(1) This is a revision filed under s. 28 of the andhra pradesh (telangana area) abolition of inams act, 1955 (herein after called the act.)
(2) This revision is an off - shoot of the remand order and directions issued by me in c. R. P. No. 3087 of 1980 on 4 - 4 - 1985. That c. R. P. Was disposed along with second appeal no. 1035/81 and w. P. No. 8034/1981 on 4 - 4 - 1985. Thereafter, there was an appeal to the supreme court of india, and under interim order passed in that appeal, the supreme court desired that the present c. R. P. Arising out of the decision of the joint collector (prescribed authority under the act) should be disposed of. That is how the present revision has come before me.
(3) The petitioners in this revision are sri g. V. Narsimha reddy and g. V. Mohan reddi and they purchased the property in question under a registered sale deed dated 19 - 8 - 1973 from its original owner - namely, the landholder sri syed mustafa hussain quadri. The suit property is admittedly 'inam land'.
(4) The respondent before me is syed aktar ali, who had earlier obtained a lease dated 5 - 10 - 1966 from the original land - holder sri syed mustafa 'hussain quadri and the respondent later claimed a right to be registered as an occupant, claimin rights under sec. 8 of the act as a 'nonprotected tenant'.
(5) The land was originally agricultural land but came to use as non - agricultural land. In fact, the respondent tenant has been using the land for the purposes of a saw - mill.
(6) The application for registration was filed 'by une respondent as a non - protected tenant on 26 - 9 - 75 before the collector. It is not in dispute that under the act, collector means, the concerned revenue divisioal on officer. The r,d. O. Rejected the respondent's application by an order dated 3 - 12 - 77 and against that order, the respondent had preferred c. R. P. No. 3087 of 1980 to this court. By my judgment dated 4 - 4 - 85, i allowed the revision and held that in case there is a question as to the validity conversion of the land from agricultural to non - agricultural under sec. 9 (2) the r. D. O. Has to make a'reference'of the matter to the 'prescribed authority' (the joint collector) under sec. 24 (2) of the act for decision.
(7) After my judgment dated 4 - 4 - 1985 the r. D. O. Heard the parties and passed fresh orders (a) referring the question of conversion to the joint collector under sec. 24 (2) and (b) rejecting the petitioner's application for grant of occupancy certificate.
(8) Thereafter the joint collector, by his order dated 27 - 5 - 1986 now impugned, framed three issues :
(1) whether the petitioner sri syed aktar ali is entitled for occupancy rights under the inam abolition act, 1955 ? (2) whether putting agricultural land in s. No. 1901 measuring 0. 21 gunta of nirmal to non - agricultural use without permission of the collector is a contravention of the provisions of the a. P. (t. A.) abolition of inam act ? (3) whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of sec. 9 of the inam abolition act as he put the agricultural land to non - agricultural use, without permission from the collector ? and held on issue no. 1 that the respondent (non - protected tenant) was entitled to an occupancy certificate and on issue no. 2 that the conversion of the land into non - agricultural land was not illegal, on issue no. 3 he held that the respondent was entitled to the benefit of sec. 9. The joint colle; - tcr accordingly granted occupancy rights to the respondent.
(9) It is against this order that the two petitioners, the purchasers from the land - holder, have, filed this revision under sec. 28 of the act.
(10) It is contended by the learned counsel for the two petitioners sri p. Ramchandra reddy and sri gopal reddy that the joint collector erred in thinking that the respondent was entitled to occupancy rights. It is pointed out that, under the act, the relevant date of vesting was 20 - 7 - 1955 and not 1 - 11 - 1973 as opined by the joint collector. On that basis it is argued that the lease by the petitioners vendor in favour of the respondent was on 5 - 10 - 1966 long subsequent to 20 - 7 - 58 and that the respondent cannot claim any rights as a non - protected tenant inasmuch as his tenancy rights are referable to a date subsequent to 20 - 7 - 55. It is argued that so far as the question of conversion is concerned, the finding regarding conversion being legal and valid is not against the petitioners and that they can take advantage of the same, but the respondent cannot lay any claim under sec. 9 to the non - agricultural land in as much as, the date of vesting i. E. 20 - 7 - 55, the holder of the non - agricultural land was the petitioners' vendor, mr. Quadri and that the respondent was now here on the scene on 20 - 7 - 55. It is argued that for purposes of sec. 10 the respondent cannot claim to be a tenant as on 20 - 7 - 55 and for purposes of sec. 9 (2) , the respondent cannot claim to be a holder of the land, inasmuch as the lease was on 5 - 10 - 1966. The joint collector committed a serious mistake in thinking that the date of vesting is 1 - 11 - 73 and in proceeding to recognise the respondent as a tenant by that date (i. E. , from 6 - 10 - 66) for purposes of sec 10 and in treating the respondent as a holder under sec. 9 (?) by 1 - 11 - 1973.
