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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Ashok Bhushan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner’s land (Khata No. 11 Gata 5M, area 0.2020 hectare, village Khanpur, Pargana Dankaur, Tahsil Sadar) was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Compensation was determined in accordance with the U.P. Land Acquisition (Determination of Compensation and Declaration of Award by Agreement) Rules, 1997, and paid to the petitioner by voucher No. 089730 dated 18.11.2008 in the amount of Rs. 1,492,780/-, which the petitioner received.

On 16.3.2011 the petitioner applied to the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) for a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, seeking enhanced compensation at Rs. 50,000 per square meter (with interest and solatium). By order dated 11.5.2011 the Additional District Magistrate rejected that application on the ground that the petitioner had received compensation under an agreement made under the 1997 Rules and had agreed not to claim any further amount. The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking quashing of the order dated 11.5.2011 and a mandamus directing the authorities to send the reference to the District Judge. The matter was heard by Ashok Bhushan, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person who has received compensation under an agreement pursuant to Section 11(2) read with the U.P. 1997 Rules (a consent/ agreement award) can make an application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for a reference to the Court for enhanced compensation.
  2. Whether absence of a notice under Section 12 affects the entitlement to make an application under Section 18 where compensation has been received under an agreement.
  3. Whether an application under Section 18 filed two years after receipt of compensation under agreement is maintainable (timeliness / limitation issue as raised by the respondents).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The mere fact of having received compensation under an agreement does not preclude filing an application under Section 18, because the petitioner never received a notice under Section 12.
  • Section 18 can be invoked by persons who have received compensation under agreement as well as by those who received awards under Section 11.
  • Mere execution of an agreement does not ipso facto prohibit invoking Section 18; every procedure should be regarded as permissible unless expressly prohibited (relying on Rajendra Prasad Gupta and related authorities).
  • Reliance placed on Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra and other authorities (including Raj Narain Saxena and Preetam Singh).

