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  • Education Act, 1921. Regulation 1 of Chapter-II of the Regulations
  • U.P Secondary Education Services Selection Board Rules, 1998
  • Saxena.14. Rule 146-A(13)
  • Rule 45 of the Rules,
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  • Education Act, 1921. Regulation 1 of Chapter-II of the Regulations
  • U.P Secondary Education Services Selection Board Rules, 1998
  • Saxena.14. Rule 146-A(13)
  • Rule 45 of the Rules,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Writ Petition No. 538 of 2009

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged an order dated 10 December 2008 of the U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board (respondent No. 6) that cancelled his selection to the post of Principal of Saraswati Inter College, Jhansi. The Board concluded that the petitioner had nine years and three months of teaching experience instead of the required ten years, thereby annulling his empanelment. The Board's action followed a complaint dated 18 July 2008 to the District Inspector of Schools, Jhansi.

The petitioner had originally been empanelled by the Board on 1 August 2002 but joined the post on 15 July 2008 after the Supreme Court's judgment vacated interim orders affecting the panel. The petitioner had earlier been regularized as a lecturer w.e.f. 12 January 1990 and had availed sanctioned study leave for higher studies in Czechoslovakia (dates in the opinion include 15.4.1992 to 7.3.1996 and 8.3.1996 in other paragraphs). The question arose whether the period spent on study leave should be counted as "teaching experience" for the minimum 10-year requirement.

On 15 January 2009 this Court granted interim relief staying the operation of the Board's cancellation order, permitting the petitioner to function as Principal pending further hearing. Another person (Respondent No. 7) had been functioning as ad hoc Principal since 1 July 2000, continued during the litigation, retired on 4 April 2009, and filed a separate petition (W.P. No. 19198/2009) seeking payment of emoluments and pension adjustments for the period he acted as officiating Principal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the period spent by the petitioner on sanctioned study leave (for higher studies abroad) can be included in the computation of "teaching experience" required for appointment to the post of Principal.
  2. Whether the requisite qualifications and teaching experience for appointment must be judged with reference to the date of application/advertisement (or any other fixed cut-off), or can be judged as on the date of actual appointment/joining.
  3. Whether the Selection Board was justified in annulling the empanelment and whether the Board was required to afford the petitioner an opportunity of hearing before cancellation.
  4. Relief relating to the separate petition of Respondent No. 7 for payment of emoluments and pension computation for the period he functioned as ad hoc Principal.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Sri P.N. Saxena)

  • The period of study leave should be included in "teaching experience" because Paragraph 146A(13) of Chapter XIA of the Financial Handbook provides that study leave counts as service for promotion and pension; by parity it should be included for computation of teaching experience.
  • The Board had a letter from the Director of Education dated 29.7.2005 (Annexure No. 6) indicating that the study leave period was included in service, and this was placed before the Board but not considered.
  • The petitioner had disclosed the study leave in the application form (Paragraph 13) and had not concealed it.
  • The Board, having empanelled the petitioner, had no power to review the empanelment or, alternatively, the qualifications should be judged as on the date he actually joined in 2008 (by then he would have more than ten years of teaching experience).
  • The impugned cancellation was passed without affording him an opportunity of hearing and therefore was illegal.

Respondents' Arguments (Selection Board and other respondents)

