Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 164 of the U.P Municipalities Act (2 of 1916),
  • Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act,
  • Section 164 of the Municipalities Act,
  • Section 151 of the Municipalities Act,
  • SECTION 188 CONTRACT ACT
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 164 of the U.P Municipalities Act (2 of 1916),
  • Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act,
  • Section 164 of the Municipalities Act,
  • Section 151 of the Municipalities Act,
  • SECTION 188 CONTRACT ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act by the Municipal Board of Jaunpur seeking revision of a decree passed by the learned Munsif (Jaunpur) in a small cause suit. The suit was brought by the opposite party, Banwari Lal, to recover Rs. 63-10-0 as refund of octroi under the Municipal Accounts Code.

Between 14 and 18 May 1937 several merchants in Jaunpur exported goods outside municipal limits. Under R. 178 of the Municipal Accounts Code an exporter of goods exported from a municipality is entitled to receive payment of a sum equivalent to the octroi (a "refund"). R. 184 prescribed the procedure for obtaining the refund (presentation of an application in Form 59, with columns 1–10 filled and signature by exporter or authorized representative; the entry in the relevant column being sufficient authority for payment).

Twenty separate applications in Form 59 were made on behalf of exporters. The plaintiff admitted that he had nothing to do with the preparation or presentation of these applications and that his name did not appear in column 4 of any of them as the person to whom payment could be made. Each application did, however, contain an endorsement requesting the Municipal Board to pay the refund to the applicant, signed by the exporter or his authorized representative. The applications were duly presented and entered in the Refund Ledger (R. 186).

The applications were not presented for payment within the one-month period after registration required by R. 192, so the claims lapsed under that Rule. R. 193 permits revival of lapsed claims if the original application is produced with an explanation of delay and subject to the three-month limit from the date of registration.

The plaintiff presented the twenty applications at issue (along with two others) and supplied an explanation of delay as required by R. 193. The Executive Officer accepted the explanation in respect of two applications and granted refunds for those. For the remaining twenty applications the Executive Officer inquired into the explanation, found it incorrect, dismissed those applications and refused payment. The plaintiff instituted the present suit to recover the amount due under those twenty applications (Rs. 63-10-0), which resulted in a decree for the plaintiff that is now the subject of this revision application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit for refund of octroi lies within the cognizance of the Civil Court or is barred by Section 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act (i.e., whether the statutory provision ousts Civil Court jurisdiction).
  2. Whether the plaintiff was a person authorized to recover the refund amounts (i.e., whether the plaintiff, though named for receipt of payment, had authority to bring suit to recover the refunds).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant (Municipal Board of Jaunpur) — Contentions

  • The suit is not maintainable in the Civil Court because jurisdiction is barred by Section 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act (which precludes questioning of valuation, assessment or liability to be taxed except by the authority/mode provided in the Act).
  • The plaintiff is not a person entitled to recover the disputed amounts — the exporters were entitled to recover and the plaintiff was not their agent or representative authorized to enforce the right by instituting a suit.

Plaintiff (Banwari Lal) — Contentions (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff presented the revival applications under R. 193 and supplied explanations for delay; two such explanations were accepted and refunds granted for two applications, indicating the procedural remedy under the Code.
  • The plaintiff relied on the fact that he was nominated in the applications as the person to whom payment of refund was to be made and, apparently relying on Section 188 of the Contract Act, contended that this authority to receive payment entailed authority to adopt legal process (i.e., to sue) to recover the sums due.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1926 All 517 Where a statutory procedure is a condition precedent to a right and the claimant fails to comply with that procedure, the claimant cannot pursue the claim in the Civil Court. The Court found this decision inapplicable because here the procedural requirements of the Municipal Accounts Code were admitted to have been complied with in respect of the applications subject to the suit.
1934 ALJ 7392 Where a statute creates a liability and prescribes a special and particular remedy for enforcing it, that remedy must be followed and other remedies are not competent (absent contrary intent). The Court applied the principle to explain that if a special remedy had been provided in the Municipalities Act or Municipal Accounts Code it would preclude resort to the Civil Court; but as no special remedy existed here, the principle did not bar the Civil Court.
AIR 1935 All 760 A suit to recover octroi on the ground that goods were not chargeable involves an objection to assessment within the meaning of Section 164, and thus lies outside Civil Court jurisdiction. The Court held this precedent inapplicable because the present suit did not involve a challenge to assessment or to liability to be taxed; it was a claim to enforce a statutory refund right under the Municipal Accounts Code.
1936 ALJ 879 (Full Bench) Where a statutory right to remission or refund is created (e.g., by Section 151 of the Municipalities Act) and no contrary intention appears, such a statutory right is enforceable in a Court of law; Section 164 does not necessarily oust Civil Court jurisdiction to entertain claims for statutory refunds/remissions. The Court regarded this Full Bench decision as governing the present case and relied on it to reject the Municipal Board's contention that Section 164 ousted the Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a refund claim under the Municipal Accounts Code.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court divided its analysis into two main questions: (1) whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction, and (2) whether the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit.