Respondent No. 3's Arguments

  • Section 18 is inapplicable because the petitioner had accepted compensation under an agreement which contained a clause barring any further claim; application for reference is available only to a person who has not accepted the award.
  • The petitioner accepted the amount by voucher dated 18.11.2008 without protest; an application filed after more than two years is not entertainable.
  • Reliance placed on apex and high court authorities (including Rajendra Prasad Gupta, State of Karnataka v. Sangappa Dyavappa Biradar, Ram Chander, and Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivbai) to support the proposition that consent awards/agreements preclude a Section 18 reference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra ((2011) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 2011 SC 1137) Principle that procedural mechanisms are permissible under inherent powers (Section 151 CPC) unless expressly prohibited; courts may permit procedures unless law forbids them. The court acknowledged the proposition but held it inapplicable to the present situation because Section 18 itself conditions the right to seek reference on non-acceptance of the award; hence the general procedural permissibility principle did not assist the petitioner.
Raj Narain Saxena v. Bhim Sen (AIR 1966 All 84 (Full Bench)) Supports the view that procedures should be regarded as permissible unless expressly prohibited (authority cited in Rajendra Prasad Gupta). Noted by the court as part of the general procedural principle relied on by the petitioner; the court held that this principle does not override the express statutory condition in Section 18.
Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey (ILR (1883) 5 All 163 (FB)) Observation that courts should treat procedures as permissible until shown to be prohibited; prohibition cannot be presumed. Referred to as supporting the general principle of procedural permissibility; court concluded the statutory language of Section 18 controls and that the principle does not permit a person who accepted compensation under agreement to invoke Section 18.
Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab ((1994) 4 SCC 67 : 1994 AIR SCW 2459) Where award was made under Section 11 and some accepted under protest, the Court observed that filing an application under Section 18 can manifest protest and an implied protest can exist notwithstanding acceptance. The court distinguished Ajit Singh because that case involved awards under Section 11(1) and circumstances where protest could be implied; here compensation was accepted under an agreement under Section 11(2), which is materially different.
Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivbai ((1997) 9 SCC 710 : AIR 1997 SC 2642) Held that claimants who received compensation under protest and who apply under Section 18(1) may seek reference; a person who received compensation otherwise than under protest is not entitled to make any application under Section 18 (by virtue of Section 31(2) proviso). The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that receipt of compensation without protest bars a Section 18 reference; applied this principle to conclude that receipt under agreement (without protest) similarly precludes Section 18 relief.
State of Gujarat v. Daya Shamji Bhai ((1995) 5 SCC 746 : AIR 1996 SC 133) Consent awards arising from agreement: once parties have contracted to receive compensation and accepted it by agreement, the right to seek reference under Section 18 does not arise; an award by consent obviates the need for reference. The court treated this authority as directly supportive: a consent/ agreement award precludes the right to reference under Section 18; therefore a person who accepted compensation under agreement has no right to make the Section 18 reference.
State of Karnataka v. Sangappa Dyavappa Biradar ((2005) 4 SCC 264 : AIR 2005 SC 2204) Consent awards are binding; the right to seek a reference arises only when the award has not been accepted; writ jurisdiction cannot be used to substitute the award unless the agreement's validity is challenged appropriately. The court relied on these paragraphs to hold that consent awards remain binding and that the Division Bench acted without jurisdiction where it allowed references despite consent awards; applied the same reasoning to deny petitioner’s Section 18 claim.
Ram Chander v. The Collector / Special Land Acquisition Officer, Varanasi (2003 (6) AWC 5222) Division Bench followed Shivbai and Ajit Singh; concerned award under Section 11 and application of principles about protest, acceptance and entitlement to reference. The court noted Ram Chander as following the precedents that support preclusion of references where compensation is accepted without protest; used it to reinforce the position that consent awards/acceptance preclude Section 18 references (and distinguished it where appropriate because the present case involves Section 11(2) agreements).
Preetam Singh v. State of U.P. (2010 (1) ADJ 685) Considered entitlement to interest where part of agreed compensation had not been paid; confirmed that petitioners who had obtained compensation under agreement are not entitled to any amount other than the agreed amount, though interest may be available if payment was delayed for reasons not attributable to them. The court distinguished Preetam Singh on facts: it did not decide whether a person who accepted compensation under agreement could file Section 18; it held Preetam Singh does not assist the petitioner on the Section 18 point and affirmed that persons who obtained compensation under agreement are not entitled to amounts beyond the agreement.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court commenced by examining the statutory scheme of the Land Acquisition Act and the 1997 U.P. Rules framed under Section 11(2). The analysis proceeded in the following steps, strictly as stated in the opinion:

