Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act (Local Act No. III of 1901).
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act,
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the Land Revenue Act of 1901.
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the Land Revenue Act,
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of Act III of 1901,
  • Act (Act XIX of 1873) but the provisions of that Act
  • provisions of section 241, clause (f), Act XIX
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of Act
  • section 241(f) of the old Land Revenue Act,
  • section 106 of the Revenue Act,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act (Local Act No. III of 1901).
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act,
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the Land Revenue Act of 1901.
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the Land Revenue Act,
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of Act III of 1901,
  • Act (Act XIX of 1873) but the provisions of that Act
  • provisions of section 241, clause (f), Act XIX
  • provisions of section 233, clause (k), of Act
  • section 241(f) of the old Land Revenue Act,
  • section 106 of the Revenue Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Richards, C.J.; Tudball, J.; Muhammad Rafiq, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit in which the plaintiff sought a declaration of title to and possession of a specific plot of land. The courts below had earlier found facts in common: in 1875 a mahal was divided into nine pattis; patti No. 9 was a shamilat (common) patti. Over time patti No. 2 became the property of the plaintiff's predecessor in title (Dular Singh). The defendant (Daljit Singh) was a co-sharer in pattis Nos. 4 and 5 and in the shamilat patti No. 9.

In 1904 the defendant applied in the Revenue Court for a perfect partition (requesting separation of his shares in pattis 4, 5 and No. 9); that application was dropped and in 1905 he filed a fresh application for an imperfect partition. The 1905 proceedings resulted in a separate patti formed for the defendant's share in pattis 4 and 5, the shamilat patti remaining unpartitioned. The plaintiff alleged that in those 1905 partition proceedings a portion of patti No. 2 (the plaintiff's patti) was erroneously included in the defendant's new patti.

Both lower courts found that the partition had mistakenly given part of the plaintiff's land to the defendant and decided in the plaintiff's favour. On appeal a judge of this Court held the suit barred by section 233, clause (k), of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act (Local Act No. III of 1901), and reversed those decrees. The present Letters Patent appeal challenges that reversal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's civil suit for declaration of title and possession is barred by section 233, clause (k), of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act (Local Act No. III of 1901) which prohibits suits "with respect to partition or union of mahals" except as provided in sections 111 and 112.
  2. Whether a partition effected in the Revenue Court (here, an imperfect partition of pattis Nos. 4 and 5 in 1905) that by mistake includes land belonging to another patti (patti No. 2) precludes the owner of that other patti from bringing a civil suit to establish title or possession, and whether imperfect partition differs in legal effect from perfect partition for this purpose.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The prohibition in section 233(k) applies only to suits that are "with respect to partition or union" of the specific mahals that were the subject of the partition or union proceedings; it does not extend to suits concerning land that was not the subject of the partition.
  • The 1905 application and resulting partition related only to pattis 4 and 5 (and not patti No. 2). The plaintiff (or his predecessor in title) had no share in pattis 4 and 5 and therefore was not a necessary party to that partition; accordingly his civil suit to recover land mistakenly included in the defendant's patti is not a suit "with respect to partition or union of mahals."
  • Even if notices were issued in 1905, the plaintiff's predecessor might not have been concerned with those pattis (4 and 5) and therefore it was reasonable that he did not take part; in any event the lower courts found no notice was given to the predecessor in title.
  • Prior authorities (Aisha Begam v. Abdulla Khan; Kishen Prasad v. Kadher Mal) support allowing a civil suit where a party did not and could not reasonably participate in partition proceedings that did not concern his patti.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents relied on section 233, clause (k) and contended that where a party has been a co-sharer and partition proceedings have been conducted under the Revenue Act the Civil Court is excluded from entertaining suits "with respect to partition or union of mahals", citing the Full Bench case of Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram.
  • The respondents argued that the plaintiff (or his predecessor) should have raised the question during the 1905 partition proceedings, and having failed to do so he is precluded from pursuing a civil suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram (Full Bench) The Court in that case held that the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to divide not only land but also trees upon it, and that a civil suit for partition in such circumstances was barred by the exclusionary provision (old section 241(f)). The opinion distinguishes Muhammad Sadiq on its facts: there was a perfect partition, all co-sharers were parties, and property within the same mahal (including trees) had been divided. Therefore Muhammad Sadiq does not control the present case where the partition was of different pattis and a plot of another patti was mistakenly included.
Aisha Begam v. Abdulla Khan Held that omission to raise a question of title by a party to an imperfect partition does not preclude that party from suing afterwards in the Civil Court to establish title. The Court (Muhammad Rafiq, J.) cited Aisha Begam for the proposition that imperfect partition does not necessarily bar subsequent civil proceedings to establish title; this supports the appellant's position that section 233(k) should not bar the present suit.
Kishen Prasad v. Kadher Mal Held that if at a perfect partition the land of another mahal was taken by mistake and divided and no objection was taken by co-sharers of the latter mahal, those co-sharers were not debarred from suing in the Civil Court to establish their title. The Court relied on Kishen Prasad to show that mistaken inclusion of land in partition proceedings does not inevitably oust civil jurisdiction to determine title in favor of the dispossessed owner.
Dharam Singh v. Ram Dial Singh Fuller This decision was cited as being "in point" and supportive of the view that the exclusion in section 233(k) does not govern the present case (specific rule text not reproduced in the opinion). The Court invoked Dharam Singh as supporting authority for treating the present facts as outside the prohibition of section 233(k) and to justify restoration of the lower appellate court's decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds through fact-finding and statutory construction, applied by three members of the bench whose opinions converge in result.

