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citation codes

Case Number

First Appeal No. 402 of 1927

Judges

Sulaiman
A.C.J
Young, J.

Acts

August.13. Sections 36 of the Transfer Property Act
Section 225 of the Agra Tenancy Act 1926
Land Revenue Act

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sulaiman, A.C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals arise from suits for profits brought by one brother (the plaintiff, a cosharer) against the eldest brother (the defendant, the lambardar). Thirty‑four connected appeals were before the Court; three of them had already been dismissed as no appeal lay to the High Court. The suits relate to different mahals but raise substantially common points. In some suits the defendant was not permitted to file written statements because applications for adjournment on his behalf were rejected; in two suits the defendant filed written statements and led evidence. The Court below had given decrees in favour of the plaintiff based on gross rentals.

Procedurally, some suits were filed on 23 December 1926; transfers between Assistant Collectors occurred in January–February 1927, and substituted service (publication in an Aligarh paper) was ordered by a later Court. The defendant claimed lack of notice and sought time to file written statements; the Revenue Court rejected his application and refused to allow written statements in certain suits. Appeals were taken from those decrees.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether decrees for a cosharer’s share of profits should be based on gross rentals or on actual collections made by the lambardar, and under what circumstances a presumption of negligence should require decree on gross rental.
Whether amounts paid by the lambardar out of estate income pursuant to a deed of relinquishment or hypothecation (annual allowances) can be set off in suits for profits in the Revenue Court.
How to determine and apportion the expenditure of collection (salaries of collection staff) among villages and whether a flat rate allowance is appropriate.
Whether litigation costs (taxable and out-of-court) can be debited against the estate and allowed to the lambardar.
The proper rate and scope of interest payable on arrears of profit (relation between the Tenancy Act s.225 1% per mensem and other possible rates or consolidated interest under CPC s.34).
Whether a prior civil suit by the plaintiff against the defendant (as agent/trustee) that was dismissed bars recovery of profits in the Revenue Court for an overlapping period.
Whether the defendant was validly served and whether he was unfairly prevented from filing written statements in the Revenue suits.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The plaintiff claimed his share of profits on the basis of gross rentals; the Court below had granted decrees on that basis.
The plaintiff maintained that the defendant, although possibly an agent, also acted as lambardar and that the right to a share in income vests from day to day even if payable on the following 1st August; thus the plaintiff argued he could claim profits in the Revenue Court (responding to defendant's reliance on a previous civil suit).
The plaintiff (implicitly) relied on the decrees already obtained in the Revenue Court and sought interest and recovery consistent with those decrees.

Defendant's Arguments

The defendant contended that actual collections (not gross rentals) should be the basis for decrees; he produced written statements in some cases and led oral evidence regarding actual collections.
He claimed that he had paid certain annual allowances under a deed of relinquishment and sought set‑off for those payments against claims for profits.
The defendant argued that the plaintiff had previously sued in the civil court for accounts (treating the defendant as agent/trustee) and that the dismissal of that civil action precluded the plaintiff from suing again in the Revenue Court for the same period.
The defendant asserted that he had been denied a fair opportunity to file written statements because of defective service (summons sent to his village while he resided in Aligarh) and the transfer of suits without proper notice.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the recurring issues across the connected appeals and addressed them collectively where appropriate.

Basis of decree: gross rentals vs actual collections

The Court held that decrees should be based on actual collections if the defendant shows the actual collections, unless those collections are so low that negligence on the part of the lambardar may be presumed.
When the discrepancy between gross rental and actual collections is very large and unexplained, the presumption is negligence and decree should be on gross rental.
As a practical rule the Court adopted (for purposes of these appeals) that collections exceeding 75% of gross rent will be treated as showing no negligence; collections below 75% give rise to a prima facie presumption of negligence.

Set-off for annual allowances paid under a deed of relinquishment

The Court held the Assistant Collector was right to disallow a set‑off in the Revenue Court for amounts not due under a decree, unless the amount can be treated as part of ordinary expenses of collection.
Payments of the annual allowances could not be treated as ordinary expenses of collection because they were payable as lump sums out of the entire estate income and not easily apportionable to individual villages; they were akin to discharge of liability under a registered deed of hypothecation.
The Court left open whether the defendant might have a separate civil remedy (e.g., suit for contribution or enforcement of the charge) but held firmly that such allowances could not be set off in the suits for profits in the Revenue Court.