(11) On the other hand, it is argued by sri azizulla khan and sri mohiuddin for the respondent, that this revision is not maintainable as the provisions of sec. 28 are not attracted. It is also argued that the crucial date for deciding the question of vesting is 1 - 11 - 73 and not 20 - 7 - 55 and that hence, both for deciding the right to occupancy under sec. 10 and for deciding as to who is holding the non - agricultural land under sec. (2) , the crucial date is 1 - 11 - 73 and that inasmuch as the tenancy started on 5 - 10 - 66, the respondent is entitled to be declared as occupancy tenant of the non - agricultural land.
(12) On these contentions, the following points arise for consideration :
(1) whether this c. R. P. Is maintainable under sec. 28 of the act ? (2) what is the crucial date of vesting of the inams in the state ? (3) whether the respondent (non - protected tenant) is entitled to a certificate of occupancy under sec. 10 and to be declared as holder under sec. 9 (2) or whether the inamdar is entitled to an occupa ncy certificate under sec. 4 ?
Point no. 1 :this point has been framed on account of the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the respondent that the revision, petition preferred by the sucessors - in interest of the inamdar under sec. 28 of the act, is not maintainable. It is argued for the respondent that the collector (i. E. R. D. O.) has only made a reference under sec. 24 (2) of the act to the ('prescribed authority' (the joint collector) and that the order of the 'prescribed authority' is final and that sec. 28 expressly excludes revisions against orders of the collector (except those referred ro in sec. 24) or by the special tribunal and that hence the revision is not maintainable.
(13) Sec. 28 of the act reads thus :
"sec. 29 revision :notwithstanding anything contained in this act or any other law for the time being in force an application for revision shall lie to the high court from any order passed or proceedings taken by the collector (except those referred to in section 24) or by the special tribunal under this act on the following grounds that the original or appellate authority. (a) exercise a jurisdiction not vested in it by law (b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested : or (c) acted illegally or with material irregularity in following the procedure or passing the order."
It is also necessary in this context to refer to section 24 as well as section 9 :
"sec. 24. Appeals from orders under sec. 10 to prescribed authority : (1) any person aggrieved by a decision of the collector under sec. 10 may, within thirty days from the date of decision, or such farther time as the prescribed authority may for sufficient cause allow, appeal to the prescribed authority and its decision shall be final. (2) if any question arises whether any building or land falls within the scope of sec. 9 the same shall be referred to the prescribed authority whose decision shall be final."
"sec. 9 :vesting of certain buildings and inam lands used for non - agricultural purposes : (1) every private building, situated within an inam shall, with effect from the date of vesting, vest in the person who owned it immediately before that date, (2) where an inam land has been converted for any purpose unconnected with agriculture, the holder of such land shall be entitled to keep the land provided that such conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force. (3) the vesting of private buildings or lands under sub - section (1) or (2) shall be subject to the payment of non - agricultural assessment that may be imposed by government from time to time.
(14) From a combined reading of sec. 9 (2) , 24 (2) and 28 it will be noticed that whenever a question of conversion arises before the collector (i. E. , r. D. O.) , he shall refer the same to the 'prescribed authority' (i. E. , joint collector) and that under section 28 the orders of the collector, if given under section 24, are not revisable. In other words, a revision is prohibited in cases where an appeal is provided under sec. 24 ( 1) or a reference is provided under sec. 24 (2) , in both cases to the prescribed authority, and this is understandable. Thus, it is clear that, if the impugned order of the prescribed authority is only an order passed on a reference, no revision lies under sec. 28. The argument of the respondent's counsel is'thus plausible but, as i shall presently show, it is not correct and cannot accepted.
(15) In the present case, the application before the primary authority (i. E. The collector) , namely the r. D. O. Filed by the respondent (non - protected tenant) was one for grant of occupancy rights under sec. 8. That application incidenlly raised a question as to the validity of conversion of agricultural land into non - agricultural land under sec. 9 (2).
