Jaganmohan Reddy, J.:-

(1) This revision petition has been referred to a bench by our learned brother ansari, j. , having regard to the importance of the question involved. The respondents, who are brothers, have applied to the rent controller for eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises which was gifted to them by their grandfather under a registered deed of gift. In their application, they stated that, as they have no houses of their own, they wanted to demolish the suit property and re - build a three - storeyed building with the object of living in the first two floors and letting out the third floor. It may be stated that the applicant before us does not reside in the suit premises which is only a site on which a petrol - bunk had been erected and with which is attached a few rooms in which the chowkidar of the petitioner resides. This premises was let out to the petitioner in 1349 - f. For five years, after the termination of which the petitioner continued the lease as a tenant - at - will from month to month. The petitioner challenged the bona fides of the application on the ground that the respondents did not really require it for their residential purposes, that in fact by this device they wanted to increase the rent of the petitioner and that they had even attempted to sell the same. He further stated that he had invested about rs. 15,000 on a petrol - bunk and that any order evicting him would put him to a loss of rs. 30,000. Though in his counter, the petitioner did not challenge the title of the respondents to the suit premises, his advocate before the rent controller appeared to have challenged the joint ownership of the respondents and tried to cast a cloud on their title. But having regard to their written admission in the counter, that contention of the learned counsel was held to be without force. The rent controller, on a very full and comprehensive enquiry, and after considering every objection that could conceivably be raised by the petitioner, came to the conclusion that the petition was a bona fide one and that the respondents required the premises for the purpose of reconstructing a new building which they had means to do and that as they had no houses of their own in the city , their claim to reside in it after reconstruction was valid. Against the order of ejectment , the petitioner preferred an appeal before the chief judge, small causes court, who maintained the order and dismissed the petitioner's appeal.

(2) Learned advocate for the petitioner contends that under the provisions of section 15 of the hyderabad houses (rent, eviction and lease) control act, 1954 act (xx of 1954) the respondents could either ask for eviction of the petitioner under section 15 (3) (a) (i) on the ground that they have no residential house in the city and that they require it for their own occupation ; or, that they desire to carry out the essential repairs or alterations to the house which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house and they bona fide require the house for the purpose of building or re - building or for making substantial additions which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house. The contention is that the respondents could ask for eviction under one or other of these grounds. In other words, it would amount to this namely, that the several grounds specified in sub - section (3) of section 15 for evicting a tenant are mutually exclusive and cannot be read together. That is, his case must come under any one of the grounds. It is therefore submitted that the landlord cannot base his claim on more than one ground for eviction nor could the relief be asked or granted on the cumulative effect of two or more grounds. For a proper appreciation of this contention, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of section 15 (3) which are set out below : - -

"15. (3) (1) a landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d) apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house - (i) in case it is a residential house, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation and if he is not occupying a residential house of his own in the city, town or village concerned ; (ii) in case it is a non - residential house which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord requires it for his own use and if he is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned, which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled ; (iii) in case it is any other non - residential house, if the landlord is not occupying for purpose of a business which he is carrying on, a non - residential house in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled ; (iv) if the landlord desires to carry out essential repairs or alterations to the house which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house bona fide requires the house for the purpose of building or re - building or for making substantial additions which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house ; provided further that where a landlord has obtained possession of a house under sub - clause (iv) he shall on the completion of the work of repairs, alterations, building, re - building, or making additions, give the tenant, the first preference for occupying the house on such terms as may be settled by the controller. (b) x x x x x x x (c) x x x x x x x (d) x x x x x x x (e) the controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord, is bona fide make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house on such date as may be specified by the controller and if the controller is not so satisfied, he shall make an order rejecting the application : provided further that, the controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the house and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in the aggregate."

(3) An examination of clause (e) of section 15 (3) would show that the controller could only grant the relief under clause (a) (i) to (iv) if the claim of the landlord is bona fide. If the landlord seeks to come under section 15 (3) (a) (i) , though he may have no other residential house in the city, he should still establish his bonafide requirement. The landlord can get an order of eviction under this clause on the following grounds, namely, (1) that he has no other residential house in the city ; (2) that he requires the premises ; (3) that such requirement was for his own occupation ; and (4) that such requirement was bonafide. The requirement must be one which shows need and not a mere wish or convenience or fancy.

(4) If, for instance, a poor man who due to his economic position can only reside in a small house of a few rooms, inherits a big house with 20 or 30 rooms which is leased and fetching a good rent, he could not be said to bona fide require the house for his residence. Similarly, a landlord accustomed to live in a big house, and having the means to do so requires larger accommodation cannot be said to bona fide require a small house with a few rooms, unless he wants to rebuild or alter the existing accommodation to suit his requirement. In such a case, the landlord cannot fulfil the requirements of clause (i) and must necessarily come under clause (iv). In envisaging hypothetical cases, we are anxious to emphasise the basic fact that even where the primary requisites stated in sub - section 3 (a) (i) are present, there may be cases in which the rent controller may consider the petition not to be granted bona fide. The line of argument taken by the learned advocate appears to us to be wholly unwarranted and unsound. There is nothing in the provisions of sub - section (3) of section 15 to indicate that these are mutually exclusive. The approach to this should be confined rather to the fulfilment of the requirements specified in each of the sub - clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (a) whatever the subsequent intention may be, which would have fallen under any of the sub - clauses. Merely because of this the landlord cannot be forced to apply for eviction under that clause also only to be later confronted with the argument that each of the grounds is mutually exclusive. The question of bona fides is a question of fact to be determined by the rent controller who is entitled to take into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances relating to the requirements of the landlord.