Primary legal focus: scope of section 233(k) of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act (Local Act No. III of 1901)

The critical legal question was whether the plaintiff's civil suit is a suit "with respect to partition or union of mahals" within the meaning of section 233(k) (and therefore barred from Civil Court jurisdiction except as provided in sections 111–112), or whether the suit is a distinct proceeding — essentially a suit to assert title and recover land mistakenly taken — that the Civil Court may entertain.

Richards, C.J. — statutory construction and party-interest approach

  • Richards, C.J. emphasizes that the character of a suit should not depend upon the identity of the plaintiff: the statute addresses the nature of the suit, not merely which party brings it.
  • He draws a distinction between (a) a suit which the Civil Court is forbidden to entertain (i.e., one that is intrinsically "with respect to partition or union") and (b) a case in which prior Revenue Court proceedings may constitute a defence (for example, res judicata) — stresses the different consequences of each characterization.
  • Applying facts, Richards treats the 1905 application as one seeking partition of pattis 4 and 5 only. Since the plaintiff's predecessor had no share in those pattis, he was not a necessary party and the partition could not be said to be a partition "with respect to" the plaintiff's patti. Therefore the present suit, which seeks to recover land wrongly allotted to the defendant, is not a suit with respect to partition of the plaintiff's mahal and is not barred by s.233(k).
  • Result: allow the appeal and restore the lower appellate court's decree in favour of the plaintiff.

Tudball, J. — characterization of the suit as one for trespass/possession and factual distinction from Muhammad Sadiq

  • Tudball, J. notes that section 106 of the Revenue Act treats partition as division of a mahal or part of a mahal; in the present case the partition effected by the 1905 application concerned a part of the mahal in which the plaintiff had no interest.
  • He characterizes the plaintiff's action in substance as a straightforward civil suit for possession on the basis of title, alleging trespass by those who had no title.
  • Tudball distinguishes Muhammad Sadiq: in that case there had been a perfect partition in which all co-sharers were parties and the Revenue Court had actually divided groves/trees; the Civil Court was therefore barred. By contrast, the present case involves a mistaken inclusion from another patti and the plaintiff had no role and possibly no notice; the present suit is not a suit "in respect of the partition" of pattis 4 and 5 but a suit in respect of trespass and title.
  • Conclusion: allow the appeal.

