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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition was filed by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) seeking a writ of certiorari to quash orders passed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad, in various execution cases enforcing orders made in reference proceedings under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioner contended that the State of Uttar Pradesh, as the acquiring authority, was liable to pay compensation, not NOIDA, and challenged an order attaching NOIDA's account without notice. The writ petition was filed after NOIDA was made a party in the reference and execution proceedings before the District Judge. NOIDA had also filed First Appeals against the District Judge’s awards which were pending without interim relief. The Court had earlier passed an interim stay on execution based on a Division Bench decision but later heard the matter in detail.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether NOIDA, as the authority for whose benefit the land was acquired, can be held liable to pay compensation awarded under a reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act when the State Government is the acquiring authority.
  2. Whether the execution orders attaching NOIDA’s accounts were passed without due opportunity or notice, rendering them arbitrary and liable to be set aside.
  3. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable to challenge the execution of a decree passed by the District Judge under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The land was acquired by the State of Uttar Pradesh; therefore, only the State is liable to pay compensation, not NOIDA.
  • The execution order attaching NOIDA's account was passed without notice or opportunity, making it arbitrary and invalid.
  • Reliance on a Division Bench decision holding that the authority for whose benefit land is acquired is not liable to pay compensation awarded in a Section 18 reference.
  • Reference to the Supreme Court decision in U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi that the acquiring authority is only a proper party, not a necessary party, in a Section 18 reference.
  • The execution order cannot be enforced against NOIDA, and the respondents should recover compensation from the State Government instead.

Respondents' Arguments

  • NOIDA was a party before the District Judge in the reference proceedings under Section 18 and also a judgment-debtor in the execution proceedings.
  • The award passed under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act is a decree for purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure and is executable against NOIDA.
  • NOIDA had contested the reference and led evidence, and has filed First Appeals which are pending without any interim relief.
  • NOIDA cannot pursue two remedies simultaneously by filing a writ petition while First Appeals are pending.
  • The execution order was passed after NOIDA appeared and requested time to deposit the amount, which was refused, negating the claim of no opportunity.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ghaziabad Development Authority v. IV Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad (Division Bench, 1988) Held that the authority for whose benefit land is acquired is not liable to pay compensation awarded in a Section 18 reference if not a party or judgment-debtor. Distinguished on facts since NOIDA was a party and judgment-debtor in the present case.
U.P. Avas Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, 1995 (2) SCC 326 The acquiring authority is a proper party but not a necessary party in a Section 18 reference. Considered but held not applicable as NOIDA was a party and judgment-debtor here.
Smt. Shyam Lata Jauhari v. The Collector, Allahabad, 1990 AWC 1234 Only awards given by the Court under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act are decrees executable under the Code of Civil Procedure. Supported the view that the District Judge’s award under Section 26 is a decree and executable against NOIDA.
Ahmad Husain v. P. B. Naiman, AIR 1963 Pat 30 Clarified the distinction between awards under Section 11 and Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. Reinforced that Section 31 provisions do not apply to awards under Section 26.
Hissar Improvement Trust v. Smt. Rukmani Devi, AIR 1990 SC 2033 Liability to pay interest for delay in compensation lies with the Collector, not the acquiring authority who deposited compensation amount. Held irrelevant to the present controversy concerning execution of a decree under Section 26.
Ghanshyam Das Gupta v. Anant Kumar Sinha, 1991 ALI 958 A writ petition is not maintainable to question the executability of a decree. Applied to hold that NOIDA cannot challenge execution proceedings by a writ petition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the legal position regarding the liability to pay compensation awarded under references made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It distinguished the earlier Division Bench decision relied upon by the petitioner on the ground that NOIDA was not a party or judgment-debtor in that case, whereas here NOIDA was a party and judgment-debtor. The Court emphasized that awards made by the District Judge under Section 26 are decrees under the Code of Civil Procedure and are executable against the judgment-debtor, in this case NOIDA. The provisions of Section 31 relating to awards under Section 11 and liability of the State Government do not apply to awards under Section 26. The Court also noted that NOIDA had contested the reference and filed First Appeals without obtaining interim relief, and therefore could not invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction to challenge execution simultaneously. Regarding the contention about lack of notice, the Court found it contrary to record since NOIDA appeared and sought time which was refused. The Court rejected the petitioner's contentions and upheld the execution orders.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is dismissed with costs.

The Court held that the execution orders enforcing the District Judge’s awards under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act against NOIDA are valid and executable. NOIDA, being a party and judgment-debtor, cannot avoid liability by relying on the State Government’s liability under other provisions. The petitioners cannot challenge the execution proceedings by a writ petition while First Appeals are pending without interim relief. The order attaching NOIDA’s account was passed after due opportunity. The decision directly affects the parties by affirming the enforceability of the compensation awards against NOIDA and does not set any new legal precedent beyond the facts of the case.

