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Advocates
  • For the Appellant: G. Surayanarayana, for K. Mangachary, Advocates.
  • For the Respondent: Government Pleader.
Judges
  • K. Subba Rao, C.J
  • Jaganmohan Reddy, J.
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • For the Appellant: G. Surayanarayana, for K. Mangachary, Advocates.
  • For the Respondent: Government Pleader.
Judges
  • K. Subba Rao, C.J
  • Jaganmohan Reddy, J.
Acts
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This reference concerns the question what court fee is payable on a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus to direct the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) to entertain and dispose of an application. The Tribunal is situated in the city of Hyderabad. The Taxing Officer took the view that Rs. 100 was payable under Article 11(1) of Schedule II of the Andhra Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, VII of 1956 (the Andhra Act). The learned counsel for the applicant contended that the fee payable was Rs. 2 under serial No. 1(d) of Schedule II of the Hyderabad Court Fees Act. The Court considered (a) the nature and territorial scope of High Court writ jurisdiction, (b) constitutional provisions (Arts. 225, 226, 246 and the Seventh Schedule), (c) the relationship between High Court rules and State court-fee legislation, (d) provisions of the Andhra Court Fees Act, and (e) the effect of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 on the applicable court-fees in the Telangana area (including Sections 119–121 and Section 120's adaptation power).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What court fee is payable on a writ petition under Article 226 seeking mandamus against the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal situated in Hyderabad — Rs. 100 under the Andhra Court Fees Act or Rs. 2 under the Hyderabad Court Fees Act?
  2. Whether a State Legislature can validly prescribe court-fees in respect of proceedings before the High Court (and thus override rules made by the High Court under Article 225)?
  3. Whether the mention of a writ petition in a schedule to the Court Fees Act (Section 19 and the schedules) creates a legal liability to pay the prescribed fee?
  4. Whether Section 2(2) of the Andhra Court Fees Act (saving provisions) operates to make the High Court's rule operate instead of the Act?
  5. Whether the levy under the Act is an invalid impost (a tax) or otherwise so excessive as to be unreasonable or amount to a fraud on power?
  6. What is the effect of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (Sections 119–121 and Section 120's adaptation mechanism) on which Court Fees Act applies to the Telangana area now part of Andhra Pradesh?

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (as advanced by learned counsel for the applicant)

  • The State Legislature cannot make laws prescribing court-fee for proceedings in the High Court or at least cannot do so for proceedings on the High Court's original side; organisation of the High Court (including fees) is preserved under Article 225 and excluded from the State List.
  • Section 19 of the Andhra Court Fees Act means court-fee for a writ petition is not made payable under the Act (the schedules do not by themselves create liability); hence mention in schedule does not create legal liability.
  • Section 2(2) of the Andhra Act means the Act's provisions are subject to any other law relating to the levy of fee (i.e., the High Court rule under Article 225 would prevail).
  • The Act, by imposing heavy court-fees, is in substance a tax and may be void if the fee is excessive and disproportionate to the services rendered; absence of affidavit/evidence prevented full consideration.
  • The heavy fee (Rs. 100) effectively deprives poorer sections of access to the High Court under Article 226 and so may be void as a fraud on power; again no material was produced to substantiate this claim.
  • Because the Tribunal is situated in Hyderabad (Telangana area), and because the States Reorganisation Act preserved pre-existing laws in that territory until adaptations were made, the Hyderabad Court Fees Act (showing Rs. 2 under Schedule II Serial No. 1(d)) continues to apply in that area.

