Bhimasankaram, J.:-

(1) The defendant is the appellant. The respondent was granted a decree by the lower court declaring that he was entitled to permanent rights of occupancy in four items of land. The case set out in the plaint is that the lands in question which are in the village of vallur are ryoti lands ; the said village is an estate and the plaintiff the ryot in possession, within the meaning of the madras estates land act (i of 1908). The plaintiff sought a similar declaration in respect of another item also but it was refused to him by the lower court on the ground that he was not in possession of that item on the date of the suit and that part of the decree of the lower court is questioned by a memo. Of cross - objections in this appeal. The cause of action for the present suit as stated in the plaint is that the defendant denied the plaintiff's permanent right of occupancy in the lands and was attempting in assertion of his own title, to alienate them.

(2) The only point argued before us is whether the suit as framed is maintainable in a civil court in view of the provisions of the madras estates (abolition and conversion into ryotwari) act (xxvi of 1948). As we have reached a conclusion in favour of the appellant on this point and it is sufficient to dispose of the appeal, we are not dealing with the merits of the controversy which indeed have not been debated before us. Before proceeding to give our reasons for our conclusion, it is necessary to state that the plaint, which had been presented on 11th july, 1951, was amended on 21st february, 1952, so as to incorporate a statement that the disputed items:

"stood transferred to and vested in the (state) government on and with effect from 7th september, 1949,. Under the provisions of the madras estates abolition act (xxvi of 1948). And therewith the defendant landholder ceased to have any manner of right to the schedule lands."

(3) Incidentally, it may be noted that although by the same amendment the plaintiff added that

"even in case the plaintiff were not to have permanent right of occupancy in the schedule lands he has got possessory right thereto"

, the relief sought upon the basis of this allegation was subsequently given up as disclosed by the order of the court, dated 13th september, 1952 and no point was made before us of this alternative case.

(4) The short question for decision in this appeal is whether the suit as framed is one which falls within the ambit of section 56 of the act. That section in so far as it is material is in these terms : -

"section 56. - (i) where after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear, or, (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the settlement officer. (a) any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the settlement officer under subsection (1) may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not liable to be questioned in any court of law."

(5) Reference has been made by the appellant's counsel to the decision of a divisional bench of this court in appanna v. Sriramamurthy, (1958) 1 an. W. R. 430. In which the scope of the section was considered. The correctness of the decision has been challenged by the respondent. There, the learned judge were dealing with a claim for rent (not as defined by the madras estates land act) made by a ryot against his under - tenant. The defendant however contended that it was he who was the ryot within the meaning of the madras estates land act and not the plaintiff. The learned judges accepted the finding of the lower appellate court that

"the plaintiff was a ryot. Under the zamindar and that the defendant was only a tenant under him (the plaintiff)."

they however held that as

"'the suit was filed after the notified date for recovery of rent from the defendant' and 'the defendant raised the question that he is the lawful ryot and not the plaintiff and also questioned the correctness of the quantum of rent claimed 'and as' both questions fall under section 56 (1) of the act, these questions cannot be agitated in a civil court. '"

(6) They held that in the circumstances the plaint should be directed to be returned (perhaps to the settlement officer) winding up their discussion with the observation that ' the defendant has no case on the merits'. It is also interesting to note that the learned judges made these observations in the course of their judgment : -

"we are not now concerned with a case where the plaintiff seeks for reliefs which cannot be given under the act. We need not, therefore, consider the question of the procedure to be followed in such cases where some reliefs fall directly under section 56 and some outside its scope."

In spite of having made the above observations, it is curious to find that the learned judges failed to see that the case before them was one in which the plaintiff sought a relief which could not be given under the act and which the civil court alone could give. The act does not provide for recovery of the sum due by way of rent to a ryot from his tenant. The word ' rent' in this connection is not to be understood in the technical sense in which that word is used in the madras estates land act, the sense which it carries, too, in section 56 of the abolition act. But this distinction seems to have escaped the notice of the learned judges. What is more, while the observations above quoted would indicate that the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the nature of the relief the plaintiff seeks, the learned judges gave effect to an argument, the effect of which was to enable the defendant by his plea, sound or unsound, to affect the jurisdiction of the court in regard to a claim which, judged by itself, was indisputably within its jurisdiction. The result of that decision was that the plaint was directed to be returned to an officer who, upon the facts found by the learned judges, had no jurisdiction to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the amount claimed by him. It is true, as the learned judges observed, that

"a dispute may arise between a lessor claiming to be a ryot and the lessee claiming to be a ryot in respect of a holding and that involves the question who the lawful ryot of the holding is and such a dispute is to be decided by the settlement officer."

(7) But it is reasonable to suppose that it is the person who raises a dispute who has to go before the settlement officer and it is not easy to see how a tenant in the position in which the appellant in the case was, could escape investigation by the civil court of his liability by merely raising such a dispute. The learned judges also remarked that if the settlement officer decides that the tenant is not a lawful ryot within the meaning of the madras estates land act, the dispute as to quantum of rent may not fall under the section although they did not say what is to happen in that contingency. They seemed to have thought that because in order to give the relief that the plaintiff claimed, it was incidentally necessary to decide the question as to whether the plaintiff was a ryot entitled to the holding - and that question has to be determined by the settlement officer - the civil court should return the plaint. With great respect to the learned judges, it seems to us that the civil court would have jurisdiction to decide every question that has to be determined in order that it might grant a party a relief which it is quite competent to grant. Indeed this position seems to have been recognised by the learned judges themselves in the earlier part of their judgment. In our opinion, therefore, the soundness of the actual decision in appanna v. Sriramamurthy, (1958) 1 an. W. R. 420, is, with respect, open to grave doubt. This does not mean, however, that the general principles as to the civil court's jurisdiction which that decision enunciates are unsound. Moreover, we are inclined to adopt the interpretation the learned judges put upon the expression : "where after an estate is notified, a dispute arises" as covering also a pre - existing dispute which subsists after the notification.

(8) We feel little difficulty, however, in deciding the present case. It is sufficient to state that the allegations in the plaint as amended clearly raise a dispute as to who the lawful ryot is in respect of the items 1 to 4 of the plaint schedule and that the only relief the plaintiff wants in the suit is the relief of a declaration that he is a such a ryot. This relief he seeks because the defendant, claiming rights adversely to him, is attempting to alienate these lands ; and is thus a person denying or interested to deny that the plaintiff is a lawful ryot. The dispute is clearly one which was pending when the act came into effect and can thus be properly said to be within the scope of the act, as pointed out in the above decision. It is manifest that if that is so, the procedure to be followed by the plaintiff is to file an application before the settlement officer in accordance with the rules framed by the state government under their rule - making power, for the determination of the dispute between him and the defendant. The civil court has no jurisdiction to give a declaration as to a right the determination of which is expressly committed to the officer and the tribunal appointed under the act. It seems to us, therefore, that the present suit should fail.

(9) We ought to state that the defendant has filed a petition for the reception of additional evidence tending to show that he has been granted a ryotwari patta by the settlement officer in respect of the lands now in dispute under section 15 (1) of the estates land act and that the plaintiff was a party to the proceedings. He has stated also in paragraph 4 of the affidavit filed in support of his petition that no appeal was filed against the decision of the settlement officer. It is unnecessary in view of what we have stated and also because the proceedings to which reference is made are proceedings subsequent to the present suit, to pronounce upon their effect as between the parties. We simply note the fact and leave it there.

(10) The result is that this appeal must succeed. The appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs both here and in the lower court. In this view, the memorandum of cross - objections must also fail and is dismissed. Appeal allowed: cross - objections and suit dismissed.