(16) Now, if the collector (r. D. O.) had merely referred the question as to the validity of conversion to the prescribed authority under sec. 24 (2) , the respondent's contention would have had to be accepted, but the r. D. O. Had, on the facts of the case, not only made a reference under sec. 24 (2) to the joint collector, but had also gone into questions arising under sec. 10 of the act and simultaneously 'rejected' the claim of the respondent (non - protected tenant) for grant of an occupancy certificate. This is clear from the facts set out under the impugned order by the joint collector (in para 8) as follows : "the revenue divisional officer, nirmal rejected the claim of the petitioner for confirmation of occupancy rights on the ground that
(17) In other words, the collector (i. E. R. D. O.) not only made a reference under sec. 24 (2) to the joint collector in respect of a matter arising under sec. 9 (2) , but has also passed orders under sec. 10 rejecting the claim for occupancy under sec. 8 made by the respondent.
(18) The joint collector in the order,. Now impugned before, me, had therefore to deal with both questions, namely the validity of the conversion under sec. 9 (2) as also the validity of the rejection of occupancy rights under sec. 10 read with sec. 8 as claimed by the respondent (non - protected tenant). That is why, the orders of the joint collector must be deemed in law, to be also of ders passed on appeal against matters arising under sec. 10 read with sec. 8.
(19) It is then argued for the respondent that even appellate orders passed by the prescribed authority under sec. 24 are not revisible. I am not inclined to agree. In this context reference has to be made to sec. 2 (a) which clearly states that 'collector' means the collector of a district and includes any other officer, not below the rank of a deputy collector, who may be authorised by the government by notification in the official gazette, to discharge the functions of a collector under this act. "
(20) Reading sec. 2 (a) with sec. 28, it is clear that under sec. 28 the legislature wanted to prohibit a revision in cases where an appeal lay, (this is on similar lines as sec. 115, c. P. C.) or a reference lay but the legislature did not, in my opinion, intend to disallow a revision to the high court against appellate orders of the collector. In as much as the r. D. O has also become a 'collector' by virtue of a delegation of power, the prohibition in sec. 28 is only in regard to order of the r. D. O. Which are appealable under sec. 24 (1) to the joint collector or a reference is to be made under sec. 24 (2). Notwithstanding the delegation, the joint collecto while dealing with appeals, is still a collector because of sec. 2 (a). Hence the words in brackets in sec. 28, namely, 'except those referred to in sec. 24' apply only to primary orders passed by the r. D. O. Which are either appealable under sec. 24 (1) or against which a reference lies under sec. 24 (2) , but not to appellate orders of the collector (i. E. , joint collector) made under sec. 24 (1) in matters concerning sec. 10 i. E. , grant of occupancy right certificates.
(21) In the present case, the impugned order of the joint collector is, as held by me, one not only under sec. 24 (2) on a reference, but also one made under sec. 24 (1) read with sec. 10 as an appellate authority and is clearly revisable under sec. 28.
(22) In any event, to avoid doubts about my jurisdiction, and having regard to the long litigation, i am inclined to exercise suo motu powers under art. 227 of the constitution of india.
(23) Thus either under sec. 28 or under art. 227 of the constitution of india, the impugned order of the joint collector is revisabie and the objection of the respondant is rejected.
(24) Another argument advanced for the respondent is that the proceeding before the joint collector was only a reference under sec. 24 (1) as per para (1) of the order of the joint collector, and therefore there was no appeal before the latter, which could enable him to decide question arising under sec. 10.
(25) This argument of the appellant if accepted, would initially cut the entire case of the respondent. I have earlier stated that, after remand, the r. D. O. Not only made a reference but a'so clearly ' - ejected' the claim of the respondent for occupancy certificate. The said order of 'rejection' being one against the respondent, the absence of an appeal by the respondent, would make the order of the rejection of the respondent's claim under sec. 8 final and could indeed shut out the respondent's case before the joint collector.
(26) Further, the order of the joint collector shows that issues were framed by him not only regarding matters arising under sec. 9 (2) and 24 (2) but also those arising under secs. 8, and 10 and the respondent, having argued also questions arising under secs. 8 and 10 before the joint collector, without filing an express appeal, cannot, now contend in this revision that question under secs. 8 and 10 cannot be raised in this revision.