  1. Statutory text and rules:
    • Section 11(1) provides for enquiry and award by the Collector; Section 11(2) (a non-obstante provision) permits the Collector to make an award according to the terms of a written agreement when all persons interested have agreed in writing.
    • The U.P. 1997 Rules (Rules 3 and 4) give effect to Section 11(2): the Collector grants permission for an agreement only after being satisfied that the persons interested are ready and willing and would appear to execute the agreement; Rule 4(ii) requires the agreement to be in prescribed form and Rule 4(iii) provides that failure to appear will lead the Collector to proceed with an enquiry under Section 11.
    • The standard pro forma agreement contains express clauses stating (inter alia) that the Collector may declare award as per the agreement, the Government may take possession subject to compensation for standing crop, and that the owner shall not claim any additional amount beyond the agreed compensation.
  2. Nature of an agreement award:
    • Receiving compensation under the agreement in accordance with Section 11(2) read with the 1997 Rules indicates acceptance of the agreed compensation by the tenure holder and constitutes consent.
  3. Interpretation of Section 18:
    • Section 18(1) expressly begins with the condition "Any person interested who has not accepted the award may ... require that the matter be referred". The court emphasized that the right to seek a reference is conditioned upon non-acceptance of the award.
    • Therefore, a person who has accepted compensation pursuant to an agreement under Section 11(2) cannot be said to be a person who "has not accepted the award".
  4. Role of Section 31(2) proviso:
    • Section 31(2) (second proviso) expressly provides that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under Section 18. The court reasoned that if the statute explicitly bars a person who received an award amount without protest from applying under Section 18, there is no reason to treat a person who accepted compensation under Section 11(2) agreement differently.
  5. Precedents and their fit with statutory scheme:
    • The court analyzed several apex and high court decisions (Ajit Singh, Shivbai, State of Gujarat v. Daya Shamji Bhai, State of Karnataka v. Sangappa, Ram Chander, and others). It concluded that decisions on consent awards uniformly support the proposition that acceptance under agreement/consent award precludes the right of reference under Section 18.
    • Ajit Singh was distinguished because it related to awards under Section 11(1) and to the doctrine that filing an application under Section 18 may manifest protest even where compensation was accepted; the present facts involved a Section 11(2) consent agreement, which is materially different.
    • State of Gujarat v. Daya Shamji Bhai and Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivbai were treated as directly instructive: when parties enter into an agreement to accept compensation, they forgo the right to seek a Section 18 reference, and a consent award obviates the need for reference.
  6. Application to facts:
    • Because the petitioner had received compensation under an agreement in accordance with Section 11(2) and the 1997 Rules (and the agreement included a clause that no further claim would be made), the petitioner had accepted the award/compensation and was therefore not a person "who has not accepted the award".
    • Consequently, the petitioner was not entitled to move under Section 18 for a reference; the application dated 16.3.2011 was rightly rejected by the Additional District Magistrate on 11.5.2011.
  7. On procedural permissibility:
    • The court accepted the general proposition (from Rajendra Prasad Gupta and earlier authorities) that procedural devices are permissible unless expressly prohibited. However, it held that this principle cannot override the specific statutory condition in Section 18 that the applicant must be a person who has not accepted the award.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The writ petition is dismissed. The court held that the application filed by the petitioner on 16.3.2011 for making a reference under Section 18 was rightly rejected by the Additional District Magistrate by order dated 11.5.2011, because the petitioner had received compensation under an agreement pursuant to Section 11(2) and the 1997 Rules and therefore could not be treated as a person who "has not accepted the award."

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner is not entitled to have the matter referred to the civil court under Section 18 and receives no relief from this writ petition; the order of the Additional District Magistrate stands.
  • Doctrinal consequence: The court applied established authority to confirm that acceptance of compensation under a consent agreement (Section 11(2) and the 1997 Rules) precludes a Section 18 reference. The opinion distinguishes cases concerning awards under Section 11(1) and confirms that the statutory condition of non-acceptance governs entitlement to reference.
  • No new expansive precedent or alteration of law was announced; the court relied on and applied existing authorities and statutory text to the facts before it.

Disposition: Petition dismissed.

    Kainash Ram Kochar v. State Of U.P And Ors.

    Ashok Bhushan, J.:— Heard Sri Uma Nath Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 as well as learned Standing Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2.

    2. By this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 11.5.2011, passed by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Gautam Buddha Nagar rejecting the application submitted by the petitioner for making a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for enhancement of compensation. A mandamus has also been sought directing the respondent authorities to send the reference before the District Judge, Gautam Buddha Nagar. Brief facts of the case as emerged from the writ petition are; the petitioner's Khata No. 11 Gata 5M area 0.2020 hectare situate in village Khanpur, Pargana Dankaur, Tahsil Sadar was acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The compensation for the land was determined in accordance with the provisions of the U.P Land Acquisition Act (Determination of Compensation and Declaration of Award by Agreement) Rules, 1997 and was paid to the petitioner by voucher No. 089730 dated 18.11.2008 to the extent of Rs. 1492780/- which was received by the petitioner. After more than two years from receiving the compensation, the petitioner moved an application before the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) on 16.3.2011 for making a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act claiming compensation at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per square meter along with interest and solatium thereon. The said application has been rejected by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) by the impugned order dated 11.5.2011 on the ground that the petitioner having received the compensation under an agreement according to 1997 Rules, his application for making reference is not maintainable. It has also been held by the Additional District Magistrate that in the agreement entered by the petitioner, there is specific clause that the petitioner shall not make a claim for any other amount except the amount agreed upon. The petitioner's case in the writ petition is that the award of acquired land has been made in accordance with 1997 Rules but up till now no notice under section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act has been received by the petitioner. It is further alleged that the compensation prepared was accepted under protest as the petitioner was not satisfied with the rate. It is further stated that the petitioner came to know about the rate of surrounding area hence he made request for payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- per square meter. It is further pleaded that under section 18 of the Act, any tenure holder can make the reference within six weeks from the date of receiving the notice under section 12.

