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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was filed challenging a motion of no-confidence moved by members of the Kshetra Panchayat constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1961 (the Act).

The petitioner was elected as Pramukh of the Kshetra Panchayat, Bihar, District Pratapgarh, took oath on 18.3.2011, and a certificate evidencing his status dated 22.12.2010 was annexed to the petition (Annexure No. 1). The Kshetra Panchayat is constituted under Section 6 of the Act and its term is five years under Section 8.

The Act (sub-section (13) of Section 15) contemplates that a motion of no-confidence may be moved after expiry of one year from the date appointed for the first meeting. The period for bringing a motion had earlier been two years but was reduced to one year by the U.P. Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 2007 (Act No. 44 of 2007). A subsequent Amendment Bill (U.P. Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat (Amendment) Bill, 2011) was passed by both Houses in August 2011 to substitute two years in place of one year; that Bill was sent to the Governor for assent but, according to the petitioner, the Governor had neither granted nor returned it.

On 9.4.2012, 75 members of the Kshetra Panchayat requisitioned the motion of no-confidence. The District Magistrate, Pratapgarh, by order dated 11.4.2012, directed the S.D.M. to convene a meeting of the Kshetra Panchayat on 4.5.2012 to discuss the motion. The petitioner challenged that order by filing the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a requisition for a motion of no-confidence that does not set out reasons or disclose charges is unlawful or incompetent for consideration under the Act.
  2. Whether the Court may direct respondent No. 4 (and/or the State) to pursue the 2011 Amending Bill with His Excellency the Governor (i.e., seek a judicial direction to the Governor to grant or return assent).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Sri J.N. Mathur, Senior Counsel)

  • The requisition for the no-confidence motion does not assign any reason or disclose grounds/charges on which the motion is based; it is therefore unlawful and incompetent to be considered as a valid motion of no-confidence.
  • The 2011 Amending Bill (which would restore the period to two years) was passed by both Houses and sent to the Governor on 12.8.2011; the Governor has not acted on it. The petitioner sought a direction to respondent No. 4 to pursue the matter with the Governor so that the amended period (two years) might apply.

Respondent's Arguments (Sri H.P. Srivastava, Additional Chief Standing Counsel)

  • For a motion of no-confidence it is not necessary to include or disclose charges or factual foundations in the requisition: lack of confidence itself is sufficient for debate in a democratic process.
  • Loss of confidence is a matter for debate and does not require specification of grounds; the authorities cited support that a motion of no-confidence need not set out particulars of alleged impropriety.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Haji Ghafoar Bukhsh v. State of U.P. and others, 1991 UPLBEC 505 Cited by respondent to support that no-confidence motions need not disclose charges. Relied upon as part of the body of authorities supporting that lack of disclosure of grounds does not invalidate a no-confidence motion.
Babubhai Muljibhai Pulii v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and others, (1994) 2 SCC 706 Held that a motion of no-confidence need not set out grounds or charges; distinction between no-confidence and censure motions. Quoted and applied to support the proposition that grounds need not be specified for a no-confidence motion.
Mohan Led Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Raibareilly and others, (1992) 4 SCC 80 Deals with the philosophy of a motion of no-confidence and its nature in democratic bodies. Referred to as authority on the conceptual basis of no-confidence motions.
Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhui and others, (2004) 5 SCC 409 Cited among cases on matters relating to motions and internal functions of elected bodies. Included in the list of authorities relied upon by respondents; used to bolster the general position applied by the Court.
Bhanumati and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2010) 12 SCC 1 Cited as part of the authorities addressing governance and statutory processes for elected bodies. Part of the jurisprudential support for the court's view on motion dynamics and members' statutory rights.
K. Krishnamurti (Dr.) and others v. Union of India and another, (2010) 7 SCC 202 Cited among decisions addressing statutory interpretation and governance issues. Used in the chain of authorities to support the court's stance on members' rights in deliberative bodies.
Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2011) 9 SCC 573 Affirmed that a no-confidence motion is not equivalent to disciplinary removal or censure; distinguishes removal by loss of confidence from disciplinary action. Quotations from paras 76–77 were relied on to stress the distinction between no-confidence and disciplinary/censure processes.
Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy and another v. State of A.P., 2006 (2) SCC 670 Principle: where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, courts should not supply a casus omissus (omissions cannot be read into statute). Applied to reject the petitioner's attempt to read into the statutory scheme a requirement that requisitions disclose grounds.
Delhi Financial Corporation and others v. Rajeev Anand and others, (2004) 11 SCC 625 Also cited for the principle that courts should not supply omissions when a statute's language is clear. Reinforced the Court's statutory-interpretation approach that it cannot read in requirements omitted by the legislature.
Nalinakhya Bysacik v. Shyam Sunder Haldar, AIR 1953 SC 148 Early authority cited for the same rule on statutory clarity and casus omissus. Part of the supporting authorities for the textualist approach adopted by the Court.
Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash, 2001 (8) SCC 61 Another authority cited on not supplying omitted provisions where statutory language is clear. Used along with other authorities to support refusal to read additional requirements into the statute.
Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar and others, JT 2011 (5) 19 Refers to the recall of a Mayor and the effect on appointees; used to illustrate practical consequences in elected bodies. Quoted in the context of explaining the practical impact of no-confidence outcomes on governance and office-holders.
Babubhai Muljibhad Patel (as cited in the opinion) Reiterated proposition that no-confidence motion need not disclose grounds; contrasted with censure motions. Directly quoted (para 19) and applied to the facts to show legal precedent for the Court's conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a structured manner, applying statutory text, dictionary meaning, and precedents as follows:

  1. Statutory Text and Structure. The Court examined Section 15 of the Act (sub-sections (6), (7), (8) and (13)) and noted that the statute uses the word "motion" and prescribes a requisition format for a motion of no-confidence but does not require that the requisition disclose charges or grounds. The statute permits debate on the motion; sub-section (7) specifically contemplates full debate.
  2. Meaning of "Debate." The Court relied on Black's Law Dictionary to describe "debate" as formal consideration of a motion's merits by speeches for or against it. From that dictionary meaning the Court inferred that formal speeches for, against or otherwise addressing the motion satisfy the statutory requirement for debate under the Act.
  3. Nature of No-Confidence Motions. The Court followed the line of authority (e.g., Babubhai Muljibhai cases, Mohan Led Tripathi, Pratap Chandra Mehta) that draws a clear distinction between a no-confidence motion and a censure or disciplinary action. A no-confidence motion is essentially a political expression of loss of confidence and need not be predicated upon specific charges of impropriety.
  4. Statutory Omission and Judicial Restraint. The Court held that since the legislature did not provide for disclosure of charges in requisitions, the Court could not read such a requirement into the statute. It relied on settled authorities that a court may not supply casus omissus where the statutory language is clear and unambiguous.
  5. Relief Sought Against Governor's Conduct. The Court rejected the petitioner's request to direct respondent No. 4 to pursue the Amending Bill with the Governor. The Court observed that compelling action with respect to the Governor's exercise of functions under Article 200 would amount to an impermissible judicial review of the Governor's conduct. The Court noted that the State Government had available remedies (e.g., reminders) to pursue assent and that the petitioner had not placed on record any material to show that the State had in fact pursued the matter with the Governor.
  6. Constitutional/Precedential Context. The Court noted that the 2007 amendment (reducing the period from two years to one year) had been upheld, and a Civil Appeal arising from challenge was dismissed by the Supreme Court, indicating that the one-year rule had been judicially validated previously. The Court commented on the legislature's later attempt to restore two years but did not grant the petitioner relief on that basis.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED IN LIMINE

Holding (core ruling): The writ petition was dismissed in limine. The Court held that (a) a requisition for a motion of no-confidence that does not specify grounds or charges is not rendered unlawful by that omission under the Act because the statutory scheme does not require disclosure of charges; and (b) the Court will not direct respondent No. 4 (or the Governor) to take steps regarding the pending Amending Bill, since that would amount to impermissible judicial review of the Governor's conduct.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's challenge to the impugned order convening the meeting for discussion of the no-confidence motion failed; the writ petition was dismissed and there were no orders as to costs.
  • Legal implications: The Court applied and reiterated established principles that (i) a motion of no-confidence is fundamentally different from a censure or disciplinary proceeding and need not disclose grounds, and (ii) where statutory language is clear an omitted provision cannot be judicially supplied. The opinion did not purport to create a new legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities.

Note: This summary has been prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion. No facts or conclusions not present in that opinion have been added.

    Radhey Shyam Maurya v. State Of U.P. And Others

    By tie Court.—

    Instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been preferred against the motion of no-confidence from the members of Ksihetra Panchayat, constituted under the Uttar Pradesh Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1961 (in short the Act).

    2. The petitioner was elected as Pramukh of Kshetra Panchayat, Bihar, District Pratapgarh and administered oath of the Office on 18.3.2011 and certificate was issued indicating his status on 22.12.2010 a copy of which is annexed as Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition.

    3. The Kshetra Panchayat constituted under the Act, has been conferred jurisdiction to discharge its obligation under the Act for over all development and supervisory work of the rural area falling in the district.

