Mears, C.J and King, J.:— After setting forth the facts as above, thus continued:—
It is admitted on behalf of the respondent that the right of suit was extended by section 31 up to the 6th of August; 1910, but the argument is that although the right of suit subsisted up to the 6th of August, 1910, nevertheless “the period prescribed for the suit,” within the meaning of section 19, is the period prescribed in the schedule, namely, a period of twelve years under article 132. On this reasoning the acknowledgement obtained on the 18th of July, 1910, was ineffectual for giving a fresh period of limitation under section 19.
It is necessary to consider the circumstances in which section 31 was enacted. The view taken by the Allahabad High Court, as well as by certain other High Courts, was that the period of limitation for suits on simple mortgages was sixty years under article 147. Certain other High Courts took the view that the period of limitation was only twelve years under article 132. The Privy Council in the case of Vasudeva Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Pillai finally decided that the period of limitation was twelve years under article 132. This meant that mortgagees in the United Provinces, whose money had become due more than twelve years before the decision of the Privy Council would be unable to enforce their mortgages. They would have lost their right of suit owing to the wrong interpretation of the law which had prevailed in the United Provinces. In order to prevent such hardship section 31 was specially enacted in the Limitation Act of 1908 enabling mortgagees, whose right of suit would ordinarily be barred by the twelve years rule of limitation under article 132, to bring suits upon their mortgages within sixty years from the date when the money became due or within two years from the passing of the Act, whichever period expired first. It is not denied that under section 31 the plaintiff was entitled to sue upon his mortgages up to the 6th of August, 1910, but it is denied that this section lays down a “period of limitation” and it is contended that even if an acknowledgement of liability is obtained within the two-year period no fresh starting point is given for limitation under section 19. The courts below have relied upon the ruling in Bai Hemkore v. Masamalli. In that case it was held that where an acknowledgement is made after the “period prescribed” for the suit has expired, then although the right to sue may be subsisting on the date of acknowledgement, under section 4 of the Limitation Act, nevertheless the acknowledgement will of extend the period of limitation. In our view that case can be distinguished. Section 4 does not prescribe any special period of limitation for any kind of suit. It only lays down that when the prescribed period of limitation expires on a day when the court is closed then the suit may be instituted on the day when the court reopens. We are in full agreement with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the ruling mentioned, but in our opinion the ruling in that case is not applicable to the present suit. In the present suit section 31 does, in our opinion, prescribe a special period of limitation for the suit. That period of limitation had not expired at the time when the written acknowledgement was obtained. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the provisions of section 19 operate so as to give a fresh period of limitation from the time of the acknowledgement.
It has been argued for the respondents that in section 19 the words “before the expiration of the period prescribed” must be taken as meaning before the expiration of the period prescribed in the schedule. We see no reason for limiting the meaning of the words in the manner suggested. A period for a suit can be prescribed by a section of the Act as well as by an article of the schedule, and in the present case the period of limitation is specially prescribed in section 31 of the Act.
We hold, therefore, that the suit was not barred by limitation and allow the appeal. The suit is remanded to the trial court for decision on its merits. We grant to the appellants costs incurred in the lower appellate court and here. The costs incurred in the trial court are to abide the event of the suit upon its merits.
Appeal allowed.