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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued to recover Rs. 11,616 from five defendants on a mortgage bond dated 24 October 1917. Defendant No. 6 was joined as a party because he was a prior mortgagee. The mortgaged property (lands and a house) belonged to defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who were brothers and members of a joint family. Defendant No. 1 executed the mortgage for himself and purportedly as agent for defendant No. 2. It was admitted that (1) defendant No. 1 did not mortgage the property as manager of a joint family; (2) he did not mortgage family property for family necessity; and (3) the power-of-attorney from defendant No. 2 did not empower defendant No. 1 to sell defendant No. 2's share in the house.

Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 purchased the equity of redemption from defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 did not appear at the hearing; having parted with the equity of redemption they no longer had an interest in the property, but remained personally liable on their covenant in the mortgage deed. The lower court had ordered that on default the plaintiff would recover the mortgage amount by sale of the mortgaged property minus the share of defendant No. 2 in the suit house, and it ordered defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to bear the costs of defendant No. 6. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 appealed that costs order (appeal No. 204 of 1924). The plaintiff was criticised in the opinion for having brought defendant No. 6 into the suit "without any necessity whatever."

Separately, defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 contested the validity of the power-of-attorney relied on by defendant No. 1 (and consequent registration), arguing it did not authorise the mortgage and that the power-of-attorney had been exhausted by a prior mortgage. The court examined the nature of the power-of-attorney, the requirements of the Indian Registration Act (in particular sections 33 and 34), and precedent bearing on presentation and registration where an agent lacked the statutory authorization.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the power-of-attorney from defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 authorised defendant No. 1 to mortgage defendant No. 2's share in the mortgaged property.
  2. Whether registration of the mortgage was valid as against defendant No. 2 when the power-of-attorney was not executed and authenticated as required by section 33 of the Indian Registration Act, and whether the appearance before the Registrar via defendant No. 1 was proper under section 34.
  3. Whether purchasers of the equity of redemption (defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5) could challenge the mortgage on the ground that the power-of-attorney and registration were defective.
  4. Whether defendants Nos. 1 and 2 should have been ordered to pay the costs of defendant No. 6 when defendant No. 6 was joined by the plaintiff (i.e., the propriety of the costs order against defendants Nos. 1 and 2).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants (Defendants Nos. 1 and 2) — on costs

  • The opinion records that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 appealed the order requiring them to pay the costs of defendant No. 6. The ground explicitly stated in the opinion is that the plaintiff had brought defendant No. 6 into the suit "without any necessity whatever," and therefore ordering defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to bear those costs could not be justified.

Contesting Parties (Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5) — on power-of-attorney and registration

  • They contended the power-of-attorney given by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 did not authorise defendant No. 1 to mortgage the suit property; it was said to have been given only for executing a prior mortgage and thus was exhausted.
  • They further argued that the power-of-attorney was not executed as required by section 33 of the Indian Registration Act, so it was not properly presented to the Registrar and any subsequent registration was a nullity for the purposes of affecting defendant No. 2's share.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jambu Prasad v. Muhammad Aftab Ali Khan (Privy Council) That where an agent who presents a document for registration has not been duly authorised in the manner prescribed by the Registration Act (section 33), the registration is not valid; an agent must have the power-of-attorney executed and authenticated as required by law and the registering officer must ensure compliance. The court relied on this decision to support the conclusion that, even if mortgagors admitted execution before the registering officer, a document presented by an agent lacking the statutory authorization cannot produce a valid registration as regards the principal's share. It was applied to hold the registration did not validly affect defendant No. 2's share.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal strands of reasoning: first, on the propriety of the costs order against defendants Nos. 1 and 2; and second, on the validity of the power-of-attorney and registration as against defendant No. 2's share.

Costs issue: The court viewed the joining of defendant No. 6 by the plaintiff as unnecessary. On that basis, there was "no justification" for ordering defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to pay defendant No. 6's costs. The court therefore allowed the appeal No. 204 of 1924 with costs and directed that the plaintiff, not defendants Nos. 1 and 2, should bear the costs of defendant No. 6 in the lower court. The cross-objections of respondent No. 1 were dismissed with costs.

Validity of power-of-attorney and registration: The court examined the requirements of Part VI of the Indian Registration Act, focusing on sections 33 and 34. It noted that section 33 recognizes only certain forms of power-of-attorney for the purposes of presentation under section 32 — specifically, where the principal resides in British India, the power-of-attorney must be executed before and authenticated by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose district or sub-district the principal resides. The court took as a fact that the power-of-attorney from defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 had not been executed and authenticated in the manner required by section 33. Although the mortgage deed was presented by defendant No. 1 (who was a party executing the document on his own behalf) and the deed was registered, the court held that so far as defendant No. 2 was concerned the presentation and appearance before the Registrar were not proper because an agent for an executing party must be authorised as provided by section 33.

The court emphasised the text of section 34, which requires persons executing a document, or their representatives, assigns or agents authorised as provided, to appear before the registering officer so the officer can (a) enquire whether the document was executed by the persons it purports to have been executed by, (b) satisfy himself as to identity, and (c) in the case of representatives/agents, satisfy himself of the right of such person to appear. From this statutory framework the court concluded defendant No. 2 did not "duly appear" before the Registrar and, in default of such appearance by a properly authorised agent, the effect of registration could not extend to defendant No. 2's share.

