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  • Section 499, read with Section 500, of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908. As'
  • Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Advocates
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  • Section 499, read with Section 500, of the Indian Penal Code.
  • Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908. As'
  • Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  • Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a revision before the Sessions Judge of Saharanpur. The appellant is a woman referred to as Musammat Parwari. She had been convicted of defamation and sentenced under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code to two months' rigorous imprisonment. The complaint was instituted by Chhajju Singh.

According to the prosecution's account contained in the record, Chhajju Singh was the step-brother of a woman also called Musammat Parwari (a Rajput who had married Pirthi Singh). That woman had, it was said, gone to the house of Umrao Singh, fallen ill and died on 21 June 1916. After that death, Pirthi Singh reportedly asserted that the woman was still alive and that Umrao Singh's statement of her death was false. The prosecution alleged a plot by Pirthi Singh and his relations to out-caste Chhajju Singh's family by introducing the appellant (described as a Chamar woman) to impersonate Pirthi Singh's wife and to give false testimony in courts at Dehra.

The gist of the criminal charge was that on 26 February 1918 at Rikhikesh the appellant, by words spoken to a Sub-Inspector of police, published imputations (including imputations concerning incestuous connections) knowing that such imputations would harm the reputation of Musammat Parwari if living and intending to harm the feelings of her near relatives — conduct alleged to be punishable under Section 499 read with Section 500 of the IPC.

The Sessions Judge found the trial record meagre and summoned Sub-Inspector Indarjit Singh to clarify how the contested statements had been taken. The Sub-Inspector's evidence was recorded and formed part of the factual matrix considered by the court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statements attributed to the appellant amounted to defamation punishable under Section 499 read with Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, having regard to Explanation 1 to Section 499 (which deals with imputations concerning a deceased person that would harm reputation if living and are intended to hurt the feelings of near relatives).
  2. Whether statements said to have been made to the police were privileged and inadmissible as evidence if taken in the course of proceedings under Sections 154 or 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thereby protected by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
  3. What degree of intention the prosecution must prove under Section 499 — specifically, whether intention can be established merely by showing that hurtful consequences were a probable consequence of the act, or whether the prosecution must prove the defendant's specific intention to be hurtful to the feelings of near relatives.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The prosecution's theory was that the appellant had been induced by Pirthi Singh and his relations to make false statements impersonating the deceased's wife, with the object of aspersing the memory of the dead and injuring the feelings of the deceased's relatives; this derived malice was said to convert the statements into criminal defamation.
  • The learned counsel for the prosecution argued that intention could be established if the hurtful result was the probable consequence of the act — i.e., that it was sufficient to prove that the statements would probably cause the hurtful result, rather than requiring proof of a specific intention to hurt the relatives.

The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate statement of the appellant's legal submissions in reply.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Manjaya v. Sesha Shetti (1888) I.L.R. 11 Mad. 477 Supports the view (expressed by the Madras High Court) that statements made to police under the authority of Sections 154 or 155 CrPC are privileged and cannot be the foundation of a charge of defamation. The court cited this authority to show that statements taken under Sections 154/155 are privileged and should not have been used as evidence to support the defamation charge, reinforcing the preliminary concern about admissibility of the contested statements.
Queen Empress v. Govinda Pillai (1892) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 235 Also cited for the principle that police statements taken under statutory authority are privileged and cannot found a defamation charge. Used alongside Manjaya to underline the established Madras view that such police statements are not admissible as the basis of defamation prosecution.
Queen v. Labouchere (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 320 Illustrative authority regarding the law on intention in defamation cases (English authority). The court described this case as instructive on the point of intention, but emphasized that English authorities must be applied with care and that the court must adhere strictly to the Indian statutory formulation of defamation in Section 499 IPC.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, using only the materials and observations contained in the opinion:

  1. The record as lodged was meagre and left unclear the precise circumstances in which the statements said to have been made on 26 February 1918 came into existence. For clarity, the Sub-Inspector who took the statements (Indarjit Singh) was summoned and his evidence recorded.
  2. The Sub-Inspector's testimony was unsatisfactory and equivocal. He stated that one written statement (Exhibit H) was taken under the authority of Section 154 CrPC, while he could not positively explain how the other statements (Exhibits I and J) had been obtained, ultimately saying they were taken in consequence of action under Section 155 CrPC (but leaving open whether he had actually acted under Section 155 or under some Police Manual authority).
  3. The court examined the legal consequence of statements taken under Sections 154 or 155 CrPC. Such statements, if falling within those provisions, are privileged and cannot be used as the foundation of a defamation charge, by force of Section 162 CrPC and as supported by the Madras decisions cited (Manjaya; Queen Empress v. Govinda Pillai). The court stressed that any internal Police Manual authority could not override the law.
  4. The court expressed doubt about the propriety of the Sub-Inspector taking such statements at all, suggesting the probability that they were taken out of undue curiosity rather than as part of a proper investigation under Chapter XIV of the CrPC. The court noted this point to prevent it being treated as mere obiter dictum.
  5. The court then turned to substantive criminal law on defamation. It explained the statutory scheme in India is different from English law: Indian law (Section 499 and its Explanation 1) treats imputations concerning a deceased person as defamation only if they would harm the reputation of the person if living and are intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his or her family or other near relatives.
  6. The court rejected the prosecution's contention that intention could be satisfied by showing that harm was the probable consequence of the appellant's acts. Instead, it held that the prosecution was bound to prove that the statements were made with an intention to be hurtful to the feelings of the named relatives (i.e., a specific mental element beyond mere probability of consequence).
  7. Applying the facts: the constable initially found the appellant dressed in male attire and took her to the Rikhikesh thana. Her initial statements there were not derogatory to the complainant's family and, if anything, tended to their credit. Later, at the railway station (when the Sub-Inspector was about to proceed on leave), she made derogatory statements. The prosecution's theory was that these later statements were made at the instigation of Pirthi Singh and therefore with derived malice.
  8. The court found that the sequence of events made the prosecution's theory improbable: if the appellant intended to cause pain to relatives, it was unlikely she would defer until an unexpected meeting at the railway station to do so. The court considered the scenario of deliberate planning to be implausible and held that the required intention to hurt the relatives' feelings had not been proved.
  9. Given the evidentiary doubts about how the statements were taken and the failure to establish the necessary intention under Section 499 (as expanded by Explanation 1), the court concluded that the offence of defamation had not been established beyond doubt.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court found the appellant not guilty of the offence of defamation under Sections 499 and 500 IPC and directed her immediate release from custody. If she was on bail, the court ordered that she be instantly released and the bail bonds cancelled.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is the acquittal and immediate release of the appellant and the cancellation of any bail bonds.
  • The court emphasised two legal points: (a) statements taken under statutory police procedure (Sections 154/155 CrPC) are privileged and should not be used as the foundation of a defamation charge (supported by cited Madras authorities and Section 162 CrPC); and (b) under Section 499 IPC (with Explanation 1), the prosecution must prove a specific intention to be hurtful to the feelings of near relatives where the imputation concerns a deceased person — probability of consequence alone is insufficient to establish that intention.
  • The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying established principles; its immediate effect is confined to the quashing of the particular conviction in this revision.

