(1) The appellants are the legal representatives of the plaintiff, whose suit for a declaration that a settlement, dated 7th may, 1949, executed by her in favour of her daughter - in - law and brother's daughter, the defendant, was vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation and otherwise invalid under mahomedan law, was dismissed by the courts below.
(2) On 27th january, 1949, abdul razak saheb, the son of the plaintiff and husband of the defendant executed a deed of settlement, exhibit b - 1, in favour of his mother and wife giving them a house in equal moieties and reserving to himself a right to be paid a sum of rs. 8, per month for his maintenance by each of the donees. On 7th may, 1949, the plaintiff executed a deed of settlement in favour of the defendant, exhibit b - 2, giving the half share of the house which she got under exhibit b - 1 to the defendant, reserving to herself a life - interest therein. Exhibit b - 2 was duly registered. The plaintiff brought the present suit on 25th november, 1949, for a declaration that exhibit b - 2 was vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation and was also invalid and ineffective under the mahomedan law. The courts below dismissed the suit finding both points against the plaintiff. The finding that exhibit b - 2 was not vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation is one of fact and is binding upon me in second appeal. The gift to the defendant under exhibit b - 2 is challenged as invalid under the mahomedan law on two grounds : (1) that a life - estate in the property had been created in favour of the plaintiff and only a vested remainder had been conferred upon the defendant and (2) that there was no delivery of possession of the property gifted to the defendant. The relevant portion of exhibit b - 2 is as follows : -
"i have, out of the right possessed by me in one - half of the schedule mentioned property herein, retaining only life - interest, hereby conveyed to you absolute right possessed by me to be enjoyed from after my lifetime. Settling that hereafter you yourself should pay the sum of rs. 8 being the maintenance payable by me till my death to my son, abdul razack saheb, in case we do not agree with each other, i have hereby conveyed to you my absolute rights to be enjoyed by you from after my lifetime. After my lifetime you shall, subject to the terms of the aforesaid settlement deed, dated 27th january, 1949, be at liberty to enjoy the schedule mentioned immoveable property with absolute rights possessed by me therein. I and my heirs shall have no rights whatever."
(3) I have to construe this document and ascertain the intention of its author from its terms. The intention has to be gathered from the words found in the document without substituting the presumed for the expressed intention. At the same time, i must bear in mind that the parties were moslems and if, without doing violence to the terms of exhibit b - 2 an interpretation which will effectuate rather than one which will invalidate the gift is possible, i may lean to such an interpretation. Notwithstanding defects or ambiguities in expression, ut res magis vale at quam pereat, " a deed shall never be void where the words used may be applied to an intent to make it good. "
(4) It was argued that exhibit b - 2 was invalid as it created a life - estate in favour of the plaintiff and a vested remainder in the defendant in a half share of the house. It is pointed out that an estate for life and vested remainder are unknown to the mahomedan law. According to the appellant, if such a gift is made, its legal effect would be that the life tenant would take the property absolutely, the remainderman taking no interest therein. It may be taken as well settled that a life estate with a vested remainder known to the english law is not recognised by muslim law and such an estate, whether created by will or deed by a muslim is invalid. It has been observed by the judicial committee that muslim law does not recognise the splitting up of ownership of land into estates distinguished in point of duration like estates in fee simple, or for life or in remainder. At the same time it was pointed out that muslim law does recognise the distinction between the corpus of the property and the usufruct in the property.
"over the corpus of property the law recognises only absolute dominion, heritable and unrestricted in point of time ; and where a gift of the corpus seeks to impose a condition inconsistent with such absolute dominion, the condition is rejected as repugnant ; but interests limited in point of time can be created in the usufruct of the property and the dominion over the corpus takes effect subject to any such limited interests. This distinction runs all thorough the muslim law of gifts - gifts of the corpus, gifts of the usufruct and usufructuary bequests. English law admits ownership of land limited in duration ; muslim law admits only ownership unlimited in duration but recognises interests of limited duration in the use of the property. If it is a gift of the corpus, then any condition which derogates from absolute dominion over the subject of the gift will be rejected as repugnant; but if upon construction, the gift is held to be one of a limited interest, the gift can take effect out of the usufruct, leaving the ownership of the corpus unaffected except to the extent to which its enjoyment is postponed for the duration of the limited interest."