The court relied on the Privy Council decision in Jambu Prasad v. Muhammad Aftab Ali Khan to reinforce the proposition that the statutory authorization requirements are mandatory and that the registration of a deed presented by an inadequately authorised agent cannot be treated as a valid registration as to the principal. The Privy Council case even held invalid registrations where mortgagors admitted execution or receipt of money in the presence of the registering officer, illustrating that such admissions do not cure the defect of an improperly authorised presenting agent.

Applying these principles, the court found that defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 (purchasers of the equity of redemption) were entitled to raise the defect in registration as it affected defendant No. 2's share. Consequently, the decree of the Subordinate Judge was varied to limit the enforceable sale on default to the share of defendant No. 1 only.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • The appeal No. 204 of 1924 is allowed with costs: The plaintiff is directed to bear the costs of defendant No. 6 in the lower court because the plaintiff had joined defendant No. 6 "without any necessity whatever."
  • The decree of the Subordinate Judge is varied: On default of payment by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, the plaintiff may recover the mortgage amount by sale of the share of defendant No. 1 only in the mortgaged property; the registration did not validly affect defendant No. 2's share because the power-of-attorney was not executed and authenticated as required by section 33 of the Indian Registration Act.
  • Cross-objections: The cross-objections are dismissed (with the opinion noting no order as to costs in the appeal and no order as to costs of the cross-objections in one part of the decree).

Implications: The immediate consequence is to restrict the plaintiff's remedy on default to sale of defendant No. 1's share only, leaving defendant No. 2's share protected from enforcement by sale on the ground that the power-of-attorney and presentation for registration were defective as to him. The court also corrected the allocation of costs in the lower court by shifting the burden from defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to the plaintiff with respect to defendant No. 6. The opinion does not announce or discuss the setting of any new precedent beyond its application of existing statutory provisions and the Privy Council authority it cites.

Decree varied.
J.G.R

    Balkrishna Raoji Velankar v. Parashram Mahadeo Ketkar

    Macleod, C.J:— The plaintiff sued to recover Rs. 11,616 from five defendants on a mortgage bond, dated October 24, 1917. Defendant No. 6 was made a party because he was a prior mortgagee. The property mortgaged belonged to defendants Nos. 1 and 2, who were brothers, members of a joint family. Defendant No. 1 executed a mortgage for himself and as agent for his brother. The property mortgaged consisted of lands and a house. It is admitted, first, that the defendant No. 1 did not mortgage the property as manager of a joint family; secondly, he did not mortgage the family property for family necessity; and thirdly, that the power-of-attorney given to defendant No. 1 by defendant No. 2 did not empower defendant No. 1 to sell defendant No. 2's share in the house. Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are the purchasers of the equity of redemption from defendants Nos. 1 and 2. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 did not appear at the hearing. Having parted with the equity of redemption, they had no further interest in the property. Still on their personal covenant in the mortgage deed, they were made liable to pay the mortgage amount, and on default the plaintiff was to recover what was due on the mortgage by sale of the mortgaged property minus the share of the defendant No. 2 in the suit house. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were ordered to bear the costs of defendant No. 6. That order is the subject-matter of an appeal by defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The plaintiff brought defendant No. 6 into the suit without any necessity whatever. Therefore, there can be no justification for ordering defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to pay costs of defendant No. 6. We must allow appeal No. 204 of 1924 with costs, and direct the plaintiff, and not defendants Nos. 1 and 2, to bear the costs of defendant No. 6 in the lower Court. The cross-objections of respondent No. 1 are dismissed with costs.

    Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were the contesting parties. They first contended that the power-of-attorney given by defendant No. 2 to defendant No. 1 did not authorise him to mortgage the suit property; that it was given for the purpose of executing the prior mortgage; and that after defendant No. 1 executed the prior mortgage as attorney for defendant No. 2, the power-of-attorney was exhausted. However, on a perusal of the power-of-attorney, it is perfectly clear that it was a general power-of-attorney, and authorised defendant No. 1 to dispose of defendant No. 2's share in the lands by sale or mortgage without specifying how many sales or mortgages could be executed. The mortgage deed was registered, and so, at first sight, it would appear that defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5, the purchasers of equity of redemption, were not entitled to dispute the plaintiff's claim as mortgagee.

    The point, however, was taken that the power-of-attorney was not executed as provided by section 33 of the Indian Registration Act, and that, therefore, the document was not properly presented to the Registrar, and any registration that followed after an improper presentation was a nullity. Further that, as section 34 requires the appearance of all the persons who have executed a document which requires registration, and has been presented for registration, and a person appearing by an agent must authorize such agent as provided by section 33, and as defendant No. 1 was not so authorized, therefore, the appearance of defendant No. 2 through defendant No. 1 before the Registrar was not proper, and, consequently, so far as defendant No. 2 was concerned, the registration of the document against him was a nullity. Part VI of the Indian Registration Act deals with the presentation of documents for registration and the scheme of the Act is that a document which is to be registered must be presented at the proper registration office either by some person executing or claiming under the same, or, by the representative or assign of such person, or by the agent of such person, representative or assign, duly authorized by power-of-attorney executed and authenticated in the manner mentioned in the Act.