    The Kshetra Panchayat is constituted under Section 6 of the Act which contains Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat and elected members. The term of the Office of Kshetra Panchayat is 5 years under Section 8 of the Act from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer.

    Under Section 10 of the Act, it shall be obligatory for State Government to make necessary arrangement for the Constitution of Kshetra Panchayat for every Khand.

    The motion of no-confidence against the Pramukh, may be moved after expiry of one year from the date appoint from its first meeting in view of the provisions contained in sub-section (13) of Section 15 of the Act.

    4. Sri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel, apprised the Court that earlier, period for motion was two years but by an amendment in the year 2007, by act no. 44 of 2007, it was reduced to one year.

    It has further been submitted that the U.P. Kshetra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat (Amendment) Bill, 2011 was passed by both the Houses of State Legislature in the year 2011, again substituting the period of one year by two years.

    Learned Senior Counsel informed that the House of State Legislative Assembly had proposed the bill on 10.8.2011, whereas, the State Legislative Council has re-affirmed the Bill on 11.8.2011 and on the very next day and, it was sent to His Excellency, the Governor for assent in compliance of Article 200 of the Constitution. The submission is that till date, His Excellency, the Governor has neither granted the assent nor returned the same keeping in view the mandate of Article 200 of the Constitution.

    5. During the course of argument, it has not been disputed that the Bill in the U.P. State Legislative Assembly, was introduced on 10.8.2011 and passed by the House on 11.8.2011. The proceeding has been filed as Annexure 7 to the writ petition.

    6. The requisition for motion of no-confidence in pursuance of Section 15 (supra), was moved on 9.4.2012 of the Kshetra Panchayat Bihar District Pratapgarh by 75 members. In consequence thereof, the District Magistrate, Pratapgarh, by the impugned order dated 11.4.2012, directed the S.D.M., Tahsil Kunda, District Pratapgarh to convene a .meeting of Kshetra Panchayat on 4.5.2012 for discussion.

    7. While assailing the impugned order, Sri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has raised two-fold arguments. First, the impugned requisition does not assign reason or discloses the grounds on which the motion of no-confidence proposed, is moved. It only reveals that signatories or the members of Kshetra Panchayat have given a notice with regard to motion of no-confidence alongwith a copy of resolution. Secondly, the proposed Bill Amending sub-section 13 of Section 15 of the Act, was passed by both the Houses of the State Legislature on 10th and 11th August, 2011. According to petitioner's counsel, on 12th August, 2011, it was sent to His Excellency, the Governor for assent but till date, neither it has been returned with or without assent. Hence keeping in view the lapse of time, this Court may issue appropriate direction to opposite party No. 4 to pursue for appropriate order with regard to Amending Bill of 2011 from His Excellency, the Governor of the State.

    8. While assailing the impugned order the first limb of argument of Sri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Counsel is that, non-disclosure of grounds in the requisition for motion of no-confidence, moved by the members of the Kshetra Panchayat, makes it unlawful and incompetence for consideration as a motion of no-confidence. Learned counsel while inviting attention to sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 15 of the Act, submits that there cannot be debate on the basis of impugned requisition or motion of no-confidence. Submission is that in democratic process and being an elected representative, the petitioner has got right to know the allegation or charges which is the foundation of the motion of no-confidence.

    9. On the other hand, Sri H.P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits that for the purpose of motion of no-confidence, it is not necessary to move a requisition containing charges or factual foundation. In case members of Kshetra Panchayat move motion of no-confidence, expressing their lack of confidence in their Kshetra Pramukh for any reason whatsoever, in democratic process, loss of confidence in the leader of House, itself is a matter of debate, requires no further explanation. To substantiate his argument, Sri H.P. Srivastava, relied upon the cases in Haji Ghafoar Bukhsh v. State of U.P. and others, 1991 UPLBEC 505; Babubhai Muljibhai Pulii v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and others, (1994) 2 SCC 706; Mohan Led Tripathi v. District Magistrate, Raibareilly and others, (1992) 4 SCC 80; Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhui and others, (2004) 5 SCC 409; Bhanumati and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2010) 12 SCC 1; K. Krishnamurti (Dr.)and others v. Union of India and another, (2010) 7 SCC 202 and Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh and others, (2011) 9 SCC 573.

    10. In Black's Law Dictionary, the word, 'debate' has been defined as under:

    "debate. Parliamentary law. Formal consideration of a motion's merits in the form of speeches for, against, or otherwise according the motion. See

    CONSIDERATION

    (2) —debatable, adj.—debatability, n.

    controlled debate. Debate in which designated managers, usu. A partisan leader, lead each side and allot time for speeches. =Also termed controlled time.

    extended debate. Debate that continues beyond an otherwise applicable limit. See EXTEND DEBATE.

    floor debate. (1884) The legislative process of debating a proposed bill before an entire chamber rather than before a committee. [Cases States <32] limited debate. Debate with restrictions. See LIMIT DEBATE.