  • The required qualifications must be possessed on the date of advertisement/application; any subsequent improvement does not cure ineligibility.
  • The advertisement expressly required that teaching experience be computed with reference to the date of application; on 16 March 2002 (date of application) the petitioner did not have ten years of teaching experience and was therefore not entitled to be considered.
  • On the issue of what constitutes "teaching experience", the respondents relied on authority (Dr. Sudha Dixit) for the proposition that "teaching experience" means actual teaching work performed and not deemed or constructive experience.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. Sudha Dixit v. State of U.P. (Single Judge, 29 Jan 2010) Teaching experience must mean actual teaching experience and cannot be "deemed" experience. The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that study leave (during which the petitioner was not teaching) cannot be counted as teaching experience.
V.B. Prasad v. Manager P.M.T. Upper Primary School and others, (2007) 10 SCC 269 : AIR 2007 SC 2053 Teaching experience required for a post must be actual teaching experience and not deemed teaching experience; notes to rules cannot be read to dilute substantive requirements. The Court cited this Apex Court decision to reinforce that study leave cannot be equated with actual teaching experience for eligibility purposes.
Punjab State Electricity Board Ltd. v. Zora Singh, (2005) 6 SCC 776 : AIR 2006 SC 182 General principle about interpretation of notes/explanations to statutory provisions — notes are explanatory and cannot dilute the main provision. The Court invoked this reasoning (via citation in V.B. Prasad) to reject the argument that an explanatory provision could alter the substantive requirement of actual teaching experience.
A.P. SRTC v. STAT (Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court) (cited within Punjab State Electricity Board) Interpretation of notes and explanatory statements: notes are explanatory in nature and do not dilute the rigour of a main statutory provision. Referenced through higher court authority to show that explanatory notes cannot override substantive eligibility requirements.
Rakesh Kumar Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 11 SCC 58 The court should not protect an illegal appointment; extraordinary relief will not be used to perpetuate illegality. The Court applied this principle to hold that it could not protect the petitioner where the Board had empanelled a person who was ineligible on the date of application.
Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Punjab Instructions (citation referenced) Where a last date for receipt of applications is fixed the qualifications as on that date alone determine eligibility. The Court relied on this principle to affirm that eligibility is to be judged with reference to the date specified in the advertisement/application process.
Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan (1993) (referred to in text) Qualifications must be examined with reference to the last date for making applications; the date of selection is uncertain and cannot be used as the reference date unless specified. The Court used this authority to support the finding that the crucial cut-off is the date fixed by the advertisement for submission of applications, not the date of actual appointment or joining.
Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar (Three-Judge Bench) (cited) Confirmed the settled principle that eligibility must be judged with reference to the last date for filing applications and that subsequent acquisition of qualifications does not help. The Court cited this three-Judge Bench to reinforce that candidates who lacked requisite qualifications on the prescribed date cannot be later treated as eligible.
State of Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari, (2012) 9 SCC 545 : AIR 2012 SC 3281 A person not possessing requisite qualifications on the cut-off date cannot apply; appointment of such a person is void and cannot be regularized later. The Court relied on this authority to underline that lack of eligibility at the relevant date renders appointment void and not curable by later events.
Prit Singh v. S.K. Mangal (1993 Supp (1) SCC 714) and Pramod Kumar v. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission (2008) 7 SCC 153 Support for the proposition that lacking eligibility on the prescribed date cannot be remedied and appointments of ineligible persons amount to serious illegality. The Court cited these cases to support its conclusion that the petitioner's empanelment, being premised on ineligibility at the date of application, could not be protected.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis mainly around two linked questions: (1) whether the period of sanctioned study leave can be counted as "teaching experience"; and (2) whether eligibility should be judged with reference to the date of application/advertisement or the date of actual appointment.

  1. Interpretation of Rule 146-A(13) of the Financial Handbook

    The Court examined Paragraph 146-A(13) (Chapter XIA of the Financial Handbook), which provides that "Study leave will count as service for promotion and pension but not for leave." The Court observed that this provision only addresses counting of study leave for promotion and pension purposes and explicitly does not address or convert study leave into "teaching experience." The Court therefore found that Paragraph 146-A(13) could not assist the petitioner in claiming that the study leave should count toward the teaching-experience requirement for appointment.

  2. Meaning of "teaching experience"

    The Court adopted the approach that "teaching experience" must mean actual experience gained while performing teaching duties and cannot be "deemed" or treated as equivalent to periods during which the person was not teaching. The Court relied on the Single Judge decision in Dr. Sudha Dixit and the Apex Court's decision in V.B. Prasad to hold that study leave, where the petitioner was not teaching, cannot be treated as teaching experience.

  3. Cut-off date for determining eligibility

    The Court next addressed the contention that eligibility should be determined as on the date of actual appointment (2008). It rejected that submission, reiterating the settled legal principle—supported by Rekha Chaturvedi, Ashok Kumar Sharma, Harpal Kaur Chahal and other authorities—that qualifications must be judged with reference to the last date prescribed for receipt of applications (or other fixed cut-off indicated in the advertisement). The Court emphasized that allowing a later date would create uncertainty and potential arbitrariness and would prejudice candidates who did not apply because they considered themselves ineligible.

  4. Consequences of empanelling an ineligible candidate

    The Court held that the Board had committed an illegality by empanelling the petitioner who admittedly did not possess ten years' teaching experience on the date of application. The Court reaffirmed the principle from Rakesh Kumar Sharma and other authorities that courts should not protect or perpetuate illegal appointments and the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be exercised to perpetuate an illegality.