1. Jurisdiction under Section 164.

Section 164 of the U.P. Municipalities Act provides that objections to valuation or assessment, or questioning of liability to be assessed or taxed, must be taken only by the authority/manner provided in the Act. The Municipal Board argued that this provision barred the Civil Court from entertaining the refund suit.

The Court examined the nature of the plaintiff's claim and the precedents relied on by the Municipal Board. It concluded that Section 164 could not apply because the plaintiff's claim did not challenge any valuation, assessment, or a person's liability to be assessed or taxed. Rather, the plaintiff was seeking enforcement of a statutory refund entitlement created by the Municipal Accounts Code (R. 178 and related rules). The Court noted that no express or necessarily implied provision in the Municipalities Act or the Municipal Accounts Code barred a person entitled to a refund from seeking enforcement in a Court of law.

The Court considered the cases cited by the Municipal Board. It held that those cases were distinguishable: AIR 1926 All 517 was about failure to comply with a condition precedent procedure (not the situation here); 1934 ALJ 7392 established the general principle that a statutory remedy must be followed where a special remedy is provided (but no such special remedy was here); AIR 1935 All 760 involved a direct objection to assessment (also not the present situation). The Full Bench decision in 1936 ALJ 879, which held that a statutory refund/remission right could be enforced in a Court of law and that Section 164 did not oust jurisdiction in that context, was found to govern the present case. On this basis, the Court rejected the Municipal Board's jurisdictional objection and held the suit to be within the Civil Court's cognizance.

2. Authority to sue (locus to maintain the suit).

The Court then addressed the Municipal Board's second ground: that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the disputed amounts because the exporters (the original entitled persons) were the ones who could sue and the plaintiff was neither their agent nor authorized representative to enforce the right by litigation.

The Court accepted this contention. It emphasized the legal distinction between the right to receive payment and the right to recover by legal process. The plaintiff had been authorized (in the applications' endorsements) only to receive payment; his name did not appear in column 4 of the Form 59 applications as the person authorized under the Rule to receive payment. The Court explained that authority to receive does not automatically include authority to sue for the amount. Section 188 of the Contract Act (an agent with authority to do an act has authority to do every lawful thing necessary to do that act) was considered but the Court held that it did not supply the missing authority to institute litigation: the examples and common-law distinctions show that power to receive payment may allow acts necessary to effect receipt but does not necessarily imply a power to sue.

The Court analogized to a moneylender appointing a collector or a shopkeeper authorizing a servant to receive payments — such appointees may be agents to receive payments but would not thereby have a right to sue the debtor. There was no evidence that the amounts had been transferred or assigned to the plaintiff, nor any evidence that the exporters had expressly authorized him to recover the sums by legal proceedings.

On these grounds the Court concluded that the plaintiff lacked the authority to maintain the suit.

Holding and Implications

Core ruling: Application allowed; the revision is allowed, the judgment and decree of the Court below are set aside, and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout.

