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  • provisions of sections 44 and 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926.
  • provisions of section 242 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1959,
  • provisions of section 291 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939,
  • provisions of the second sub-section of section 180,
  • provisions of section 273 of the Agra Tenancy Act
  • U.P Tenancy Act, 1939. Section 180 of that Act
  • section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939,
  • Section 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926,
  • section 288 of the U.P Tenancy Act.
  • section 180 of the Tenancy Act
  • section 44 of the Tenancy Act
  • Agra Tenancy Act, 1926,
  • Tenancy Act, 1939,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of sections 44 and 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926.
  • provisions of section 242 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1959,
  • provisions of section 291 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939,
  • provisions of the second sub-section of section 180,
  • provisions of section 273 of the Agra Tenancy Act
  • U.P Tenancy Act, 1939. Section 180 of that Act
  • section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939,
  • Section 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926,
  • section 288 of the U.P Tenancy Act.
  • section 180 of the Tenancy Act
  • section 44 of the Tenancy Act
  • Agra Tenancy Act, 1926,
  • Tenancy Act, 1939,
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Allsop, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant instituted a suit for possession of plots of agricultural land. The defendants pleaded that they were tenants, having obtained a lease from the lambardar, who was not the plaintiff. The learned Munsif sent an issue to the revenue court to decide whether the defendants were properly tenants. The revenue court found that the defendants were tenants. The Munsif dismissed the suit on two grounds: (1) the defendants were tenants; and (2) the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

The plaintiff appealed. The lower appellate court held that the defendants were not tenants but nevertheless held that the civil court had no jurisdiction, directing that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court. The plaintiff then appealed to this Court contending that the civil court did have jurisdiction. The matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench because of the difficulty arising from prior decisions and statutory interpretation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain a suit for ejectment/possession of agricultural land when the defendant had pleaded tenancy.
  2. How provisions of the Tenancy legislation (in particular sections corresponding to section 44 and section 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, and sections 180 and 242 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939) affect the forum — i.e., whether such provisions oust civil jurisdiction and require suit in the revenue court.
  3. Whether the jurisdictional question depends on the allegations in the plaint (proprietary/trespass claim) or on the defence subsequently raised.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muhammad Muslim v. Maharania Held that where the allegations in the plaint make out a case of pure trespass (i.e., the defendant is asserting proprietary title), the civil court may be the proper forum; section 44 (Agra Tenancy Act) provides a limited damages remedy in the revenue court but does not necessarily oust civil jurisdiction for trespass claims. The Court respectfully concurs with the decision's core reasoning: that suits against pure trespassers may be brought in the civil court and that section 44 was intended to provide a speedy remedy in the revenue court where the owner was prepared to accept the statutory limit of damages.
Raji v. Ram Lagan Followed Muhammad Muslim and emphasised that section 44 gives a remedy with a limited amount of damages. Cited as part of the line of authority that recognised a proprietor's option to sue in civil court or to use the limited remedy in the revenue court.
Jagdamba Singh v. Ram Sarup A case where the plaint asserted that the defendant claimed title as a tenant; nevertheless, the Judge relied on Muhammad Muslim and emphasised the speedy remedy aspect of section 44. Cited to show the application of Muhammad Muslim reasoning even where tenancy was alleged in the plaint; used in the discussion of the scope of remedies under the Tenancy Act.
Dan Sakai v. Jairam Singh Appeared to support the contention that the suit should have been instituted in the revenue court (i.e., favours revenue forum). Not followed; the Court notes it seemed to support the revenue-court view but was decided contrary to the Full Bench decision in Muhammad Muslim.
Lachhmina Kunwari v. Makfula Kumuari Held that the proprietor could either sue a trespasser in the civil court or avail himself of the remedy under section 44 in the revenue court. Cited as part of a current of decisions supporting the proprietor's option between civil and revenue remedies under the earlier statute.
Parmeshwari Das v. Angan Lal Held there was no substantial difference between section 180 (U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939) and section 44 (Agra Tenancy Act, 1926). The Court respectfully departs from aspects of this decision because it observed that the second sub-section of section 180 (which was apparently not considered in that case) materially affects the interpretation: section 180(2) indicates the provision is directed to persons setting up tenancy rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from statutory text and prior decisions. The starting point is that earlier decisions (especially Muhammad Muslim v. Maharania) established that plaintiffs alleging pure trespass against proprietary title could sue in the civil court, while section 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act provided a limited alternative remedy in the revenue court.