  5. On breach of natural justice

    Although the petitioner argued that the selection was annulled without hearing, the Court noted the admitted factual position that the petitioner was ineligible on the date of application and the advertisement made the cut-off explicit; consequently, the challenge based on denial of hearing could not assist the petitioner where the underlying empanelment itself was illegal.

  6. Relief to the ad hoc Principal (Respondent No. 7)

    On the separate petition by Respondent No. 7 (W.P. No. 19198/2009) seeking emoluments for acting as ad hoc Principal, the Court observed that he had in fact functioned as senior-most teacher and as ad hoc Principal. The Court concluded he was rightly entitled to be paid emoluments of ad hoc Principal for the period he actually discharged those functions and directed respondent No. 3 to scrutinize and process his claims expeditiously, preferably within two months from production of a certified copy of the judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition filed by the empanelled candidate is dismissed; the Board's order dated 10.12.2008 cancelling the petitioner’s selection is held to be valid and justified. The interim order dated 15.01.2009 is discharged.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioner's empanelment and appointment as Principal (which the Board annulled on the ground of insufficient teaching experience as measured on the date of application) will not be restored by this Court.
  • The Court confirmed that sanctioned study leave (during which the petitioner did not actually teach) cannot be counted as "teaching experience" required for appointment to the post of Principal, and the Board's decision to exclude the study-leave period was upheld.
  • On the question of natural justice, the Court indicated that where an empanelment is founded on an illegality (lack of eligibility on the prescribed date), the fact that the Board later cancelled the empanelment does not operate to the petitioner's advantage and the Court will not protect such an illegal appointment.
  • Writ Petition No. 19198/2009 (by the person who acted as ad hoc Principal) is disposed of in the petitioner's favour as to entitlement to ad hoc emoluments; respondent No. 3 is directed to consider and process all claims for emoluments payable to that petitioner for periods actually served as ad hoc Principal, preferably within two months of production of a certified copy of this judgment.
  • No novel legal principle was laid down; the Court applied established precedents concerning the meaning of "teaching experience" and the cut-off date for assessing eligibility and reaffirmed the principle that courts should not perpetuate illegal appointments.

Order pronounced: Writ Petition No. 538 of 2009 dismissed; interim order discharged; Writ Petition No. 19198 of 2009 disposed of with directions as above.

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    Vivek Mudgil v. State Of U.P. & Others.

    1. The present petition assails the validity of an order dated 10th December, 2008 passed by the U.P Secondary Education Service Selection Board (respondent No. 6 herein), in terms of which the selection of the petitioner on the post of Principal of Saraswati Inter College, Jhansi has been cancelled.

    2. In brief the order passed by the respondent No. 6 has come to be passed upon the Board concluding that the petitioner had teaching experience of 9 years 3 months as against the required 10 years and had therefore been incorrectly empanelled by it. The order itself, and it is so admitted to parties, came to be passed by the Board on the basis of a complaint letter received by the District Inspector of Schools, Jhansi on 18.7.2008 This petition was entertained by this Court on 15.1.2009 and on the said date the following order came to be passed’

    “Impleadment Application filed on behalf of Sri. Ved Prakash Rai today is taken on record and is allowed. The petitioner is directed to make necessary correction in the array of parties during the course of day.

    By the impugned order, the appointment of the petitioner, as Principal in Saraswati Inter College, Sipriri Bazar, ‘Jhansi has been cancelled by the Selection Board on the ground that the petitioner does not possess the minimum 10 years of teaching experience as a lecturer and has excluded the period which the petitioner had spent in Czechoslovakia for higher studies for the period 15.4.1992 to 7.3.1996 which period is included in the service period as per the letter of the Director of Education dated 29.7.2005, a copy of which has been annexed as Annexed as Annexure No. 6 to the writ petition. The petitioner further states that this letter was specifically placed before the Selection Board but the same has not been adverted to.

    Sri. Neeraj Tewari, the learned counsel appearing for the Selection Board, Sri. Birendra Singh, the learned counsel appearing for newly impleaded Ved Prakash Rai and the learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are all granted three weeks time to file counter-affidavit.

    Issue notice to the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 by registered post A/D. Steps to be taken within a week.

    List for admission after the expiry of four weeks, by which time, the said respondents may file a counter-affidavit.

    In view of the aforesaid, prima facie it appears that the period which the petitioner Had spent in Czechoslovakia for higher studies, has not been taken into consideration and if this period is taken into consideration, the petitioner could possess the requisite number of years and becomes eligible for consideration for the post of Principal.