    3. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition contended that the mere fact that the petitioner received the compensation under an agreement does not preclude him from making an application for reference under section 18 since the petitioner never received notice under section 12. He further submits that the provisions of Section 18 can be invoked both by persons, who has received compensation under agreement as well as by person who has received compensation under an award made under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. He submits that Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) committed error in rejecting the application of the petitioner for making a reference. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that merely because the petitioner has entered into an agreement under 1997 Rules, reference under section 18 of the Act is not prohibited. It is submitted that every procedure is to understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in (2011) 2 SCC 705 : (AIR 2011 SC 1137) Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra, AIR 1966 Allahabad 84 (F.B) Raj Narain Saxena v. Bhim Sen and Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2010 (1) ADJ 685, Preetam Singh v. State of U.P.

    4. Sri. Ramendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3, refuting the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner contended that section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was not attracted in the present case since the petitioner received the compensation under an agreement with a condition that he shall not claim any further amount except the agreed amount. It is submitted that application for reference can be moved by only that person who has not accepted the award. He submits that for those persons who have received compensation under an agreement, the provisions of section 18 are not attracted. He submits that the petitioner accepted the amount without any protest under an agreement by voucher dated 18.11.2008 and the application filed by the petitioner after more than two years cannot be entertained and has rightly been rejected by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition). Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the respondent on the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra ((2011) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 2011 SC 1137), reported in (2005) 4 SCC 264 : (AIR 2005 SC 2204), State of Karnataka v. Sangappa Dyavappa Biradar, a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2003 (6) AWC 5222, Ram Chander v. The Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer, Varanasi, as well as 1998 (1) AWC 399 : ((1997) 9 SCC 710 : AIR 1997 SC 2642) Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivbai.

    5. We have considered the submissions of learned Counsel for the parties and have perused the record. Before we proceed to consider the respective submissions of learned counsel for the parties, it is useful to look into the statutory scheme as delineated by the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and the Rules framed thereunder.

    6. Section 11 of the Act provides for inquiry and award by the Collector. Section 11 sub-sections (1) and (2) which are relevant are quoted as below:

    “11. Enquiry and award by Collector.- (1) On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objection (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 to the measurements made under section 8, and in to the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1), and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of

    (i) the true area of the land;

    (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and

    (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, or whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether of not they have Spectively appeared before him;

    Provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Govenment or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorize in this behalf:

    Provided further that it shall be competent for the appropriate Government to direct that the Collector may make such award without such approval in such class of cases as the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf.

    (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if at any stage of the proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government, he may, without making further equiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement.”

    7. The State of U.P has framed Rules in exercise of power under section 55 read with sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act namely; U.P Land Acquisition (Determination of Compensation and Declaration of Award by Agreement) Rules, 1997. Sub-section (2) of Section 11 starts with non-obstante clause i.e “Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if at any stage of the proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing”. Thus sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act empowers the Collector to make an award according to the terms of agreement as agreed upon notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of Section 11. 1997 Rules have been framed to give effect to the provisions of Section 11 Subsection (2). Rules 3 and 4 of 1997 Rules which are relevant are quoted below:

    “3. The Collector may, after hearing the parties, and upon being satisfied that the persons interested in the land are ready and willing to execute the agreement, grant the permission unless, for reasons to be recorded in writing he decides to refuse it.

    4. (i) The Collector shall, where he grants the permission inform the persons interested in the land by registered post, about date, time and place for the execution of the agreement.

    (ii) The agreement shall be executed in the form appended to the serules, withnecessary detailsas to whether possession has, or has not, been taken before the award.