With the enactment of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, the relevant provisions were re‑enacted and modified. Section 180(1) of the 1939 Act resembles section 44 in providing for ejectment and damages up to four times annual rental; critically, section 180(2) states that if no suit is brought under section 180 or a decree is not executed within the prescribed period of limitation, the person in possession becomes a hereditary tenant. The Court reasons that the second sub‑section demonstrates that section 180 is directed at persons who are asserting a tenancy interest — i.e., those claiming to hold as tenants — not at pure trespassers who assert proprietary title.

The Court further notes that section 242 of the 1939 Act (analogous to section 230 of the 1926 Act) omits the word "adequate" before "relief," meaning that a plaintiff cannot now institute a civil suit if relief could be obtained in the revenue court — the sufficiency/adequacy test of earlier cases is no longer present in the same terms. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that jurisdiction does not depend on an abstract comparison of remedies but on the nature of the allegations in the plaint at the time the suit is instituted.

The Court articulates a controlling distinction:

  • If the plaint alleges that the defendant is a pure trespasser and is denying the plaintiff's proprietary title, the civil court is the proper forum.
  • If the plaint alleges that the defendant is setting up an interest to hold the land as a tenant, the revenue court is the proper forum under the Tenancy Act.
The Court emphasises that jurisdiction depends on the state of affairs and the allegations before the suit is instituted, not on the defence subsequently raised. A plaintiff cannot obtain jurisdiction by making false allegations; similarly, a plea of tenancy raised before institution may properly oust civil jurisdiction.

The Court also refers to section 288 (explanation) (referred to in the opinion) which provides that a plea of tenancy which is clearly untenable and intended only to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court shall not be deemed to raise a plea of tenancy. The Court interprets that explanation as aimed at pleas of tenancy known to the plaintiff before institution; it reinforces the view that a bona fide absence of a tenant plea in the plaint means the civil court may have jurisdiction.

On the facts of the present case, the plaint plainly alleged that the defendants were setting up their right as tenants (i.e., the plaint contained the allegation of tenancy). Given this, and in light of the statutory scheme and the Court's statutory interpretation, the civil court had no jurisdiction to hear the suit.

The Court expressly declined to decide an alternative contention under section 291 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, because it was not argued and involved issues previously dealt with by a Full Bench.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED WITH COSTS. The Court upheld the lower appellate court's conclusion that the civil court had no jurisdiction because the plaint alleged that the defendants were asserting tenancy rights.

Implications of the decision as stated in the opinion:

  • Jurisdiction to entertain suits for possession of agricultural land under the Tenancy legislation depends on the allegations in the plaint at the time of institution: civil courts have jurisdiction where the plaintiff alleges the defendant is a pure trespasser denying proprietary title; revenue courts have jurisdiction where the plaintiff alleges the defendant is claiming tenancy rights.
  • The distinction is reinforced by the second sub-section of section 180 (U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939), which shows the statutory provision is directed to persons setting up tenancy claims (and contemplates conversion to hereditary tenant upon lapse of limitation if no action is taken under the section).
  • The omission of the word "adequate" from section 242 (compared to the earlier Act) strengthens the statutory scheme by making the availability of relief in the revenue court (irrespective of whether it is termed "adequate") a bar to civil suit in appropriate cases; nevertheless, the core test remains the nature of allegations in the plaint.
  • The Court did not decide issues under section 291 and did not purport to overrule earlier Full Bench decisions beyond the interpretive clarifications it supplies; its central practical effect is to confirm that where tenancy is pleaded before suit, the civil court is without jurisdiction.