    Consequently, till the next date of listing, the effect and operation of the impugned order dated 10.12.08 passed by the Selection Board shall remain stayed.”

    3. It was on the basis of the above order that the petitioner has continued to function as a Principal of the Institution in question till this matter was taken up for hearing by this Court. Insofar as the Respondent No. 7 herein is concerned, he is said to have been appointed Ad hoc Prinicipal with effect from 01.07.2000 He continued to function as such despite the empanellment of the Petitioner on 01.08.2002 in light of the litigation which ensued and till the Petitioner joined on the post on 15.07.2008 He thereafter claims to have functioned during the period when the selection of the Petitioner came to be cancelled by the Board and till this Court passed the interim order on 15.01.2009 The respondent No. 7 has since retired from service on 04.04.2009 He has separately petitioned this Court (W.P No. 19198/2009) for being paid all emoluments and salaries of Officiating Principal for the period August, 2008 to June, 2009 and to compute his pension treating him to be the Principal. Let the facts however first be noticed in some greater detail. The petitioner was appointed as a Lecturer in Physics and his services were regularized w.e.f 12.1.1990 It appears that in response to an advertisement issued by the respondent No. 6 in 2002, the petitioner also applied for being selected to the post of Principal at Sarswati Inter College. The Board appears to have prepared a panel of selected candidates and in the said panel the petitioner stood selected for being appointed as Principal to the Institution in question. The name of the Petitioner was included in the panel constituted by the Board on 01.08.2002

    4. In the meantime, it appears that litigation ensued in this Court challenging the various selections made by the Board to the post of Principals of various Intermediate Colleges in the State of U.P including the Institution in which the petitioner had been selected. The writ petitions met with failure before a Single Judge of this Court. However, when the said judgment was assailed in intra-Court appeals, a Division Bench of this Court allowed all the appeals and quashed the panel of selected candidates prepared by the Board. This judgment of the Division Bench in appeal was assailed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India which ultimately allowed all the appeals by a detailed judgment dated 16th May, 2008 and vacated all interim orders operating in respect of the panel prepared by the Board. It was post the judgment of the Apex Court laying the controversy to rest that the petitioner who had been empanelled on 01.08.2002 joined as Principal in the Institution in question on 15.07.2008

    5. The dispute however, appears to have arisen when a complaint with regard to the empanelment of the petitioner was made on 18th July, 2008 to the District Inspector of Schools, Jhansi. This complaint is said to have alleged and asserted that the petitioner did not have ten years of teaching experience as was required mandatorily for him being selected to the post of Principal. In terms of the U.P Secondary Education Services Selection Board Rules, 1998 and more particularly Rule 5 thereof a candidate for appointment to a post of teacher is required to possess qualifications specified in Regulation 1 of Chapter-II of the Regulations framed under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Regulation 1 of Chapter-II of the Regulations framed under the Act, 1921 prescribe the minimum qualifications for appointment as Head of the Institution and teachers to be as such as prescribed in Appendix ‘A’. Appendix ‘A’ specifies the essential qualifications required of a Head of an Institution and they being relevant for our purposes, are being extracted hereinbelow:

    Essential Qualifications

    Sl. No. Name of the post Essential Training experience Age Desirable qualifications 1 2 3 4 5 1 Head of the Institution (1) should be trained M.A or M. Sc, or M. Com or M. Sc. (Ag) or any equiva-lent Post-graduate or other degree which is conferred by any body as re-ferred to in above para and should pos-sess teaching experience from any training institution recognised by the department pr any degree college affiliated with any University or institution or any degree college affiliated with such in-stitution as referred to in above mentioned first para, or at least four years teaching experience in classes 9-12 in Minimum 30 years.
    any institutioin recognised by Board or in any institution affiliated with the Boards of other States or alike institu-tions, whose examinations are recognised by Board, or should possess at least four years experience as trained graduate Head Master in any Junior High School recognised by Deptt. Provided that he/she should not be less than thirty years of age (2) Teaching experience often years in Intermediate classes of any recognised institution with first or second class postgraduate degree, or third class post graduate degree with 15 years' teaching experience. (3) Post graduate diploma holder in Sci-ence; provided that he has passed di-ploma course in first or second class and has served meritoriously for 15 years or 20 years respectively in any recognised institution after passing such diploma course. Note- (1) At least second class post graduate degree and on special teaching experience of 10 years in Interme-diate classes of recognised institution, training eligibility of Asstt, teachers may be relaxed (As per the provisions in the Act). (2) Teaching prior to training or after training both, are included in teaching experience. (3) Higher classes means classes 9-12 and teaching experience of these classes is admissible for the post of Principal in Intermediate College.

