(1) The petitioner is the 1st defendant. The suit is filed by the plaintiffs respondents for recovery of rs. 14,730 - 39 ps. Representing the value of short delivered aluminium sheets. Pursuant to the order placed by the plaintiffs with the 2nd defendant for the supply of alluminium sheets, the aluminium sheets were sent by the 2nd defendant through m/s bombay andhra transport company - 1st defendant. The plaintiffs paid the value of 1688 kgs of aluminium sheets through the syndicate bank. But, at the time of taking delivery at hyderabad, it was discovered that the goods delivered were actually weighing about 850 kgs though the original lorry receipt shows the weightage of goods as 1688 kgs. The 1st defendant issued a shortage certificate dated 17 - 6 - 1974. The defendants did not make the goods available or pay the price of the goods in spite of repeated demands. Thereupon, the plaintiffs were obliged to file the suit for recovery of the amount representing the market price of the afuminlum sheets not delivered. The plea of the 1st defendant is that it is a partnership firm having its principal place of business at 113, bandar! street, bombay and the defendant undertook to transport the consignment under the terms and conditions mentioned on the reverse of the lorry receipt forwarding note. According to the terms and conditions printed on the reverse of the lorry receipt forwarding note, the court at bombay city alone has jurisdiction in respect of claims and matters arising under the consignment of goods entrusted for transport and as such the city civil court at hyderabad has no jurisdiction. The other pleas raised are not relevant for the puipose of this revision petition. The 2nd defendant denied the liability to pay the suit claim and pleaded that the entire quantity of the goods was despatched through the 1st defendant. On the pleadings, five issues have been framed by the trial court out of which the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the court has been tried as a preliminary issue. Viz. "whether this court has jurisdiction in view of condition no. 17 of the lorry receipt". The trial court held that the city civil court at hyderabad has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the bombay city court alone has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and consequently the plaint was directed to be returned for presentation to proper court. On appeal at the i, stance of the plaintiffs, the learned additional chief judge, city civil court, held that the city civil court at hyderabad has jurisdiction to entertain the suit and set aside the order passed by the trial court and directed the city civil court to restore the suit and dispose of the same according to law.
(2) The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the plaintiffs having taken delivery of the goods pursuant to the forwarding note, cannot resile from the conditions stipulated in the forwarding note and further having ralied upon the forwarding note and the connected shortage certificate for the claim, the plaintiffs cannot resile from part of the terms of the contrect and rely upon the part which suits them. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the plaintiffs are not bound by ex. A - 1 as they are not parties to the same and the suit is filed wholly on the basis of ex a - 2 viz. , shortage certificate and the cause of action arose when the shortage was discovered and shortage certificate was issued at hyderabad and no part of the cause of action arose at bombay so far as the plantilfs are concerned and hence ex. A - 1 cannot be pressed into service so far as the plaintiffs are concerned.
(3) To appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to amplify the facts, pursuant to the arrangement between the plaintiffs and the 2nd defendant, the goods were entrusted by 2nd defendant to the 1st defendant to be transported to hyderabad. It transpired that the 1st defendant has forwarded the documents to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs paid the money in the bank on the basis of the document wherein the 2nd defendant figured as consignor and consignee was described as self. Condition no. 17 in the forwarding note is material. Condition no. 17 states that in respect of any dispute touching the transaction the bombay court alone has jurisdiction. This forwarding note is exhibited as ex. A - 1. At the time of delivery of the goods at hyderabad, it came to light that there was a shortage of goods and the 1st defendant was obliged to give shortage certificate to the plaintiffs and this shortage certificate is exhibited as ex. A 2. The essence of the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that ex. A 1 is the basis for the entire traniaction and it must be presumed that the plaintiffs have seen the forwarding note at the time of paymant of tha money in the bank and must have presumed to have understood its contents and the conditions incorporated in clause 17 are binding on them and as ex. A - 1 is tha basis for filing the suit, the plaintiffs cannot resile from the part of the terms of the contract particularly cl. 17.
