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  • section 237(1) and still less section 238(2),
  • section 236, Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • sections of the Indian Penal Code
  • s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • s. 114, ill. (a), Indian Evidence Act,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 237(1) and still less section 238(2),
  • section 236, Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • sections of the Indian Penal Code
  • s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
  • s. 114, ill. (a), Indian Evidence Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Beaumont, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal by accused No. 1 against his conviction for the offence of murder (s.302, Indian Penal Code) by the Sessions Judge of Kaira. The other accused in the trial was acquitted. The victim, Bai Vakhat (the wife of the complainant), was murdered in a field in the afternoon of October 1, 1942.

There were two alleged eyewitnesses to the killing, Balu (exhibit 9) and Jamal (exhibit 10). The learned Sessions Judge convicted accused No. 1, but the assessors were of the opinion that the case was not proved; the Judge and assessors disbelieved the eyewitnesses. The Sessions Judge's conviction was founded principally on evidence of footmarks and on the accused's production of ornaments said to have belonged to the deceased.

On appeal the Court analyzed the credibility of eyewitness testimony, the reliability of the footmark evidence (panchnama exhibit 19), and the circumstances of the production of the ornaments (panchnama exhibit 25 and other facts concerning detention, release, re-arrest and recovery of a dharia and a bundle). The Court ultimately set aside the murder conviction and convicted the appellant of receiving stolen property (s.411 IPC), sentencing him to three years' rigorous imprisonment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant (accused No. 1) was proved guilty of murder (s.302 IPC) beyond reasonable doubt given the trial record and the assessors' contrary opinion.
  2. Whether possession or production shortly after the murder of ornaments that belonged to the deceased justifies an inference that the possessor committed the murder (i.e., whether possession gives rise to a presumption of murder).
  3. Whether, although the accused was charged only with murder, the Court may alter the conviction to an offence under the Indian Penal Code dealing with offences against property (specifically s.411 IPC—receiving stolen property), in circumstances where the evidence supports that offence.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution (Government Pleader)

  • Invited the Court to convict the accused under s.411 IPC (receiving property known to be stolen) because the accused had produced ornaments identified as belonging to the deceased and gave no explanation of their possession.

Defence (Mr. Shah, for the accused)

  • Argued that the accused could not be convicted under s.411 because the only charge prefixed against him was one under s.302 IPC (murder). He relied on a decision of the Lahore High Court in Wallu v. The Crown to contend that the Court could not alter a conviction under a murder charge to one under provisions dealing with offences against property.
  • The accused also denied that he produced the property in question and offered no explanation of possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Decision of the Madras High Court (unnamed in the opinion) Justification of a presumption of murder from the fact that the accused was in possession of ornaments which had belonged to the murdered person. The Court noted that the Sessions Judge relied on that Madras High Court decision, but observed that "this Court has differed from the law laid down by the Madras High Court in that case." The present Court declined to treat mere possession of the ornaments as sufficient to infer that the accused committed the murder.
Wallu v. The Crown (Lahore High Court) Held that where the sole charge is under s.302 IPC, a court could not alter a conviction under s.302 to one under sections dealing with offences against property; the Lahore High Court treated such alteration as impermissible. The opinion quoted Wallu and explicitly rejected its reasoning. The Court explained why, invoking CrPC provisions (ss.236, 237 and 239(e)) and concluding that it is open to the Court to convict on evidence of an offence (s.411 IPC) which the accused might properly have been charged with under the procedural provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in distinct stages, applying principles of evidence and criminal procedure strictly to the trial record.