    6. The dispute itself arose in light of the fact that the petitioner proceeded on study leave w.e.f 15th April, 1992 up to 8th March, 1996. It is not disputed by parties that this study leave was duly sanctioned and approved by the Government of India, the Institution where the petitioner was functioning as Lecturer as well as the District Inspector of Schools, Jhansi. The issue itself has arisen on account of the fact that if this period of study leave be not treated as and included in “teaching experience”, the petitioner would have only nine years and three months of experience as against the required ten years on the date of his selection.

    7. The Board has found that the study leave period of the petitioner was not liable to be included in teaching experience. It consequently held that the’“teaching experience” of the petitioner was only nine years and three months and since it was short of the required ten years experience, it proceeded to annul the selection of the petitioner.

    8. Sri. P.N Saxena, learned Senior Coun sel appearing in support of this writ petition has submitted that the study leave period of the petitioner was liable to be taken into con sideration and has in this connection relied upon the provisions of Paragraph 146A(13) appear ing in Chapter-XI A of the Financial Handbook. He submitted that in terms of the above provi sions of the Financial Handbook, the period spent by him on study leave was liable to be included for all purposes including the com putation of “teaching experience”. He has also submitted that the Board having once made the recommendation and having constituted the panel, it had no power to review the same. He has further submitted that even otherwise the order of the Board is clearly illegal inas much as it came to be passed without afford ing him any opportunity of hearing.

    9. He has lastly submitted that this was not a case where the petitioner had concealed the fact that he had been on study leave. He has referred to the contents of the Application Form submitted by him before the Board wherein in Paragraph 13 he made a specific disclosure of him having been on study leave between the period 15th April, 1992 to 8th March, 1996. Elaborating his submissions, Sri. Saxena has contended that the research work for which he had gone to Czechoslovakia, was liable to be countenanced and included in “teaching experience” required for the post. On the strength of the above submissions, Sri. Saxena contends that the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

    10. Sri. Saxena has further contended with reference to the language of Regulation 1 of Chapter-II of the Regulations framed under the Act, 1991 to contend that the qualifications prescribed in Appendix ‘A’ are with reference to the ‘appointment’ of the petitioner as a Principal and that the qualifications on the date of appointment were liable to be taken into consideration. He sought to submit that in any view of the, matter in 2008 when he was actually appointed and permitted to join, he had already acquired more than ten years “teaching experience” and therefore, the selection and appointment of the petitioner was not liable to be set aside.

    11. Sri. Indra Raj Singh, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No. 7 and Sri. R.K Ojha, learned Senior Counsel have op posed this writ petition and have submitted that since the petitioner did not have the requi site qualifications, the Board was well within its right to annul the empanelment of the petitioner. Learned counsels for the respondents have submitted thatthe qualifications must be held by an Applicant on the date of advertise ment and any subsequent improvement is not permissible. They would contend that the cru cial date and in faet, the only cut-off date with reference to which the qualifications of a can didate are to be judged, is the advertisement. They have further referred to the advertise ment itself which prescribed that the educational qualifications as well as the “teaching experience” required of the post would be computed with reference to the date of appli cation. They submit that since admittedly the petitioner on 16th March, 2002 (the date on which he submitted the application), did not have ten years “teaching experience”, he was not entitled to be considered for selection and, therefore, his empanelment which was an illegality, has been rightly set at naught by the impugned order.

    12. Insofar as the issue of “teaching expe rience” is concerned, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgment ren dered by a single Judge of this Court of 29th January, 2010 passed in writ Petition No. 4222 of 2004, Dr. Sudha Dixit v. State of U.P and submitted, that the words “teaching experience” cannot mean deemed teaching experience and must be interpreted to mean actually teaching work undertaken by the candidate for a period of ten years. They have in this connection relied upon the following observations contained in the aforementioned judgment:—

    “On the parameters as set out in the aforesaid judgment and looking into the requirement as provided under Appendix ‘A’ of Chapter II of the Regulations framed under U.P Act No. 2 of 1921, the incumbents who do not have to their credit requisite qualification, including teaching experience, qua said incumbents alternative eligibility criteria has been provided for. As far as petitioner is concerned, she has to her credit Master Degree in first division; she has to have 10 years teaching experience as Lecturer in Intermediate College. The question is as to whether said eligibility criteria is fulfilled and the petitioner has to her credit 10 years' teaching experience as Lecturer or not, for being appointed as Principal of the institution, which is the minimum eligibility criteria as provided under Appendix ‘A’ Chapter II of the Regulations framed under U.P Act No. 2 of 1921.

