Wazir, C.J:— Mst. Gian Kour, Santu and Hari Singh filed three separate writ petitions in this Court and they came up for haaring before a single Judge. The learned Judge, after hearing the arguments, felt that the following points were of considerable importance and likely to occur in various writ petitions which are filed by the allottee against the orders of the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer and he therefore, formulated the following points and referred them to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement:

(1) What are the rights accruing to an allottee in the land allotted to him?

(2) Can an allottee be turned out from land without following the procedure laid down by the rules framed in this behalf?

(3) Whether the provisions of Order No. 578-C of 1954 are intra vires of the powers of the Government?

(4) Does the remedy suggested in Section 30(A) of the E.P Act provide an effective remedy, so as to bar a writ petition?

2. Messrs Lok Nath Sharma, Suraj prakash offered to address arguments on behalf of the petitioners and Mr. Dina Nath Mahajan and the Assistant Advocate-General appeared on behalf of the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer. The petitioners are displaced persons. It appears that they were allotted lands at different places by the Joint Rehabilitation Board and the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer cancelled the allotments made in their favour and allotted the same lands to some other persons. As the allotments were cancelled and ejectment orders were passed against the petitioners, they have filed petitions seeking writs of mandamus against the opposite party prohibiting them from interfering with the petitioner's possession and for writs of certiorari for quashing the orders cancelling previous allotment and making fresh allotments in favour of other persons.

3. In their petitions the petitioners have alleged that the orders of cancellation are without the authority of lav; and deprives the petitioners of their fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India to hold property allotted to them.

4. The question for consideration is whether or not the rights accruing to an allottee in the land allotted to him are fundamental rights. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the allottee has got some rights in the land and those rights constitute his property within the meaning of Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Section 2(a) of the Jammu and Kashmir State Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 2006, defines the term ‘allotment’.

5. According to this definition an allottee has merely a right of temporary use and occupation of immoveable property. The definition expressly says that the grant is to be treated otherwise than by way of lease. These words otherwise than by way of lease clearly indicate that the grant is not a lease.

6. Lease, it may be noted, by reference to Sections 105 & 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act is a transfer of interest in property and is assignable. It is also hereditable in some cases such as leases for fixed periods. The position of an allottee however is quite different to that of the lessee.

7. An allottee is merely a licensee. In a lease there is a transfer of interest in property whereas in license no estate in property passes and it can be revoked at any time. Reference in this connection may be made to ‘Thakar Das v. The Custodian Evacuee Property, Jullundur’, 1951 Punj 327 (AIR V 38) (A) in which it is laid down that an allottee is a mere licensee whose licence can be revoked at any time. The same view has been taken in ‘A.S Bhasin v. Custodian Evacuee Property, Punjab’, 1954 Punj 165 (AIR V 41) (B).

8. In Commr. of H.R.E v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar’, 1954 SC 282 (para 12) (AIR V 41) (C) it has been held that there is no reason why the word “property” as used in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution, should not be given a liberal and wide connotation and should not be extended to those well-recognised types of interest which have the insignia or characteristics of proprietary rights”. The allottee has no insignia or characteristics of proprietary rights vested in him in respect of land allotted to him. Whatever may be the Interest of the allottee in the land it does not constitute property as used in Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

9. Prom the definition of allotment as given in Section 2(a) of the Jammu and Kashmir State Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act it is clear that allotment is a grant or conveyance by Government or Custodian or a person duly authorised by a Custodian in this behalf. In the present cases the lands were allotted by the Joint Rehabilitation Board which had no legal existence.

10. In these circumstances the petitioners could not be considered as allottees under the States Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act. The petitioners net having any interest in the lands which may fall within the term ‘property’ as used in Article 19(1)(f) their ejectment from those lands would not amount to infringement of their fundamental rights vested in them under the above, Article.

11. The counsel for the petitioners has argued that the allottee could not be turned out of the lands without following the procedure laid down in this behalf. We now propose to dispose of this contention. It is agreed that the Act in force at the time of allotment was the J.K State Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act, 2006.