Direct consequences:

  • The decree in favour of the plaintiff passed by the Munsif is vacated.
  • The plaintiff's suit to recover Rs. 63-10-0 (the amount claimed as refund on twenty applications) is dismissed.
  • Costs were awarded against the plaintiff throughout.

Broader implications: The Court reaffirmed that a statutory refund right which does not involve challenging an assessment or a liability to be taxed is enforceable in a Civil Court unless an express or necessary implication in the municipal statute or rules bars such remedy. However, the Court also clarified that being nominated to receive payment under administrative procedure does not, without more, confer authority to institute legal proceedings to recover the amount.

S.G/R.K

Order: Application allowed.

    Municipal Board v. Banwari Lal

    1. This is an application under Section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act, by the Municipal Board of Jaunpur seeking revision of a decree passed by the learned Munsif, Jaunpur, in the exercise of Small Cause Court powers in a suit brought by the opposite party Banwari Lal to recover a certain amount as refund of octroi under the rules laid down in the Municipal Accounts Code. The circumstances which led to the institution of the suit may briefly be stated. Between 14th and 18th May 1937, a number of merchants in Jaunpur despatched goods outside the municipal limits. As octroi duty would have been leviable on those goods if they had been imported within the Municipal limits, the exporters became entitled to receive payment of a sum equivalent to that duty as refund under R. 178, Municipal Accounts Code which runs as follows:

    A person who exports from a municipality any goods on which if they were being imported octroi would be leviable shall be entitled to receive payment of a sum equivalent to that octroi. This payment shall be described as refund.

    2. The Municipal Accounts Code also prescribes a certain procedure for obtaining payment of refund. The material provision in this connexion is to be found in R. 184 which runs as follows:

    In order to obtain payment of a refund the exporter shall cause to be presented at the head octroi office an application in Form 59. Cols. 1 to 10 of the form shall be filled in before presentation and the form shall be signed by the exporter or his representative authorized in writing in this behalf. The application may then be presented by the exporter in person or by a representative of the exporter. The entry in column of Form 59 is sufficient authority for payment of refund to the person named.

    3. In conformity with this Rule, twenty separate applications were made on behalf of the exporters in Form No. 59. It may he noted here that the plaintiff had admittedly nothing to do with the preparation or presentation of these applications as required by the Rule; nor was his name mentioned in column 4 of any of these applications as that of the person to whom according to the Rule payment of refund could be made. There is however in each application an endorsement at the end containing a request to the Municipal Board to pay the refund duty to the applicant. The endorsement in each case is signed either by the exporter or his authorized representative. The procedure prescribed in the. Municipal Accounts Code was followed with regard to these applications and it is admitted that they were duly presented and entered in the Refund Ledger as required lay R. 186. Now according to the Code these applications could be presented at the head octroi office either by the exporter or by the person authorized on the application to receive payment within one month of their registration in the Refund Ledger and in that case the Municipal Board would have been bound to make payment of the refund. It is admitted that the applications were not presented within that period and hence the claim for refund based on them lapsed under R. 192 which runs as follows:

    If an application for refund is not presented for payment within such period not exceeding one month after the registration of the application in the Refund Ledger as the Board may determine, the claim shall be considered to have lapsed.

    4. There is however a rule in the Code providing for the revival of lapsed claims which runs as follows:

    Rule 193. If the claim is subsequently revised the original application must be produced with an explanation of the delay. If the Refund Ledger has not been closed for the month under R. 191 the application shall be dealt with as if the claim had not lapsed. If however the Ledger has been dosed the application shall be renumbered and related and fresh entries made in columns 1 to 6 of the ledger in the same manner as for a new application.

    Provided that no application for the revival of the claim shall be entertained if presented after three months from the date of the registration of the original application in the Refund Ledger.

