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  • proceeding.7. Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • U.P Co-operative Land Development Bank Act 1984
  • SECTION 52 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 47 of the Code.6.
  • Section 47 C.P.C
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • proceeding.7. Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • U.P Co-operative Land Development Bank Act 1984
  • SECTION 52 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT 1882
  • Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 47 of the Code.6.
  • Section 47 C.P.C
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — D.K. Seth, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from a suit between two private persons instituted in 1973. The suit was decreed in 1978, affirmed on first appeal in 1979 and decided on second appeal in 1992. Following completion of the appellate process, execution of the decree was sought. During execution proceedings the petitioner filed an application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming that the suit property was mortgaged to the U.P. Co-operative Land Development Bank (referred to in the opinion as the said Bank), and that under the U.P. Co-operative Land Development Bank Act, 1984 ("the said Act") the decree was inexecutable.

The petitioner had a Special Leave Petition pending before the Supreme Court but conceded that no stay order had been obtained. The executing court rejected the Section 47 objection. Revision against that order was decided against the petitioner. The petitioner then filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the order rejecting the Section 47 application. The writ petition alleged that loans/mortgages were taken in 1976 and 1992; however, the mortgage (if any) was not pleaded or supported by particulars or documents in the original suit or the appeals, and particulars were vague or missing in the execution application and the writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an objection in execution proceedings under Section 47 CPC that the decree is inexecutable because the suit property was mortgaged to a Co-operative Land Development Bank (under the U.P. Co-operative Land Development Bank Act, 1984) can be entertained when that defence was not raised in the suit or appeals.
  2. Whether the executing court may "go behind" the decree to adjudicate a new right or challenge the validity of the decree, particularly where resolution of the objection would require fresh evidence and effectively reverse or alter the decree.
  3. Whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (doctrine of lis pendens) is applicable to the facts before the Court (the court indicated this issue need not be decided in view of its other findings).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Sri V.M. Zaidi) Arguments

  • The petitioner asserted that the suit property was mortgaged with the U.P. Co-operative Land Development Bank and relied on the U.P. Co-operative Land Development Bank Act, 1984 to contend that the decree was inexecutable.
  • Counsel argued that because Section 22 of the said Act contains a non obstante clause, the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would not apply.
  • Although the application under Section 47 of CPC did not state dates, counsel pointed to paragraph 10 of the writ petition which alleged loans were taken in 1976 and 1992; counsel conceded, however, that the 1976 loan was not disclosed in the original suit or in the appeals and was first raised in the Section 47 application.

Opposite Party's (Sri Ashok Singh, holding brief for Sri Shashi Nandan) Arguments

  • Counsel submitted that the Section 47 application did not disclose the date on which the alleged mortgage was created in favour of the Land Development Bank.
  • He relied on the revisional court's order which indicated the alleged mortgage was created sometime in 1992 and that it was not under Section 22 of the said Act.
  • Both courts below had found against the petitioner on this issue, and counsel urged that this Court should not interfere with those findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lalmani v. Shiv Shanker, A.I.R. 1980 Patna 134 Supports the principle that when a new right is claimed which requires adjudication of rights in property it results in going behind the decree; executing court cannot adjudicate such new rights. The court cited it to show that an executing court cannot entertain a claim that effectively seeks to avoid the decree by adjudicating a new right.
Sheshwar Bhartia v. Udiasthree, 1994 CLJ 297 (Ori.) Similar proposition: new rights asserted in execution leading to going behind the decree are impermissible. Used alongside Lalmani to illustrate established authority that execution proceedings cannot be used to try new title claims.
Sarwan Lal v. Kanti Prasad, A.I.R. 1986 All. 1 Held that objections to executability that amount to challenging the maintainability of the suit cannot be raised before the executing court. Cited to support the proposition that the executing court cannot be made a forum to challenge the suit's maintainability or substantive decree.
Bhawarao v. Savitribai, A.I.R. 1991 Bombay 55 Mixed questions of law and fact cannot be raised for the first time in execution proceedings. Relied upon to show that new factual or mixed law/fact issues cannot be entertained in execution.
Manful Hussain v. Kiran Rano, 1993 2 CLJ 456 (M.P.) Objection tending to show that a decree is erroneous is not maintainable under Section 47 CPC. Cited to reinforce the rule that execution proceedings are not a vehicle for contesting the correctness of a decree.
V.D. Modi v. R. Rahman, 1970 1 SCC 670 Apex Court authority that the executing court cannot go behind the decree; it must take the decree as it stands and execute it; cannot entertain objections that the decree is incorrect in law or fact. Applied as high authority for the general rule restricting the powers of an executing court.
Addison Pains v. Sant Bux, A.I.R. 1976 Del 137 Section 47 does not entitle the court to investigate the validity of the decree when on the face of it there is nothing illegal in it. Cited to support the proposition that Section 47 is not a license to re-open or re-try the correctness of a decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based strictly on the opinion's text:

