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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions of section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sections 396, 302 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code)
  • section 167 of the. Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 337.
  • section 344. Sub-section (3) of section 337
  • provisions of section 344(1) of the Code.
  • SECTION 167 A CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 344 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provisions of sections 61, 167, 170
  • sub-section (3) of section 337
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • sections 396, 302 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code)
  • section 167 of the. Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of sub-section (3) of section 337.
  • section 344. Sub-section (3) of section 337
  • provisions of section 344(1) of the Code.
  • SECTION 167 A CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • SECTION 344 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE
  • provisions of sections 61, 167, 170
  • sub-section (3) of section 337
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns two connected matters arising from the detention of one Hazari, a confessing accused (approver), and related revision and reference proceedings.

The first matter was an application in revision (Revision No. 445 of 1942) by Dan Bahadur Singh against an order of the Sessions Judge of Shahjahanpur declining to interfere with a Magistrate's order that Hazari be kept in police custody beyond the maximum 15 days permitted under section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court did not decide this application on the merits because, after the application was made, the investigation finished, the accused were committed for trial, and Hazari was tendered a pardon under section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and detained under sub-section (3) of section 337. The judge dismissed that revision application as academic.

The second matter is Criminal Reference No. 580 of 1942. On 15 June 1942 Hazari was tendered a pardon under section 337. The Magistrate then considered whether, under sub-section (3) of section 337 (which provides that such person shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial unless already on bail), Hazari should be detained in police custody or in judicial/jail custody. The Magistrate made inquiries of jail and police superintendents, asked Hazari's wishes, considered an application by the accused in the main case requesting that the approver be sent to jail rather than remain in police custody, and referred to two Lahore High Court cases. The Magistrate decided not to disturb Hazari's current custody (police custody) pending the expected outcome of the revision application to this Court.

An application in revision against the Magistrate's order was made to the Sessions Judge on 4 July 1942. The Sessions Judge, by an order on 20 July, referred the matter to this Court (Criminal Reference No. 580 of 1942), recommending that the Magistrate's order be set aside as illegal when passed, but declining to recommend a replacement order and leaving that to this Court after hearing the full circumstances.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the term "detained in custody" in sub-section (3) of section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contemplates detention in police custody or refers to judicial/jail custody.
  2. Whether the detention of the approver Hazari in police custody after the pardoning under section 337 was lawful (in particular, whether such detention was permissible beyond the limits prescribed by section 167).
  3. Whether the general scheme of the Code (notably sections 61, 167, 170, 171 and 344) constrains a Magistrate to order detention of a witness or approver only in judicial custody (jail) except where the context expressly permits police custody.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Dan Bahadur Singh) Arguments

  • Relied strongly on two Lahore High Court cases and other authorities holding that the "custody" referred to in section 344 of the Code is always jail or judicial custody and can never be police custody.
  • Argued that the Code deliberately limits detention in police custody (section 167) and that subsequently remand under section 344 contemplates judicial custody under the Prisons Act; therefore, custody generally means judicial custody unless the context indicates otherwise.

