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  • provisions of order XXII, rule 4(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
  • provisions of order XXXIV, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • XXXIV, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • rule 4(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
  • rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • provisions of order XXII, rule 4(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
  • provisions of order XXXIV, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code
  • XXXIV, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • rule 4(2) of the Civil Procedure Code
  • rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 21st November 1925, Tribhuwan Ojha executed a mortgage in favour of Ganesh Singh. A suit on this mortgage was filed on 12th August 1930, resulting in a preliminary decree on 16th December 1930. Tribhuwan died on 1st September 1931. Subsequently, on 28th April 1932, the plaintiff applied to substitute Ram Ugrah Ojha (Tribhuwan's brother) and Bhola Nath Ojha (Ram Ugrah's son) as legal representatives of Tribhuwan for the preparation of the final decree. The final decree was passed ex parte on 11th June 1932 but was set aside on 1st June 1933 following the appellants' application. The appellants objected to the preparation of the final decree, raising issues about joint family property rights, survivorship, validity of the mortgage, and their status as legal representatives.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellants, as members of the joint family, could object to the preparation of the final decree on the grounds that the mortgaged property was joint family property and passed by right of survivorship.
  2. Whether the appellants were legal representatives of the deceased Tribhuwan Ojha for the purpose of substitution in the suit and preparation of the final decree.
  3. Whether the appellants could raise objections relating to the validity of the mortgage and the nature of the property in proceedings under Order XXXIV, Rule 5 and Order XXII, Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  4. The extent of the court’s power at the stage of passing the final decree to revisit issues decided in the preliminary decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The mortgaged property belonged to the joint family, of which they and the deceased were members.
  • They acquired the property by right of survivorship.
  • The mortgage was not for any legal family necessity and thus invalid and not binding on the property.
  • They were not the legal representatives of the deceased.
  • Relied on Moti Bala Debi v. Satyanand Tirtha Swami to support their position.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Asserted that the appellants were legal heirs and thus legal representatives of the deceased under Section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Relied on Kalloo v. Niader Singh to argue that objections to the preparation of the final decree could not be raised by legal representatives beyond their representative character.
  • Contended that the appellants could not raise personal objections in proceedings under Order XXII, Rule 4.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Moti Bala Debi v. Satyanand Tirtha Swami Legal representative's right to raise defence appropriate to character; interpretation of Order XXXIV, Rule 5 and Order XXII, Rule 4(2) CPC. The court disagreed with the decision’s assumption that the legal representative could raise personal defences in final decree proceedings when not sued in representative character.
Kalloo v. Niader Singh Limitation of court's power at final decree stage; res judicata principles; Order XXXIV, Rule 5 CPC. The court agreed that at final decree stage, the court cannot revisit issues decided in the preliminary decree and is bound to act under Order XXXIV, Rule 5.
Dwarka Das v. Krishan Kishore Definition of legal representative in joint Hindu family property suits; application of Section 2(11) CPC. Distinguished on facts; held that succession law applies to separate property, and objectors brought on record as legal heirs of deceased individually, not as joint family members.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by affirming the definition of "legal representative" under Section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code, emphasizing that it includes persons who represent the estate of a deceased. Although the property was joint family property passing by survivorship, the suit was brought against Tribhuwan Ojha in his individual capacity concerning his separate property. The objectors were rightly brought on record as his legal heirs, not as joint family members succeeding by survivorship.

Relying on Dwarka Das v. Krishan Kishore, the court distinguished the present case from suits involving joint family property, noting that succession law does apply to separate property. The appellants' objections were personal and not appropriate to their character as legal representatives under Order XXII, Rule 4(2) CPC, which permits a legal representative to make only those defences appropriate to their representative character.

The court critically examined Moti Bala Debi v. Satyanand Tirtha Swami, finding that the decision was based on a wrong assumption that the legal representative succeeded to a particular office or character (mahantship) and thus could raise such defences. Since the appellants were not sued in a representative character related to such an office or management, they could not raise personal objections in these proceedings.

Finally, the court agreed with the principle in Kalloo v. Niader Singh that at the stage of passing a final decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 5 CPC, the court cannot revisit issues already determined by the preliminary decree. The court’s powers are limited to enforcing the decree, and objections that challenge the preliminary decree’s findings are not permissible.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED THE APPEAL WITH COSTS.