Expenditure of collection (salaries, staff, apportionment)

Because the same staff served multiple scattered villages and apportionment per village would be impracticable, the Court adopted a just and equitable practical solution: in addition to the lambardari dues of 5% under the Land Revenue Act, the lambardar should be allowed an additional 5% on the actual collections as a flat rate toward expenses of collection.

Costs of litigation

Litigation is not an ordinary management expense but where litigation is unavoidable it is incurred for the benefit of the entire coparcenary; taxable costs of litigation that remain unrealized from tenants may be credited to the lambardar if supported by documentary evidence.
Out‑of‑court costs are uncertain and part ought to be included in staff salaries rather than separately allowed.

Interest on arrears of profit

The Court noted there is a statutory provision (Section 225 of the Agra Tenancy Act 1926) entitling a cosharer to claim interest at 1% per mensem on arrears of profit.
The Court rejected the higher rate of 6.25% previously awarded by the Court below without adequate reason, and held the plaintiff is entitled to interest at 1% per mensem on the net arrears from the date when they became divisible until at least the date of this Court's decree.
The Court also allowed simple interest at 1% per mensem on the plaintiff's share of net profits from the date they became divisible until actual realization, applying the principle of s.225 to post-decree interest up to realization.
While consolidation and a grant of future interest under CPC s.34 at 6% on a consolidated sum were contemplated, the Court followed the statutory rate of 1% and rejected departure without justification. In special circumstances the plaintiff might obtain additional interest up to 12% per annum on the principal amount from 1st August following the year for which profits were due until the first Court's decree, but only where recalculation shows the plaintiff's amount up to the first Court's decree is less than that awarded by that Court; excess sums awarded by the first Court would not be increased.

Effect of prior civil suit (agency/trust)

The Court examined the prior civil suit in which the plaintiff sought accounts against the defendant as agent/trustee for the period of alleged agency; the civil Court found the agency continued until November or December 1924 and dismissed the plaintiff's claim.
The Court reasoned that profits accrue day to day and vest in cosharers even if payable on the following 1st August; however, where the plaintiff's previous civil suit actually sought recovery of the plaintiff's share in the net income realized by the defendant during the period of agency and that claim was litigated and dismissed, the plaintiff cannot recover in the Revenue Court for that overlapping period.
If the defendant did not actually realize income during his agency and profits were realized only after termination of the agency, those post‑agency realizations were not necessarily within the subject‑matter of the prior civil suit and the plaintiff is not precluded from claiming them.

Service and opportunity to file written statements

On the facts, summonses were sent to the defendant's village (Dharampur) while he resided in Aligarh; process‑server reports did not indicate personal service or service on household members nor affix copies at the door; substituted service by newspaper publication was ordered but the Court found the defendant's later application claiming lack of knowledge meritorious.
The appellate Court concluded it would be unfair to debar the defendant from taking special pleas or from filing written statements in addition to pleas he had already taken; accordingly, in those appeals where the defendant had been prevented from filing written statements, the appeals were allowed and decrees below set aside and remanded for disposal according to law with opportunity to file statements and produce evidence.

Disposition of particular appeals (examples)

Appeals Nos. 402 and 403 of 1927: the defendant had filed written statements and led evidence; collections exceeded 75% of gross rentals, so there was no justification for decreeing on gross rentals. Defendant entitled to 5% on actual collections as collection expenses plus 5% lambardari dues; plaintiff not entitled to further interest beyond that awarded by the decree unless adjustments on recomputation justify additional interest subject to limits stated by the Court. Costs apportioned in proportion to success and failure.
Other appeals where defendant had been denied written statements: the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the decrees below and remanded the cases for fresh disposal, leaving rate of interest open pending account‑taking with the defendant allowed to file written statements and produce evidence. Costs to abide the result.

Holding and Implications

The Court's dispositive orders and legal conclusions are summarized below.