    The term “experience” has been defined as “knowledge or practical wisdom gained from what one has observed encountered or undergone”. Teaching experience has to be teaching experience and not deemed teaching experience, in this background, it has to be seen as to whether 10 years teaching experience in Psychology was or was not to the credit of the petitioner. The factual position which emerges in the present case is that the petitioner has functioned as Lecturer in Psychology with effect from 28.08.1980 up to May, 1981, and thereafter from 08.07.1981 to 26th August, 1982 where after order of dispensation of service had been passed. Thereafter, petitioner has not functioned, and the said order of termination had been upheld by this Court clearly mentioning therein that the petitioner had full knowledge of the order of dispensation of her service, and merely because salary has been paid it cannot be said that there was no dispensation of service. Hon'ble Apex Court has held that seven teachers who had got employment should be given seniority on the deemed situation. Once termination order had been upheld and the entire exercise which was undertaken was in respect of reemployment, then in this background since petitioner was not given appointment, her services were not liable to be clubbed and treated as teaching experience. Petitioner joined on being reemployed after absorption on 16.08.1991, and the last date for submission of application form in response to advertisement was 30.09.1998 Total services, which the petitioner completed at the second institution wherein she was absorbed, was six years eleven months and twenty seven days, and at the earlier institution, admitted position is that the petitioner had functioned from 28.08.1980 to May, 1981 and thereafter from 08.07.1981 to 25.08.1982, when resolution was passed by the Managing Committee dispensing with her services. This was the actual period for which the petitioner had functioned. Once this is the factual scenario, then by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the petitioner had completed ten years service as Lecturer. The period for which she remained out of employment, cannot be counted or accepted towards teaching experience. The payment of salary which had been made to the petitioner from November, 1982 till October, 1983 and again for the month of December, 1984 will not make any difference, once order of dispensation of service had been upheld by this Court. In the facts of the case re-employment certainly connoted fresh contract of service, and no interference is feasible, as the petitioner did not have to her credit 10 years teaching experience as Lecturer in Psychology and she was not at all eligible for being appointed as Principal of the institution.”

    13. The primary consideration in the opinion of this Court is whether the period spent by the petitioner on study leave is liable to be included in ‘teaching experience’ or not. However, before proceeding to decide the said issue it would be relevant to first deal with the other contentions advanced by Sri. Saxena.

    14. Rule 146-A(13) falls in Chapter XIA of the Financial Handbook. The said provision reads as under:

    “146-A(13): Study leave will count as service for promotion and pension but not for leave. It will not affect any leave which may already be due to a Government servant; it will count as extra leave on half average pay and will not be taken into account in reckoning the aggregate amount of leave on half average pay taken by the Government servant towards the maximum period admissible under the Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules.”

    15. A bare reading of the above shows and establishes that the same cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. All that the said provision lays down is that study leave would count as service for promotion and pension. The reason behind this is obvious. A person on study leave does not exit service or demit the post held by him. In light of the above counting of the said period towards promotion and pension cannot be faulted. This provision however by no stretch provides that the period spent on study leave would be liable to be included in ‘teaching experience’. As was held by this Court in Dr. Sudha Dixit (supra), ‘teaching experience’ must necessarily mean actual experience acquired by a person while performing the job attached to the post of a teacher. This issue is otherwise also no longer res integra. The Apex Court in V.B Prasad v. Manager P.M.T). Upper Primary School and others (2007) 10 SCC 269 : (AIR 2007 SC 2053) explained the position as follows:

    “9. For the time being, we may assume that in view of fact that he had also acquired the qualification of B. Ed, in April, 1989, his case also could be considered in terms of Rule 45; although it is well-settled principles of law that the note appended to a statutory provision or the subordinate legislation must be read in the context of the substantive provision and not in derogation thereof. Five years' teaching experience for appointment to the post of Headmaster was a sine qua non. Such teaching experience was to be ‘teaching experience’ and not a deemed teaching experience.