Taxing Officer / State Position

  • The taxing officer took the view that the court-fee payable on the application is Rs. 100 under Article 11(1) of Schedule II of the Andhra Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, VII of 1956.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkataratnam v. Secretary of State, ILR 53 Mad 979 ; AIR 1930 Mad 896 That High Courts in India possess the same jurisdiction to issue writs (mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto) as the Court of King's Bench in England; that the jurisdiction is 'original' in the sense of being contrasted with appellate jurisdiction and is not confined by the local limits of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The Court relied on this authority to explain the nature and territorial reach of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and to guard against confusing 'original jurisdiction' in this sense with the ordinary local limits of original civil jurisdiction.
Ramayya v. State of Madras, ILR (1952) Mad 698 ; AIR 1952 Mad 300 To the effect that proceedings for writs can be regarded as original civil proceedings (in the context of considering whether an appeal lay from an order dismissing a writ application); did not hold that such proceedings were confined to ordinary original jurisdiction limits. The Court noted that Ramayya did not depart from the Venkataratnam view and used it to reinforce the proposition that Article 226 confers an extraordinary original jurisdiction extending throughout the State.
Seshadri v. Province of Madras, 1954-1 Mad LJ 206 ; AIR 1954 Mad 543 Considered the scope of Article 225 vis-à-vis a High Court's power to frame rules prescribing court-fees: Art. 225 preserves the pre-existing power of High Courts to make rules, but rules made by the High Court would not have legal authority where the appropriate legislature has made law on the same subject. The Court accepted this reasoning and conclusion and applied it to hold that state legislation on court-fees (Item 3 of List II) can prevail over High Court rules prescribing fees.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a sequential legal analysis grounded in constitutional text, prior decisions, and the statutory scheme:

  1. Nature and territorial scope of writ jurisdiction: The Court explained that writs under Article 226 are issued in the High Court's extraordinary original jurisdiction — a supervisory jurisdiction that extends throughout the State (drawing on Venkataratnam and Ramayya). This established that the High Court can issue writs against tribunals situated anywhere within the State of Andhra Pradesh, including tribunals located in the Telangana area formerly part of the State of Hyderabad.
  2. Relationship between High Court rules and State legislation: The Court examined Article 225 which preserves pre-existing High Court powers "subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of power conferred on that legislature." It then examined item 3 of List II of the Seventh Schedule (State List) which expressly includes "fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court." Relying on Seshadri, the Court accepted that while Article 225 preserves the High Court's rule-making power, a State law validly enacted under its List II powers may displace a High Court rule on the same subject. Consequently, the Andhra Court Fees Act, if validly enacted, would prevail over any High Court rule prescribing a different fee.
  3. Construction of the Andhra Act and schedules: The Court rejected the argument that the schedules do not create liability (Section 19 argument). It held that the schedules form part of the Act and that Section 4 made documents chargeable under the Act not to be filed without payment — therefore the writ petition was chargeable under Article 11(s) (Schedule II) of the Andhra Act at Rs. 100, if the Andhra Act applied.
  4. Applicability of Section 2(2) of the Andhra Act: The Court addressed the contention that Section 2(2) (which makes the Act's levy subject to any other law relating to the levy of fee in respect of proceedings under such law) saved the High Court rule. The Court reasoned that Sub‑section 2 applies where the same law prescribes both the proceeding and the fee. Because the High Court's power to make rules arises from Article 225 and is not a statute that prescribes proceedings and fees in the manner contemplated by Section 2(2), Sub‑section 2 does not operate to save the High Court rule in this context.
  5. Challenges to validity based on taxation, excessiveness or fraud on power: The Court recognized arguments that an excessive fee could be a tax or a deprivation of access to justice (fraud on power), but declined to decide these issues on the present record because the petitioner had not produced factual material (for example, an affidavit showing the incidence of fee on litigants or comparative administrative cost) necessary to sustain such challenges.
  6. Effect of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956: The Court carefully analysed Sections 119–121 (including Section 120's power to make adaptations before the expiry of one year) of the States Reorganisation Act. Section 119 preserves, in the territory transferred, the laws in force immediately before the appointed day until a competent Legislature otherwise provides. Since no competent adaptations under Section 120 were made affecting court-fees in the Telangana area before the Court's decision, the pre-existing Hyderabad Court Fees Act remained operative in that territory. The Court rejected a narrow reading that "High Court" in the Hyderabad schedule must denote only a now-defunct "Hyderabad High Court"; it read "High Court" as applicable to the present High Court to avoid an anomalous result (i.e., absence of any law governing fees).
  7. Conclusion of applicability: Because the Tribunal is situated in Hyderabad (territory formerly of the State of Hyderabad), the Hyderabad Court Fees Act applied to writ petitions directed against tribunals within that area. Under the Hyderabad Act, Schedule II Serial No. 1(d) prescribes a fee of Rs. 2 for a writ petition under Article 226 (other than habeas corpus).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that court-fee of Rs. 2/- is payable on any petition under Article 226 of the Constitution where the relief sought is against a tribunal situated within that part of the State of Andhra Pradesh which, before the States Reorganisation Act, was part of the State of Hyderabad. (Order accordingly.)