The holding confirms that legal representatives substituted under Order XXII, Rule 3 CPC can raise only those defences appropriate to their representative character under Order XXII, Rule 4(2) CPC. Personal objections unrelated to their representative capacity are not admissible in proceedings for preparation of the final decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 5 CPC. The court reinforced the principle that the final decree stage is procedural and cannot be used to re-litigate issues decided in the preliminary decree. This decision clarifies the limited scope of objections permissible at the final decree stage and affirms the distinction between joint family property succession and separate property succession in such proceedings. No new precedent beyond the application of established procedural rules was set.

    Ram Ugrah Ojha v. Ganesh Singh

    Thom, C.J and Allsop and Ganga Nath, JJ.:— This is an appeal by the objectors and arises out of proceedings for preparation of the final decree under order XXXIV, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code. On the 21st of November, 1925, a mortgage was executed by Tribhuwan Ojha, since deceased, in favour of Ganesh Singh respondent. A suit was brought on this mortgage on the 12th of August, 1930, and a preliminary decree was passed on the 16th of December, 1930. On the 1st of September, 1931, Tribhuwan died. On the 28th of April, 1932, an application was made by the plaintiff to bring on the record Ram Ugrah Ojha, appellant No. 1, a brother of Tribhuwan, and Bhola Nath Ojha, appellant No. 2, son of Ram Ugrah Ojha, in place of Tribhuwan Ojha and for preparation of the final decree. The final decree was passed ex parte on the 11th of June, 1932. This decree was ultimately set aside on the 1st of June, 1933, on an application of the appellants.

    The appellants objected to the preparation of the final decree on the grounds that (1) the mortgaged property belonged to the joint family of which they and the deceased (Tribhuwan) were members, (2) that the objectors got the property by right of survivorship, and (3) that the mortgage not being for any legal family necessity was not valid and binding on the property. They also contended that they were not the legal representatives of the deceased.

    Both the lower courts have field that the objectors are the legal representatives of the deceased and have brought them on the record; but they have held that it was not open to the objectors to raise these objections in the proceedings for the preparation of the final decree.

    The appellants relied on Moti Bala Debi v. Satyanand Tirtha Swami(1) while the respondent relied on Kalloo v. Niader Singh(2). The case was referred to the Full Bench on account of a conflict in these decisions.

    Section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code defines a “legal representative”. It lays down: “‘Legal representative’ means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased, and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character, the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued.”

    The decree-holder applied to the court to bring the objectors on the record as the deceased's heirs. It is not denied that the objectors are the legal heirs of the deceased. They as such “represent the estate of the deceased, and have consequently been brought on the record. There is no doubt that in a joint family the law of inheritance does not apply to the joint family property, and on the death of a coparcener the property passes to the remaining coparceners by right of survivorship; but even in a joint family a coparcener may be possessed of separate property which will be governed by the law of succession.

    Learned counsel for the appellants relied on Dwarka Das v. Krishan Kishore(3). There a suit was brought by two brothers, Jagan Nath and Dwarka Das as members of an undivided family, in respect of joint family property. During the pendency of the appeal Jagan Nath died, and on his death an application was made under order XXII, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code that his brother Dwarka Das and his mother Mst. Puran Devi should be brought on the record as his legal representatives. It was contended that there was no such thing as succession, properly so called, in an undivided Hindu family and on no construction of the term “legal representative” could members of a joint Hindu family be brought within its definition as contained in section 2(11) of the Civil Procedure Code. This contention was accepted. As would appear from the facts stated above, the suit related to the joint family property and had been brought by two brothers as members of the joint family. It was rightly contended that in an undivided Hindu family the rules of succession did not apply to the property. In the present case the suit was brought against Tribhuwan Ojha not as a member of the joint family, but in his individual capacity. The objectors have been brought on the record not as members of the joint family, and, as such, succeeding to the property, but as the legal heirs of the deceased. There is nothing in the case cited by the appellants to suggest that the law of succession does not apply to the separate property of a member of a joint Hindu family. The objectors being the legal heirs of the deceased have been rightly brought on the record as his legal representatives.

