Mears, C.J and Mukerji, J.:— The judgement of the Court after stating the facts as above, thus continued:—
No attempt has been made, on behalf of Sham Narain, to support the decree of the court below on the ground that the plaintiff possessed property sufficient for her maintenance. The only question which we have to decide in this appeal is whether in the case of a partition between a son and a grandson of a female, the latter is entitled to a share, the grandson being the son of a son who is other than the surviving one.
The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the present case was governed by the Full Bench case of Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad. In that case the facts were materially different, inasmuch as the partition was between the female claimant's son and his own sons. The learned Judges pointed out that there were two texts of the sage Yajnavalkya relied upon by the author of Mitakshara and these considered only two cases of partition. One case was when the father was alive and the partition proceeded in his lifetime and the other case was when he was dead and the descendants proceeded to divide the property among themselves. In the former case, they pointed out, the “father's wife” took, as such, a share. In the latter case, the “mother” took as such a share. It was further stated that Vijnaneswara did not contemplate the case of a partition between a father and his own sons, and did not provide for a share for the father's mother in, such a case. The case before us is, clearly, not the same as was submitted for the consideration of the Full Bench. Here, as already stated the partition is between a grandson and paternal uncle of the grandson. The case falls within the four corners of the text which contemplates a partition “on the death of the father”. Colebrooke in his translation of the Mitakshara translates the text of Yajnavalkya bearing, on the point in the following language: “Of heirs dividing after the death of the father let the mother also take an equal share”. Probably a better translation would be as follows: “When there is a partition on the death of the father let the mother take an equal share”. It is agreed on all hands that if this text applies, the plaintiff would be entitled to a third share. In our opinion there can be no doubt that this text is directly applicable. Although, strictly speaking, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, every male member in the family is the owner of every portion of the joint family property, still it is the head of the family who is supposed to “own” the entire property. The passage quoted above occurs after Vijnaneswara has discussed the separate and joint family properties. It seems to us to be clear that when he was speaking of the division of father's property, he was speaking both as regards the separate and the joint family property. The only question material, therefore, is who is the person that should be called the father in the present case. The point seems to us to be so clear as not to admit of any two opinions. Sham Narain and Jagat Narain, when they divided the family property, did not seek the division of Jai Gobind's property. Sham Narain, stepping into the shoes of Jai Oobind, claimed an equal share with Jagat Narain. Jagat Narain's father Bhagirathi was therefore the father on whose death the partition has taken place. In this view the plaintiff, as the mother of Jai Gobind and Jagat Narain, would be entitled to a share equal to that of her sons. Thus she would be entitled to a third share in the property.
The case of Kanhaiya Lal v. Gaura has been brought to our notice. In this case the grandsons of one Nam Suhh, by his only son Chhunni, claimed a partition between themselves. The question was whether Nam Suhk's widow (the grandmother of the claimants for partition) was entitled to a share. It was held that she was. The case of Sheo Narain v. Janki Prasad was distinguished. But we need not consider that case. It may or may not support the case of the plaintiff before us. We are of opinion that on the text quoted in the Full Bench case aforesaid, the plaintiff is entitled to the share claimed.
We allow the appeal, set aside the decree of the court below and decree the plaintiff's claim for a third share. The contesting defendant will pay the appellant's costs in both the courts.
Appeal allowed.