    (iii) If the persons so informed fail to turn up and execute the agreement on such date, time and place or the extended date, as the case may be, the Collector shall proceed to make enquiry under Section-11 from the stage, at which the application under Rule 2 was made.”

    8. The scheme of 1997 Rules as quoted above clearly indicates that agreement is to be executed only when Collector is satisfied that persons interested are ready and willing and they appear for execution of the agreement on the date and time fixed by the Collector. Sub clauses (ii) and (iii) of Rule 4 of 1997 Rules clearly provide that in case person interested fail to appear and execute the agreement, the Collector shall make enquiry under section 11 from the stage at which application under Rule 2 was made. Thus, execution of agreement is possible only when person interested is agreeable and execute the agreement. There is element of willingness on the part of interested person in execution of the agreement. The form of agreement which is referred to under rule 4(ii) is also part of the Rules. It is useful to quote conditions Nos. (1), (2) and (3) of the terms of agreement as contained in prescribed proforma of agreement:

    “(1) that the Land Acquisition Officer………

    shall be competent to declare the award as per term of this agreement without any furthur enquiry which is required to be held under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

    (2) If the Government deems it necessary to take immediate possession of the land under acquisition even though there is a standing crop on it the Government will be entitled to do so provided that compensation for the standing crop as shown in as per the award is paid;

    (3) that the owner/owners and interested party/parties shall not claim any amount inaddition to the amount agreed upon as aforesaid as compensation and accept it without any protest.”

    9. Futhermore, following part of the pro forma agreement is also relevant which is quoted below:

    “And whereas the owner/owners and/or the interested party/parties agrees/agree to refer the matter to the reference of the Collector or……and to accept the award to be made thereon as compensation payable under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 including additional amount@12% undersub-section (1-A), solatium @30%undersub-section(2) there of for the said land/lands and also agrees/agree to apportion the same between them selves as stated in detail at the end;

    10. Thus, compensation which is paid under the agreement is determined as per Sections 3 and 23 including additional amount at the rate of 12% under sub-section (1-A), solatium @ 30% From the above, it is clear that receiving compensation under the agreement in accordance with Section 11(2) read with 1997 Rules clearly indicates acceptance of compensation by the tenure holder under an agreement and consent.

    11. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which provide for reference and are relevant for the present case are quoted below:

    “18. Reference to Court. — (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require the the matter be referred by the Collector for the detemination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the person interested.

    (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:

    Provided that every such application shall be made

    (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, with in six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;

    (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or with in six months from the date of the Collector's award, which ever period shall first expire.”

    12. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 begins with a condition of reference i.e “Any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the Collector”, thus application for reference can be made by person interested only on the condition when “he has not accepted the award”. The person who has accepted the compensation under an agreement under Section 11(2) read with 1997 Rules cannot be said to be a person who has not accepted the award.

    13. Even in a case, where award is made under section 11 and a person accepting the compensation without protest is also debarred from making an application under section 18, which is clearly spelled out from specific provisions of Section 31(2), second proviso. Section 31(1)(2) is quoted below:

    “31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court.— (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled there to according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.

    (2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted:

    Provided that any person admittted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:

    Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under section 18:

    Provided also that nothing herein contained shall after the liabillity of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.”

    14. The statute when expressly debars a person who has received the amount of compensation without any protest in pursuance of an award made under section 11, there is no reason for not debarring a person from making an application under section 18 who has accepted the compensation under section 11(2) under an agreement.

    15. The above view of ours is also fully supported by various decisions of this Court as well as of the Apex Court. The first case which needs consideration is the Apex Court's judgment in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 4 SCC 67 : (1994 AIR SCW 2459). In the said case award was made under section 11 and some persons accepted the award under protest and some accepted without protest. The Apex Court made following observations in paragraph 5:

    “….In as much as the appellants have filed an application for reference under section 18 of the Act that will manifest their intention.

    Therefore, the protest against the award of the Collector is implied notwithstanding the acceptance of compensation. The District Judge and the High Court, therefore, fell into patent error in denying the enhanced compensation to the appellants.”