    Emperor v. Parwari

    1. This is a case in revision. The Sessions Judge of Saharanpur had before him an appeal by a woman one Musammat Parwari, so called at any rate. The appellant had been convicted of the offence of defamation and sentenced under Sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code to two months' rigorous imprisonment. The complaint had been instituted against her by one Chhajju Singh. Chhajju Singh, according to the prosecution was step brother of one Musammat Parwari, Rajput by caste, and Musammat Parwari was the wife of Pirthi Singh, also Rajput, Parwari, some two years before the complaint was lodged, had gone to the house of Umrao Singh, her sister's husband. There she fell ill and died on the 21st of June, 1916. After her death, Pirthi Singh gave it out that she was still alive, and that Umrao Singh's story that she was dead, was false, and the woman was really in concealment in Umrao Singh's house. Parwari's husband and relations had wanted, so the complainant says, to out-caste him and his family and in order to effect this had put up the appellant who was in fact a Chamar woman, to pretend to be his wife: that, in pursuance of this conspiracy, the appellant had been induced to go to the courts at Dehra and to make a false statement to the effect that she was Pirthi Singh's wife and had been kept in seclusion as above mentioned. As a result of this, the complainant, his parents and Umrao Singh have been out casted. The complaint went on to say that the feelings of the complainant had been further outraged by statements made by the appellant. Those statements were certainly statements, if true, to the prejudice of the complainant and his relations. All these statements were said to have been made by the woman appellant to a Sub-Inspector of police stationed at Rikhikesh, and when the charge sheet was drawn up the woman was charged with having on the 26th of February, 1918, at Rikhikesh, by words spoken, to the Sub-Inspector, published an imputation of incestuous connection with different persons knowing that such imputation would harm the reputation of Musammat Parwari, if living, and intended to harm the feelings of the near relatives such as her father and brother. The statements are then set out in the charge sheet; and it is added that she had thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 499, read with Section 500, of the Indian Penal Code. The record, as it stood, was, as I pointed out in my order of the 2nd of December', 1918, so meagre, that it was difficult to-decide from it the precise circumstances under which the statement of the 26th of February said to have been made by the appellant came into existence. In order to ascertain these circumstances, I summoned Sub-Inspector Indarjit Singh, the Sub-Inspector concerned, to ascertain these circumstances as far as possible. His evidence has been recorded, and I cannot say that it is at all satisfactory. Taking it as it stands, he says that the statement contained in Exhibit H was a statement made under the authority of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908. As' to the statements contained in Exhibit I and J, he found it difficult to say positively how those statements came to be made. Eventually, however, he deposed that they were statements made in consequence of action taken by him under Section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a novice in police work, for he says he has been Sub-Inspector for five years, but he left it rather doubtful whether he did intentionally and knowingly act under the authority of section 155 of the code or of some authority given him by the Police Manual. If the statements resulted from action taken under Section 154 or under Section 155, they are privileged statements, and as such, should not have been used as evidence at all. [See Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the case of Manjaya v. Sesha Shetti (1888) I.L.R. 11 Mad., 477 also Queen Empress v. Govinda Pillai (1892) I.L.R., 13 Mad., 235]. The Madras High Court is very positive and consistent upon the view that statements under these circumstances are privileged and cannot be made the foundation of a charge of defamation. I do not know what authority the Police Manual may give, but, whatever authority it may give, if it does give any authority, that cannot override the law. It is difficult to understand how the Sub-Inspector could have taken these statements at all. The probability is that he took them out of prurient curiosity and not in the course of any investigation made under Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I mention this as what I am about to say might otherwise be considered obiter dictum. I have on previous occasions pointed out that in dealing with cases of criminal defamation]it is necessary to follow carefully the provisions made in the Indian Penal Code on the question of defamation. There is a marked difference between criminal liability for defamation under the English law and under the Indian law, arising no doubt from the fact that the English criminal law when dealing with defamation had mainly to consider whether the defamation was such as would result in a breach of the peace or the question whether the person who claimed punishment for defamation was a person aggrieved by the statements made. In the present case the defamation consisted of imputing matters which concerned a deceased person. The authors of the Code have themselves pointed out their intention that the penal law in India on this point, should differ from that in England. Their intention was that the essence of the offence of defamation should consist in its tendency to cause that description of pain which is felt by a person who knows himself to be the object of the unfavourable sentiments of his fellow creatures and those inconveniences to which a person who is the object of such unfavourable sentiments is exposed. This was the reason evidently why they attached to Section 499 the explanation marked 1. Section 499 by itself could not touch the present case. The imputation affected a deceased person. Explanation I expands Section 499 by adding that it may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person if the imputation would harm the reputation of the person if living and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives. The learned Counsel who supported the case for the prosecution argued that in this case intention was proved if it was the probable consequence of the act done. I find myself unable to agree with him, ably as he put forward that argument, and I hold that in the present case it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove not only that the statements made by the appellant would have harmed the reputation of Musammat Parwari as they undoubtedly would have, but also, that he had to prove that the statements were made with an intention to be hurtful to the feelings of Chhajju Singh, Chhajju Singh's family or other near relatives. Whether the words "near relatives" would include Chhajju Singh is open to question. The evidence for the Crown is, however, that the appellant on the 26th of February made statements on which she has been convicted under these circumstances:A constable came upon herein a fair, she was at the time wearing a male attire. For some reason or other he suspected that she was not a male person but a woman in male attire. He took her to the thana of Rikhikesh. She was seen at once by the Sub-Inspector, Indarjit Singh. He questioned her and came to the conclusion that she was a woman masquerading in male clothes. The statements she made at that time were not statements to the prejudice, but if it can be so said, would have been to the credit of the family of Chhajju Singh, She described herself as a Brahmin and so forth. The Sub-Inspector sent her to another thana, Sahaspur. She left for Sahaspur under the conduct or the arrest of a constable. Soon after the Sub-Inspector went to the railway station, Rikhikesh road, with the intention of proceeding on four days leave. He there saw the woman again, and she then made statements which were to the derogation of the family aforesaid. The theory of the prosecution is that she made, these latter statements at the instigation of one Pirthi Singh and hence the derived malice that turns these statements into defamation, statements, made according to the Crown, with the object of aspersing the memory of the dead and with a design to injure the feelings of the relatives of the dead. The case of Queen v. Labouchere (1884) 12 Q.B.D., 320 is very instructive on this point, always bearing in mind that we must adhere strictly to the Indian law as laid down in Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code If the intention of the appellant was to aggrieve, if the word may be used, the feelings of the relations, is it at all likely that the woman would not have done so on the first occasion she had a change of doing it, namely, when she came to the Rikhikesh thana or later on as she is charged with doing,? A woman bent upon causing pain to the relations of Chhajju Singh would surely have done so when she had the first opportunity of doing it. We can easily imagine her blurting out a false story upon the first opportunity. It is difficult to imagine her designing to get credence to her false story by first stating matters to the c-of the family and then taking advantage of an unexpected interview with the Sub-Inspector to do the opposite. She did not know of the Sub-Inspector's intention to take leave or the probability of meeting him at the railway station. The improbability is so great that it amounts to my mind to an impossibility. Her intention was not to cause pain to the relatives of the deceased, but to get herself, if she could, out of the scrape into which she had come by going about in male attire with a large amount of jewellery. In any case I cannot hold that the intention has been proved; her statements therefore do not amount to defamation, The offence of defamation of which she has been convicted has not been established. I find her not guilty and direct her immediate release from custody; if on bail, as I understand she is, she should be instantly released and the bail bonds cancelled.

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    Emperor v. Parwari
    (Jan 3, 1919)