  1. Establishing the factual posture: The suit was instituted in 1973, decreed in 1978, and appeals concluded by 1992. The petitioner raised, for the first time in execution proceedings (and in a writ petition), that the property had been mortgaged to the Co-operative Land Development Bank with loans allegedly taken in 1976 and 1992. The petitioner conceded that the 1976 mortgage/loan was not pleaded in the suit or in the appeals.
  2. Identifying procedural and evidentiary deficiencies: The Court observed there were no particulars or documentary proof before the executing court as to when the alleged mortgage was created or any deeds evidencing the mortgage. The Section 47 application lacked dates and particulars; the writ petition alleged the years but did not annex mortgage deeds or specific particulars sufficient to establish the claimed right.
  3. Interpreting the scope of Section 47 CPC: The Court explained that "all questions" in Section 47 are limited to questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The executing court's jurisdiction does not extend to deciding controversial questions which form the basis of the decree; it cannot act as a trial court to re-adjudicate the suit.
  4. Applying established authorities and principles: The Court relied on precedent to state the settled principle that an executing court cannot "go behind" the decree to entertain objections that effectively challenge the correctness or validity of the decree or require adjudication of new rights in property. When resolution of an objection would necessitate fresh evidence or would amount to reversing or altering the decree, it is impermissible in execution proceedings.
  5. Constructive res judicata and foreclosed defences: The Court held that the mortgage/loan alleged to have been created in 1976 (i.e., prior to decree) constituted a defence which should have been raised and decided in the original suit. A defence which could have been but was not raised is deemed to have been raised and decided (constructive res judicata) and cannot be re-opened in execution proceedings.
  6. Conclusion on scope of Section 47 application: Given the lack of particulars and documentary proof and because the objection went to the root of the decree (i.e., would require altering the decree or trying title of a third party), the objection did not fall within the scope of Section 47 CPC and the courts below had not erred in rejecting it.
  7. On collateral issues: The Court explicitly stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would be attracted, in view of the above conclusions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed; the Court declined to interfere with the order impugned and found no infirmity, illegality or irregularity in the courts below' findings that the Section 47 objection did not succeed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's challenge to the rejection of the Section 47 application failed; execution of the decree may proceed subject to the directions in the impugned order. The Court ordered that a copy of the order be supplied to the petitioner's counsel on payment of usual charges within a week and made no order as to costs.
  • On precedent/broader law: The Court applied established principles (as cited) restricting the powers of executing courts and did not announce any new legal principle. The opinion does not purport to create new law or expand the scope of Section 47 CPC; rather it applied settled authorities to the facts of the case.

Disposition: Petition dismissed. No order as to costs.

    Jagbir Singh v. Vith Additional District And Sessions Judge Bijnor

    D.K Seth, J.:— The suit between two private persons were instituted in the year 1973 and was decreed in 1978. It was affirmed on appeal in 1979. The second appeal was decided in 1992. The decree was sought to be executed. Sri V.M Zaidi, learned counsel for the petitioner states that special Leave petition is pending but very fairly concedes that no stay order has been obtained. In the execution an application under Section 47 of the Act was filed claiming that the suit property is mortgaged with the Land Development Bank. Therefore, the decree is inexecutable in view of the provisions contained in the U.P Co-operative Land Development Bank Act 1984 (herein after referred to as the said Act).

    2. Sri Ashok Singh, learned counsel, holding brief of Sri Shashi Nandan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that in the application under Section 47 it has not been disclosed as to on which date the alleged mortgage was created in favour of the land Development Bank. He points out from the order passed in the revision against the order rejecting application under Section 47 of the Act that the alleged mortgage was created some times in 1992 and that it was not mortgaged under Section 22 of the said Act. According to him both the courts below have found against the petitioner. Therefore, this court should not interfere with the same. In reply thereto Sri Zaidi, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in view of the provisions contained in Section 22 of the said Act the doctrine of lispendens as contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act, 1882, would not be applicable because of the non obstante clause with which Section 22 begins. He further contends that though no date was mentioned as to when such mortgage was created in the application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the said fact was disclosed in para 10 of the writ petition wherein he has pointed out that the loan was obtained from the Bank in the year 1976 and 1992. However, he very fairly concedes that this fact of obtaining loan from the Bank in the year 1976 was not disclosed in the suit, though the suit was decreed in 1976 or in any of the two successive appeals and was raised for the first time in the application under Section 47 of the aforesaid Act.

    3. I have heard Sri V.M Zaidi, counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ashok Singh, counsel for the opposite party at length.

    4. In the present case the suit was admittedly instituted in 1973. It is alleged by the petitioner in paragraph 10 of the writ petition that the petitioner had mortgaged the property with the Co-operative land Development Bank (hereinafter referred to as the said Bank) and took loan from the said Bank in the year 1976 and in the year 1992. The suit was decreed in 1978. The first appeal was decided in 1979 and the Second appeal in 1992. Admittedly the fact of the alleged mortgage etc. was not brought on record either in the suit or in any of the appeals. For the first time it was pleaded in the application under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that too without any particulars at all which however, was sought to be mended in the writ petition and then again very feebly and vaguely.