(5) In so far as clause (iv) is concerned, the landlord would be entitled to an order for eviction if he bona fide requires the house for building or rebuilding or making substantial repairs, etc. Here again the question of bona fides would be a question of fact, that is, the rent controller would be entitled to take into consideration the fact that the landlord has the means and that he intends in fact to construct. The question whether he intends to construct a big or a small building, and whether it is reasonable or necessary to construct it or not, is not a matter which could be taken into consideration because that would depend upon the means and the intention of the landlord to make the best use of his property, a matter in which his view will not be substituted by the view of the rent controller. If the landlord has the means to build and intends to build, a three - storeyed building as in this case, that does not go counter to the policy of therent control act. In fact, it may effectuate the policy because the policy of the rent control act is to protect the tenants, having regard to the scarcity of accommodation. If a landlord can afford to build premises with greater accommodation, certainly that would in some way relieve the scarcity. In dealing with the question of what constitutes bona fide requirements, harries, c. J. , in bhilan singh v. Ganendra kumar, a. I. R. 1950 cal. 74, while considering the term 'bona fide' in section 11 (a) (i) of the west bengal premises, rent control (temporary provisions) act (xxxviii of 1948) which is somewhat analogous in so far as eviction on the ground of rebuilding is concerned stated at page 75 : "it is to be observed that proviso (f) to section 11 (1) of the act does not mention premises requiring rebuilding. What it states is that sub - section (1) shall have no application if the landlord requires the premises bona fide for rebuilding. The state of the premises, therefore, is not an essential factor in the case. However, it cannot be overlooked that in this case the learned judge has accepted the evidence of a witness which showed that these premises were very old, dilapidated, dangerous and likely to fall if extensive repairs were not done to them quickly.

"it appears to me that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding if the landlord honestly requires them for that purpose. The equivalent of the phrase 'bona fide' is 'honestly'. It refers to the state of the landlord's mind. The landlord, therefore, will be entitled to possession as against the tenant if he established that he honestly requires the premises for re - building."

(6) The essential ingredient of section 15 (3) (a) (iv) is that he must require the house for the purpose of building or re - building and not that the premises requires re - building, as we have said, if the landlord is bona fide in his intention to build and has the means to do so, merely because he discloses his future intention after the building is re - constructed, it cannot affect his bona fides in so far as that provision is concerned ; nor can it have the effect of rebutting the ground, which is otherwise valid, for the purpose of enforcing his right under that provision. Suppose the landlord made out a a case for bona fide requirement under clause (i) and after getting the tenant evicted and residing for sometime demolishes it and reconstructs a new premises for residing therein, can he be prevented from doing so. In our view, he cannot because under the relevant proviso, he can only complain if the landlord does not reside and gives it to some other person for rent. If the landlord cannot be prevented from reconstructing the house after he obtains possession under clause (iv) , his requirement under that clause with the object of residing therein cannot be said to be not bona fide. If this view is right - and we think it is - then there is no question of the several grounds specified in clause (a) of section 15 (3) being mutually exclusive. The tenant, in our view, is amply protected if, after his eviction, the landlord does not construct the building or after constructing the same, does not reside therein but gives it to some other person. Under the proviso referred to above, he has got the first preference. We find that in a similar case where the landlord required the premises for demolition and reconstruction with a view to reside therein, it was held by the rangoon high court in the punjab motor co. V. Shaik juman, a. I. R. 1923 rang. 13 at 14, that an eviction was valid and that public purpose was served. Robinson, c. J. , said at page 14 :

"on the merits of the case we cannot find any ground for differing from the opinion of the court below. We are satisfied that the respondent purchased these premises with the object of pulling down the present building which is a one - storeyed building and erecting on the site a large and commodious building that would afford residence to many people. The rent act is a piece of emergency legislation passed with the object of temporarily restricting the increase of rents. It is not the object of the act to interfere with the legal use of private property and is aimed to protect tenants from ejectment where they are unable or unwilling to pay an enhanced rent. It is no doubt necessary that the landlord should show that he is acting bona fide, that it is his real intention to pull down and re - erect and that he has the means to carry out his intentions, for no landlord could be permitted to eject his tenant on such a plea if he had no real intention of carrying out his purpose."

(7) The above observations, with respect, accord entirely with the view we have taken and we have not the slightest doubt that the order of eviction passed by the courts below is valid. This revision petition is dismissed with costs. The petitioner is given two months' time to vacate the premises which in the circumstances is reasonable. Revision dismissed.