    Under section 33 for the purposes of section 32, the following powers-of-attorney shall alone be recognized, namely:— (a) if the principal at the time of executing the power-of-attorney resides in any part of British India in which the Act is for the time being in force, a power-of-attorney executed before and authenticated by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose district or sub-district the principal resides.

    That is the provision which is applicable to this case. The power-of-attorney, therefore, executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 for the purposes of registration should have been executed and authenticated by the Registrar or Sub-Registrar within whose district or sub-district defendant No. 2 resided.

    It must be taken as a fact in this case that the power-of-attorney was not so executed and authenticated. But for the purposes of presentation, as defendant No. 1 was a party executing the document on his own behalf, then the document was properly presented. Section 34 is as follows:—

    “(1)…no document shall be registered under this Act, unless the persons executing such document, or their representative?, assigns or agents authorized as aforesaid, appear before the registering officer within the time allowed for presentation under sections 23, 24, 25 and 26…

    (2) Appearances under sub section (1) may be simultaneous or at different times.

    (3) The registering officer shall thereupon—

    (a) enquire whether or not such document was executed by the persons by whom it purports to have been executed;

    (b) satisfy himself as to the identity of the persons appearing before him and alleging that they have executed the document; and

    (c) in the case of any person appearing as a representative, assign or agent, satisfy himself of the right of such person so to appear.”

    Therefore, the defendant No. 2 was bound to appear before the Registrar, and if he appeared through an agent, he could only appear through an agent duly authorised under the provisions of section 33.

    It has been contended that the provisions of section 33 only apply in a case of a power-of-attorney executed for the purpose of enabling an agent to present a document for registration. The words “authorised as aforesaid” in section 34 clearly show that an agent for an executing party must be authorised as provided by section 33. The result is that defendant No. 2 as mortgagor of the mortgage propounded by the plaintiff, did not duly appear before the Registrar, and in default of such appearance the document ought not to have been registered so far as it affected his share in the suit property.

    We have been referred to the decision in Jambu Prasacl v. Muhammad Aftab Ali Khan. The Privy Council in that case had only to deal with the question whether the document requiring registration had been duly presented within the provisions of section 32. The mortgage deed was presented for registration at the proper registration office on behalf of the mortgagee by one N who held a power-of-attorney from the mortgagee which, however, did not empower N to present documents for registration. The power-of-attorney had been duly authenticated by the proper registering officer, but it had not been executed before him. Another mortgage deed was similarly presented on behalf of the mortgagee by one I.B who held a similar power-of-attorney from the mortgagee. This power-of-attorney had neither been authenticated by nor executed before the proper registering officer. In both cases the mortgagors admitted before the registering officer the execution and completion of the deeds and either received the mortgage money in his presence or acknowledged the receipt thereof. The registering officer thereupon registered the two deeds. It was held that the mortgagors attended the registration office to enable the registering officer to comply with sections 34 and 35 of act iii of 1877 by satisfying himself that they had executed the deeds, anil not to present them for registration; that the mortgagors did not present the deeds for registration; that in neither case did the agent of the mortgagee hold such a power-of-attorney as was necessary under section 33 of that act to enable a valid registration to be made; that the omission of the registering officer to notice in each case that the power-of-attorney, under which the agent had presented the mortgage deed for registration, had not been executed or authenticated in accordance with section 33 of that act, could not be regarded as a defect in procedure within the meaning of section 87 thereof, and that in each case the registration of the mortgage deed was not a valid registration under Act III of 1877. Their Lordships observed at p. 56:—

    “One object of sections 32, 33, 34 and 36 of Act III of 1877 was to make it difficult for persons to commit frauds by means of registration under the Act.

    It is the duty of Courts in India not to allow the imperative provisions of the Act to be defeated when, as in this case, it is proved that an agent who presented a document for registration bad not been duly authorised in the manner prescribed by the Act to present it.”

    It will be seen that in that case the mortgagors actually admitted before the registering officer the execution and completion of the deeds, and either received the mortgage money or acknowledged the receipt thereof. Still in spite of these facts the suit was dismissed with regard to the mortgage deeds.

    The argument, therefore, as it has been put forward in his case, that defendant No. 2 cannot resist the claim of the mortgagee in spite of the fact that the mortgage has not been properly registered, and that consequently, defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 as purchasers from defendants Nos. 1 and 2 cannot raise the sane defence, fails.

    It follows then that we must vary the decree of the Subordinate Judge by directing that, on default of payment by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, the plaintiff will recover the mortgage amount by sale of the share of defendant No. 1 only in the mortgaged property. No order as to costs in the appeal. The cross-objections are dismissed. No order as to costs of the crossobjections.

    Decree varied.
    J.G.R
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    Balkrishna Raoji Velankar v. Parashram Mahadeo Ketkar
    (Mar 12, 1926)