    16. The said case laid down that protest against the award of the Collector is implied when an application is made under section 18. The present is a case where compensation has been accepted under an agreement under section 11(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and the above observation of the Apex Court are not attracted in the present case which is clearly distinguishable.

    17. It is further useful to note another judgment of the apex Court reported in (1997) 9 SCC 710 : (AIR 1977 SC 2642) Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivbai, in which the Apex Court has taken the view that claimants who received compensation under protest and who made application under Section 18(1) alone are entitled to seek reference. Following was laid down by the apex Court in paragraphs 7 and 9.

    “7. Thus it could be seen that when the parties were present at the time when the award came to be made, the notice under Clause(b) of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 was not necessary. As a consequence, within six weeks from the date of the award an application is required to be made for reference under Section 18. If the amount is received without protest, by operation of second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31, such person who has received the amount without protest is not entitled to seek a reference under Section 18.

    9. No doubt they had filed the writ petition in the High Court for seeking reference. But the High Court's order was only for making refernce on verification and to find out correct factual position. The officer him self was in collusion with the claimants and without making any enquiry he made the reference. Subsequently, some persons were impleaded to the reference. That itself indicates that all was not going well. It is now settled position in law that the claimants who receive the compensation under protest and who make application under Section 18(1), alone are entitled to seek a reference; third parties, who have been impleaded, have no right to claim higher compensation by circumventing the process of reference under Section 18. Under these circumstances, the reference iteself is without any jurisdiction and barred by limitation. Thereby, the award of the reference court is clearly illegal. On appeal, the High Court has not considered all these perspectives and found it convenient to rely on another judgment to uphold the award of the civil court.”

    18. The Division Bench of this Court in 2003 (6) AWC 5222 Ram Chander v. The Collector/Special Land Acquisition Officer, Varanasi noticed both the above cases and followed the subsequent judgment of the Apex Court in Land Acquisition Officer v. Shivbai ((1997) 9 SCC 710 : AIR 1997 SC 2642) (supra) and Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab (1994 AIR SCW 2459) (supra). The Division Bench judgment in Ram Chander's case (supra) was also a case of award under section 11. The present case is on a better footing since in the present case compensation has been received under section 11(2).

    19. The Apex Court had occasion to consider the question of applicability of Section 18 in a case of consent award in (1995) 5 SCC 746 : AIR 1996 SC 133 State of Gujarat v. Daya Shamji Bhai. In the said case land holders gave their consent in writing agreeing to accept the compensation determined by the Land Acquisition Officer. They were paid compensation as per consent agreement signed by them. Subsequently reference was sought under section 18. Following was laid down in paragraphs 6 and 9.

    “6. In view of the above agreement and in view of the discussion made by the Land Acquisition Offficer in the award and working details given in the annexures made there in, it is clear that the parties having contracted to receive compensation the question emerges whether they are entitled to seek a reference. On making an award under Section 11 and issuance of the notice under Section 12 of the Act, the Collector is enjoined under Section 31(1) to tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the interested persons entitled thereto to receive the compensation according to the terms of the award. Under the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 “no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under Section 18”. The entitlement to make reference to civil court under Section 18(1) and within the period prescribed under sub-section (2) is conditioned upon non-acceptance of the award. Sub-section (1) of Section 18 makes the matter clear thus:

    “Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court regarding his objection, be it to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.”

    The right and entitlement to seek reference would, therefore, arise when the amount of compensation was received under protest in writing which would manifest the intention of the owner of non-acceptance of the award. Section 11(2) opens with an non-obstante clause “notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1)” and provides that” if at any stage of the proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matter to be included in the award of the Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government, he may, without making further enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement. By virtue of sub-section (4), “notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908, no agreement made under subsection (2) shall be liable to registration under that Act”. The award made under Section 11(2) in terms of the agreement is, therefore, an award with consent obviating the necessity of reference under Section 18.

    9. By operation of Section 11(4), the need for registration of the agreement is obviated. As seen in the contract, the respondents have forgone their right of seeking reference in lieu of of 25% more than the compensation determined by the Collector under Section 11(2) of the Act. In fact, 25 per cent in addition to the market value determined by the Collector in his award under Section 11(1) had been paid as the consideration to forgo refernce. Even other wise, once an agreement was entered by the parties, the question of objection to receive compensation under protest does not arise. So, they have no right to seek a reference to the Civil Court under Sectin 18 of Act.”