Implications (direct effects on the parties and scope)

  • Direct effect: For the petition in question (a mandamus against the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal situated in Hyderabad), the applicable court-fee is Rs. 2 under the Hyderabad Court Fees Act (Schedule II, Serial No. 1(d)), not Rs. 100 under the Andhra Court Fees Act.
  • Territorial rule articulated: The decision clarifies that pre-existing laws of the territory transferred by the States Reorganisation Act continue to apply in that territory until adaptations/modifications are made by the competent authority; consequently, the Hyderabad Court-fees Act governs proceedings arising in the Telangana area until changed under the Act's adaptation provisions.
  • Unresolved questions: The Court explicitly declined to resolve whether the Andhra Act's fee would be an invalid tax or so excessive as to constitute a deprivation of access to the High Court (fraud on power) because there was insufficient factual material before it. Those constitutional challenges remain unadjudicated on the present record.
  • Precedential note: The opinion applies and explains existing constitutional and statutory principles (including the interplay of Article 225 and state legislative competence under List II). The Court did not purport to lay down any broader novel legal rule beyond these applications; the immediate practical consequence is the fee determination for petitions against tribunals situated in the former Hyderabad territory.

Order concluded in the opinion: "Order accordingly." The Court declined to decide the validity/constitutional excessiveness or tax character of the fee in the absence of necessary evidence.

Show full summary ...

    Bh. Satyanarayanamurthi v. Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench .

    Judgement

    SUBBA RAO, C.J. :- This reference raises the question of the Court fee payable on a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India for issuing a Writ of mandamus directing the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to entertain the application filed by the petitioner and to dispose of it according to law.

    2. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is now situated in the City of Hyderabad. The taxing Officer expressed the opinion that the Court feel payable on the said application is Rs. 100/- under Art. 11 (1) of Schedule II of the Andhra Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, VII of 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Learned Counsel for the applicant contends that the Court fee payable is Rs. 2/- under serial No. 1 (d) of schedule II of the Hyderabad Court Fees Act. Before adverting to the argument we shall briefly notice the nature of writ proceedings so far as is material to the question raised before us.

    3. It is settled law, though the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not accept it, that the High Court was issuing writs in the nature of mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari in exercise of its extraordinary original jurisdiction. If authority is required for the said proposition, it is found in Venkataratnam v. Secretary of State, ILR 53 Mad 979 : (AIR 1930 Mad 896) (A), where the learned Judges held, on a consideration of the history of writs, that High Courts in India possess the same Jurisdiction to issue writs as Court of Kings Bench in England. Venkata Subba Rao J., at page 999, (of ILR Mad) : (at p 901 of AIR) administered a caution against jurisdiction to issue writs being confused with that of the original jurisdiction of the High Court. The learned Judge says :

    "I must guard myself against being understood that the term original jurisdiction in this context connotes that the writ cannot be issued outside the limits of the city. This is not the sense in which the expression is used. The jurisdiction in the exercise of which the writ is granted is original, as contrasted with appellate. This jurisdiction termed original is not to be confused with original civil jurisdiction, mentioned in Section 12 of the Letters Patent, The last mentioned jurisdiction can be exercised, by its very nature, within certain local limits. But the jurisdiction possessed by the High Court in the matter of certiorari is supervisory or corrective and on the English analogy, extends over all inferior tribunals amenable to its authority.