  1. Credibility of eyewitnesses: - There were two eyewitnesses (Balu and Jamal). The trial Judge and the assessors who saw those witnesses disbelieved them. Beaumont, C.J. noted that on the written depositions he had some doubt about that disbelief—particularly about Balu, who allegedly narrated his observations to others the same night and next day, and whose account was corroborated on those points. However, the appellate Court declined to overrule the trial court's assessment of credibility because the appellate Bench had not seen the witnesses and could not properly substitute its view for that of the judges who had seen and heard them. The Court emphasized that if the eyewitnesses were disbelieved, it implied an attempt to manufacture evidence, which requires heightened scrutiny of the remaining evidence.
  2. Footmark evidence: - The first panchnama (exhibit 19, dated October 2) recorded no footmarks. The Sub-Inspector later stated that an unnamed person had pointed out footmarks, whereupon shoes allegedly belonging to the accused were taken and said to tally with the marks. The Court found this evidence unreliable because the circumstances of the discovery were not known and the unnamed informant might have planted evidence. It also found the evidence inadequate: the police witnesses only said the marks "tallied" with the accused's shoes, which could only mean they were of the same size; the Court observed that many villagers might have shoes of the same size, and nothing was shown about peculiarities identifying the accused's shoes. Conclusion: the footmark evidence was of no probative value.
  3. Production of ornaments and related facts: - It was proved by the complainant and especially by the deceased's mother that the deceased had worn certain ornaments on the day of her death, and the mother—who went with the deceased that day—identified some of those ornaments among those produced by the accused. - Chronology and police conduct: The accused was detained on October 3 but was allowed to go at night on that day, despite the Sub-Inspector having taken Balu's statement naming the accused; the accused was not found on October 4 and 5, was arrested on the evening of the 5th, and on October 6 took the Sub-Inspector and the panch to a field and produced a dharia and a bundle hidden in a hedge. The bundle contained the identified ornaments; the dharia was proved to have been stained with human blood. - Panchnama exhibit 25 (prepared by the Sub-Inspector) recorded that the accused, noted as in police custody, stated in the presence of the panch that he had committed the murder and had removed the ornaments. The Court observed that such a statement was not admissible under s.27 Indian Evidence Act (because it was not a statement necessary to explain how the property was produced) and expressed disfavor toward a police-prepared document that inserted a purported confession of murder in that context, drawing adverse inference against the police. Nonetheless, the Court accepted that the accused produced the ornaments and that they belonged to the deceased.
  4. Whether possession suffices to infer murder: - The Court concluded that, in the absence of credible eyewitnesses, there was no evidence linking the accused to the act of murder itself. It emphasized alternative possibilities: someone else might have committed the murder and the accused might have acquired the ornaments from that person; or the accused might have robbed the deceased and someone else later murdered her. Therefore, the mere fact of production of ornaments shortly after the murder was insufficient to justify a conclusive inference that the accused had committed the murder.
  5. Approach to convicting on a different offence (s.411 IPC): - The Government Pleader's suggestion to convict under s.411 was examined. The accused having denied production and offered no explanation for possession, the Court found it proper to infer that he knew the property was stolen. The Court invoked the presumption under s.114, illustration (a) of the Indian Evidence Act (i.e., that the court may presume intent or knowledge in the absence of explanation when such inference is warranted). - The defence submission relying on Wallu v. The Crown (Lahore High Court) was considered and rejected. The Court analyzed procedural provisions: s.239(e) CrPC (persons may be charged and tried together where offences include theft and receiving stolen property), s.236 CrPC (allowing alternative charging when a single act may constitute different offences), and s.237 CrPC (stating that if evidence shows a different offence for which the accused might have been charged, he may be convicted of that offence even though he was not formally charged with it). The Court concluded these provisions permit conviction under s.411 when the evidence supports that offence even though the accused was tried on a murder charge.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court set aside the conviction for murder under s.302 IPC and instead convicted the accused under s.411 IPC (receiving property known to be stolen). The Court sentenced the accused to three years' rigorous imprisonment, the sentence to run from the date of the conviction in the lower Court. (Sen, J. agreed with Beaumont, C.J.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's murder conviction was quashed and replaced by a conviction for receiving stolen property with a three-year sentence; the other accused remained acquitted as at trial.
  • Procedural/legal consequence articulated by the Court: The opinion explains and applies ss.236 and 237 CrPC (read with s.239(e)) to hold that a court may convict an accused of an offence for which he might properly have been charged even if the formal charge at trial was different, provided the evidence on record establishes that offence. The Court explicitly rejected the contrary reasoning in Wallu v. The Crown (Lahore High Court).
  • On the question of whether possession of a deceased person's ornaments supports an inference of murder, the Court held that mere possession/production of those ornaments shortly after the killing is not necessarily enough to infer the accused committed the murder; additional proof is required to connect the accused to the homicidal act. The Court therefore did not accept the Madras High Court's approach—at least in effect—on treating possession alone as sufficient to infer murder.
  • The opinion indicates caution about police procedures and documentary statements prepared by police (drawing adverse inference where a police document appears to insert an inadmissible confession), and stresses careful scrutiny where eyewitness testimony has been disbelieved.
Conviction and sentence altered.
(Opinion signed Beaumont, C.J.; Sen, J. concurring.)

    Emperor v. Bhika Gobar (Original Accused No. 1)

    Beaumont, C.J:—

    This is an appeal by accused No. 1 against his conviction of the offence of murder by the Sessions Judge of Kaira. The other accused was acquitted.