    10. In Punjab State Electricity Board Ltd. v. Zora Singh [(2005) 6 SCC 776] : (AIR 2006 SC 182), this Court noticing a decision of a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.P SRTC v. STAT [ILR 2001 AP 1], observed: 2005 AIR SCW 5676, Para 21 : AIR 2001 AP 335

    “23. In A.P SRTC v. STAT a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has noticed thus (An LT p. 544, para 31):

    31[24]. The meaning of note as per P. Ramanatha Aiyars Law Lexicon, 1997 Edn. is a brief statement of particulars of some fact, a passage or explanation.

    24. The note, therefore, was merely explanatory in nature and thereby the rigour of the main provision was not diluted.”

    11. Mr. V. Shekhar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Appellant, however, has drawn to our attention to a circular letter dated 30.12.2005-issued by the Government of Kerala Finance (Rules) Department, from a perusal whereof it-appears that the leave without allowance under Rule 91 for study purpose would carry service benefit in regard to seniority/promotion accumulation of HPL but would not be counted towards seniority/promotion and accumulation of earned leave.

    13. Indisputably, Appellant was on study leave for the period 01.06.1991 to 28.02.1993 During the said period, he was not teaching. He did not gain any teaching experience during the said period. If the said period is excluded for the purpose of computing teaching experience as envisaged under Rule 45 of the Rules, the question of his being considered for promotion to the post of Headmaster would not arise. Eligibility condition must be satisfied before a person is considered for promotion/appointment in respect of a particular post.”

    16. This contention therefore, cannot be accepted by this Court.

    17. Sri. Saxena had then contended that the Board had proceeded to annul his selection without affording any opportunity of hearing. Without prejudice to the above, he has further contended that the eligibility of the petitioner was liable to be deemed as existing on the date of his actual appointment. He had submitted that although the petitioner had been empanelled in 2002, he, was permitted to join only in 2008 consequent to all litigation coming to an end and on the said date it could not be said that he did not have the requisite 10 years' ‘teaching experience’.

    18. Insofar as the issue of breach of principles of natural justice are concerned suffice it to state that the factual position is not disputed by Sri. Saxena. Admittedly on the date of application the petitioner did not have 10 years ‘teaching experience’. The advertisement clearly specified that the qualifications of each candidates were liable to be judged as existing on the date of application. Even otherwise it is settled law that a candidate/applicant must possess the requisite minimum qualifications prescribed on the date of application and even if the said candidate obtains the said qualifications subsequently the same would not be a factor which would inhere to his benefit. The Court in this connection relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Rakesh Kumar Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 11 SCC 58:

    14. In Harpal Kaur Chahal v. Director, Punjab Instructions this Court held: (SCC p. 707, para 2)

    “2………………..It is to be seen that when the recruitment is sought to be made, the last date has been fixed for receipt of the applications. Such of those candidates, who possessed of all the qualifications as on that date, alone are eligible to apply for and to be considered for recruitment according to the rules.”

    15. This Court in Rekha Chaturvedi v. Uni versity of Rajasthan held. (SCC p. 175, para 10) : (1993 AIR SCW 1488, p. 1494, para 12)

    “10. The contention that the required qualifications of the candidates should be examined with reference to the date of selection and not with reference to the last date for making applications has only to be stated to be rejected. The date of selection is invariably uncertain. In the absence of knowledge of such date the candidates who apply for the posts would be unable to state Whether they are qualified for the posts in question or not, if they are yet to acquire the qualifications. Unless the advertisement mentiones a fixed date with referene to which the qualifications are to be judged, whether the said date is of selection or otherwise, it would not be possible for the candidates who do not possess the requisite qualifications in praesenti even to make applications for the posts. The uncertainty of the date may also lead to a contrary consequence viz. Even those candidates who do not have the qualifications in praesenti and are likely to acquire them at an uncertain future date, may apply for the posts thus swelling the number of applications. But a still worse consequence may follow, in that it may leave open a scope for malpractices. The date of selection may be so fixed or manipulated as to entertain some applicants and reject others, arbitrarily. Hence, in the absence of a fixed date indicated in the advertisement/notification inviting applications with reference to which the requisite qualifications should be judged, the only certain date for the scrutiny of the qualifications will be the last date for making the applications…. Reference in this connection may also be made to two recent decisions of this Court in A.R Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra and Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M. Tripura Sundari Devi.”

    17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chander Shekhar reconsidered and explained the judgment of Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) observing: (Chander Shekhar case, SCC pp. 21-22, para 6)

    “6. The proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judge with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it were known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority judgment.” The Court in Ashok Kumar Sharma further explained that the majority view in Ashok Kumar Sharma (1993) was not correct, rather the dissenting view-by R.M Sahai, J. was correct as the Court held as under: (SCC p. 22; para 6)

    “6…….. The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to appear “for the interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talent available and that such” course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the, record. In our opinion, R.M Sahai, J. (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that, the 33 respondents could hot have been allowed to appear for the interview.”