    5. In conformity with this Rule, the plain, tiff presented the above-mentioned twenty applications along with two others. In the petition made by the plaintiff while presenting these applications he gave an explanation of the delay as required by R. 193. The executive officer of the Municipal Board accepted the explanation in respect of two applications and accordingly granted refund of the amount due on their basis. As regards the remaining twenty applications which form the subject-matter of the present case the executive officer appears to have instituted an inquiry into the truth of the explanation of delay furnished by the plaintiff and finding as a result thereof that the explanation was not correct he dismissed them all and refused to make any payment on their basis. The total amount due under these applications was Rs. 63-10-0 and in order to recover that amount the plaintiff instituted the suit out of which the present application in revision arises. The two main grounds on which the suit has been resisted by the Municipal Board and which alone have to be considered for the purposes of the present application are firstly, that the plaintiff is not a person authorized to recover the amount in dispute and is not therefore entitled to maintain the suit; and secondly, that the suit does not lie within the cognizance of the Civil Court. I shall deal first with the latter ground which to my mind is not tenable. The argument on behalf the applicant is that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred by Section 164 of the U.P Municipalities Act (2 of 1916), which runs as follows:

    No objection shall be taken to a valuation or assessment, nor shall the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act.

    6. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the applicant relied upon the following three decisions of this Court: AIR 1926 All 517;1 1934 ALJ 7392 and AIR 1935 All 760.3 Having carefully considered all the cases, I find that they do nob lend any support to the learned counsel's contention and have no application to the facts of the present case. It is in my opinion perfectly clear that S. 164 cannot possibly apply to the present case because the claim to recover an amount as refund of octroi duty under the Rules referred to above does not involve any objection to valuation or assessment or the questioning of the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed. In fact no question either of valuation or assessment or of the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed arises at all in the present case. All that the plaintiff seeks is to recover a certain amount to which he says he is entitled under the rules laid down in the Municipal Accounts Code. The learned counsel for the applicant had to concede in the course of his arguments that S. 164 does not apply in terms to the present case and further that there is no provision either in the Municipal Accounts Code or in the Municipalities Act under which a person entitled to refund of octroi duty can enforce his right if it is unjustly or arbitrarily denied by the Municipal Board. Nor is there any provision for any appeal to any authority prescribed by the Municipalities Act against such a denial. A person entitled to refund of octroi duty under the statutory right conferred upon him by the Municipal Accounts Code must be deemed to have a remedy in a Court of law unless it is found that his claim is barred either expressly or by necessary implication by any provision contained in the Municipalities Act or in the Municipal Accounts Code. In the present case, the applicant has entirely failed to show that there is any such provision as would bar the plaintiff from enforcing his right in a Court of law. It must therefore be held that this suit was not beyond the cognizance of the Civil Court. None of the cases relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant has decided anything to the contrary. In AIR 1926 All 517 all that was held was that where according to the rules the right of an exporter of goods to get refund depends on his adopting the procedure for obtaining a refund, his failure to comply with such procedure prevents him from putting any claim to the refund in the Civil Court. This obviously has no application to the present case where it is admitted that the procedure as laid down in the Municipal Accounts Code was duly followed in respect of all the applications which are the subject-matter of the suit. In 1934 ALJ 7392 it was held that where a liability which did not exist prior to the enactment is created by the statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it then unless a contrary intention appears the remedy provided by the statute has to be followed and it is not competent to a party to pursue other forms of remedy.

    7. Upon this principle the claim of the Municipal Board, Bareilly, in that case to recover certain octroi dues by means of a suit in the Civil Court was repelled. This decision necessarily implies that where no special remedy is provided for the enforcement of a liability imposed by a particular statute the ordinary right to institute a suit in the Civil Court remains intact. In the present case it is admitted that there is no special remedy provided either by the Municipalities Act or by the Municipal Accounts Code for the enforcement of the right to refund of octroi by a person who acquires that right. It follows therefore that the case relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant affords no authority in the present case for holding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In AIR 1935 All 760 the plaintiff sought to recover a certain amount which had been levied from him as octroi duty on the ground that the goods in question were not chargeable with octroi at all. Such a claim clearly involved an objection to assessment within the meaning of Section 164 of the Municipalities Act, and hence it was held that no suit for a refund of octroi which has been assessed by the Municipal Board on goods imported lies in a Civil Court on the ground that the goods were not in fact assessable or that the amount of assessment was excessive. This has obviously no application to the facts of the present case. On the other hand, I find that the matter in dispute is set at rest by the Full Bench decision of this Court in 1936 ALJ 879.4 In that case the plaintiff who had been assessed to house and water tax claimed remission from the Municipal Board for a certain period during which his house had remained unoccupied and upon his claim being rejected brought a suit in the Civil Court to enforce his right. The suit was resisted by the Municipal Board on the ground that the cognizance of the Civil Court was barred by Section 164 of the Municipalities Act. This contention was repelled by the majority who held that the statutory right for remission or refund created in favour of the taxpayer by Section 151 of the Municipalities Act, was enforceable in a Court of law and the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such a claim was not ousted either expressly or by necessary implication by anything contained in S. 164 of the Act. That decision in my opinion fully governs the present case. I therefore reject the applicant's contention that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court.