Core Ruling: The Court allowed the appeals in which the defendant had been unfairly prevented from filing written statements, set aside the decrees in those cases and remitted them for fresh disposal; in other specified appeals (e.g., Nos. 402 and 403 of 1927) the Court affirmed that decrees should be based on actual collections where collections exceed the adopted 75% threshold, awarded a flat 5% allowance on actual collections as collection expenses in addition to the 5% lambardari dues, disallowed set‑off for annual allowances paid under a deed in the Revenue suits, and held that interest on arrears of profit is payable at 1% per mensem pursuant to Section 225 of the Agra Tenancy Act 1926 (simple interest from date profits became divisible until realization).

Practical consequences and implications for the parties:

Where actual collections are proved and exceed 75% of gross rental, decrees must be based on actual collections; where collections are under 75% a presumption of negligence arises and the decree may be based on gross rental unless satisfactorily explained.
The lambardar is entitled to his statutory lambardari dues (5%) and an additional flat 5% of actual collections as a practical allowance for expenses of collection.
Allowances paid under a deed of relinquishment/hypothecation are not allowable as set‑offs in Revenue Court suits for profits (though the defendant may have a separate civil remedy, left open by the Court).
Taxable costs of litigation unrealized from tenants may be credited to the lambardar if documented; out‑of‑court costs are not separately allowed except insofar as included within staff expenses.
Interest on arrears of profit is governed by Section 225, Agra Tenancy Act 1926: the plaintiff is entitled to simple interest at 1% per mensem from the date when profits became divisible until realization (and at least until the date of this decree); consolidation and higher future rates were not applied in place of the statutory rate.
Where a prior civil suit has actually litigated and dismissed a claim for the plaintiff's share of income realized by the defendant during the defendant's agency, the plaintiff cannot recover for that overlapping period in the Revenue Court; non‑overlapping realizations remain recoverable.
Where service and notice were defective and the defendant was denied opportunity to file written statements, the Court will allow the defendant to be heard and remit the matters for fresh disposal; the decrees previously obtained in such circumstances were set aside.
Costs in the affected appeals were to be determined in proportion to success and failure or to abide the result on remand, as specified in the Court's directions.

Final order (as expressed):

Order accordingly.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the content explicitly stated in the provided opinion and does not add factual or legal inferences beyond that text.

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Kunwar Mohammad Abdul Jalil Khan v. Kunwar Mohammad Abdus Salam Khan

Sulaiman, A.C.J:— Three out of the thirty four appeals which were connected with one another wore dismissed by us yesterday, as no appeal lay to the High Court. These appeals arise out of suits for profits brought by one brother as cosharer against the eldest brother as the lambardar. They relate to different mahals, but the points which arise in most of them are more or less common.

2. In some cases the defendant was not allowed to file his written statements as applications for adjournment of the cases on his behalf were rejected. In two cases he filed his written statements which gave us an idea of the pleas raised on his behalf. It is convenient to dispose of the points which are common in all these appeals.

3. The plaintiff claimed his share of profits on the basis of gross rentals. The Court below has given him decrees on the basis of the gross rentals in all the cases. It is quite clear that if the defendant succeeds in showing the actual collections, then, unless those collections are so low that the Court may presume negligence on the part of the lambardar, the decrees have to be male on the basis of the actual collections and not on the gross rentals. On the other hand, if the discrepancy between the gross rental and the actual collection is very large, then, in the absence of any satisfactory explanation on the part of the lambardar why he was not able to collect a larger amount, the presumption would be that he was negligent and the decree should be on the basis of gross rental. In the absence of any definite evidence either way, we would roughly take those cases in which collections exceed 75 per cent as cases in which no negligence can be presumed. In cases in which collections are less than 75 per cent of the rent there is prima facie a presumption of such negligence.

4. The defendant further claimed that under a deed of relinquishment executed by the mother and other lady relations of the parties there was a liability to pay certain annual allowances out of the income of the entire estate and that the defendant had paid these allowances. He claimed a set-off on account of these allowances in the suit for profits. The Assistant Collector has rightly disallowed this set off. It is quite obvious that no set-off can be allowed in the Revenue Court for any amount that is not due under a decree, unless the amount can be treated as part of the ordinary expenses of collection. In this particular case it is impossible to treat the payment of these allowances as an expenditure incurred in the collection of profits because the amount has to be paid in a lump sum out of the entire income of the estate and it is not easy to apportion it separately for each village. Strictly speaking it is a discharge of liability under a registered deed of hypothecation and not a part of the ordinary expenses of collection. It is not necessary for us to express any final opinion whether the defendant will have separate remedy to recover these allowances in case he has paid them. It may be that inasmuch as there was a joint liability under a registered deed of hypothecation creating a charge on part of the estate, the defendant as one of the co-debtors having paid off the amount has his remedy by a suit for contribution by enforcement of that charge, for which the period of limitation may be 12 years. As mentioned above we would leave this point open. We have however no doubt in our minds that the allowances cannot be set off in these suits.