Muhammad Rafiq, J. — detailed factual recitation and reliance on prior authorities

  • He recounts the procedural history and the finding that in separating the defendant's share from pattis 4 and 5, the Assistant Collector inadvertently included part of patti No. 2.
  • He analyses the meaning of section 233(k), concluding it governs only partitions of the mahals that are the subject of the Revenue Court proceeding; it cannot be read to bar suits by proprietors of other mahals whose land was mistakenly included.
  • He also raises the practical concern that construing s.233(k) as broadly as the respondents urge would leave owners of mistakenly included land without remedy.
  • He points out authorities (Aisha Begam; Kishen Prasad) supporting the view that imperfect partition or mistaken inclusion does not necessarily preclude civil suits to establish title, and distinguishes Laute Ram (Muhammad Sadiq) on grounds that the latter involved a perfect partition, property actually divided within the same mahal, and a rule excluding Civil Court jurisdiction under the older Act.
  • He also refers to Dharam Singh as an authority that supports the view that s.233(k) does not govern the present case.
  • Conclusion: section 233(k) does not bar the plaintiff's suit; allow the appeal and restore the lower appellate court's decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding: By unanimous direction of the Court, the earlier judge's reversal is set aside and the decree of the lower appellate court (which found for the plaintiff) is restored. The Court ordered that the decree of the learned Judge of this Court be set aside and the decree of the lower appellate court restored with costs in all courts. The Court concluded: Appeal allowed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's favorable findings in the lower appellate court are reinstated; the plaintiff's claim to the plot (held to belong to patti No. 2) is recognized and the plaintiff is entitled to relief (including possession if out of possession). Costs are awarded in favour of the plaintiff in all courts.
  • Scope of statutory exclusion: The Court interprets section 233(k) as confined to suits that are genuinely "with respect to partition or union" of the specific mahals subject to Revenue Court partition or union; mistaken inclusion of land from another patti (especially where the owner had no share or was not a necessary party) does not automatically convert a subsequent title/possession suit into a barred partition suit.
  • On precedent and generality: The Court distinguishes earlier Full Bench authority (Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram) on its facts and relies on other authorities (Aisha Begam; Kishen Prasad; Dharam Singh) to support allowing civil remedies where appropriate. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader new rule beyond its statutory interpretation and fact-driven holding; its practical effect is to preserve Civil Court remedies in cases of mistaken inclusion or where the plaintiff was not concerned with the partitioned pattis.

By the Court: The decree of the learned Judge of this Court is set aside, the decree of the lower appellate court is restored with costs in all courts. Appeal allowed.

    Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh

    Richards, C.J:— This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff claims a declaration of his title to and possession of a certain plot of land. The case will be found reported in 13 A.L.J, 779. It is only necessary to shortly sum up the facts which have been found by both the courts below. In a particular mahal there were nine pattis formed in the year 1875. Patti No. 9 was a shamilat patti common to all the co-sharers. In course of time patti No. 2 became the property of plaintiff. The defendant was a co-sharer in pattis Nos. 4 and 5 and also in the shamilat patti No. 9. The plaintiff, or his predecessor in title, had no share in pattis Nos. 4 and 5. In 1904, the defendant made an application for perfect partition in the Revenue Court. He asked that a separate mahal might be made of his share in pattis Nos. 4 and 5 and also in No. 9, for some reason or another this application was dropped aud a fresh application was made for imperfect partition in the year 1905. There is nothing to show, whether or not the predecessor in title of the plaintiff, Dular Singh, ever got notice of this second application. It resulted in a separate patti being formed of the defendant's share in pattis Nos. 4 and 5, the shamilat patti remaining unpartitioned. The plaintiff instituted the present suit, alleging that in the partition made on the second application of the defendant, a portion of his patti No. 2 was erroneously brought into the defendant's new patti. He accordingly claimed a declaration of his title to the plot and possession if he should be found out of possession. Both the courts agreed that there was a mistake and that portion of the plaintiff's land was by mistake given to the defendant. The first two courts decided in his favour. A learned Judge of this Court held that the suit was barred by the provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the Land Revenue Act of 1901. That section provides that no person shall institute any suit or other proceeding in the Civil Court with respect to partition or union of mahals except as provided in sections 111 and 112. Sections 111 and 112 provide that if in partition proceedings in the Revenue Court questions of title arise, the Collector may, if he thinks fit, try the question himself in which case he is to adopt the procedure therein mentioned and his decree is deemed the decree of the Civil Court. It seems to me extremely difficult to hold that the present suit is a suit “with respect to partition or union of mahals.” It is admitted that, if the very same suit was brought by a person who had not received notice or by reason of his not being a recorded co-sharer was not a party to the partition proceedings, his suit would not have been barred by section 233(k). But it is said that the section is a bar to the suit if the plaintiff was a party to the partition proceedings in the Revenue Court. I have great difficulty in seeing how a suit is a suit “in respect of partition” if brought by one person while it is not a suit “in respect of partition” if brought by another. The suit, if brought by a person who was not a party to the Revenue Court proceedings, affects the partition neither more nor less than it would if he was a person who was a party to the Revenue Court proceedings. It would disturb or upset the recent partition as much and as little in the one case as in the other. The section deals with suits of a particular nature, not with the parties to it. One has to carefully bear in mind the distinction between holding that the suit is a suit which the plaintiff cannot institute in the Civil Court and holding that the proceedings in the Revenue Court are a defence to the suit. If the suit is one which cannot be instituted, it is at once thrown out on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to hear it. It is quite a different matter if, after the case had been heard, the court finds that the proceedings in the Revenue Court disclose a defence to the suit, for example, on the ground of res judicata. The facts of the present case seem to me to illustrate how dangerous it would be to hold that a suit like the present could not be instituted in the Civil Court, and in this connection I may remark that a party has a right to institute in the Civil Court any suit which he is not by the Legislature in clear terms prevented from instituting. In my opinion, under the circumstances of the present case, we are entitled and bound to treat the second application which was made by the defendant in the year 1905, as an application for the partition of pattis 4 and 5 alone. These were the only two pattis which were, as a matter of fact, dealt with in the partition. This being so, the present plaintiff or his predecessor in title was in no way interested in the manner in which pattis 4 and 5 were partitioned. The plaintiff's predecessor in title had no share in pattis 4 and 5 and the applicant for partition had no share in patti No. 2, which belonged to the plaintiff's predecessor in title. It seems to me that the plaintiff was not even a necessary party to this second application in so far as it was for the partition of pattis 4 and 5. He would only be a necessary party to a partition which was for the division of the property in which he was concerned. In my opinion the present suit was not barred by the provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the Land Revenue Act, and, as the findings are in favour of the plaintiff, I think the decree of the lower appellate court ought to be restored. I would allow the appeal.

    I may add one word about the case of Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram. It seems to me that the plaintiff was there asking the Civil Court to partition what was part and parcel of the property which could only be partitioned by the Revenue Court.