    8. The next contention on behalf of the applicant is that the plaintiff had no right to maintain the suit because the persons who were entitled to recover the amount in dispute were the exporters and the plaintiff was not their agent or representative for the purpose of enforcing the right on their behalf. This contention is to my mind perfectly sound and must prevail. The learned Munsif has tried to meet this contention by reliance on the fact that the plaintiff was nominated in all the applications as the person to whom payment of refund was to be made and arguing upon that basis, presumably in view of Section 188 of the Contract Act, that the plaintiff must be deemed to have had also the authority of adopting any legal process for recovering the said amount. I am clearly of opinion that this argument is not well founded. It does not recognize the vital difference between the right to receive and the right to recover. A person who is entitled to a certain amount has a right which is clearly divisible into two parts—the right to recover and the right to receive payment. If the amount itself is transferred or assigned in accordance with the law both the rights pass to the transferee or the assignee. It is open to the person having title to delegate only one of the two rights which he possesses, namely the right to receive payment. Such a delegation does not necessarily involve also the delegation of the other right to recover. A moneylender can engage any person to make collection on his behalf from his debtors and such a person may become an agent for that particular purpose and a payment made to him may amount to a valid discharge of the debt; but it can hardly be argued with any show of reason that such a person would have the right to institute a suit on behalf of the moneylender for recovering any debt. A shopkeeper may employ a servant for sending bills to his customers and may authorize that servant to receive payments; but it can hardly be argued with any force that such a servant would have the right to institute a suit on behalf of the shopkeeper against a customer who refused to make the payment to him. The authority of an agent is strictly limited to acts which are permitted by the principal either expressly or by necessary implication. In the present case there is no suggestion that the amount due on account of refund was transferred or assigned to the plaintiff in his own right or that the plaintiff was expressly jauthorized to recover the amount. The mere fact that he was authorised to receive payment of the amount does not necessarily imply any authority to recover it by instituting a legal process. Section 188 of the Contract Act, upon which the learned Munsif has apparently relied, says nothing to the contrary. It runs as follows:

    An agent having an authority to do an act has authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary in order to do such act.

    9. Now the plaintiff in the present case had authority to receive payment of the refund from the Municipal Board and he could therefore do every lawful thing which was necessary in order to do that act. He could, for instance, make an application to the Municipal Board as he did. It does not necessarily follow that he could institute a suit for recovering the amount. The first illustration to S. 188 which might have influenced the mind of the learned Munsif clearly recognizes the difference between authority to receive payment and authority to recover a debt. In view of the facts mentioned above, the plaintiff in the present case had only the status of an agent or a servant employed on a small payment or commission by a number of merchants who wanted to save themselves the inconvenience and trouble of going to the office of the Municipal Board for making applications for refund of petty amounts. He had only been authorized to receive the amount, but there is nothing to show that he had further the authority to institute a legal process for recovering that amount. I therefore hold that the plaintiff had no right to maintain the suit. The result there, fore is that I allow this application in revision, and setting aside the judgment and decree of the Court below dismiss the plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.

    S.G/R.K

    10. Application allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Municipal Board v. Banwari Lal
    (Apr 25, 1939)