Respondent's (Deputy Government Advocate) Arguments

  • Conceded that custody under section 344 must be jail custody but contended that sub-section (3) of section 337 uses different wording ("detained in custody") and therefore need not mean jail custody in every case.
  • Pointed out that sub-section (3) of section 337 does not invariably require detention because it contemplates cases in which the approver is already on bail.
  • Relied on one Lahore case's view that an approver is to be regarded as a witness rather than as an accused and argued that this supports the proposition that detention under s.337(3) need not be judicial custody in all circumstances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Queen-Empress v. Engadu Distinguished police custody under section 167 from the custody under remand in section 344; custody under section 344 is the custody provided for under the Prisons Act for under-trial prisoners. The court relied on the passage quoted from this case to support the proposition that custody under section 344 is judicial custody distinct from police custody and that section 167 limits police custody to specified periods.
In re Nagendra Nath Chakravarti Held that the custody mentioned in section 344 is different from police custody and is intended for under-trial prisoners; referred to sections 61, 167, 170 and 344. The court cited this decision to reinforce the view that remand custody under section 344 is judicial custody and distinct from police custody.
Kundan Lal v. The Crown (Lahore High Court) One of the Lahore High Court cases considered on the question whether custody of approver must be judicial custody (the court considered both Lahore decisions together). The judge considered this case but found the reasoning in the companion Lahore decision (Khairati Ram) to be more persuasive; the decision assisted in framing the discussion on the meaning of "custody."
In the matter of the detention of the Approver Khairati Ram (Lahore High Court) Expressed that nothing in the Code justifies detention of a witness in police custody; held an approver is to be regarded as a witness and that law did not contemplate detention in police custody after the 15-day maximum period. The court found the reasoning of this case convincing and adopted its view that there is nothing in the Code to justify detention of an approver/witness in police custody and that custodial detention should be judicial custody.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two parts: first addressing the revision application (No. 445 of 1942) as moot, then analyzing Criminal Reference No. 580 of 1942 on its merits.

On the moot revision: the judge noted that the investigation had since been completed, the accused committed for trial, and Hazari had been tendered a pardon under section 337 and detained under sub-section (3) of section 337. Because the factual circumstances had changed, the question raised in revision No. 445 of 1942 no longer arose and the application was dismissed as academic.

On the reference concerning detention under sub-section (3) of section 337, the court reviewed the statutory framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure:

  • Section 167 restricts police custody of an accused initially to 24 hours and permits extension by magistrate only up to a maximum of 15 days in the aggregate; thereafter the accused must be sent to jail or judicial custody and remanded under section 344(1).
  • Section 344 refers to remand custody for under-trial prisoners, which the authorities treat as judicial custody provided under the Prisons Act.
  • For witnesses, section 171 (and the proviso) contemplates police custody only to bring a witness before the Magistrate and thereafter magisterial detention in jail or judicial custody until execution of a bond or completion of hearing; the Code contains no provision permitting a Magistrate to detain a witness otherwise than in judicial custody.

The court considered the semantic argument that wording differences (e.g., "detained in custody" in s.337(3) versus "remand to custody" in s.344) might allow different meanings. The judge found little significance in that difference and accepted the applicant's broader argument that the Code, by its structure and deliberate limits (sections 61, 167, 170, 171, 344), generally treats "custody" as judicial custody unless the context clearly indicates police custody or gives the Magistrate discretion to decide the nature of custody.

The court reviewed the precedents cited (Queen-Empress v. Engadu and In re Nagendra Nath Chakravarti) which distinguish police custody from remand/judicial custody and referred to the two Lahore High Court decisions. The judge stated that he found the reasoning in In the matter of the detention of the Approver Khairati Ram more convincing than in Kundan Lal v. The Crown. The Lahore decisions supported the proposition that there is nothing in the Code justifying detention of a witness in police custody and that an approver is to be regarded as a witness; they also indicated that even if an approver were treated as an accused person, detention beyond the 15-day police custody limit was not contemplated.

Applying these principles to the facts, the judge concluded that Hazari's detention in police custody under the circumstances of this case was illegal. He rejected the argument that exceptional circumstances justified departure from the Lahore cases' strict view. He observed that any risks from detaining Hazari in jail were matters for the Superintendent of the jail to address, guided by the Jail Manual.

On this basis, the court accepted the Sessions Judge's reference and directed that Hazari be removed from police custody and detained in judicial custody in future.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that Hazari's detention in police custody was illegal and directed that he be removed from police custody and detained in judicial (jail) custody going forward. The earlier revision application (No. 445 of 1942) was dismissed as academic because events rendered that challenge moot.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Hazari must be transferred from police custody to judicial/jail custody; the revision application was dismissed as academic and required no further relief.
  • The court adopted and applied existing authorities (including Lahore High Court decisions and the cited rulings) to interpret the Code's scheme concerning custody; the judge emphasized that "custody" in the Code normally means judicial custody unless context clearly indicates police custody.
  • The opinion does not contain an express statement that it establishes a new precedent. It proceeds by applying and aligning with prior decisions and statutory interpretation to resolve the question presented in this case.