    4. The judgment of Govinda Menon and Ramaswami Gounder, JJ. in Ramayya v. State of Madras ILR (1952) Mad 698 : (AIR 1952 Mad 300) (B) did not express a view different from that of the earlier division Bench. Therein, the learned Judges were only considering the question whether an appeal lay against an order of a single Judge dismissing an application for the issue of a Writ of Certiorari. In that context, they held that the matter involved in the appeal before them was an original civil proceeding and not a Criminal Proceeding.

    The learned Judges did not hold that it was an original proceeding in the sense that it was confined only to the limits of the ordinary original jurisdiction of the High Court. Art. 226 of the Constitution conferred express power on the High Court to issue the writs mentioned therein throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The territorial limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court extends throughout the State of Andhra Pradesh and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court under that Article may be conveniently described as extradinory original jurisdiction as distinguished from the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of a High Court.

    The High Court Andhra Pradesh, therefore, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226, can issue writs against tribunals situated or persons resident in any part of the state of Andhra Pradesh. We are in this case concerned only with a writ against a tribunal situated in the Teiangana area which, though now a part of the State of Andhra Pradesh, was till 1st November, 1956 part of the State of Hyderabad.

    5. We shall now proceed to consider seriatim the various arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the applicant. It is first contended that the State Legislature cannot make laws prescribing Court-fee in respect of proceedings taken in the High Court, or, at any rate, in regard to proceedings on its original side. To appreciate this contention, it will be useful to read the relevant statutory provisions. Art. 225 :

    Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature made by virtue of power conferred on that legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of, and the law administered in, any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the judges thereof in relation to the administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution.

    Provided that any restriction to which the exercise of original jurisdiction by any of the High Courts with respect to any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act ordered or done in the collection thereof was subject immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall no longer apply to the exercise of such jurisdiction. Art. 246 :

    (3) Subject to clauses 1 and 2, the Legislature of any State specified in Part A or part B of the First Schedule has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as State List). Item 3 of List II of the Seventh Schedule :

    Administration of Justice; constitution and organisation of all Courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Court; officers and servants of the High Court; procedure in rent and revenue courts, fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court.

    6. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions, it is contended that the High Courts power to prescribe Court fee in respect of proceedings taken before it is preserved from State Legislative interference by excluding the Constitution and organisation of the High Court from item 3 of list II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. To put it differently, it is said that the organisation of a Court involves by necessary implication the power, inter alia to prescribe fees on the proceedings taken before it and the constitution, by excluding that power from the State list, rested it exclusively with the High Court. This argument, if we may say so, is inconsistent with the express provisions of the Constitution.

    The scope of the provisions of Art. 225 vis-a-vis the right of the High Court to frame rules prescribing court fees was considered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, of which one of us was a member, in Seshadri v. Province of Madras 1954-1 Mad LJ 206 : (AIR 1954 Mad 543) (C). There, the Division Bench held that Art. 225 of the Constitution of India preserved the pre-existing power of the High Court to make rules of court and prescribe court fees but that the rules made by the High Court would not have any legal authority if the appropriate legislature made law on the same subject. We entirely agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the Division Bench.

    7. Rule 3(1) of the Rules framed by the High Court of Madras under Art. 225 of the Constitution prescribed a Court fee of Rs. 20/- on a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. By reason of the aforesaid decision, that rule would cease to govern proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution if the provisions of the Andhra Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, prescribing Rs. 100/- for such a proceedings were validly made. Article 225 of the Constitution is subject to the provisions of any law of the appropriate legislature made by virtue of the powers conferred on that legislature by the Constitution. The Andhra Legislature has power to make laws in respect of item 3 of the State List which includes fees taken in all courts except the Supreme Court. The contention that the fees taken in all Courts should exclude the fees taken in the High Court as part of the organisation of the High Court does not appeal to us. If that was the intention of the Constitution makers, they would have expressly excepted fees taken not only in the Supreme Court but also in the High Court from the jurisdiction of the State Legislatures. Though the prescription and collection of Court-fees in regard to proceedings taken in a court, if a liberal construction is adopted, may be a step in the organisation of a Court, the specific mention of the words fees taken in all courts in the same item prevents any such construction being put upon those words. Item 3 of the State List, in our view, confers specific power on the legislature to make laws prescribing the fees in the High Court. If so, it follows that the provision in the Court Fees Act should prevail over the rule made by the High Court.

