the High Court.

    9. The appeal to the High Court was heard by Chapman and Roe JJ., and was dismissed by the decree of that Court of the 23rd February, 1917. The leading judgment in the High Court was delivered by Roe J., with which Chapman J. concurred. Mr. Justice Roe was of opinion that in one respect the official translation of the will of the 5th Jane, 1864, was not quite accurate. In his judgment he said :

    A more accurate translation of clause beginning 'The said Musammats after my death...'would be-'And in respect of all the moveables and immoveables after my death all and complete rights, the power of a land. holder in every circumstance, accrues to the said Masammats.' The Urdu words which I have translated 'accrues' are 'hasil hai.' The Urdu word which I have translated 'of a landholder' is 'Malikiyat.' There is no such word in the language. Either the long a is a mistake or the word is a manufactured word. The point has been pressed at some length in the argument. It is not to my mind material. 'Milkyat' or 'Malikiyat' would equally imply something appertaining to a Malik, The word 'Malik' means literally one who holds mulk or land. The translation with the amendments which I suggest represents the terms of the Deed.

    10. There does not appear to their Lordships to be any material difference in that respect between the official translation and that suggested by Mr. Justice Roe. In their Lordships' view they mean the same thing. But if they materially differ, their Lordships hold that they must accept the official translation as correct. If that translation was incorrect there was ample opportunity to have it judicially corrected in the High Court after evidence as to its correctness or incorrectness had been taken and recorded in the Court in which the correctness of the official translation was challenged. The Judicial Committee has no means of enquiring into the correctness of an official translation of a document in a vernacular language of India, except by sending the case back to the Court with a direction to make such enquiry. It is not necessary to adopt that course in this case.

    11. The following decisions, which, it has been contended, should guide their Lordships in construing this will, have been cited in argument at the Bar, Their Lordships may observe that it is always dangerous to construe the words of one will by the construction of more or less similar words in a different will, which was adopted by a Court in another case. Their Lordships will briefly refer to the decisions which have been cited in the order of their dates.

    12. In 1874, in Mahomed Shumsool v. Shewukram (1874) L.R. 2 I.A. 7, which came on appeal from the High Court of Calcutta, and related to the construction of a testamentary document executed by Roy Hurnarain, a Hindu of Behar, the Board held that:-

    In construing the will of a Hindu it is not improper to bake into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with respect to the devolution of property. It may be assumed that a Hindu generally desires that an estate, especially an ancestral estate, shall be retained in his family; and it may be assumed that a Hindu knows that, as a general rule, at all events, women do not take absolute estates of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate.

    13. The Board, having regard to those considerations, and to the document as a whole, all the expressions of which should be taken together, held that Hurnarain, in using the expression "except Mussumat Ranee Dhun Kowar aforesaid, none other is nor shall be my heir or malik," intended that Ranee Dhun Kowar should take in his property "life interest immediately succeeding him, without that interest being shared by her daughters or by any other person," but that she should not take an absolute estate which she should have power to dispose of absolutely. The Board so decided, although it held that there were expressions in the document which, if they stood alone, showed that Hurnarain intended to make an absolute gift to Ranee Dhun Kowar. She was the widow of Hurnarain's deceased son, by whom she had had two daughters, who were living at the date of the document, and were named in it.

    14. In 1875, in Mussammat Kollany Kooer v. Luchmee Pershad (1875) 24 W.R. 395 which depended on the construction of a Hindu will, and came to the High Court at Calcutta on appeal from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Sarun in the Patna Division of Bengal, and related to the title to immoveable property, Romesh Chundar Mitter J., in his judgment, from which the other Judge who heard the appeal, Glover J., did not dissent, held :-

    Therefore the primary matter for our consideration is the language of the will, or the words in which it is expressed. As far as the words go, I think it is plain that the testator intended to make an absolute gift of big property in favour of his widow and daughter. He says that after his death they shall be (maliks), and his entire estate shall devolve upon them.

    15. Mr. Justice Mitter considered that there being nothing to show a contrary intention, the words which were used gave an absolute estate, and not merely the estate of a Hindu female, to the testator's widow and daughter.

    16. In 1884, Sir Richard Garth C.J. and Cunningham J., in Punchoo Money Dossee v. Troyluckco Mohiney Dossee (1884) I.L.R. 10 Cal. 342 which was an appeal from a decree of Wilkinson J., in a suit on the original jurisdiction side of the High Court at Calcutta, and related to a Hindu will, held that the description in the will of a devisee, a woman, as malik, did not necessarily import an intention of the testator that by his will an absolute or proprietary interest should pass to her.

    17. In 1897, in Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkun Lal Roy (1897) L.R. 24 I.A. 76 which was an appeal from a decree of the High Court at Calcutta, which had reversed a decree of the District Court of Hooghley in a suit which related to a Hindu will, the Board held that the words of gift in the will to the effect that the donee shall "become owner (malik) of all my estate and properties" conferred an heritable and alienable estate in the absence of a context indicating a different meaning.