(27) As already stated, for the purpose of avoiding all doubts and to shorten litigation, i am also, exercising powers under art. 227 of the constitution, and going into all the questions covered by issues 1 to 3 before the joint collector.
(28) Hence i hold that this revision is maintainable and point no. 1 is accordingly decided in favour of the petitioner.
(29) Points 2 and 3 :the question is as to what is the crucial date of vesting for purpose of the case.
(30) The hyderabad inam abolitation act, 1955 was passed ;n 1955 and was repealed by act 9 of 1969 but the repealing act was held void and unconstit uticnal.
(31) Section 3 of the act deals with abolition and vesting of mams and the consequence thereof.
(32) Under section 1 (3) (a) , it is stated that section 1, 2 and sec. 3 except clauses (d) , (g) , (h) , (i) of sub - section 2, secs. 30 to 34, secs. 35 and 36 etc. , shall come into force on the date of publication of the act in the gazette. The act was so published in the gazette on 20 - 7 - 1955.
(33) In the present inquiry, we are concerned with sec. 3 (2) (b) read with secs. 4,5,6,7,8,9 and 10. It is clear that these sections came into force on 20 - 7 - 1955.
(34) The question has arisen as to the date of vesting under the act, in several cases. In mohd shankat hussain khan vs. State of s. P. 1 the supreme court observed as follows :
"there can be no doubt that on publication of the notification under sub - sec. (1) of sec. 3 of the abolition act, all inams were abolished and vested in the state. The inams which were so abolished and vested in the state includes in it all rights, title and interest in the inams by virtue of
clause (b) of sub - section (2) of section 3 of the abolition act."
The same is the view mentioned by a division bench of this court in jagannadha rao vs. State of a. P. 2 where it was observed:
"the said act in its entirety came into force on 20 - 7 - 55. According to sec. 3 of the act, all inams to which the act was made applicable stood abolished and vested in the state. The consequences of such abolition and vesting were firstly that the act mentioned in sec. 3 (2) (a) were made applicable ; secondly all rights, title and interest vesting in the inamdar and others. Stood ceased and vested absolutely in the state free from all encumbrances. .
(35) Under sec. 4 every inamdar, under sec. 5 every kabiz - kadim, under sec. 6 every permanent tenant, under sec. 7 every protected tenant, under sec. 8 every non - protected tenant, with effect from the date of vesting, all entitled to be registered as an occupant of all inam lands other than those mentioned in sec. 4 and in accordance with those sections. " it was again observed (at page 379 - 80) as follows :
"it will be seen from the various provisions referred to above that the inams stood abolished and vested in the government from 20 - 7 - 1955. The inamdars and other persons became entitled firstly to compensation for the rights abolished and for the surplus land taken over by the government on 20 - 7 - 1955 itself. The governmsnt was to pay the compensation with interest thereon within six months from the date of vesting failing which they were further burdened with the obligation to make the interim payment apart from the compensation. Secondly, the inamdars were entitled to. The grant of patta with effect from the date of such vesting on such land to which they were declared entitled under the act."
The division bench, in the above said case, then referred to the amendment by act 10 of 1956 and pointed out that the effect'of the amendment was that, whereas the abolition of inams and their vesting in accordance with sec. 3 which had come into force on 20 - 7 - 1955 remained unchanged the enquiry which was to be made by the collector both in regard to the grant of patta and the determination of compensation was, however, in effect, suspended. In fact, the later suspension was lilted on 1 - 11 - 73.
(36) From the aforesaid decision of the division bench of this court, it is clear that, so far as the substantive rights of the parties are concerned, the effective date is 20 - 7 - 1955. That is the date on which the inams were abolished and vested in the state. That is also the date, with reference to which the rights of the parties for obtaining occupancy pattas have to be determined. What was suspended by virtue of the amendment introduced by the act 10 of 1956 was only the enquiry that was to be conducted by the collector, both in respect of the compensation as well as the grant of patta. It is now not in dispute that the suspended provisions were again revived by virtue of the subsequent notification on 1 - 11 - 1973. In other words, though the enquiry was to be made by the collector subsequent to 1 - 11 - 1973 both as regards the right of the parties or occupancy pattas as well as for compensation so far as the substantive rights of the parties are concerned, they have to be adjudged only as on 20 - 7 - 1955. To the same effect is the judgment of jeevan reddy, j. In w. P. No. 8870 and 8923 of 1981 in sudarsan reddy vs. Kannaimma the learned judge clearly observed as follows:
". For the purpose of making an enquiry as to who is entitled to be registered as an occupant, what is to be seen is the position obtaining as on 20 - 7 - 1955 viz. , the date of abolition and vesting."