(4) It is well settled that in a situation where the cause of action arises in two places, the parties by agreement can have the jurisdiction of the court at one place and can exclude the jurisdiction of the court of another place in hakam singh v. Gommon (india) ltd (air 1971 sc 740) the supreme court held that the agreement that one of the courts having jurisdiction shall try the dispute is not in contravention of the public policy or section 28 of the contract act. The learned counsel relied upon the desision of the madras high court in savany transport v. C mudaliar and co. (air 1979 madras 21). In this case the firm at erode entrusted textiles to the firm carrying on business at bombay to be transported to erode. As there was a delay the suit was filed at erode against the firm carrying on business at bombay. It was contended on behalf of the bombay firm that in view of clause 17 in the contract of affreightment the bombay courts alone shall have jurisdiction in respect of all claims and matters. This contention of the bombay firm was upheld by the madras high court and it was held that a reasonable presumption can be drawn that the parties were aware of the conditions in the contract and the parties cannot wriggle out of the contract having agreed to exercise the choice of the one of the courts having jurisdiction. The contract in the madras casa is a bilateral one and as such far removed from the facts of this case. The issue that arises for decision in this case is whether the plaintiffs who are third parties and who are expected to take delivery of the goods pursuant to the contract between them and the 2nd defendant are aware of the conditions in ex. A - 1 and can be presumed to have acted upon those conditions. The next case cited on behalf of the petilioner is n. B. T. Co. Madras v. A. Narasimha rao (1968 (1) an. W. R. 424). In this case the company in bombay entrusted the bales of yarn to the transport company having head quarters at madras to be despatched to the firm carrying on business at sattenapalli. The transport company caused delay in delivery of the goods, there upon the company at sattenapaili filed a suit in the district munsif's court, sattenapaili for damages. The transport company at madras resisted the suit contending that in accordance with the terms and conditions printed on the reverse of the forwarding note, the court at madres city alone had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, but not the court at sattenapaili. The trial court held that such 6 condition in the contract is repugnant to saction 28 of the contrct act and therefore invalid. On revision, basireddy, j held that where the parties agreed to have settled in a particular forum out of several forums having jurisdiction such forum is not precluded from entertaining the suit. It is true that the facts in this decision have close affinity to the facts of this case. However, the decision rested upon the issue whether by agreement the parties can choose one of the courts having jurisdiction but did not advert to the issue whether third party is bound by an agreement arrived at between the two parties and as such this decision is not helpful to determine the issue arising in this case. Reliance is also placed on the decision in t. An janeyulu v. Rama krishna textiles (1976 (2) a. P. L j. 358). In this decision alladi kuppuswamy, j held that when the parties stipulated that the dispute will be subject to jurisdiction of one of the courts having jurisdiction to entertain the suit, there is a necessary implication that the jurisdiction of one of them is excluded and then the bill issued by the vendor is binding upon the other party as it was acted upon and the goods were ostained and money was paid on the basis of the terms including the condition specifying the jurisdiction of a particular court. This again is directly a transaction between the two parties and the third is not involved and as such this decision cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case. Another decision cited by the learned counsel is e. I. D, parry (india) ltd. , vs. M/s, savani transporters (a. I. R. 1980 a. P. 30). This decision is also concerned with the agreement between two parties and the binding nature of the clause incorporated in the way bill confering jurisdiction on one of the courts and as such is not applicable to the facts of this ease.
(5) The learned counsel for the respondents contended that clause 17 stipulating the condition of jurisdiction of bombay court alone is not decisive. In support of this contention reliance was made on the decision of this court in c. Satyanarayana vs v. L. Narailmham (a. I. R. 1961 a. P. 330). This decision proceeded upon the footing that there was no finding that "subject to madras jurisdiction" was a term of the transaction and that the letter written by one of the parties subsequent to the transaction incorporating the same is unilateral and does not bind the other side. In g. P. Venkataraju vs. Palukuri (a. I. R. 1975 a p. 32) relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, the suit was filed for recovery of damages on the ground that the goods delivered were unfit for consumption. As the delivery was effected at rajahmundry it was held that the cause of action arose wholely at rajahmundry, it was further held on the facts that the bill alone containing the words "subject to calcutta jurisdiction" cannot be equated to a concluded contract so as to bind the parlies and as such this decision also cannot be pressed into service.
