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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 132, clause (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of rule 4, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • correct, rule 1 of order XXYI of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of rule 3, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • rule 1, order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • rule 3, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • rule 4, order X of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 132, clause (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of rule 4, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • correct, rule 1 of order XXYI of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of rule 3, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provisions of section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • rule 1, order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • rule 3, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • rule 4, order X of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a plaintiff's appeal arising from a suit instituted by Mst. Sundar Devi against defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the Subordinate Judge's court at Jaunpur. Defendant No. 1, a solicitor practising in Bombay, had previously obtained a decree against the plaintiff from the Bombay High Court on 23rd November 1927. The plaintiff sought a declaration that this decree was not binding on her. During the proceedings, after issues were settled, a commission was issued to record evidence at Benares. While examining witness Mst. Lakhpati, the defendants suspected tutoring behind a parda, which was reported to the court. The defendants requested further cross-examination of both Mst. Lakhpati and the plaintiff in Jaunpur. The court directed the plaintiff to appear personally on 5th January 1929, warning of consequences for non-appearance. The plaintiff failed to appear, and the suit was dismissed for default of prosecution. The present appeal challenges this dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a pardanashin lady can be compelled to attend court personally under Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. The scope and applicability of rules under the Code of Civil Procedure, specifically rule 1, order XXVI; rule 3, order V; and rule 4, order X, in compelling attendance of a party who is a pardanashin lady.
  3. The correctness of the dismissal of the suit for non-appearance of the plaintiff who claims exemption from personal attendance due to customs and manners.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The court had the power under rule 3, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure to compel the plaintiff's personal attendance.
  • The court acted under rule 4, order X of the Code of Civil Procedure to order the plaintiff's attendance, asserting that the plaintiff's counsel was unable to answer material questions.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff denied the defendants' allegation of tutoring behind the parda during witness examination.
  • The plaintiff expressed readiness to tender the witness Mst. Lakhpati for further cross-examination if so ordered, without being compelled to personally attend court.
  • The plaintiff relied on Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure, asserting exemption from personal attendance due to customs and manners regarding parda.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Vellai Nachiar v. Meiyappa Chetty Exemption of pardanashin women from personal attendance in court under Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court relied on this precedent to hold that compelling personal attendance of a pardanashin lady was clearly wrong.
In re Bilasroy Serowgee Interpretation of "appearance" under Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding pardanashin ladies. The court respectfully disagreed with this precedent, holding that personal attendance means appearing in public and cannot be compelled.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which exempts women who, according to local customs and manners, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, from personal attendance in court. It emphasized that "personal appearance" means physical attendance in court, which for pardanashin ladies is considered compelled public appearance, even if their face is covered. The court rejected the Calcutta High Court's interpretation that a pardanashin lady could be ordered to give evidence in court without being visible to the public, asserting that this undermines the protection intended by Section 132.

Rule 1, order XXVI of the Code allows examination of such witnesses by commission, reinforcing the right to avoid personal attendance. The court held that the Subordinate Judge erred in ordering the plaintiff's personal attendance, violating Section 132.

Regarding the defendants’ reliance on rule 3, order V, the court found it inapplicable as that rule applies before issues are framed, which was not the case here. Moreover, compelling attendance under this rule would conflict with Section 132 protections.

The defendants' contention that rule 4, order X empowered the court to order attendance was also rejected, as the record did not show that the plaintiff’s counsel was unable to answer material questions.

On the merits, the court noted that the plaintiff’s statement had been recorded by commission and that if tutoring was suspected, the court could have taken other measures consistent with the plaintiff’s right to exemption, such as re-recording evidence with safeguards or excluding the evidence. Insisting on personal attendance was unwarranted.

Holding and Implications

The court held that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge directing the personal attendance of the plaintiff was erroneous and contrary to Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the decree dismissing the suit was set aside.

Appeal Allowed and Decree Set Aside.

The defendants were ordered to pay the costs of the appellant in this Court. This decision directly reverses the dismissal of the suit but does not establish any new precedent beyond reaffirming the protections under Section 132 regarding personal attendance of pardanashin ladies.

    Sundar Devi v. Datta Traya Narhar

    Rachhpal Singh, J.:— This is a plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit which she instituted against the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Jaunpur and which has been dismissed. The plaintiff is one Mst. Sundar Devi Datta Traya Narhar, defendant No. 1, is a solicitor practising in Bombay. According to the plaintiff, Parmeshwar Din defendant No. 2 is an agent of the defendant No. 1.

    On the 23rd of November, 1927, the defendant No. 1 obtained a decree from the Bombay High Court for a sum of money against Mst. Sundar Devi, plaintiff. The plaintiff, who resides in Benares, instituted a suit against the two defendants in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Jaunpur to obtain a declaration to the effect that the aforesaid decree, for the reasons given in her plaint, was not binding upon her. After the issues had been settled in the case, a commission was issued for recording the evidence of the plaintiff and one Mst. Lakhpati at Benares. The statement of the plaintiff was recorded: While Mst. Lakhpati was being examined it was suspected by the counsel for the defendants that there was some one else with Mst. Lakhpati Devi behind the parda, who was tutoring her. This suspicion of the defendants' counsel was brought to the notice of the Commissioner. The Commissioner went behind the parda and found one person ascending the staircase near the spot where Mst. Lakhpati had been sitting. The defendants' counsel stopped further cross-examination of Mst. Lakhpati and made a written application to the Commissioner to report the matter to the court. This, application was made on the 22nd of September, 1928. The Commissioner sent the record to the court.