Nawazish ali khan v. Ali raza khan. , (1948) 2 m. L. J. 303 : l. R. 75 i. A. 621 : a. I. R. 1948 p. C. 134 (p. C.).
(5) This being the latest pronouncement of the piivy council, i do not refer to the earlier decisions cited before me. There is little practical difference between a gift of the usufruct in the property for the lifetime of the donee and the gift of a life - estate in the property but the muslim law draws a distinction between a gift of the usufruct and a gift of the property for the life of the donee. Subtle and hair - splitting distinctions of the kind in which the schoolmen of a by - gone age revelled are wholly unadapted to a progressive state of society. In the case of a gift to a for life and thereafter to b where there is no compelling language to the contrary, courts might reasonably construe the gift as a gift of the corpus absolutely to b and of the usufruct to a for life so as to conform to the muslim law governing hiba. The high courts of calcutta, bombay and nagpur held that a gift of a life interest is valid in decisions which are collected on page 48 of mullah's mahomedan law, fourteenth edition. These decisions were all given before the decision of the privy council nawazish ali khan v. Ali raza khan1, which reiterated that a life estate as known to the english law could not be created by hiba but at the same time pointed out that if the gift is one of a limited interest such as for the duration of a life, the gift can take effect out of the usufruct, leaving the ownership of the corpus unaffected except to the extent to which its enjoyment is postponed for the duration of the limited interest. In a recent madras case the question whether a life estate with a vested remainder could be created by a settlement under muslim law was referred to a division bench of the madras high court, but the learned judges construed the deed as a settlement of the corpus of the property on the donees the donor reserving the usufruct of the property to himself during his lifetime. Syed mahomed v. Kairum bivi, (1954) 1 m. L. J. 673.
(6) In the present case too, exhibit b - 2 is not impossible of a similar construction. Indeed, it is somewhat artificial to say that the donor conferred a life - interest on herself and a vested zamindar on the defendant. The natural construction would be to hold that the donor gave her share of the house to the donee absolutely reserving the enjoyment of the property to herself during her lifetime and i hold accordingly.
(7) The further contention of the appellant is that there was no delivery of possession to the donee and this circumstance made the gift invalid. The decision in mohomed aslam khan v. Khalilul rehman khan,a. I. R. (1947) p. C. 97. Has no application here. There the property was in the possession of the donor, and he continued to remain in possession even after the gift which was sought to be made out from an entry in the diary of the donor. In the present case the donor had only a half - share in the house which she gifted under exhibit b - 2. The donee had the right to the other half - share already. The house was in the occupation of a tenant. The donee's name was entered in the municipal registers as sole owner with the consent of the donor and the donee alone paid the municipal taxes for the house after the date of exhibit b - 2. The taxes were exigible from the rents of the house. The donee was also directed to pay rs. 8 a month to the son of the donor out of the rents of the house. The original title deed of the house exhibit b - 1 was produced by the defendant. I am of the opinion that in these circumstances, the gift was complete. Though there was no physical delivery of possession, there was a delivery of such possession as the subject of the gift was susceptible of and that is all that is required to complete a gift under muslim law. Sadik hussain v. Hashim ali, (1916) 31 m. L. J. 607 : i. L. R. 38 all. 627, 645 - 646 : l. R. 43 i. A. 212 (p. C.). Mohammad abdul ghani v. Fakhr jahan begam, (1922) 43 m. L. J. 453: l. R. 49 i. A. 195 : i. L. R. 44 all. 301, 315 (p. C.). Gani mia v. Majid ali. ,a. I. R. (1935) cal. 393.
(8) The courts below were clearly wrong in holding that as the gift to the defendant was of a vested remainder, the question of delivery of possession would arise only aftei the donor's death. This runs counter to the declaration of the prophet that "a gift is not valid unless possessed. " i hold that there was in this case such delivery of possession as is contemplated by mahomedan jurists to validate a gift.
(9) For these reasons, i am of the opinion that the decree appealed from is correct, though not the reasoning of the court below. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.