This summary is confined to the matters expressly stated in the provided opinion and does not infer facts or arguments that are not contained therein.

    D.N. Rege v. Kazi Muhammad Haider

    Allsop, J.:— The suit which has given rise to this appeal was instituted by the plaintiff-appellant in order to recover possession over plots of agricultural land. The defendants pleaded that they were tenants, having obtained a lease from the lam bardar who was a person other than the plaintiff. The learned Munsif in whose court the suit was instituted sent an issue to the revenue court upon the question whether the defendants were properly tenants of the land. The revenue court found that they were tenants. The Munsif thereupon dismissed the suit upon two grounds, namely, (1) that the defendants were tenants and (2) that the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

    The plaintiff appealed and the lower appellate court held that the defendants were not tenants but that the civil court had no jurisdiction. The learned Judge of the lower appellate court, therefore, directed that the plaint should be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court.

    Against this order the plaintiff has filed an appeal to this Court upon the ground that the civil court had jurisdiction. The appeal came before a Bench of this Court which suggested that it should go before a larger Bench as the question at issue was one of some difficulty. The appeal has, therefore, come before this Bench of three Judges.

    The difficulty arises on account of previous decisions of this Court. Section 44 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, was as follows:

    “A person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land without the consent of the landholder and in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall be liable to ejectment on the suit of the landholder and also to pay damages which may extend to four times the annual rental value at the rates applicable to statutory tenants.”

    Section 230 of the Act was as follows:

    “Subject to the provisions of section 271 (which deals with the adjudication by civil courts on issues of title raised in revenue courts) all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule (which includes suits under section 44) shall be heard and determined by the revenue court and no courts other than a revenue court shall, except by way of appeal or revision as provided in this Act, take cognizance of any such suit or application, or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which adequate relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application.”

    The question arose in the case of Muhammad Muslim v. Maharania(1) whether a suit by a zamindar against a trespasser could be filed in a civil court. In that case the plaintiff had asserted that he was the proprietor of the land which had been in the occupation of a tenant and that on the tenant's death the defendant had occupied the land and was in wrongful possession as a trespasser. The defendant contended that the civil court could not entertain the suit because of the provisions of sections 44 and 230 of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. The learned Judges said that they had to decide whether the intention of the legislature was to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court completely in respect of suits relating to agricultural land. They had already mentioned that the allegations in the plaint made out a case of trespass, pure and simple. The learned Judges pointed out that there was a maximum limit prescribed for the amount of damages which could be claimed under section 44, although a larger amount might be claimed by way of mesne profits in a civil court. They thought that the legislature could not be presumed to have taken away the proprietor's right to claim the full amount of mesne profits from a trespasser. They then expressed the opinion that section 44 was probably enacted in order to allow facilities to an owner of agricultural land in seeking a speedy remedy through the revenue court if the defendant had taken possession without his consent and if he was prepared to accept damages up to the maximum prescribed. They also referred to the provisions of section 273 of the Agra Tenancy Act which was in the following terms:

    “(1) If in any suit relating to an agricultural holding instituted in a civil court the defendant pleads that he holds such land as the tenant of the plaintiff or of a person in possession holding from the plaintiff, the civil court shall frame an issue on the plea of tenancy and submit the record to the appropriate revenue court for decision of that issue only…”