12. Under Section 39 of the Act the Government is empowered to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act and the Government has framed such rules Rule 14 of these Rules provides for the cancellation or variation of the leases and allotments. A close scrutiny of the rule will show that it has no relevancy to the cases under examination.

13. Rule 14(1) applies only when the Custodian acts, under Sections 6 & 7 of the J & K State Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act. Rule 14(2) applies to cases of leases or allotments granted by the Custodian himself and has no connection with cases in which allotments have not been made by him. As pointed out above, the allotments in the present cases were made by the Joint Rehabilitation Board. The counsel for the petitioners next referred to Section 10(1) of the J. and K State Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act which reads as under:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force the Custodian may cancel any allotment or terminate any lease or agreement on which any evacuee property is held or occupied by any person, whether such allotment, lease or agreement was granted or entered into before or after the commencement of this Act;

Provided that no allotment shall be cancelled except as provided in the rules framed by the Government in this behalf”.

14. This provision is also not helpful to the petitioners inasmuch as the allotments were cancelled not by the Custodian but by the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer while implementing Cabinet Order No. 578-C of 1954. The proviso is added to S. 10(1) and therefore it will apply to the provisions of S. 10(1) alone and would not be read as an independent provision of the Act. That being so, the proviso to S. 10(1) also cannot be invoked as the word allotment occurring therein is to be read ejusdem generis with the previous context, i.e cancellation of the allotment by the Custodian.

15. Since there is no restriction on cancellation of allotment, the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir which provides for equality before law and equal protection of laws are not violated.

16. As these applications can be disposed of on the points discussed above, it is not necessary to go into the third question formulated in the order of reference.

17. As regards the question No. 4 it may be stated here that the remedy provided ill Article 32(2A) of the Constitution as applied to the State cannot be Used as a substitute for ordinary remedies. If a statute provides a remedy for a wrong, (resort must be had to that remedy. Reference may be made to ‘Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.’, 1952 SC 182 (AIR V 39) (D) wherein it is laid down that

“writs as are referred to in Article 228 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However, extensive the jurisdiction may be, it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made”.

18. It will also be advantageous to reproduce below the observations made by Chagla C.J in ‘Walchandnagar Industries Ltd. v. Ratanchand Kliimchand’ 1953 Ecm 195 (AIR V 40) (3) wherein it is remarked as follows:

“It was never the intention of our Constitution makers that Article 226 should supplant the ordinary remedies open to a citizen. If that had been the case, then it would have been left to the option of a party aggrieved whether to file a suit in the ordinary court of law or to approach us to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 226. Surely that could not be the interpretation of Article 226”.

19. It is, therefore, clear that where there is another remedy been to a party the High Court should be very reluctant in granting extraordinary remedy by way a writ cut in exceptional circumstances where a party is likely to suffer irreparable loss due to delay which may occur by pursuing the ordinary remedy, the High Court may in extraordinary circumstances grant a speedy remedy by way of a writ.

20. In Jammu and Kashmir State Evacuees' (Administration of Property) Act there is remedy provided under S. 30-A by way of revision to the Custodian General. In lace of the remedy provided under the Act the High Court will not entertain a writ person except in extraordinary circumstances where tile petitioner satisfies the Court that the remedy provided will not be effective and that he will suffer irreparable loss if remedy by way of a writ is not granted. In support of this view reliance may be placed on ‘S.M Zaki v. State Of Bihar*’, 1953 Pat 112 (AIR V 4G) (F) in which it was held that where the Act itself has provided adequate remedies, an interference by way of a writ of certiorari would not be desirable, except under very extraordinary circumstances. The same view is taken in 1954 punj 165 (AIR V 41) (E) where it is held that where an order is passed by the Custodian leasing out the premises to another person and ejecting the petitioner, he has the right to go in revision under Section 26 of the Administration of Evacuee property Act. If another remedy is open to the petitioner he cannot ordinarily come to the High Court to invoke the extraordinary power of the Court.

D.S.P

21. Order accordingly.