    There is no doubt that a woman named Bai Vakhat, the wife of the complainant, was murdered in a field in the afternoon of October 1, 1942. The only question is whether the appellant was guilty of the murder, as the learned Sessions Judge held. The assessors were of opinion that the case was not proved. There were two eyewitnesses to the offence,—Balu (exhibit 9) and Jamal (exhibit 10)—, and the learned Judge and all the assessors have disbelieved those eye-witnesses. Judging merely from the depositions, I feel myself some doubt whether the learned Judge and assessors were right in disbelieving that evidence, particularly the evidence of Balu, who says that he narrated what he saw to Rama the same night and to the complainant the next day, and both the witnesses corroborate his statement. Balu and Jamal, according to their statements, witnessed the offence from different sides of the field, and, therefore, they might or might not have seen each other, and according to their evidence they did not see each other. 1 should have expected that, if the evidence was concocted, the witnesses would have been careful to say that each noticed the other doing something which the other said he was doing. However, there it is. The learned Judge and the assessors who saw these witnesses in the box disbelieved them, and it would not be right for this Court to overrule their opinion, when we have not had the advantage of seeing these witnesses. It is quite possible that if we had seen the witnesses, we should have agreed that they were not telling the truth. But if one disbelieves the evidence of these eye-witnesses, it necessarily follows that an attempt has been made to manufacture evidence against the accused, and that necessitates the Court being particularly careful in relation to the rest of the evidence.

    The learned Sessions Judge has convicted accused No. 1 on the strength of the evidence of footmarks and evidence of the production of ornaments said to have been on the murdered woman. With regard to the footmarks the evidence is unreliable and inadequate. According to the first panchnama made on October 2, no footmarks were noticed. This is exhibit 19. But the Sub-Inspector says that somebody, whose name he was not prepared to disclose, pointed out footmarks to him on some subsequent occasion, and as a result he attached a pair of shoes from the accused's house, and he says that the footmarks tallied with those shoes. As we do not know the circumstances in which the footmarks were discovered, the evidence is obviously unreliable, because it is possible that the undisclosed informant himself collected the accused's shoes and made the impressions after the murder in order to manufacture evidence. And the evidence is inadequate, because all the Police Sub-Inspector and the panch say is that the footmarks tallied with the accused's shoes. That may mean no more than that these marks were made by shoes of a size corresponding to the size of the accused's shoes. That is not enough. There may be a large number of shoes in the village of the size of the accused's shoes. The evidence must go further and show that the marks had some peculiarity which was found in the shoes of the accused, and would not be found in most other shoes. In my view, one cannot attach any importance whatever to the evidence of footmarks.

    The evidence with regard to the production of ornaments is more serious. It is, I think, proved by the evidence of the complainant and the deceased's mother, and particularly the latter, that the deceased woman had got certain ornaments on her person on the day on which she met her death. The mother went out with the deceased, and says what ornaments the deceased had got. She would naturally know the ornaments of her daughter. She says that the deceased was wearing those ornaments, and she identified some of the ornaments worn by the deceased from the ornaments which were produced by accused No. 1. They were produced in these circumstances. Accused No. 1 was first detained by the police on October 3, but for some strange reason he was allowed to go at night, although the Police Sub-Inspector had that day taken the statement of Balu, the alleged eye-witness. I find it rather difficult to see what justification the Police Sub-Inspector had for allowing the man to go when he had the evidence of an eye-witness saying that this man had committed the murder. The Police Sub-Inspector was not in a position to gauge the value of the eye-witness's evidence. However, the accused was allowed to go, and he was not found on the 4th and the 5th, but was arrested in the evening of the 5th, and on the 6th he took the Police Sub-Inspector and the panch to his field, and produced a dharia and a bundle concealed in a hedge by his field. The bundle contained ornaments which are identified as those worn by the deceased on the day of her death, and the dharia was proved to have been stained with human blood. The learned Judge, on the strength of that evidence, and the evidence of footmarks, convicted the accused of murder. He relied on a decision of the Madras High Court to justify a presumption of murder from the fact that the accused was in possession of ornaments which had belonged to the murdered person. But if the learned Judge had pursued his researches further, he would have found that this Court has differed from the law laid down by the Madras High Court in that case.

    In the present case in the absence of eye-witnesses we have no evidence whatever to connect the accused with the murder. It is obvious that somebody else might have committed the murder, and the accused might have acquired the ornaments from that person; or he might have robbed the deceased, and somebody have subsequently murdered her. The mere fact that he produced, shortly after the murder, ornaments which were on the murdered woman is not enough, in my opinion, to justify an inference that the accused must have committed the murder.