    Tudball, J.:— I fully agree. Partition means, as pointed out in section 106 of the Revenue Act, division not only of a mahal but also a part of a mahal. In the present case what was actually partitioned on the basis of the application of the 25th of March, 1905, was a part of the mahal in which the present plaintiff, or his predecessor in title, had no concern. It was immaterial to him how the land of those two pattis was divided amongst the co-sharers therein. What seems to have happened is that in dividing the land of those two pattis the partition court erroneously thought that a certain plot was within the boundaries of those two pattis and took it into consideration in the partition. Of that fact the plaintiff, or his predecessor is title probably had not the slightest information at all. It was only when the plaintiff's possession began to be disturbed that he had any knowledge of what had occurred. He has come into court with the present suit, which in substance and in form is a simple suit for possession of land on the basis of title on the allegation that certain persons who had no title thereto had trespassed on it and some had taken it into their possession, I believe that, as a matter of fact, he made no objection to the partition proceedings nor was it necessary for him to do so. In my opinion in the circumstances of this case it is utterly impossible to say that the suit is a suit in respect of the partition of pattis Nos. 4 and 5. It is really a suit in respect of the trespass committed by certain persons on property to which they had no title whatsoever. In the course of the arguments attention has been called to the decision of this Court in Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram and great stress has been laid upon certain remarks to be found in the judgement therein. The facts of that case were simple. There was a partition. All the co-sharers were parties to that partition. The lands constituting the mahal were actually divided among the co-sharers. On some of the lands stood some trees. The plaintiff in that case came forward with a civil suit for the partition of the trees on the allegation that the Revenue Court had not, as a matter of fact, partitioned the trees and moreover had no jurisdiction whatsoever to partition the trees. Therefore he asked for division of the trees among the persons concerned. This Court held and I think rightly that the Revenue Court had jurisdiction to divide up not only the land but also the trees upon it, and that it had actually divided both the land and the trees. The suit was one which was barred by section 241(f) of the old Land Revenue Act, which deprived the Civil Court of any jurisdiction in a matter relating to the distribution of the land among the co-sharers. In my opinion the case was rightly decided on the facts thereof, and any remarks which are to be found are to be read in conjunction with the facts and circumstances of that case and they are not to be taken out of their setting and placed apart as being general principles which will govern the facts and circumstances of every other case.

    In my opinion the decision of the courts below was correct and I would allow the appeal.

    Muhammad Rafiq, J.:— I am also of opinion that this appeal should prevail. The appeal is on behalf of the plaintiff and the question, for decision is whether his claim is barred by the provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act (Local Act No. III of 1901). In order to determine the question it is necessary to recite some of the facts which are either admitted or proved, it appears that as long ago as 1875, a partition took place through the Revenue Court between the co-sharers of the mahal under which it was divided into several pattis, one of which, patti No. 9, was known as patti shamilat. Patti No. 2 was awarded to one Dular Singh, the predecessor in title of the plaintiff, and pattis Nos. 4 and 5 were allotted to Daljit Singh defendant and some others. In 1905, Daljit Singh applied for separation of his share out of pattis Nos. 4 and 5 as also out of the shamilat patti No. 9 by perfect partition. On the application of Daljit Singh notices were issued to all the co-sharers of the pattis, in the mahal. The Assistant Collector, however, declined to make a perfect partition, expressing an opinion that he would, if so desired, allow an imperfect partition. Thereupon Daljit Singh presented a fresh application asking for the separation of his share by an imperfect partition. The Assistant Collector, in the course of separation of the share of Daljit Singh out of pattis Nos. 4 and 5, somehow included a portion of the land belonging to patti No. 2, that is, of Dular Singh. The plaintiff, who is the purchaser of Dular Singh's rights in patti No. 2, instituted the suit out of which this appeal has arisen for a declaration that the said portion of land, taken out of patti No. 2 and included in the patti of Daljit Singh by mistake during the proceedings of imperfect partition in 1905, belonged to him and that, in case he was found out of possession, a decree for possession should be granted to him.