    8. The next contention of the learned Counsel is that no legal liability to pay court fee on a writ Petition is created by the Act and, in support of this contention, reliance is placed upon Section 19 which reads :-

    "The fee payable under this Act shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter, Chanter VI, Chapter VIII and Schedules I and II"
    .

    9. Basing his argument on the express provisions of the Section, it is stated that court fee in respect of a writ Petition is not made payable under the Act and, therefore, the mention of it in the schedule will not create legal liability. This argument is more ingenious than sound. The words this Act in the Section include not only the Sections of the Act but also the schedules to the Act. The schedules are as much a part of the Act as the Sections. Section 4 of the Act says :

    "No document which is chargeable with fee under this Act shall be filed.....in ...any Court including the High Court."

    Art. 11(S) of Schedule II of the Act prescribes a fee of Rs. 100/- on a petition to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution other than a writ of habeas corpus. The petition, therefore, is chargeable under the provisions of the Act with a court fee of Rs. 100/- and the fee payable under the Act will be computed in the manner prescribed by the schedule. We cannot, therefore, accept this argument.

    10. There is greater plausibility in the argument based upon Section 2 (2) of the Act, which reads :

    "The Provisions of this Act relating to the levy of fee shall be subject to the provisions of any other law relating to the levy of fee in respect of proceedings under such law."

    The provisions of this Act, so the argument proceeds, is subject to the law relating to the levy of fee made by the High Court, and therefore, the latter overrides the former. But the necessary condition for the applicability of Sub-section 2 is that the same law should have prescribed the proceedings and also the Court fee payable thereon. This objection is met by the contention that an application for the issue of writ is under Art. 226 of the Constitution, that the fee is fixed by the rule made in exercise of the power conferred under Art. 225 of the Constitution, and that, therefore, both the proceeding and the law relating to court fee are prescribed by the same law. Under Sub-section 2 the law relating to the levy of fee should be in respect of proceedings under such law. i. e. the same law under which the fee is levied. This provision is obviously intended to save the proceedings under a statute which itself prescribes the court fee on the said proceedings. To illustrate: The Religious Endowments Act prescribes the court fee payable on the proceedings taken under that Act. In the instant case, though the power to make rules prescribing the court fees is derived by the High Court from Art. 225 of the Constitution, the Court fee is not payable under the Constitution. Assuming for a moment that the word "law" in Sub-Section 2 includes the Constitution, which is the Supreme law of the land, that law, namely, the Constitution does not provide both for a proceeding. Sub-Section 2 does not, therefore, save the rule made by the High Court.

    11. The learned Counsel then raised an important question which, if accepted would invalidate the Act. He says that the Act, under the cloak of collecting fees, provides for taxation and, therefore, is void. Reliance is placed upon the obvious difference between a fee and a tax and the contention is advanced that fees payable on an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution is unreasonable and commensurate with the services rendered by the State and, therefore, the enhancement of the rate of court fee is void. It is not possible to consider this question, in this case for it should be necessary to ascertain whether the court fee levied is far in excess of the expenses incurred by the State of Judicial Administration. The Petitioner has not filed any affidavit giving details to sustain his arguments. We would prefer not to express our view on this important question in this case.

    12. It is then contended that the State Legislature by imposing a heavy court fee of Rs. 100/-in effect and substance, deprive the proper (poor?) sections of the public from invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article in suitable cases and that, therefore, it must be held that the amendment is void on the ground of fraud on power. Even here, except the general argument advanced, no relevant material has been placed before us. We are, therefore, not justified in expressing our view on this question either.