5. The next point in dispute is the amount of the expenditure which the lambardar can claim from his cosharers. Oral evidence was led on his behalf to show the number of employees like siyaha navis, karinda, peon, etc., who were employed in the estate for the purpose of collecting rents. It is clear from the evidence that the same staff is employed for a number of villages and it is very difficult to apportion expenditure incurred in the payment of their salaries for each village. In some cases the total income of the village is very small; in other cases it is very large. On the other hand, it is quite clear that some staff must be employed by the lambardar defendant so that he may successfully make collections in so many villages which are scattered all over the district. We think that it would be highly impracticable to go into each case separately and apportion the expenditure separately. The most just and equitable way would be to fix upon a rough fiat rate which would cover the expenses and give satisfactory results. Having considered the matter we are of opinion that in addition to the lambardari dues of 5% which the lambardar is entitled to get under the Land Revenue Act he should get 5% on the actual collections made by him towards the expenses of collection.

6. Another point in dispute between the parties is the costs of litigation. It is quite clear that litigation is not a part of the ordinary expenditure in the management of a mahal. In some years litigation may be very expensive and heavy and in others it may be practically nil. Where it is unavoidable, it is a necessary part of the expenditure incurred by a lambardar and it is undoubtedly incurred for the benefit of the entire coparcenary body. There is no reason why the defendant should not be credited with the taxable costs of the litigation incurred. As regards the costs incurred out of Court there would be considerable uncertainty, part of which ought to be included in the salaries of the staff. We therefore think that the defendant should be allowed credit for any taxable costs of litigation which have remained unrealized from the tenants of the various villages in suits by or against them, provided the same are shown by documentary evidence.

7. Another point in dispute between the parties is as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest on the arrears of profit. The Court below has allowed him interest at the rate of 6 ¼ per cent. It has not given any reasons why the rate of 1 per cent per mensem, which is specified in Section 225 of the Agra Tenancy Act 1926 was not adhered to. There is now a statutory provision which entitles a cosharer to claim interest on arrears of profit at 1 per cent per mensem. After accounts have been taken, and an amount has been found due to the plaintiff, there is no reason why he should be debarred from claiming the rate which is allowed by the Tenancy Act. We therefore think that there can be no doubt that the plaintiff should be given interest at the rate of 1 per cent per mensem on the principal amount of the net arrears of profit found due to him from the date when they became divisible till at least the date of the decree of this court.

8. If we were to consolidate the principal sum and interest up to the date of decree, we might under Section 34 of the CPC, have allowed future interest at the rate of 6 per cent on the consolidated amount. The learned advocate for the defendant however urges that the plaintiff does not claim interest on the consolidated amount, but should be given 1 per cent per mensem simple interest on the principal amount of arrears up to the date of realization. We see no reason why the principle underlying S. 225 should not be applied to future interest after the decree up to the date of realization. We would accordingly allow the plaintiff simple interest at the rate of 1 per cent on his share of net profits from the date when they became divisible until actual realization.

9. The learned advocate for the defendant contends that the plaintiff had previously brought a suit for accounts against the defendant treating him as his trustee and agent for the period of the alleged agency, which was dismissed because the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff had himself removed the necessary papers, and that accordingly he is not entitled to sue for profits in the Revenue Court for the same period over again for which his civil suit had been instituted. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the plaintiff replies that the defendant held a dual capacity of the plaintiff's agent and the lambardar and he was not bound to pay the profits as lambardar to the plaintiff cosharer, whose agent he may be supposed to have been before the date on which the profits became divisible. Admittedly the profits become divisible as between the lambardar and the cosharers on 1st August following the year for which they are claimed. In the previous suit the plaintiff had alleged that the agency of the defendant terminated either on 22nd November 1924 or 10th December 1924, on account of certain letters sent by the plaintiff revoking the agency. This fact was denied by the defendant. The learned Sub-ordinate Judge in his findings on issues 3 and 15 came to the conclusion “that the defendant continued to manage the estate as an agent on behalf of the plaintiff after the expiry of the period of the minority up to November or December 1924, when the plaintiff expressly revoked the powers given to him by means of written letters.”