    The first two courts found that the land in suit formed part of patti No. 2 and decreed the claim. On appeal a learned Judge of this Court held that, though the land in suit was a part of patti No. 2, the plaintiff could not maintain the present suit in view of the provisions of section 233, clause (k), of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, and accordingly reversed the decrees of the lower courts. The plaintiff has preferred this Letters Patent appeal and contends that section 233, clause (k), does not govern his case. On the other hand, the respondents rely on the said section and the Full Bench case of Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram. They contend that under the Revenue Act “no person shall institute any suit or other proceeding in the Civil Court with respect to partition or union of mahals except as provided in sections 111 and 112” of the Act. Dular Singh, the predecessor id title of the plaintiff, should have raised the question now raised during the proceedings of imperfect partition in 1905, or in any case he could have done so. He having failed to do so, no civil suit lies. I do not think that the contention for the respondents is correct. The partition or union of mahals referred to in clause (k) of section 233 means the partition or union of those mahals in respect of which partition or union is sought and not any other. The prohibition therefore governs the case of those mahals only in respect of which partition or union is asked for and made. It could not apply to other mahals which were not the subject of partition or union. If the construction of the section in question contended for on behalf of the respondents were correct, the proprietors of a village some portion of whose land had been included by mistake or error during the partition of an adjacent mahal, would have no remedy at all. It may be said for the respondents that the proprietors of the village could bring a civil suit on the ground that they had no notice of the partition of the adjacent mahal. But the obvious reply would be that under the law no notice was required to be given to them, and; partition once made and no objection taken during the partition proceedings, no civil suit could be entertained. However, in the present case it has been found by the lower courts that no notice was given to Dular Singh of the second application of Daljit Singh asking for imperfect partition. In my opinion, even if a notice had been issued to Dular Singh he might very well have kept away thinking that he was not concerned with the partition of pattis Nos. 4 aud 5, in which he had no share. Besides it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 233, clause (k), of Act III of 1901, would apply to proceedings in an imperfect partition. In the case of Aisha Begam v. Abdulla Khan it was held that the omission to raise the question of title by a party to an imperfect partition did not preclude him from suing afterwards in the Civil Court, to establish this title. In another case, namely, that of Kishen Prasad v. Kadher Mal, it was held that if at a perfect partition of a mahal the land of another mahal was taken by mistake and divided and no objection was taken by the co-sharers of the latter mahal they were not debarred from suing in the Civil Court to establish their title.

    It is true that both these cases were decided under the former Act (Act XIX of 1873) but the provisions of that Act as to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court were similar to those in the present at (III of 1900). It may, however, be argued that the said cases were decided before the Full Bench case of Muhammad Sadiq v. Laute Ram and hence may be taken to have been overruled. The reply is that the points raised in the former cases were not raised and decided in the Full Bench case. Besides the facts of the latter case were quite different from those reported in the Weekly Notes for 1899 and 1900, and from the present case. The facts of the Full Bench case were that Muhammad Sadiq, Dewan Mal and some others were co-sharers in a certain village. An application was made by some of the co-sharers, in which Dewan Mal did not join, for perfect partition, and notices were issued to all the co-sharers, including Dewan Mal. He made no objection in time. The Assistant Collector made the partition, in the course of which he divided the groves also. The share of Dewan Mal was sold in execution of a decree and purchased by Laute Ram. The latter brought a suit in the Civil Court for a declaration of his title to the groves on the allegation that they belonged exclusively to Dewan Mal and that the Revenue Court could partition the land but not the trees. It was held that the suit of Laute Ram could not be entertained by a Civil Court in view of the provisions of section 241, clause (f), Act XIX of 1873. The case of Laute Ram is clearly distinguishable from the present case on three grounds, namely, first, there was in that case a perfect partition, secondly, property included in the village sought to be partitioned was divided and no property outside the village was taken and divided, and, thirdly, the Revenue Court could-divide also the groves situate in the village. Laute Ram's case is therefore not in point and does not help the respondents. The case of Dharam Singh…Plaintiff v. Ram Dial Singh Fuller…Defendant . is in point and supports the view of the law I have taken. In my judgement the provisions of section 233, clause (k), of Act No. 111 of 1901 do not govern the present case.

    By the Court:— The order of the Court is that the decree of the learned Judge of this Court is set aside and the decree of the lower appellate court is restored with costs in all courts.

    Appeal allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Shambhu Singh v. Daljit Singh
    (Feb 17, 1916)