    I would point out that in panchnama, exhibit 25, as to the production of these ornaments by the accused, which was no doubt prepared by the Police Sub-Inspector, the accused who was noted as being in police custody, is said to have stated in the presence of the panch that he had committed the murder of Bai Vakhat and had removed her ornaments. This Court has pointed out over and over again that a statement that the accused has committed a murder does not fall within s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, because it is not a statement required to lead up to the production of the property. It is quite enough to say that he would show the property which belonged to the deceased. When I find a statement of that sort put into a document prepared by the police, I am disposed to draw every inference against the police officer. Obviously the Police Sub-Inspector wanted to impress the Judge with something which he knew he could not bring in as evidence. However, I am prepared to accept the evidence that the accused did produce the ornaments, and that they were the ornaments on the body of the deceased, shortly after the time of the murder.

    The learned Government Pleader has invited us to convict the accused under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code for receiving property which he knew to be stolen. The accused has merely denied that he produced the property. He gave no explanation of its possession. I have no doubt that on the evidence the proper inference is that he did know that this property had been stolen, whether or not he knew that the owner had been murdered. It is for him to prove how he came into possession of this property; otherwise the presumption under s. 114, ill. (a), Indian Evidence Act, would apply. Mr. Shah, however, for the accused says that we cannot convict the accused under s. 411, because the only charge is under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and he has referred us to a decision of the Lahore High Court in Wallu v. The Crown. In that case the accused had been charged only with murder. He was convicted by the trial Court, and the conviction was set aside by the High Court. It was held that the Court could not alter the conviction to one under one of the sections of the Indian Penal Code dealing with offences against property, and the Court dealt with the matter in these words (p. 375):

    “The sole charge framed against the appellant was one under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and it would not, in our opinion, be open to us to alter the conviction under section 302 to a conviction under one of the sections dealing with offences against property. The appellant might perhaps have been charged under section 236, Code of Criminal Procedure, with the offence of robbery as well as with the offence of murder, but he was not go charged, and the essentials of the two offences are so widely different that we do not think that section 237(1) and still less section 238(2), could be applied.”

    I must confess that I do not follow that reasoning. It is extremely common to find that murders are committed for the sole purpose of perpetrating robbery, and I fail to see why the essentials of the two offences are different. The facts necessary to establish them are frequently common. It is usual enough, at any rate in this Presidency, for a person to be convicted both of murder and robbery, and separate sentences to be given for the two offences. No doubt, in this case the accused is not shown to have committed the robbery or that the robbery took place at the time of the murder though it probably did. He is only shown five days after the murder to have been in possession of the property worn by the murdered woman, and the question is whether we can in those circumstances convict him under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code.

    Now, s. 239(e), Criminal Procedure Code, provides that the following persons may be charged and tried together, namely, persons accused of an offence which includes theft, extortion, or criminal misappropriation, and persons accused of receiving or retaining, or assisting in the disposal or concealment of, property possession of which is alleged to have been transferred by any such offence committed by the first-named persons. So that it seems clear that the accused might have been charged with murder and robbery and, as an alternative to robbery, with receiving the proceeds of the robbery. The question then is whether, the accused not having been so charged, can nevertheless be convicted of one of the offences with which he might have been charged. Section 236 provides that if a single act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative with having committed some one of the said offences. The series of acts in this case might have justified, if proved, a conviction on the charge of murder and robbery, and alternatively receiving property. Then s. 237 provides that if, in the case mentioned in s. 236, the accused is charged with one offence, and it appears in evidence that he committed a different offence for which he might have been charged under the provisions of that section, he may be convicted of the offence which he is shown to have committed, although he was not charged with it. It seems to me that section applies. The accused might have been charged under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code under s. 236 read with s. 239(e) of the Criminal Procedure Code, and s. 237 of the Procedure Code provides that if the evidence shows that he was guilty of the offence under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code with which he might have been charged, it is open to the Court to convict him of that offence. In my opinion, therefore, we are entitled to convict the accused on the evidence on record of an offence under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge might himself have recorded such conviction.

    Therefore we set aside the conviction of murder under s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and convict the accused under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentence him to three years' rigorous imprisonment. The sentence to run from the date of the conviction in the lower Court.

    Sen, J.:—I agree.

    Conviction and sentence altered.
    Y.V.D
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    Comments

    Emperor v. Bhika Gobar (Original Accused No. 1)
    (Jun 15, 1943)