Let the record of Criminal Reference No. 580 of 1942 be returned.

    Emperor v. Dan Bahadur Singh

    Yorke, J.:— The first of these two matters is an application in revision by Dan Bahadur Singh against an order of the Sessions Judge of Shahjahanpur declining to interfere with the order of a first class Magistrate directing that one Hazari a confessing accused, should the kept in police custody beyond the maximum period of 15 days prescribed by section 167 of the. Code of Criminal Procedure. I do not propose to deal with this application because since it was made the investigation of that, case has been finished and the accused have been committed for trial to the court of session. The accused Hazari has been tendered a pardon under the provisions of section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and he is now detained in custody not under the order to which the application in revision No. 445 of 1942 relates but under an order of the Magistrate made under the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 337. It is conceded that, in these circumstances, the question which arose in revision No. 445 of 1942 no longer arises and the matter becomes really of an academic nature only. I accordingly dismiss this application.

    I come now to the connected matter, Criminal Reference No. 580 of 1942. On the 15th June, 1942, a pardon was tendered to the confessing accused, Hazari, under the provisions of section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the same day the Magistrate considered the question of the detention of Hazari with reference to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 337. That sub-section provides: “Such person, unless he is already on bail, shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial.” The Magistrate heard arguments on the question whether the custody in which Hazari should be ordered to be detained under this sub-section could or could not be police custody. He made inquiries from the Superintendent of the Shahjahanpur jail as also from the Superintendent of Police as to whether they could guarantee the safety of Hazari and he also made inquiries as to the wishes of Hazari himself. He also considered an application made on behalf of the accused in the case (a very serious case under sections 396, 302 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code) asking that the approver should be sent to jail and not allowed to remain in police custody. He considered two cases of the Lahore High Court to which I shall make reference later and also the peculiar circumstances of the present case and he decided that if was not advisable to disturb the present custody of Hazari as he expected the matter to be decided shortly on the revision application to this Court to which I have referred earlier. Against this order an application was made in revision to the Sessions Judge of Shahjahanpur on the 4th July, 1942, upon which the learned Sessions Judge has on the 20th July, made the present reference to this Court recommending that the order of the learned Magistrate be set aside as in his opinion it was illegal at, the time it was passed. He said that he was not prepared to make any recommendation as to what order should be passed in its place, because this would depend entirely on whether this Court, after hearing the full circumstances of this present case considers that they justify a departure from the principle laid down by the Lahore High Court.

    I have listened to a very full argument by learned counsel on behalf of Dan Bahadur Singh (the applicant in revision in the court of the Sessions Judge). He has relied strongly on the two cases of the Lahore High Court referred to by the learned Sessions Judge and some other cases in which it has been held that the custody referred to, in section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is always jail or judicial custody and can never be police custody. On the other hand, the learned Deputy Government. Advocate, contends that even, if it be the case, as he concedes it is, that the custody provided for by section 344 must be jail custody, it does not follow that the custody referred to in sub-section (3) of section 337 is necessarily jail custody. He points out that the wording of this sub-section differs markedly from the wording of section 344. sub-section (3) of section 337 provides merely that such person shall be detained in custody until the termination of the trial, whereas section 344 provides for the remanding of an accused to custody by a warrant. It is, of course, evident that there is a considerable difference in the language of the two sections and it is also necessary to note that sub-section (3) of section 337 does not require that an approver, should invariably be detained in custody since the sub-section itself visualises cases where the approver is already on bail, in which case the law does not require his detention in custody. The learned Deputy Government Advocate relies on the view taken in one of the Lahore cases that an approver is not to be regarded any longer as an accused but is to be regarded as a witness and he contends, in these circumstances, that it cannot be regarded as a binding rule that the detention must be detention in jail or judicial custody.