Jeevan reddy, , j. Had occasion to consider the question later in k. Veera reddy vs. R. D. O. Vikarabad in that case, the learned judge specifically observed as follows :
"in this writ petition the first contention raised is that the date of vesting under the act, 1955 is not 20 - 7 - 1955 but 1 - 11 - 1973. On that basis it is contended that the petitioners who are in possession from 1960 as lessess would be kabiz - e - kadim. In my opinion this contention is wholly unsustainable. The date of vesting under the act is beyond any doubt 20 - 7 - 1955. It is not 1 - 11 - 1973. Sec. 3 (1) which provides for the abolition and vesting of inams in the government came into force on 20 - 7 - 1955. Of course most of the remaining provisions were not brought into force until 1 - 11 - 1973. But in as much as sec. 3 (1) was brought into force with effect from 20 - 7 - 1955, the date of vesting is undoubtedly that date and not 1 - 11 - 1973. If so, the petitioners cannot claim as kabiz - e - kadim."
To a like effect is the recent judgment of p. A choudary, j. In b. Ramender reddy vs. The dist. Collector. The learned judge referred to the decision of the supreme court and to the other judgments above mentioned and came to the clear conclusion that the rights, for purposes of the grant of occupancy certificate, have to be adjudged with reference to the date of vesting and that the date of vesting is 20 - 7 - 1955 and not1 - 11 - 1973. It was also pointed out that "successors - in - interest'' of the inamdars. Are also entitled to put forward their claims even though the right of the inamdar devolved on them subsequent to 20 - 7 - 1955. In other words persons who have purchased the inamdar's rights subsequent to 20 - 7 - 1955 would also be entitled to claim the rights of the inamdar including the right to obtain an occupancy certificate under sec. 4 of the act.
(37) In kodithala kesavulu vs. Govt. Of a. P. 6 jeevan reddy, j. Pointed out that the rights of the parties have to be adjudged with reference to 29 - 7 - 1955 and not with reference to 1 - 11 - 1973. It was also pointed out that in view of the provisions of s. 2 (d) and rule 5 of the rules the 'successor - in - interest" of the inamadar was included in the definition of 'inamdar' and was therefore entitled to claim a right to obtain an occupancy certificate under sec. 4 of the act. I may point out that the definition of 'inamdar' is as follows :
"sec. 2 (l) (d) inamdar means a person holding as inam or a share therein, either for his own benefit or in trust and includes the successor - in - interest of inamdar."
(38) In view of the above judgments it is clear that the rights of the parties for grant of patta are to be based on the respective position of the claimants as on 20 - 7 - 1955. In the present case the appellate authority was clearly in error in thinking that the date of vesting is 1 - 11 - 1973 and in holding that the respondent who obtained a lease on 15 - 10 - 1966 is entitled to patta as an occupant. The lease dated 15 - 10 - 1968 granted in favour of the respondent cannot enable him to claim any rights as a non - protected tenant under sec. 8 in asmuch as such tenancy was not in existence prior to 20 - 7 - 1955. Admittedly the person holding the land on 20 - 8 - 1955 is the inamdar and he had sold his interest in favour of the two petitioners by sale deeds dated 20 - 12 - 76. Thus the petitioners in the revision are entitled to claim the occupancy certificate in the place of their vendor under sec. 4 and the respondent who is a non - protected tenant whose tenancy started on 15 - 10 - 1956 is not entitled to any such occupancy certificate under sec. 8.
(39) For the aforesaid reasons the impugned order of the joint collector is set aside and it is held on points 2 and 3 that the crucial date for vgsting in the state is 20 - 7 - 1955 and not 1 - 11 - 1973 and tha the right to occupancy patta has to be judged on the basis of the claims as on, 20 - 7 - 1955. The respondent - non - protected tenant whose lease is dated 15 - 10 - 1966 is not entitled to any such occupancy certificate under section 8. The petitioners, as the successors - in - interest of the inamdars, by virtue of the sale deeds dt 20 - 12 - 1976, are entitled to occupancy pattas under section 4 of the act.
(40) For the aforesaid reasons the order of the joint collector is set aside and the revision allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.