10. In the earlier portion of his judgment he pointed out that the plaintiff alleged that he had sent a letter on 22nd November 1924 and one on 19th December 1924, and that in this last mentioned letter he had clearly expressed his intention of putting an end to the relationship of agent which up to that time existed between the parties. There is no doubt that the learned Sub-ordinate Judge was inclined to take the view that the agency terminated on 19th December 1924; but his actual finding was in the alternative, namely, that it terminated either in November or December 1924.

11. The previous civil suit was for recovery of the amount found due on the taking of the accounts between the parties, and it was up to the end of the period of the agency. The defendant no doubt held two capacities. If the plaintiff had sued him in the Revenue Court merely as a lambardar, his suit for recovery of profits as a cosharer would have been premature if it were brought before 1st August following. But the suit was not brought by a cosharer against the lambardar under the Tenancy Act, but it was by a principal as against an agent or trustee in the civil Court. If the suit had been decreed the civil Court would without doubt have passed a preliminary decree for an account to be taken up to the end of the period of agency which would have been either November or December 1924. The decree of the first Court came to be passed long after the expiry of 1st August 1925 when the profits against the lambardar had also become divisible.

12. It seems to us that the date fixed for the division of profits is nothing more than a date fixed for the payment of those profits. That date does not imply that the right to a share in the income does not vest till the arrival of that date. The profits accrue from day to day and become vested in the cosharers, although the time for payment is postponed for the sake of convenience till the following August.

13. Sections 36 of the Transfer Property Act in terms cannot apply to this case, because that deals with the case of a transfer of immovable property. But the principle underlying that section is of a wider scope and certainly lays down the rule regulating the rights of proprietors to the receipt of income from their properties. As between two rival owners, in the absence of a contract or local usage to the contrary, all rents, annuities, pensions, dividends and other periodical payments in the nature of income accrue due from day to day, and are apportionable accordingly, but they are payable on the days appointed for the payment thereof. Under that principle although the day for the payment of the share income may not have arrived the income does accrue from day to day and is apportionable accordingly, although the actual apportionment would not in fact be given effect to till that date has arrived.

14. It seems to us that if it were established that the defendant, who was according to the view taken in the civil suit acting as the agent and trustee of the plaintiff, and in fact as the managing member of the family had in reality realized the income of the estate during the period of his agency, then, even though the actual date for the division of the profits as between cosharers and lambardar arrived after the expiry of the period of the agency, he would have been liable to render accounts for the plaintiff's share in the net profits. The civil Court in its decree for accounts would undoubtedly have made the defendant liable to pay to the plaintiff his due share in the net profits of all the income that was realized by him during the period of his agency. The previous suit therefore did involve a claim of the plaintiff for recovery of his share in the net income actually realized by the defendant before his agency terminated. Unfortunately for the plaintiff the civil suit was dismissed and no relief was granted to him. The result therefore is that the plaintiff's claim for recovery of his share in the income received by the defendant during the period of his agency was made in the civil Court, and was dismissed. It seems to us that the plaintiff cannot now be allowed to come to the Revenue Court and ask for profits for a period which would overlap, that is to say, he cannot be given a decree for his share of the profits with regard to the period which was included in the former civil suit.

15. In the present suits the plaintiff is claiming profits for the whole of 1332 and 1333 Faslis. Kharif of 1332 Fasli terminated on 31st December 1924, and would therefore include a part of the period which was under consideration in the civil suit. We think that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to claim profits for that part. On the other hand if the defendant did not actually realize any part of the profits before the termination of his agency, and those profits were realized subsequently, it cannot be assumed that amount had been claimed in the previous suit. The plaintiff therefore would not be disentitled from claiming his share of such profits.