    On the 20th of November, 1928, the defendants made an application to the court mentioning the above mentioned facts and praying that they should be given an opportunity to further cross-examine not only Mst. Lakhpati but also the plaintiff. They asked the court to order that both the plaintiff and Mst. Lakhpati should present themselves in Jaunpur where the might be further examined in parda either in court or some other suitable place. The court directed the plaintiff to file written objections by the 29th of November, 1928. No objections were filed on behalf of the plaintiff. But it may be pointed out that on the 11th of November, 1928, after the Commissioner had returned the commission, the plaintiff had made a petition to the court. In that petition, while denying the allegations of the defendants that there had been any tutoring of Mst. Lakhpati behind the parda, she expressed her readiness to tender Mst. Lakhpati for further cross-examination if so ordered. * * * * Ultimately the Subordinate Judge directed the plaintiff to attend the court on the 5th of January, 1929. In this order, he stated as follows: “The conduct of the plaintiff as reported by the Commissioner is highly objectionable. The only course open is now to direct the plaintiff, Mst. Sundar Devi, to attend in person on the 5th instant, when she will be questioned about the case on the points raised by the defendants. Further orders shall be made on that date. In case of non-appearance she will bear the legal consequences.” On the 5th of January, 1929, the plaintiff did not appear. The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. The court below in its judgment says that “as she had not entered appearance as directed, the suit is dismissed for default of prosecution with costs.” The present appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff against this order of dismissal of her suit.

    I am of opinion that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge is wrong and cannot be sustained. Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that women who, according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, shall be exempt from personal attendance in court. The exemption from personal appearance under this section is a right which no court has power to refuse, and applies to the parties as well as witnesses. In a Madras case, Vellai Nachiar v. Meiyappa Chetty(1), it was held that the lower court was clearly wrong in seeking to compel the personal attendance in court of a pardanashin lady. I may say here that in a Calcutta case, In re Bilasroy Serowgee(2), a single Judge of that Court took the view that the word “appearance” means that a pardanashin lady shall not be compelled to come forth into view or to become visible to the public gaze and that the court, therefore, has powers to order a pardanashin lady to give evidence in court provided she is not compelled to become Adsible to the public gaze. With all possible respect to the opinion of the learned Judge, I am of opinion that the view taken by him is not correct. The words used in Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure are that women who, according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, shall be exempt from personal attendance in court. The words “ought not to be compelled to appear in public” are important. If a pardanashin lady observing strict parda is ordered to attend the court, it means that she is “compelled to appear in public”. Her face may be covered or she may be wearing a burka, but all the same she is compelled to appear in public if she is ordered to attend the court. This is against the spirit of Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In families in which ladies observe strict parda it is considered most objectionable for them to appear in public even with their faces covered. I am of opinion that the words “personal appearance” used in section 132 mean “personal attendance”. In this connection we may look to rule 1, order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure which empowers a court to issue commission for the examination of witnesses who are exempted under this Code from attending the court. Among those so exempted are women who, according to the customs and manners of the country, ought not to be compelled to appear in public. A court has no power to insist that a pardanashin lady must attend and give evidence in court. It is the right of a pardanashin lady to refuse to attend the court and to say that if she is to be examined, her statement should be taken on commission. If the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in the aforesaid case were correct, rule 1 of order XXYI of the Code of Civil Procedure would become useless. I hold that the correct view is that under the provisions of section 132, clause (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, a pardanashin lady cannot be compelled to attend the court, either as a party or as a witness. I, therefore, decide that the learned Subordinate Judge acted wrongly in going against the provisions of Section 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure in insisting on the personal attendance of the plaintiff in court.

    It was urged by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants that the court had the power to order the plaintiff to attend under the provisions of rule 3, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am of opinion that rule 3, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure is confined to those cases in which the court, before issues are framed, desires, for some reason, the personal attendance of a party. In the case under appeal that stage had passed. Nor do I think a court, acting under rule 3, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure, can compel the attendance of a party who is a pardanashin. Such an order would be against the provisions of section 132, clause (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also contended on behalf of the respondents that the court acted under rule 4, order X of the Code of Civil Procedure. I disagree with this contention. Under this rule a court can order the attendance of a party only where his or her counsel is unable to answer material questions. In the case before us the record does not show that the counsel appearing for the plaintiff was unable to answer any questions which the court put or wished to put to him. I also think that under the provisions of rule 4, order V of the Code of Civil Procedure the court cannot insist on the personal attendance of a party who is a pardanashin lady.

    Coming to the merits of the case, I am clearly of opinion that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge directing the personal attendance of the plaintiff was unwarranted. The statement of the plaintiff had been finished before the Commissioner. When Mst. Lakhpati was being cross-examined, the counsel for the defendants suspected that there was some one behind the parda along with the witness who was perhaps tutoring her. The cross-examination was stopped and the matter was reported to the court. The plaintiff put in an application denying the allegations of the defendants. That application is dated the 11th of November, 1928, and is on the record. If the learned Subordinate Judge thought that there was any substance in the allegations of the defendants, he could have directed her evidence being recorded again with such precautions and safeguards as seemed reasonable consistently with her right to be exempt from appearance in court. It was also open to him to refuse to admit the statement of Mst. Lakhpati in evidence, if he considered that a case had been made out for its exclusion. Where a fraud of the kind alleged by the defendant is established, the court has undoubtedly the discretion to exclude the evidence. But there was no justification for the learned Subordinate Judge to insist on the attendance of the plaintiff in court.

    For the reasons given above, I am of opinion that the decree passed by the court below is bad and must, therefore, be set aside. The appeal is allowed and the decree passed by the learned Subordinate Judge is set aside. The defendants will pay the costs of the appellants in this Court.

    Niamat-ullah, J.:— I concur.

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    Comments

    Sundar Devi v. Datta Traya Narhar
    (Apr 11, 1933)