    I am not inclined to think that there is any great significance in the use of the words “detained in custody” as contrasted with the words “remand to custody” in the two sections. It seems to me that there is much force in the argument put forward by learned counsel for the applicant, Dan Bahadur Singh, that in the Code of Criminal Procedure the legislature has deliberately and very carefully placed limits upon detention either of accused persons or of witnesses in police custody. Section 167 deals with the detention of an accused person in police custody and limits it in the first instance to 24 hours which may be extended by a competent Magistrate to a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. Thereafter the accused person has to be sent to jail or judicial custody to which a Magistrate may from time to time remand him under the provisions of section 344(1) of the Code. That this custody to which section 344 relates is necessarily judicial custody (1) follows from the limitations prescribed by section 167 and (2) has been held in a number of cases, though in most of them rather incidentally. The clearest case of those quoted to me is Queen-Empress v. Engadu(1). At page 101 Brandt, J., remarked: “Under an order made under section 167, Criminal Procedure Code, the accused person is detained in the custody of the police, or in such other custody as the Magistrate making the order thinks fit. Ordinarily, no doubt, he will be in the custody of the police. Such detention is altogether different from the custody in which an accused person is kept under remand given under section 344, Criminal Procedure Code; which is the custody provided by the legislature for under trial prisoners,” that is the custody which is to be provided under the Prisons Act. Similarly in In re Nagendra Nath Chakravarti(2), at page 412 the learned Judges remarked: “But the custody mentioned in section 344 is quite different (from police custody) and is intended for under-trial prisoners.” They went on to refer to the provisions of sections 61, 167, 170 and 344 of the Code.

    In the case of, witnesses the powers of the police are more circumscribed. Section 171 empowers the police only to forward a witness in custody if he refuses to attend or to execute a bond as directed in section 170. The section further gives power to the Magistrate to detain the witness in custody until he executes such a bond or until the hearing of the case is completed. The proviso which gives this power obviously contemplates first police custody until the witness reaches the Magistrate, and then magisterial custody, that is to say detention in jail or judicial custody. Learned counsel have not been able to show me any provision in the Code which would enable a Magistrate to detain a witness otherwise than in judicial custody.

    In the light of the lengthy discussion of this subject in the two cases of the Lahore High Court to which I shall now come, I do not think it would serve any purpose to enter into a detailed discussion of the matter. It will be sufficient for me to say that for myself I think that the frame of the Code, that, is to say the procedure contemplated in the case of accused persons by sections 61, 167 and 344 and in the case, of witnesses by the proviso to section 171, makes it clear that speaking generally the word “custody” in the Code always means judicial custody, save only where the context clearly indicates either that it is police custody or that the Magistrate has been given liberty to decide what the custody shall be. I am confirmed in this view by the decisions in the Lahore cases, Kundan Lal v. The Crown and In the matter of the detention of the Approver Khairati Ram. With great respect, I find the arguments put forward in the latter case more convincing than those in the former. The learned Judges expressed the view, with which I find it impossible to disagree, that there is nothing in the Code which justifies an order for the detention of a witness in police custody and that an approver is to be regarded as a witness. Similarly they expressed the view that even if an approver were to be regarded as an accused person (although they expressly declined to accept that contention) the law did not contemplate the detention of an accused person in police custody after the expiry of the maximum period of 15 days from his arrest.

    In my judgment, the detention of the approver, Hazari, in police custody in the present case is illegal and must be terminated. I am not impressed by the argument that the circumstances of the case may justify departing from the strict view taken in the Lahore cases. Either the detention in the police custody is legal or it is illegal and if it is illegal, it must be terminated. As regards the peculiar circumstances and the risks to which the detention of Hazari in the jail may give rise, it is the duty of the Superintendent of the jail to take the necessary precautions and, indeed, there are provisions in the Jail Manual directed to that end. On this view of the matter, I accept the reference and direct that the approver, Hazari, be removed from police custody and detained in judicial custody in future.

    Let the record of Criminal Reference No. 580 of 1942 be returned.

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    Emperor v. Dan Bahadur Singh
    (Nov 13, 1942)