(6) The learned counsel for the respondent raised an alternate contention hat even if it is construed that ex a - 1 is binding, the jurisdiction of the court at hyderabad is not ouated. The inspiration for this contention is the decisions of the gujarat high court reported in arun kumar vs. Ramalal, a. I r. 1975 guj. 72 and r g. Transport co. V. United india f and g ins. Co (a. I. R, 1980 gujrat 184). In the said decisions the gujarat high court held that though it is open to the parties to stipulate the jurisdiction of a particular court but the normal jurisdiction of any other court cannot be ousted by such an agreement in the event of oppressive nature, hardship and stakes involved i am uneble to agree with these decisions. The relaxation pestuleted in these decisions is not founded upon correct premises and is in teeth of the consensus of judicial opinion by the supreme court and high courts. The jurisdiction of the court either territorial, pscuniary or otherwise should be precise, definite and categorical in the interests o! smooth functioning of the administration of justice the litigant should not be exposed to the risk of uncertainty in locating the court of forum in which the action should be initiated. The jurisdiction shall be specitied with exac itude and in the event of cause of action arising in plurality of courts the parties at the time of entering into transaction by mutual agreement can choosa one of the forums and this is noi violative of section 28 of the contract act. If this intrusion of considerations of hardship and oppressiveness are allowed the cartalcity of jurisdiction predicated as a s qual to the agreement and the sanctity of the agreement will be sat at nought. The agreement between the parties is concerned with the exercise of choice amongst the courts having jurisdiction and the agreement cannot confer a jurisdiction on tha court where no part of cause o! action arises. At the time whan the agreament is concluded the parties to the agreement are expected to choose one of the courts deliberately and consciously and the parties cannot be permitted so resild there from subsequent to setting in motion the process of litigation.
(7) The principles that emerge from 'the decisions cited by the either side may be recapitulated. The parties by a concluded and binding agreement can choose to have the jurisdiction of one of the courts where part of the cause of action arises and exclude the other court. The condition precedent for such exercise of choice is that part of the causa of action should arise in the court where the parties agree to have the disputes adjudicated and also in the courts excluded by agreement. The contract between the parties with regard to the exclusion of jurisdiction of a court can be either express or implied but the contract should be unequivocal and should be precise and definite. The contract is binding and conclusive on the parties to the agreement but it cannot be fastened on the third party unless if is satisfactorily shown that the third parly is privy to the contract or acted upon the contract consciously knowing the effect and implications of the said agreement. It must be shown that the third party is made aware of the implications of the agreement. Having regard to these principles it has to be considered whether the plaintiffs are bound by ex. A - 1. The goods were consigned to self by 2nd defendant and at the inception and when the goods w,ere put in the slreem of transport there were only iwo parties. The plaintiffs came into the area when the documents were sent to them by the 2nd defendant and the money was paid by them in the bank at hyderabad, the crucial consideration is whether at the point of paying the money the plaintiffs were made aware of the agreement between 1 st defendant and 2nd defendant rega ding jurisdiction of bombay city court. There is absolutely no semblance of evidence or surrounding clrcumstances to indicate that the plaintiffs were conscious of clause 17 in ex - a1 or they acted upon the same. The tripartite arrangement cannot be spaitout from ex. A - 1 or the conduct of the plaintiffs. There is absolutely no privity of contract regarding the jurisdiction between the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant. The cause of action for the piainiffs as against the ist defendant arose at the point and time when srortage of goods was discovered and whan ex. A - 2 was,issued and upto this point of time the 1st defendant was acting as agent of the 2nd defendant without any disclosed or known obligation or contract with the plaintiffs.
(8) In the view taken that the court at bombay has no jurisdiction and the court at hyderabad has jurisdiction it is not necessary to deal with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the court at hyderabad alone has juirsdiction founded upon the applicability of section 20 (c) c. P. C.
(9) I am amazed to note that the disposal of preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction basing upon the purport of ex. A - 1 and ex. A - 2 took five years. The trial court is d/rected to dispose of the suit within three months from the date of receipt of records.
(10) In the rasult, the civil ravision petition is dismissed with costs