    20. The above case clearly lays down that once an agreement was entered by the parties, the question of objection to receive compensation does not arise and they have no right to make a reference under section 18. The judgment of the Apex Court in (2005) 4 SCC 264 : (AIR 2005 SC 2004) State of Karnataka v. Sangappa Dyavappa Biradar was also a case of consent award. It is useful to quote paragraphs 3, 12, 14 and 18:

    “3. Keeping inview the point involved in these appeals, it is not necessary to state the fact of the matter in great details. Suffice it to point out that for the purpose of submergence and construction of canal for the Upper Krishna Project, the Appellant State intended to acquire some lands including the lands belonging to the respondents herein. The parties entered into negotiations as regard the price of the lands; pursuant whereto and in furtherance where of consent awards were passed by the Special Land Acquisition Offficer. The amount of compensation awarded in terms of the consent award was also received by the Respondents in fulll satisfaction of their claim. The Respondents, however, filed applications for reference to the Civil Court interms of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) claiming enhanced compensation. The said prayer was rejected by the Collector by an order dated 23.8.1999 The respondents there after filed writ petition before the High Court which were marked as Writ Petition Nos. 41354, 36840 and 36748 of 1999 praying there in for quashing of the said order as also for a direction up on the Respondent No. 2 to refer the applications filed by them to the Civil Court for determining the amount of compensation in respect of the acquired lands.

    12. A right of a land holder to obtain anorder of reference would arise only when he has not accepted the award. Once such award is accepted, no legal right in him survives for claiming a reference to the Civil Court. An agreement between the parties as regard the value of the lands acquired by the State is binding on the parties. So long as such agreement and consequently the consent awards are not set aside in an appropriate proceeding by a court of law having jurisdiction in relation thereto, the same remain binding. It is one thing to say that agreement are avoid or void able in terms of the provisions of the Indian Contract Act having been obtained by fraud, collusion, etc, or are against public policy but it is another thing to say that without questioning the validity thereof, the Respondents could have maintained their writ petitions. We have noticed herein before that even in the writ petitions, the prayers made by the Respondents were for quashing the order dated 23.8.1999 passed by the Special Land Acquisition officer and for issuance of a direction up on him to referthe matter of the Civil Court. The High Court while exercising its jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India, thus, could not have substituted the award passed by the Land Acquisition Offficer by reason of the impugned judgment. Furthermore, the question as regard the validity of the agreements had not been raised before the High Court. As indicated herein before, the Division Bench of the High Court had also rejected the contention raised on behalf of the Respondents herein to the efffect that the agreements did not conformtothe requirements of Article 299 of the Constitution of India or had not been drawn up in the prescribed proforma.

    14. An award under the Act is passed either on consent of the parties or on adjudication of rival claims. For the purpose of passing a consent award, it was not necessary to comply with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. An agreement between the parties need not further more be strictly in terms of a prescribed format.

    18. Keeping in view the fact that the condition precedent for maintaining application for reference under Section 18 is non-acceptance of the award by the awardee, in our considered opinion, the Division Bench acted illegallly and without jurisdiction in passing the impugned judgment. The learned Single Judge was right in concluding that the writ petitions were not maintainable.”

    21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since there is no express prohibition under the Act from making an application under section 18 by a person who has received compensation under an agreement, the application under section 18 cannot be rejected. Reliance has been placed on a judgment of the Apex Court Rajendra Prasad Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra ((2011) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 2011 SC 1137) (supra). In the aforesaid case, the issue was as to whether once an application for withdrawal of a suit is filed, suit stands dismissed as withdrawn even without any order or whether second application for withdrawal of the withdrawal application is maintainable. In the above context the Apex Court relying on a Division Bench judgment in Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey, ILR (1883) 5 All 163 (FB) and Raj Narain Saxena v. Bhim Sen, AIR 1966 All 84, laid down following in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6:

    “3. The High Court was of the view that once the application for withdrawal of the suit is filed the suit stands dismissed as withdrawn even without any order on the withdrawal application. Hence, the second application was not maintainable.