    18. In 1907, in Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (1907) L.R. 35 I.A. 17 in an appeal from a decree of the High Court at Allahabad which had affirmed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpur in a suit which related to a deed of gift or testamentary instrument by which a Hindu gave to his first and second wives and daughter-in-law respectively certain immoveable property, reserving to himself a life-interest, but directing that after his death they shall be "malik na, khud ikhtiyar (owners with proprietary rights)," the Board said :-

    This case of Lalit Mohun Singh Boy v. Chukkun Lal Roy seems to adopt and apply the game view of the word 'malik' as was taken in the Calcutta case in 24 W.R. above cited (Kollany Kooer v. Luchmee Pershad, with the result that In order to cut down the full proprietary rights that the word imports something must be found in the context to qualify it. Nothing has been found in the context here or the surrounding circumstances, or is relied upon by the respondents, but the fact that the donee (Surajmani) is a woman and a widow, which was expressly decided in the last-mentioned case not to suffice. But, while there is nothing in the context or surrounding facts to displace the presumption of absolute ownership implied in the word 'malik', the context does seem to strengthen the presumption that the intention was that 'malik' should bear its proper technical meaning.

    19. In Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (1907) L.R. 35 I.A. 17 the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpur, who tried the suit, held that Surajmani took a Hindu widow's estate, and was incompetent to alienate it, and the High Court on the appeal held :-

    that under the Hindu law, as interpreted up to the present in the case of immoveable property given or devised by a husband to his wife, the wife has no power to alienate, unless the power of alienation is conferred upon her in express terms. The learned vakil for the appellants (Surajmani and others) contended that the words of the document we have to consider, and that we have cited above, did expressly convey such power, or at any rate that from them the intention of the executant to confer a power of alienation was evident. We cannot so hold.

    20. In 1909, in Amarendra Nath Bose v. Shuradhani Dasi (1909) 14 C.W.N. 458 Mookerjee J. held that the expression "malik like myself" in a Hindu will, as describing the position which the donee would occupy, was an indication that the testator intended the donee to take an absolute interest in the property devised, but that the word "malik" by itself would not indicate that more than a limited interest was intended to be conferred,

    21. In 1916, in Fateh Chand v. Rup Chand (1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 183 in an appeal from a decree of the High Court at Allahabad which had varied a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Saharanpur in a suit which related to the title to immoveable property, the Board held that the words in a Hindu will

    "I have bequeathed Mauza Khudda to Musammat Gomi...after my death she shall be owner in possession (malik-o-quakiz) of the entire property in Mauza Khudda aforesaid,"
    conferred full ownership upon the devisee, there being in the will, in the opinion of the Board, nothing from which a contrary intention of the testator should be inferred.

    22. It appears from some of the decisions to which their Lordships have referred and from the judgment of the Board in Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab (1921) L.R. 49 I.A. 1; 24 Bom. L.R. 651 that the term "malik," when used in a will or other document as descriptive of the position which a devisee or donee is intended to hold, has been held apt to describe an owner possessed of full proprietary rights, including a full right of alienation, unless there is something in the context or in the surrounding circumstances to indicate that such full proprietary rights were not intended to be conferred, but the meaning of every word in an Indian will must always depend upon the setting in which it is placed, the subject to which it is related, and the locality of the testator from which it may receive its true shade of meaning, and their Lordships can find nothing in the quoted decisions contrary to this view,

    23. Mr. Justice Chapman, in his concurring judgment in this suit said:

    "As regards the word 'malik', I trust that a word in such common everyday use in this part of the country (Behar) will not be converted by the decisions into a technical term of conveyancing."
    At least outside the Presidency towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, the art of conveyancing is but little understood in India, and the drafting of documents, including wills, is generally of a very simple and inartificial character. See the observations of the Board in Gokuldoss Gopaldoss v. Rambux Seochand (1884) L.R. 11 I.A. 126, 133 and in Mahomed Ibrahim Hossein Khan v. Ambika Persad Singh. ( 1911) L.R. 89 I.A. 68

    24. In the present case the term" malik" does not occur in the will but the word "malkiyat," which has been rendered in the official translation as " all proprietary rights," does, and Mr. Justice Roe, who did not accept the official translation as literally quite accurate, considered that a mistake in the spelling of the word had been made, or that the word was a manufactured word. His opinion was that whether the intended word was "milkyat" or "malikiyat" it meant the same thing-that is, the power of a landholder, and he stated that "malik" means literally one who holds land. Their Lordships cannot construe the words of the will giving to the Musammats, as the testator's heirs, all his moveable and immoveable properties, as interpreted by the declaration that after his death they "shall have, in every way, full power and all proprietary rights over all the moveable and immoveable properties," as meaning anything less than that they should hold in his properties full and complete rights as proprietors, including full rights of alienation, and that was, their Lordships infer, what the testator intended.

    25. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be allowed with costs, and the suit should be dismissed with costs.

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    Mussammat Sasiman Chowdhurain v. Shib Narayan Chowdhury
    (Dec 2, 1921)