    13. Lastly, the learned Counsel advanced an acceptable argument, which should have been presented in the forefront. To appreciate this argument, some relevant facts may be stated. The Telangana area, in which Hyderabad City is situated, formed part of the State of Hyderabad till 1st November, 1956. Section 3 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, added the territories comprised in the area popularly called Telangana to the Andhra State. The writ is now sought to be issued against the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal situated in the city of Hyderabad. Learned Counsel contends that, though Telangana area was integrated with the Andhra State from 1st November 1956, the laws of that territory were preserved under the States Reorganisation Act till the competent Legislature made the necessary adaptations and modifications of the laws within one year from the appointed day and as no such adaptations haver yet been made, the provisions of the Hyderabad Court Fees Act would apply to proceedings taken in the erstwhile Telangana area. To appreciate this contention, the relevant provisions of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, may be read.

    SECTION 119.

    "The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies and territorial references in any such law to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories with that State immediately before the appointed day."

    SECTION 120 :

    "For the purpose of facilitating the application of any law in relation to any of the States formed or territorially altered by the provisions of Part II, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of one year from the appointed day, by order made such adaptations and modifications of law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.

    SECTION 121 : "Power to construe laws :

    Notwithstanding that no provision or insufficient provision has been made under section 120 for the adaptation of a law made before the appointed day, any Court, tribunal or authority required or empowered to enforce such law may, for the purpose of facilitating its application in relation to any State formed or territorially altered by the provisions of Part II, construe the law in such manner, without affecting the substance, as may be necessary or proper in regard to the matter before the Court, tribunal or authority."

    14. Section 119 enacts that, for the purpose of the application of the laws, there must be deemed to have been no change in the territories. i. e. though Telangana is now a part of the State of Andhra Pradesh, the laws of the State of Hyderabad will be in force in that area as if there was no disintegration of that area of the State of Hyderabad and integration of the same with the State of Andhra Pradesh. The laws in that area would continue to prevail and govern the rights of parties till the competent Legislature or other competent authority otherwise provides. Section 120 confers a power on the appropriate governments before the expiration of one year from the appointed day to make such adaptations and modifications in law and the law with such adaptations and modifications will prevail till the competent Legislature or authority amends the law. So too, if the appropriate Government exercises its powers and makes suitable orders under Section 120, and if a lacuna is found in such orders, the Courts, for the purpose of facilitating the application of the law without affecting the substance may, under S. 121, construe the law in such manner as is necessary to facilitate the application of the laws in relation to the territory altered by the Act. In the instant case, no order making the necessary adaptations and modifications was made under Section 120 and, therefore, there is no scope for the Courts to construe the provisions of the Act in the manner provided by Section 121.

    The result is that the law obtaining in the State of Hyderabad before the appointed day would still govern the rights of parties in the Telangana area. The law of Court-fees obtaining before that date in the State of Hyderabad is the Hyderabad Court-fees Act and, therefore, the Hyderabad Court-fees Act governs the proceedings arising out of that area. In that present case, the petitioner seeks the aid of the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus against a Tribunal situated in the Hyderabad city. The Hyderabad Court-fees Act which was the law obtaining in the State of Hyderabad before the appointed day, would apply to such a proceeding. If so, the Court-fee payable under Schedule II, Serial No. 1 (d) is Rs. 2/- on a writ petition.

    15. But, it is said that "High Court" mentioned in the schedules is the Hyderabad High Court and not the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Though there is some force in this argument, when under Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act, the Hyderabad Court Fees Act, prevails in the Telangana area of the State of Andhra Pradesh, we think the reference therein to High Court can reasonably be construed to be a reference to the present High Court.

    If it is not so construed, it would lead to the anomalous position of no Court-fee being payable at all on such an application, for there would be no law governing the Court fee payable on such application in that area. This result can be avoided without doing violence to the language of the Act, The Hyderabad Court Fees Act only uses the words "High Court and not "Hyderabad High Court" and, therefore, those words would equally apply to the present High Court.

    16. In the result, we hold that Court-fee of only Rs. 2/- is payable on any application under Art. 226 of the Constitution where the relief asked for is against a Tribunal situated within that part of the State of Andhra Pradesh, which before the States Reorganisation Act was passed, was part of the State of Hyderabad.

    Order accordingly

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    Comments

    Bh. Satyanarayanamurthi v. Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, Madras Bench .
    (Mar 1, 1957)