    They thought that the provisions of this section would be superfluous if it were to be held that no suit about the possession of an agricultural holding could be filed in the civil court it seems to us that the learned Judges were really intending to decide that there might be cases against trespassers on agricultural land which could be instituted in the civil court and this is a decision with which we would respectfully concur. We are, however, inclined to think that the decision might have been based upon another ground, namely, that the jurisdiction of a court to take cognizance of a suit depends upon the allegations in the plaint and that the civil court is the proper forum where those allegations are that the defendant is a pure and simple trespasser against the proprietary title as was asserted in the case with which the learned Judges were dealing whereas the proper forum is the revenue court if the assertion is that the defendant is setting himself up merely as a tenant and is trespassing against the tenancy rights. In the case of Raji v. Ram Lagan the learned Judges followed the decision in Muhammad Muslim v. Maharania, but emphasised the point that section 44 gave a remedy with a limited amount of damages. The case of Jagdamba Singh v. Ram Sarup(2) was one in which the plaint asserted that the defendant was setting up a title as a tenant. The learned Judge N of this Court who decided the case however still relied on the case of Muhammad Muslim v. Maharania and emphasised that part of the judgment in the case which said that section 44 was enacted in order to allow facilities to an owner of agricultural land in seeking a speedy remedy through the revenue court. He mentioned another case, Dan Sakai v. Jairam Singh(3) which seemed to support the contention that the suit should have been instituted in the revenue court but decided that was contrary to the decision of the Full Bench and that the case before him could not be distinguished from that decision. We may mention that the decision in the case of Muhammad Muslim v. Maharania was a decision of a Bench of three Judges of the Court. Then there is a case of Lachhmina Kunwari v. Makfula Kumuari(4) in which the learned fudges relying on the case of Muhammad Muslim v. Maharania held that it was open to the proprietor of agricultural land either to sue a trespasser for ejectment in the civil court or to avail himself of the speedy remedy provided by section 44 of the Tenancy Act and to file a suit for ejectment and for damages in the revenue court.

    There can be no doubt that there was a current of decisions based on the case of Muhammad Muslim v. Maharania that it was open to a proprietor when the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, was in force to sue a trespasser either in the civil court or under section 44 of the Tenancy Act in the revenue court. As the Tenancy Act was, in general, intended to control the relations of landlords and tenants with the exception of suits between admitted co-sharers for arrears of revenue and profits, we are inclined to think ourselves that, it was always the intention of the legislature that a suit for ejectment of a trespasser under that Act was intended to be a suit against a person who was not claiming that he had any proprietary interest in the land but we might have felt bound to follow the previous decisions if there had been no amendment of the Tenancy Act. The law is now contained in the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939. Section 180 of that Act is as follows:

    “(1) A person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled, or when the joint consent of more than one person is required on the suit of any one, or more of such persons, and also to pay damages, which may extend to four times the annual rental value calculated in accordance with the sanctioned rates applicable to hereditary tenants.

    (2) If no suit is brought under this section or a decree obtained under this section is not executed the persons in possession shall on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit or for the execution of such decree, as the case may be, become a hereditary tenant of such plot or plots.”