    5. It appears that there was no material before the learned court below, on the basis of application under Section 47 as to the date on which such interest was created in favour of the Bank. The petitioner has not come up with proper particulars in order to make out a proper case in the application under Section 47. He has neither disclosed the date of taking loan and creation of mortgage nor has disclosed any documents in support thereof. Unless proper case is made out the court is not called upon to decide the same. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out as to whether any document in regard to creation of such interest was produced before the executing court or not. Though, however, he relies on the statement made in para 12 of the writ petition to the extent that the finding of the revisional court that there was no deed of mortgage executed, is incorrect but he has not spelt out anything in the writ petition that any such deed of mortgage was created or executed nor he furnished any such particulars thereof nor copy of the same is annexed with the writ petition. In absence of all these materials it is not possible to go into these questions at this stage of raising objection under Section 47 of the Code.

    6. Be that as it may the question now raised is, in effect of a defence which ought to have been raised in the suit itself. It is alleged in para 10 of the writ petition that the first mortgage was created in the year 1976 before the decree was passed. Therefore, the same is a defence in the suit itself. A defence which has not been raised, which could have been raised, shall be deemed to have been raised and decided by reason of principles of constructive res-judicata. The same can not remain open to be agitated at the time of execution. A defence in the suit can not be a ground of application under Section 47 inasmuch as it would have the effect of reversing the decree. Such question can not be gone into by the executing court on the established principle that the executing court can not go behind the decree. Such question is no more open to be decided in execution proceeding.

    7. Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

    “47-Questions to be determined by the Court executing decree:

    (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed or their representatives and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the court executing the decree and not be a separate suit.

    (2) ………………..

    (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section be determined by the court.”

    8. The scope of “all questions” referred “to in Section 47 is limited to the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree” if raised. The expression ‘party’ includes the purchaser of property in execution. The question whether one is a representative of one or the other of the party is also a question so included. It further includes the question of delivery of such property to such purchaser or his representative.

    9. Executing court can not go behind the decree is a well settled principle of law. The executing court is not invested with the right to determine controversial questions which are the basis of the decree to be executed. It can not go into such question and act as a trial court.

    10. The power of the executing court travels only to the extent of interpreting the decree or to identify the propriety. Even for the purpose of identifying the property or interpreting the decree it can not take additional evidence. It was so held in the case of Lalmani v. Shiv Shanker . A.I.R 1980 patna 134., and Sheshwar Bhartia v. Udiasthree . 1994 Civil Law Journal 297 Ori., when a new right is claimed, which requires adjudication of a right in the property and thus indirectly seeking to avoid the decree passed, is in effect an adjudication leading to go behind the decree. In the case of Sarwan Lal v. Kanti Prasad . A.I.R 1986 Alld., 1., it was held that the objection to executability of decree which boils down to challenging the maintainability of suit can not be taken before the executing Court. A mixed question of law and fact can not be raised for the first time in execution case Bhawarao v. Savitribai . A.I.R 1991 Bombay 55 at page 59.. Objection tending to show that the decree is erroneous can not be raised under Section 47 C.P.C In Manful Hussain v. Kiran Rano . 1993 2 Civil Law Journal 456 M.P., in V.D Modi v. R. Rahman . 1970 1 SCC 670, the Apex court held that the general rule is that an executing court can not go behind the decree. It must take the decree as it is and must proceed to execute it, it can not entertain an objection that the decree is incorrect in law or facts. In Addison Pains v. Sant Bux . A.I.R 1976 Del 137., it was held that Section 47 does not entitle the court to investigate into the question of validity of the decree when on the face of it there is nothing illegal in it.

    11. Such an objection as in the present case, which was never taken either in the written statement or at any stage of the suit or appeal goes to the root of the decree itself namely if such objection is allowed in that event the decree has to be altered. The same would amount to questioning the validity of the decree altogether on new facts raised for the first time requiring adjudication of a new right in the property and that too in favour of a stranger in the lis and who also does not come forward himself, seeking to avoid execution. It would amount to going behind the decree. It would mean entertaining objection that the decree is incorrect in law or fact. It is not an objection relating to the interpretation of the decree. It is not a case of identifying the property. It is a case of investigation of the title of a third party to the property since adjudicated between the parties in the suit. It would be questioning the validity of the decree opening a new front of defence to the passing of the decree; a defence never raised.

    12. A question which could have been raised as a defence in the suit can not be raised after the decree is passed. Decree is defined in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, to mean, “the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit….”. Once it is so determined and expressed formally in decree, setting up of a new case or right for investigation in execution thereof would amount to going behind the decree. The objection raised in the present case cannot be decided without taking fresh evidence which is otherwise impermissible in execution.

    13. In the facts and circumstances of the case therefore, the objection raised does not come within the scope of Section 47 C.P.C The finding of the learned court's below therefore, can not be said to suffer from any infirmity, illegality or irregularity or illegal exercise of jurisdiction.

    14. The question whether Section 52 of the Transfer of property Act would be attracted in the present case is not necessary to be gone into in view of the observations made above.

    15. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case I do not find any reason to interfere with the order impugned. The writ petition is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be given to the learned counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within a week.

    16. Petition Dismissed.

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    Jagbir Singh v. Vith Additional District And Sessions Judge Bijnor
    (Feb 28, 1997)