    As regards the defence open to the legal representatives, the law is very clear and is laid down in order XXII, rule 4 as follows: “(2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant.”

    The objections which are raised by the appellants to the preparation of the final decree are not open to them as legal representatives of the deceased. They are raising these contentions in their personal capacity. The personal rights of the objectors and whatever remedy they may have in exercise thereof are not affected by the present decree. The decree will not bar their personal remedy, because the defence which they might wish to raise in exercise of their personal rights is not open to them to raise in the present proceedings under order XXII, rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    In Moti Bala Debt v. Satyanand Tirtha Swami on which reliance is placed by the appellants, it was observed:

    “While under ordinary circumstances the provisions of order XXXIV, rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code being imperative in their character should be followed, but taking them with the provisions of order XXII, rule 4(2) of the Civil Procedure Code it is clear to us that the legal representative is at liberty to take any defence which may be appropriate to his character as the legal representative of the deceased defendant. Satyanand Swami having been found to be the mahant of the math to which the mortgaged property appertains, is bound to protect the interest of the math and is entitled to oppose further proceedings being taken for the enforcement of the invalid mortgage deed executed by his predecessor in office.”

    There a preliminary decree was passed against Kalkanand Swami, mahant of a temple situated in Benares. He died shortly afterwards. Mahant Satyanand was brought on the record as the legal representative of the deceased Kalkanand Swami. The decision proceeds on a wrong assumption that the suit was brought against Kalkanand Swami as the mahant of the temple and on his death Satyanand was brought on the record as the representative of Kalkanand Swami on account of his having succeeded to the mahantship. It was observed:

    “Satyanand Swami can be treated as the legal representative of Kalkanand Swami if the mortgaged property is part of the endowed property which was in the management of Kalkanand Swami, who has been succeeded in that management by Satyanand Swami. Under order XXII, rule 4(2) of the Civil Procedure Code a person against whom an application is made for substitution can, if brought on the record, make any defence appropriate to his character as the legal representative of the deceased defendant. If therefore Satyanand Swami be treated as the legal representative of the deceased it is open to him to contest the plaintiff's claim to obtain a final decree on the ground that the mortgage deed executed by Kalkanand Swami was invalid and that a final decree should now be refused.”

    The fact that Satyanand Swami had been brought on the record not as the mahant of the math but as an intermeddler with the estate of Kalkanand Swami, as would appear from the following observations, was lost sight of:

    “We have not been able to discover any definite order of the trial court directing the name of the respondent being substituted as the legal representative of the deceased mahant but the trend of the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge shows that he was inclined to the view that Satyanand Swami having intermeddled with the estate of Kalkanand Swami is his legal representative.”

    Kalkanand Swami not having been sued in a representative character and Satyanand Swami not having been brought on the record as having succeeded to the mahantship, the defence that was raised by him was not open to him under order XXII, rule 4. With all respect to the learned Judges who decided this case we do not therefore agree with the decision.

    The law ha's been correctly laid down in Kalloo v. Niader Singh. There subsequent to a preliminary decree obtained by the defendants against the plaintiffs' father alone without impleading the plaintiffs, the father died and the plaintiffs were substituted as his legal representatives. A final decree was then passed ex parte. Later on the plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried to have the ex parte decree set aside, raised objections to the preparation of the final decree and attacked the mortgage decree on the ground that the mortgage was without legal necessity. It was held:

    “The question, on its merits, depends upon whether the court at the time of passing a final decree was entitled to go behind its own findings in passing the preliminary decree. In our opinion the court was right in holding that at the time of passing the final decree it had no power to go behind the preliminary decree in which the rights and liabilities of the parties had been determined. At the time of passing the final decree the court's powers are limited to acting in accordance with order XXXIV, rule 5. Where it is found that payment has not been made of the sum specified, then the court is bound to pass a decree that the mortgaged property, or a sufficient part thereof, be sold. We hold that the court in taking action under this rule is not empowered to re-open the questions which have already been determined by the preliminary decree. As the court in passing the final decree had no power to decide the questions which were raised by the plaintiffs in the present suit, we hold that the rule of res judicata does not apply.”

    With this exposition of the law we are in agreement. In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.

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    Ram Ugrah Ojha v. Ganesh Singh
    (Nov 29, 1939)