    4. We do not agree. Rules of procedure are handmaids of justice. Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives inherent powers to the court to do justice. That provision has to be interpreted to mean that every procedure is permitted to the court for doing justice unless expressly prohibited, and not that every procedure is prohibited unless expressly permitted. There is no express bar in filing an application for withdrawal of the withdrawal application.

    5. In Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey, Mahmood, the celebrated Judge of the Allahabad High Court, observed:

    “Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure it is to be taken as prohibited unless it is provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle prohibition cannot be presumed.”

    6. The above view was followed by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Raj Narain Saxena v. Bhim Sen and we agree with this view. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the application praying for withdrawal of the withdrawal application was maintainable. We order accordingly.”

    22. The Apex Court laid down that every procedure is permitted to the Court for doing justice unless expressly prohibited. There cannot be any dispute to the proposition as laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Rajendra Prasad Gupta ((2011) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 2011 SC 1137) and of this Court in Raj Narain Saxena (AIR 1966 All 84) (FB) (supra). In the present case the application under section 18 is subject to the conditions as laid down in Section 18(1) itself that any person who has not accepted the award may by written application require the matter to be referred. Thus, the section clearly contemplates that a person, who has accepted the award cannot make an application for reference under section 18.

    23. The same result also flows from Section 31(2) second proviso as quoted above. Thus, the above judgments relied by the petitioner do not help the petitioner in the present case. The case of Preetam Singh (supra) relied by learned counsel for the petitioner, although was considering a case where compensation was paid on the basis of agreement under section 11(2) of the Act but the question considered and decided was that whether a person is entitled for payment of interest in the event a part of compensation has not been paid and paid with delay. The Court in Preetam Singh (supra) was not considering the question as to whether application under section 18 can be made by a person who has accepted the compensation under an agreement. Thus, the said judgment does not help the petitioner to support his contention that application under section 18 can be filed even though a person has received compensation under an agreement. Even in Preetam Singh case (supra), the court has laid down the proposition only to the effect that if certain part of the compensation is not paid on the date of agreement, the interest cannot be deprived to the person. However, it was clearly laid down that the petitioners, who had obtained compensation under agreement, are not entitled to any amount other than agreed amount. Following was laid down in paragraphs 22 and 25:

    “22. The petitioners are not entitled to any amount other than agreed amount, from any time prior to the date of agreement but there is nothing to prevent to apply Section 31(1) and Section 34, if a part of the amount under agreement has not been paid for the reasons, which are not attributable to them. In this case we find that 20% compensation was not deposited by the acquiring body on the date of agreement. The parties were fully aware that full amount will not be paid on the date of agreement. They, however, did not provide for any interest in the agreement. But that should not be a ground to deprive the persons, who lost their lands, if the payment of a part of the amount was delayed for years altogether.

    25. Even if the agreed compensation was paid in the year 2000, the award under Section 11(2) of the Act was not made until 9.1.2009 and thus we find that the petitioners are entitled to interest, which should be calculated at the same rate at which the interest is payable, for compulsory acquisition of land under Section 34 of the Act. The writ petition are allowed to the extent that all the petitioners, who have not been paid 20% compensation, shall get 20% compensation with 9% interest from 30.10.2000 to 29.10.2001 there after at the rate of 15% up to the date of this judgment i.e 18.12.2009 within a period of one month from the date, when they apply. The interest shall be paid to them without the benefit of compounding.”

    24. The submission of learned Counsel for the petitioner that since they have not received notice under section 12 they are entitled to file application under section 18 is also misconceived. Compensation having been received in pursuance of an agreement, there is no question of making an application under section 18.

    25. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the view that the application filed by the petitioners for making a reference dated 16.3.2011 has rightly been rejected by Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition) by his order dated 11.5.2011 The petitioner is not entitled for any relief in this writ petition. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.

    26. Petition dismissed.

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