    New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. State Of U.P. And Ors.

    R.B.Mehrotra, J.-

    The present writ petition has been filed by New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, for convenience hereinafter referred to as NOIDA, praying for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the orders passed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad in various execution cases enforcing the orders of the District Judge passed in reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

    2. The contentions made in the writ petition are -

    (1) That the land has been acquired by the State of Uttar Pradesh, as such the liability for paying the compensation is on the State of Uttar Pradesh and the petitioner cannot be compelled to pay the compensation determined by the District Judge while deciding a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.

    (2) That the order of attachment of the petitioner's account, impugned in the writ petition, whereby the account of the petitioner has been attached, has been passed without any opportunity or notice to the petitioner, as such the order is arbitrary and is liable to be set aside on the said ground.

    3. In the writ petition, notice was issued to the respondents by this Court on 18-5-1995 and an interim order has also been passed in favour of the petitioner staying the execution of the orders passed in Annexures 'I' to '8' to the writ petition, referred to above, on the basis of a Division Bench deci­sion of this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3544 of 1988, Ghaziabad Development, Ghaziabad v. IV Addl. District Judge, Ghaziabad, decided on 17-5-1988. On notice being issued, respondents Nos. 9 to 56 have put in appearance and have filed counter-affidavit.

    4. I have heard learned counsel foe the petitioner Sri A. K. Mishra and the learned counsel for the respondents Sri M. D. Singh, Sri S. N. Singh and Sri Pankaj Mittal at length. The sheet anchor of the petitioner's case is a Division Bench decision, referred to earlier wherein this Court has held :

    "The matter in regard to the payment of compensation and its realisa­tion is, in our opinion, one between the State Government through the Collector on the one hand and the person who are held entitled to receive compensation on the other. The authority for which the land is acquired cannot hence be proceeded against in the execution of the award

    5. On the basis of the aforesaid decision, the contention of the peti­tioner's counsel is that the Division Bench has held that the payment of compensation awarded to the persons whose land have been acquired is on the State Government and the petitioner for whose benefit the land was acquired cannot be proceeded against for recovery of compensation. In this connection, the learned counsel the petitioner has also submitted that in U. P. Avas Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi, reported in 1995 (2) SCC 326, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the authority in whose favour the land is being acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, is only a proper party and not a necessary party in a reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The contention of the petitioner's counsel is that since the petitioner was not a necessary party, the order passed for payment of compensation cannot be enforced against the petitioner and the respondents are free to execute the aforesaid order against the State Government.

    6. The Division Bench decision, referred to above and relied upon by the petitioner is clearly distinguishable in the context of the present case. In the aforesaid decision, a categorical finding has been recorded by the Division Bench that Ghaziabad Development Authority was not a party before the District Judge and "even the execution application was not directed against the Ghaziabad Development Authority." At another place in the judgment, the Division Bench again stressed on the same point and noticed -

    "As mentioned above, the decree-holders had not even applied for execution against the Ghaziabad Development Authority."

    7. In the present case, it is not in dispute that NOIDA was a party before the concerned District Judge deciding the land acquisition reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is also not disputed that against the judgment given by the District Judge for enforcement of which, the impugned order has been passed, the petitioners have filed First Appeals in this Court which are pending consideration. The petitioners have not been able to obtain any interim order in the aforesaid First Appeals. The petitioner is already pursuing its remedy against the impugned orders by means of filing First Appeals in this Court. In the circumstances, there is no justification for the petitioners for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court for challenging the enforcement of the orders against which the peti­tioners themselves have preferred First Appeals in this Court. Peti­tioners cannot be permitted to pursue two remedies simultaneously particularly in the case where the petitioners have not been able to obtain interim orders in the First appeals.

    8. In the present case admittedly a judgment has been given by the District Judge, Ghaziabad awarding compensation in favour of respondents No. 9 to 56 in a reference to him under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act where both the State Government and NOIDA were arrayed as respondents and in the execution application filed by the respondents, both the State Government and the petitioners are arrayed as opposite parties. The District Judge has given award under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. Sub-section (2) of the Section 26 of the aforesaid Act provides;

    "(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the state­ment of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, clause (2), and Section 2, claus (9), respec­tively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908."

    9. Section 53 of tike Land Acquisition Act makes the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the proceedings under the Land Acqui­sition Act in cases there it no provision to the contrary contained in the Act. The aforesaid two provisions make it amply clear that an award given by the District Judge under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act is a decree for the purposes of the Code of Civil Procedure and the said decree can be executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, The peti­tioners' position is that of a judgment-debtor in the aforesaid decree.

