(1) The joint collector, warangal, by his proceedings dated 7 - 11 - 83 cancelled the assignment of the government land made in favour of the petitioners in exercise of his powers vested in him under sec. 166 - b of a. P. (telangana area) land revenue act and directed the tahsildar, parkal to assign the lands to the eligible landless poor persons. In the year 1968 these lands had been assigned to six persons on the basis that these six persons were landless poor persons. Upon a representation made by the harijans of dammannapet village that those assignees were not landless poor persons and the assignment was illegally made by patwari the joint collector, warangal, issued notice to the petitioners directing them to show cause as to why the assignment of the government lands made in their favour should not be cancelled by invoking sec. 166 - b of the aforementioned act. They were also directed to appear before the court to answer the notice. From the order of cancellation it appears that inspite of "service of notices and affording a dozen opportunities, the respondents neither appeared before the court nor filed any counter to the show cause notice'. The court found on the basis of an inquiry made by the tahsildar that none of those six respondents i. E. , respondents 1 to 4 and 6 were landless poor persons at the time the assignment was made and that therefore, they were not eligible to the assignment of the government land. The tahsildar's report also revealed that one of those six persons was even fictitious. There was no person in the village by the name of the 5th respondent i. E. , gangula samaiah. The tahsildar reported that the very land assigned to the petitioners had been under the occupation of the harijans of the village in the year 1978 and that since the harijans have been cultivating the same without any interference from the respondents. On the basis of the above facts, the joint collector, warangal passed an order on 7 - 11 - 83 cancelling the assignment made in favour of the respondents. Immediately thereafter, the aforementioned respondents, who are the writ petitioners, had filed an application under order 9 rule 13 c. P. C. Before the joint collector, warangal to set aside his order dated 7 - 11 - 83 and to rehear the matter and decide it on merits. Their justification for not being present before the joint collector is that one veeraiah who was looking after their litigation was ill at the time of passing of the order and had expired late and therefore they could not attend the hearing before the joint collector, on that footing the respondents argued that they had no knowledge of the order passed by the joint collector on 7 - 11 - 83 and that they had come to know of the passing of the order by. The joint collector only on 3 - 4 - 84. This application made to the joint collector was rejected by him both on the grounds of law and fact. He found that sufficient opportunities had been afforded to the respondents and that a dozen adjournments had been granted to them. It was also noted that there was delay in filing order 9 rule 13 c. P. C. Application and the same was not properly explained and that in any case, order 9 rule 13 c. P. C. Application would not be maintainable. It was on that basis, the joint collector had dismissed the application filed by the respondents. It was against that order of the joint collector, warangal, the present writ petition has been filed.
(2) The principal argument of sri pratap reddy is that assuming that the order of the joint collector, as correct, the collector had erred in exercising his powers under sec. 166 - b of the aforementioned act after this length of time in the year 1983. He relied upon two judgments one reported in a. Kodanda rao vs govt. Of a. P. Which was a case decided under the a. P. (andhra area) estates (abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act, 1948 and another judgment of the supreme court reported in state of gujarat vs. P. Raghav i find from the language of sec. 166 - b of the a. P. (telangana area) land revenue act, that a collector may call for the record of a case or proceedings from a subordinate department and inspect it in order to satisfy himself that the order or decision passed or the proceedings taken by the subordinate officer is regular, legal and proper any may make suitable order in that behalf. Clearly there is no limitation of time prescribed by that section on the action of the joint collector. The proviso to the section says that the affected party should be sommoned and heard. Literally speaking there was no violation in this case of the requirements of section 166 - b of the aforementioned act. But what sri pratap reddy says is that notwithstanding the absence of express language limitations must be read into section 166 - b of the act. He says that action under sec. 166 - b can be taken only within reasonable time. He argues that notwithstanding the fact that there was no limitation of time found in the statute the same must be implied as was done by the aforementioned two cases. For more than one reason i think that this argument should be rejected. Firstly there is a direct decision of chandra reddy c. J. , (as he then was) reported in ramlingam vs. Lachmaiah holding that "the powers of revision under section 166 - b of the act conferred on the government are very vide and when the government fee! that the order sought to be revised is irregular, illegal or improper they can pass any suitable order in that behalf. First of all, before they could exercise their jurisdiction, it should be shown that the oider is irregular, illegal or improper". As the decision of the division bench delivered by chandra reddy, c. J. , was directly under section 166 - b of the act, i cannot but follow that decision. Even otherwise, i do not find that the decision on which the petitioners, relied upon lend any analogical support to the petitioner's argument. In the state of gujarat vs. P. Raghav (supra) the supreme court did not lay down what period of time would be reasonable period of time and on the other hand, it said that "the power of the commissioner to revise under sec. 65 must be exercised in reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised". The supreme court implies that taking of action would be out of limits of reasonable time by reason of the peculiarity of the facts of the case and not merely by change of calendar or running of the clock. In other words, the supreme court did not lay it down that exercise of power becomes unreasonable by mere lapse of time however long it is. Where no innocent third party interests have crept in and where the nature of fraud or misrepresentation is so glaring and patent carrying out for judicial correction and where the assignee himself was a privy to the fraud played on the state, it becomes the duty of the authority to take action immediately the fraud is detected and discovered. It is. For that reason the statute gave power without reference to any time limit. The judgment of the division bench of this court reported in a. Kodanda rao vs. Govt. Of a. P. (supra) is one rendered under the a. P. (andhra area) estates (abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act, 1948 and strictly speaking will be of no use in this context. Even otherwise, i am not hi a position to agree with the argument that the legal concept of reasonable time is the sanie as the ordinary physical concept of time. This court should not support the contention which will have the effect of alienating any government land in favour of those who having more than 13 to 20 acres each had obtained assignments on the basis that they were landless poor. The theory of arbitrary cancellation and the improper exercise of jurisdiction, are all in my opinion, inappli - cable to a case of this nature. This must have been the real reason why ihe assignees had never appeared before the tahsildar and never contested the matter before him inspite of the service of notices on them. Having thus deliberately avoided the inquiry conducted by the tahsildar, the assignees cannot now be heard to say that the inquiry itself was illegal and arbitrary. I do not see any merits in this writ petition. Following the judgment of the division bench of this court reported in ramaliugam vs. Lachmaiah (supra) i dismiss this writ petition.