    It was certainly held in the case of Parmeshwari Das v. Angan Lal that there was no substantial difference between section 180 of the Act of 1939 and section 44 of the Act of 1926, but the attention of the learned Judges was not directed to the second sub-section of section 180. Section 242 of the Act of 1939 is in much the same terms as section 230 of the Act of 1926, but it is to be noticed that the word “adequate” has been omitted before the word relief so that a plaintiff cannot now institute a suit in the civil court if he can obtain relief in the revenue court. It is immaterial whether the relief is adequate. The learned Judges who decided the case of Parmeshwari Das v. Angan Lal agreed that the word ‘relief’ might not mean the entire relief claimed but they thought that it could not mean insignificant relief and that the relief referred to must be the relief claimed by the plaintiff or a substantial portion of it. With the greatest respect we doubt whether it can fairly be said that a decree for ejectment together with damages amounting to four times the annual rental value calculated in accordance with the sanctioned rates applicable to hereditary tenants would be an insignificant relief. However that may be, our main reason for respectfully differing from the learned Judges arises out of the provisions of the second sub-section of section 180, which were apparently not brought to their notice. It seems to us quite clear from the provisions of this second sub-section that the section itself applies to persons who are setting up a claim to an interest in the land as tenants and not to persons who are setting up an interest as proprietors. The legislature could surely not have intended that a person who never claimed to be a tenant at all should, by the failure of the proprietor to sue or to execute a decree for ejectment under section 180, obtain the rights of an hereditary tenant Under the fourth schedule to the Tenancy Act, 1939, the period of limitation for a suit under section 180 would now generally be either six years or three years. If section 180 of the Tenancy Act was intended to apply to persons who were not claiming tenancy rights in the land but were setting themselves up as proprietors we would get the extraordinary result that a mere trespasser who never claimed, any tenancy rights would, by process of law, become an hereditary tenant if he had not been sued under section 180 within the period prescribed. If he was sued in the civil court after the expiry of the prescribed period he might claim in the alternative that he had the rights of a statutory tenant and was entitled to remain in possession as such, even if it was found that he had no proprietary interest in the land. Most of our litigation about land is concerned with revenue paying mahals, that is, zamindari land, and a mahal is not an abstraction but is by definition an area of land. Nobody could surely think that a defendant in a suit about proprietary title could set up that he was at least an hereditary tenant of plots of, agricultural land in a mahal or at least of any plots in the mahal of which he had taken actual cultivating possession as his sir or khudkasht. We, therefore, think that there cannot be any doubt now that the distinction between an ordinary suit against a trespasser in a civil court and a suit under section 180 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, is that the plaintiff in the first case alleges that the defendant is setting up a title against his proprietary interest whereas in the second case the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is setting up a title to hold the land as a tenant. We do not think that section 180 applies at all to cases in which the defendant has never given the plaintiff reason to think that he is setting up a claim to be the proprietor of the land and conversely that a suit in a civil court does not lie when the defendant has given the plaintiff reason to think that he is claiming an interest as a tenant. We would point out that the jurisdiction of a court does not depend upon the defence which is set up after the suit is instituted but upon the state of affairs, which existed before the institution of the suit. We are not to be understood to express the opinion that a plaintiff can give either the civil court or the revenue court jurisdiction by making false allegations, in his plaint. It may be thought that there may be cases in which the plaintiff would not know what position the defendant was claiming to occupy but we think that such cases would be very few indeed. The plaintiff would in most cases know on what grounds the defendant was claiming to be in possession of the land and if he did not, it would be open to him by means of notice or otherwise to inquire before he instituted the suit. We feel that a plaintiff should as far as possible ascertain the facts before he files a plaint. If he had reason to believe that the defendant was setting up a proprietary title he would rightly institute a suit in the civil court and if the defendant then set up a plea of tenancy, a reference could be made under section 288 of the U.P Tenancy Act. The explanation to that section says that a plea of tenancy which is clearly untenable and intended only to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court shall not be deemed to raise a plea of tenancy. We confess that explanation might suggest that a plea of tenancy properly raised would oust the jurisdiction of the civil court, but for the reasons we have given we think it must be held to apply to a plea of tenancy which was raised before the institution of the suit to the knowledge of the plaintiff. The explanation strengthens our opinion that the civil court would necessarily have jurisdiction if there was no plea of tenancy. We think that it is very difficult in view of the provisions of section 242 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1959, to hold that the civil court and revenue court can in any case have concurrent jurisdiction and we would hold, therefore, that the jurisdiction is not concurrent but depends on the allegations made in the plaint provided those allegations are established to be true. The civil court has no jurisdiction where a claim to a tenancy has been set up before the institution of the suit and the revenue court has no jurisdiction where it has not been so set up.

    In the present case no difficulty arises because it is quite clear from the allegations made in the plaint that the defendant was setting up his right as a tenant and not as a proprietor of the land in suit. That being so, the learned Judge of the lower appellate court was right in holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction.

    We have not been asked in the alternative to hold that the learned Judge of the lower appellate court should have decided the suit under the provisions of section 291 of the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, and consequently we express no opinion on the point. It was doubtless not raised on account of a decision of a Full Bench of this Court which might or might not be upheld if the matter came up before a larger Bench which was capable of reconsidering it. We may add that the decision on the question of tenancy can be of no effect one way or the other since the learned Judge has held that it was recorded in the course of proceedings arising out of a suit with which the court in which the suit was instituted had no jurisdiction to deal.

    In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    D.N. Rege v. Kazi Muhammad Haider
    (Feb 21, 1946)