    10. In Smt. Shyam Lata Jauhari v. The Collector, Allahabad, reported in 1990 AWC 1234, a Division Bench of this court has held:

    "A look at the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act will reveal that Part II of the Act deals with the initial stages of acquisition pro­ceedings which take place before the Collector which also include Section 11 which deals with enquiry and determination of com­pensation while making the award. Part III of the Act, on the other hand, deals with proceedings consequent upon a reference against the Collector's award. Section 26 prescribes the manner and form of the award which the Court gives on a reference being made to it by the Collector under Section 18.

    "The words that at once attract attention in Section 26 are that 'every award under this part shall be in writing signed by the Judge and ....The expression 'this part' excludes the award made by the Collector under Section 11. Besides the award, this section speaks of it is the one given under the signature of the Judge and not Collector. Thus only the award given by the court" on a reference being made under Section 18 and which is signed by the Judge can be deemed to be a decree under Section 26 capable of being executed as such by the Civil Court....".

    11. The same view has been taken by the Patna High Court in Ahmad Husain v. P. B. Naiman, reported in AIR 1963 Pat 30. The Division Bench decision in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority (supra) has referred to Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act has no relevance for awards given under Section 26 in a reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 31 refers to award given by the Collector under Section II of the Land Acquisition Act. The responsibility of paying compensation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisi­tion Act has been fixed on the State Government only in cases where Collector has made an award under Section 11 of the Act. The said section is not relevant for the purpose of the execution of an award given under Section 26 by a District Judge which is equivalent to a decree passed by the Civil Court and which is executable in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench decision in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority (supra) was mainly considering a case where Ghaziabad Development Authority was neither a judgment-debtor nor a patty in the reference. In the aforesaid context, the Court held that the compensation awarded by the District Judge cannot be recovered from the authority in whose favour acquisition has been made. I am of the view that the aforesaid Division Bench decision is not relevant in the context of the present case. However, with all respects, I say that a reference made under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act in the aforesaid Division Bench decision was not relevant in the context of enforcing on award passed under Section 26 of the Land Acqui­sition Act. The attention of the Division Bench was not drawn towards the provisions of Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. However, since I have taken a view that the aforesaid Division Bench decision is distinguishable on the facts of the present case, it is not necessary any further to deal with the aforesaid decision ot the Division Bench. In the circumstances of the case, and particularly in view of the fact that the petitioners have contested the reference proceedings made to the District Judge and have led evidence in the aforesaid proceedings and aggrieved by the award of the District Judge, the petitioners having themselves filed First Appeals in this Court, the petitioners cannot be permitted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    12. The petitioners have also placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Hissar Improvement Trust v. Smt. Rukmani Devi, reported in AIR 1990 SC 2033 in support of his contention that the liability of payment of compensation is on the Collector and not on the body for whose benefit the land has been acquired. The said decision has no relevance to the controversy involved in the present case. In the said decision, the question was whether the Hissar Improvement Trust is liable to pay interest to the claimant on the ground that the claimant was not paid the compensation amount within the time. The Court held that since the Hissar Improvement Trust had already deposited the entire amount of compensation with the Collector, the Improvement Trust cannot be saddled with the liability of the interest for not paying compensation to the claimant within the stipulated time. In the present case, no such controversy is involved.

    13. The petitioners' counsel has also contended that Section 31 of the Act provides procedure to the contrary for recovering the compensation amount from the State Government. I have already held that Section 31 of the Act has no relevance in the case where the award has been given under Section 26 of the Act.

    14. In Ghanshyam Das Gupta v. Anant Kumar Sinha, reported in 1991 AL.I 958, the Hpn'ble Supreme Court has held that a writ petition questioning the executability of a decree is not maintainable.

    15. In view of the aforesaid decision, the petitioners cannot be permitted to challenge the aforesaid execution proceedings, particularly in the, circumstances of the case, by means of a writ petition in this Court.

    16. So far as the second contention is concerned, this contention is both contrary to record and contrary to law. The order impugned in the writ petition itself shows that the petitioners put in appearance before the executing court and asked for time to deposit the amount awarded by the District Judge in an award given under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. The request of the petitioners was rejected. This be lies the petitioners' contention that the order was passed without opportunity to them. The objection is also not sustainable on the ground that for executing a decree of a court, a judgment-debtor is not entitled of any further opportunity to show cause or notice. The second objection raised by the petitioners' counsel is accordingly rejected.

    17. For the reasons discussed above, the writ petition is dismissed with costs which 1 determine Rs. 500 to each of the contesting respondents. The interim order passed by this Court is vacated forthwith.

    Petition dismissed.

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    New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. State Of U.P. And Ors.
    (Aug 21, 1995)