    Pro-con debate. A debate that adheres to the parliamentary principle that speeches should alternate between opposing viewpoint. Sometimes those seeking the floor on one side outnumber those on the other side in which case the chair may allow two (or more) speeches in a row on the same side of the question."

    11. From the dictionary meaning, of the debate, it appears that formal consideration of motion on merit in the form of speeches for, against or otherwise, addressing the motion, shall be sufficient compliance of statutory provisions and during the course of discussion or speech, members may express their views for or against the motion. According to dictionary meaning, there may be limited debate or controlled debate that is in letter and spirit of sub-sections (6), (7) and (8) of Section 15 of the Act.

    12. Sub-section (7) speaks for full debate on the motion of no-confidence for which the members express their views with regard to lack of confidence in the Pramukh of the Kshetra Panchayat. Subsections (7) and (8) speaks for full bloom debate on the motion of no-confidence and every member has got right to address for, against or otherwise during the course of discussion or debate.

    13. The right to move motion or participate in debate is a statutory right in fee members conferred by Section 15 of the Act. The provisions (supra), used the word, motion and does not speaks for motion containing charges. Legislature to their wisdom has conferred powers on the members of Kshetra Panchayat to move requisition in prescribed format for motion of no-confidence. Once, Legislature to their wisdom has not provided to disclose charges or the allegations, then it is not permissible for the Court to apply principles of reading down.

    14. It is well-settled law that in case the language of statute is clear and unambiguous, then casus omisus cannot be supplied, vide Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy and another v. State of A.P., 2006 (2) SCC 670; Delhi Financial Corporation and others v. Rajeev Anand and others, (2004) 11 SCC 625; Nalinakhya Bysacik v. Shyam Sunder Haldar, AIR 1953 SC 148 and Dental Council of India v. Hari Prakash, 2001 (8) SCC 61.

    15. The elected representatives are accountable to their electorate and electorate choose their members as well as Pramukh. It is right of elected representatives to show their lack of confidence by moving motion of no-confidence accordance with the statutory provisions. This is inherent philosophy in the policy of motion of no-confidence.

    16. The democracy is a concept and political philosophy and an ideal practice by resorting to governance by representatives of the people elected directly or indirectly. It is neither fundamental nor common law but statutory right to remove elected representative and in absence of any constitutional restriction, it is within the power of members of elected body to move motion of no-confidence in accordance with statutory provisions. The philosophy of motion of no-confidence has been dealt with and considered by Hon"ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Lal Tripathi (supra).

    17. In the case of Babubhai Muljibhai Patel (supra), their lordships while considering the significance of motion of no-confidence, held that even if there is provision with regard to disclosure of ground, motion of no-confidence may be moved without setting up the ground or charges. It is held that motion of no-confidence or a censure motion are different facets of political philosophy. In a censure motion, it has to disclose the reason whereas, in matters of motion of no-confidence, it is suffice to say that members lack their confidence. To quote relevant portion from para 19 of the case of Babubhai Muljibhad Patel (supra), is reproduced as under:

    It is no doubt true that according to the form prescribed the ground for the, motion of no confidence has to be mentioned in the notice of intention to move a motion of no confidence. It does not, however, follow therefrom that the ground must also be specified when a motion of no confidence is actually passed against a President. It is pertinent in this context to observe that there is a difference between a motion of no confidence and a censure motion. While it is necessary in the case of a censure motion to set out the ground or charge on which it is based, a motion of no confidence need not set out a ground or charge. A vote of censure presupposes that the persons censured have been guilty of some impropriety or lapse by act or omission. It may, therefore, become necessary to specify the impropriety or lapse while moving a vote of censure. No such consideration arises when a motion of no confidence is moved. Although aground may be mentioned when passing a motion of no confidence, the existence of a ground is not .a prerequisite of a motion of no confidence. There is no legal bar to the passing of a motion of no confidence against an authority in the absence of any charge of impropriety or lapse on the part of that authority. The essential connotation of a no confidence motion is that the party against whom such motion is passed has ceased to enjoy the confidence of the requisite majority of members. We may in the above context refer to page 591 of Practice & Procedure of Parliament, Second Ed. by Kaul and Shakdher. wherein it is observed as under :

    "A no-confidence motion in the Council of Ministers is distinct from a- censure motion. Whereas, a censure motion must set out the grounds or charge on which it is based and is moved for the specific purpose of censuring the Government for certain policies and actions, a motion of no-confidence need not set out any grounds on which it is based. Even when grounds are mentioned in the notice and read out in the House, they do not form part of the no-confidence motion."