    (Emphasis added)

    20. This Court lately in State of Gujarat v. Arvindkumar T. Tiwari held: (SCC p. 550, para 14) : ((2012) 9 SCC 545 : AIR 2012 SC 3281, p. 3284 para 11).

    “14. A person who [does not possess the requisite quali cannot even apply for recruitment for the reason that his appointment would be contrary to the statutory rules, and would therefore, be void in law. Lacking eligibility for the post cannot be cured at any stage and appointing such a person would amount to serious illegality and not mere irregularity. Such a person cannot approach the court for any relief for the reason that he does not have a right which can be enforced through court. (See Prit Singh v. S.K Mangal, 1993 Supp (1) SCC 714 and Pramod, Kumar v. U.P Secondary Education Services Commission, (2008) 7 SCC 153) : (AIR 2008 SC 1817)”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    21. In the instant case the appellant did not possess the requisite qualification on the last date of submission of the application though he applied representing that he possessed the same. The letter of offer of appointment was issued to him which was provisional and conditional subject to the verification of educational qualification, i.e, eligibility, character verification etc. Clause 11 of the letter of offer of appointment dated 23.2.2009 made it clear that in case character is not certified or he did not possess the qualification, the services will be terminated. The legal proposition that emerges from the settled position of law as enumerated above is that the result of the examination does not relate back to the date of examination. Aperson would possess qualification only on the date of declaration of the result. Thus, in view of the above, no exception can be taken to the judgment of the High Court.

    22. It also needs to be noted that like the present appellant there could be large number of candidates who were not eligible as per the requirement of rules/advertisement since they did not possess the required eligibility on the last date of submission of the application forms. Granting any benefit to the appellant would be violative of the doctrine of equality, a backbone of the fundamental rights under our Constitution. A large number of such candidates may not have applied considering themselves to be ineligible adhering to the statutory rules and the terms of the advertisement.”

    19. This Court further finds itself unable to grant to the petitioner any benefit of the fact that he had disclosed all particulars in his application form. The Board had clearly committed an illegality in empanelling the petitioner who admittedly on the date of application did not have the 10 years' experience required. This mistake committed by the Board cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner. The acceptance of such a submission would clearly amount to this Court of permitting the perpetuation of an illegality. The powers of this Court conferred by Article 226 of the Consitution of India can never be exercised for such a purpose. One may on this score usefully refer to what the Apex Court observed in Rakesh Kumar Sharma (supra):—

    “23. There is no obligation on the court to protect an illegal appointment. Extraordinary power of the court should be used only in an appropriate case to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat the rights of others or create arbitrariness. Usurpation of a post by an ineligible candidate in any circumstance is impermissible. The process of verification and notice of termination in the instant case followed within a very short proximity of the appointment and was not delayed at all so as to even remotely give rise to an expectancy of continuance.”

    20. In light of the aforesaid conspectus of fact and the conclusions arrived at by this Court, it is constrained to hold that the order passed by the Board cancelling the selection of the petitioner was valid and justified. Accordingly and in view of the above conclusion, Writ Petition No. 538, of 2009 is liable to be and is accordingly dismissed. The interim order passed by this Court on 15th January, 2009 is hereby discharged. Insofar as the case of the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 19198 of 2009 is concerned, it is not disputed by the State-respondents that he was the Seniormost teacher and that he had in fact functioned as such for the periods noticed hereinabove. In the opinion of the Court since the said petitioner had functioned as ad hoc Principal pending finalisation of the panel drawn up by the Board, he was rightly entitled to be paid emoluments of ad hoc Principal. It is also not disputed by parties that the said respondent No. 7 continued to function as ad hoc Principal post the cancellation of the selection of me petitioner and till the passing of the interim orders by this, Court. Accordingly and in view of the above Writ Petition No. 19198 of 2009 shall stand disposed of with a direction requiring the respondent No. 3 to consider all claims of the petitioner therein with regard to payment of emoluments attached to the post of ad hoc Principal for the period during which he may have actually discharged functions as such. The respondent No. 3 shall in this connection scrutinze all records and relevant papers and process the claims of the petitioner therein expeditiously and preferably within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of the judgment of this Court.

    21. Order accordingly.

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