16. By the expression net “income” or “net profits” which we have used, we mean the plaintiff's share in the net profits of the village after deducting the proportionate amounts of the Government revenue, the lambardar's dues, the expenses of collection and the costs of the litigation that may be allowed. The next point in dispute in the remaining cases is as to whether the defendant had been rightly prevented from filing his written statements in some of these suits. The suits were filed on 23rd December 1926, and the Christmas holidays followed. On 5th January 1927 an application was made on behalf of the defendant to the Revenue Court in which it was admitted that he had knowledge of the institution of these 34 suits. Subsequently on 15th January 1927 the suits were transferred to the Court of another Assistant Collector on an application of the plaintiff for which apparently notice was not issued to the defendant. The new Court issued summonses to the defendant fixing 10th February. These summonses were sent to him at his village Dharampur and not at his house in Aligarh. On 21st January 1927 the process-server reported that the defendant was not at Dharampur but had gone to Aligarh and he accordingly brought back the summonses. The reports did not say that he had shown these summonses to any of the servants of the defendant or to any the inmates of the house at Dharampur or that he had affixed copies of them at the door of the defendant's house. In the application before the Court the plaintiff also admitted that the defendant was residing at Aligarh. On an application by the plaintiff the cases were again transferred to another Court on 8th February 1927. Again there was no notice of this transfer given to the defendant formally. Curiously enough the Court did not make any order that summonses should be issued to the defendant according to his address at Aligarh, but ordered that there should be substituted service.

17. It directed that the summonses should be published in an Aligarh paper. The order was passed on 10th February 1927; the publication appeared on the paper bearing the date 13th February 1927 fixing 15th February 1927 for the hearing. On 14th February an application was filed on behalf of the defendant stating that he had no knowledge of the suits from before and that time should be given to him for filing written statements. The Court did not consider that there was a satisfactory explanation and rejected the application not on that date but either on 15th or 16th February. In these circumstances the defendant was not allowed to file his written statements. After considering the circumstances we have come to the conclusion that it would be unfair to the defendant to debar him from taking any special pleas that may be open to him in addition to those which he had already taken in the suits which were contested.

18. Having dealt with the general aspects of the case and the points which were common to most of the appeals, we would now take up these appeals separately. We have already noted that three appeals namely, Nos. 380, 390 and 396 of 1927 have already been dismissed.

19. First Appeals Nos. 402 and 403 of 1927 arise out of suit in which the defendant had an opportunity of filing his written statements and of leading evidence. No case is made out for allowing him to produce any fresh evidence. The collections in these cases were much more than 75 per cent of the gross rentals and there is no justification for decreeing the claim on the basis of gross rentals. The defendant will however get 5 per cent on the actual collections as his expenses in addition to the 5 per cent of the Government revenue as the lambardar's dues. But in these appeals the plaintiff has filed no cross-objections as regards any further interest. He is not therefore entitled to any interest in excess of that awarded by the decree. But the plaintiff is entitled to support the decree of the Court below even on a ground which was decided against him. We are therefore inclined to think that he should be given interest at the rate quoted above provided that the principal amount plus interest up to the date of the first Court's decree does not exceed the amount of that decree in each case. Further interest in excess of that allowed by the judgment in each case will not be allowed. If on the account being taken afresh it is found that the amount due to the plaintiff up to the date of the first Court's decree is less than that awarded by that Court, the plaintiff would be entitled to an addition on account of the extra rate of interest up to 12 per cent per annum calculated on the principal amount of profits from 1st August following the year for which they were due till the first Court's decree. In case the result is an excess amount, the plaintiff will not be entitled to the excess but the decree of the Court below will be maintained. The costs in both the Courts will be in proportion to success and failure. In the remaining appeals we have already held that the defendant is entitled to file written statements and produce evidence. The question of the rate of interest is left open in those cases which are to be sent back and in which the defendant is allowed to file written statements. As the cases have been disposed of without this opportunity having been accorded to him, we must allow these appeals and setting aside the decrees of the Court below send the cases back to that Court for disposal according to law. The costs in these cases will abide the result.

K.N/R.K

20. Order accordingly.

Kunwar Mohammad Abdul Jalil Khan v. Kunwar Mohammad Abdus Salam Khan

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sulaiman, A.C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

Defendant's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Kunwar Mohammad Abdul Jalil Khan v. Kunwar Mohammad Abdus Salam Khan

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