    18. In one other case, relied upon fay Sri H.P. Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel reported in Pratap Chandra Merita (supra), the aforesaid proposition of law has been reiterated and their lordships held that motion of no-confidence cannot be equated in law to removal relatable to a disciplinary action or as a censure. It is stricto sensu not removal from office, but a removal resulting from loss of confidence, to quote relevant paras 76 and 77 of Pratap Chandra Mehta's case (supra) as under:

    76. It needs to be noticed at the very threshold of consideration of this submission that "no confidence motion' cannot be equated in law to removal relatable to a disciplinary action or as a censure. It is stricto senso not removal from office, but a removal resulting from loss of confidence. It is relatable to no confidence and is not removal relatable to the conduct or improper behaviour of the elected person. Even the concept of term' under the Rules, is referable to and is controlled by a super-imposed limitation of no confidence. This tenure cannot be compared to a statutory tenure as is commonly understood in the service jurisprudence.

    77. The distinction between removal by way of 'no confidence motion' and removal as a result of disciplinary action or censure is quite well accepted in law. They are incapable of being inter-changed in their application and must essentially operate in separate fields. The Court has always prioritized harmonious functioning of the State Bar Council. In Afjal Imam v. State of Bihar, the recall of a Mayor and the re-election of a different Mayor in his place has been held to implicitly shorten the term of the appointees of the previous Mayor, if such is in the interest of smooth functioning of the body."

    [Afjal Imamv. State of Bihar and others, JT 2011 (5) 19]

    19. The other case relied upon by the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel reiterated the aforesaid proposition of law. Motion of no-confidence expressed by the members of elected body itself is a matter of debate hence it is not necessary to disclose the charges while moving requisition of no-confidence. Persons holding public office as a leader of elected body, cannot equate themselves with the Government employees or bureaucracy. They are elected to discharge public obligations till the confidence reposed in them by the people continue. The moment the people loose their confidence in the elected representative holding a public office or a member of elected body such public representative should relinquish the public office. That is why, in some of the countries apart from the provisions with regard to no-confidence motion or for absence of confidence, there is provision for recall of elected representative for the purity of system. Election for five years also does not mean that the elected representative has got blanket power to move on his/her own way without taking care of public interest.

    20. Of course, sometimes, the motion of no-confidence may be passed by the members of elected body but that is a part and parcel of democratic polity and for that, a provision may be made for recall of elected representative by the electorate.

    21. Coming to second limb of argument with regard to relief claimed by the petitioner for issuance of a direction to respondent No. 4 to. pursue the matter pending with His Excellency, the Governor of State, which also seems to be not sustainable.

    22. In case the argument advanced by the petitioner's counsel is accepted, it shall amount to judicial review of the conduct of the Governor which seems to be forbidden under the law.

    23. Under Article 200 of the Constitution, whenever a bill is sent for assent of the Governor of the State, it shall be obligatory for the Governor to declare either he assents to the bill or that he withholds the assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the President. In the present case, all three steps seem to have not been taken. Then what is the option? The option was very well available to the State Government to pursue the matter with His Excellency, the Governor of State by submitting reminders. Nothing has been brought on record by the petitioner to indicate the persuasion made by the State Government approaching His Excellency, the Governor of State. Of course, there is change of the Government but ultimately, burden lies on the petitioner to establish the factual position and cause of action for interference by the Court.

    24. Admittedly, U.P. Panchayat Laws (Amendment) Act, 2007 was upheld by this Court. The Civil Appeal No. 4135-4152 of 2010 [arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 3802-3819 of 2009] was also dismissed by the judgment and order dated 4.5.2010. Meaning thereby, reduction of period from two year to one year was upheld by Hon’ble Supreme Court.

    25. What prompted the Government to increase the period again, for two years within a year of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court (supra), is not borne out from the record. Legislative power may be exercised on justifiable ground but not in arbitrary manner. In case wrong precedent is set up by one Government while discharging their constitutional functions in due course of time, it shall be repeated by the subsequent Governments. That is why, in Mahatma Gandhi's views, 'mean should justify the end. Right means, correct approach, fair thinking and intention to secure public interest should be paramount consideration for discharge of constitutional obligations by the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. One incorrect precedent causes pain and suffering for centuries to come.

    26. In view of the above, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed in limine.

    No orders as to costs.

    _____________

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    Radhey Shyam Maurya v. State Of U.P. And Others
    (May 2, 2012)