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  • r. 40 of the Defence of India Rules
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  • r. 40 of the Defence of India Rules
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Divatia, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Additional District Magistrate (Ahmedabad) on 26 January 1944, under rule 40 of the Defence of India Rules, prohibited the daily paper Sandesh from publishing, selling or distributing a special issue scheduled for 26 January (an "Independence Day" issue). The editor and publisher of Sandesh filed a revisional application; the Sessions Judge concluded that the Additional District Magistrate had no jurisdiction and that rule 40 did not apply to the circumstances of the case, and therefore made a reference under section 438 (referred in the opinion as s. 438) of the Criminal Procedure Code to the High Court, recommending that the magistrate's order be quashed (Reference No. 101 of 1944).

A Division Bench of this Court considered the reference and, without issuing notice to the parties, passed the order: "No order on this reference." Thereafter, on 30 November 1944, the petitioner (the editor and publisher of Sandesh) filed a revisional application in this Court seeking that the Additional District Magistrate's order be quashed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. When a Sessions Judge makes a reference under section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code and a Division Bench of the High Court disposes of that reference by an order reading "No order on this reference" without issuing notice, whether the applicant who caused the reference is entitled to file a revisional application to the High Court in the same matter in view of section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  2. Whether an order of the High Court in such a reference — specifically an order of the form "No order on this reference" — constitutes a "judgment" within the meaning of section 369, thereby prohibiting alteration or review of that decision in a later proceeding.

Arguments of the Parties

Assistant Government Pleader (preliminary objection)

  • The revisional application filed by the petitioner is incompetent because section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code prohibits alteration or review of a signed judgment; the High Court's order "No order on this reference" is a judgment within the meaning of section 369 and therefore cannot be revisited in the present revisional application.
  • The objection rests on the premise that the question now before the Court in revision is the same question that was the subject-matter of the reference previously disposed of by this Court.

Petitioner (as reflected in the opinion; including concessions and reliance)

  • It was conceded on behalf of the petitioner that under section 440 no party has a right to be heard before the High Court in revision, and that sub-section (2) of section 439 (which prevents orders to the prejudice of an accused unless he had an opportunity of being heard) applies to enhancement of sentence cases and not to the present case where the petitioner is not an accused.
  • The petitioner (through Mr. Shah) relied on a number of decisions of this and other High Courts (including Chamanlal Kevalchand v. Bai Ruxmani; Emperor v. Kohna Ram; Sheo Saran Vaish v. Jitendra Nath Das; Bibhuty Mohun Roy v. Dasimoni Dass; Kishen Singh v. Girdhmi Lal) in support of the contention that the present revisional application is competent despite the earlier order in the reference.
  • Implicitly, the petitioner argued that because the Division Bench did not issue notice and merely recorded "No order on this reference," that earlier disposition should not preclude the petitioner from seeking revision and an opportunity to be heard on the merits.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Damu Senapati v. Sridhar Rajwar Definition/description of "judgment" as "the expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and of the arguments, if any." The Court relied on this description to analyse whether an order of the High Court (the "No order on this reference" disposal) qualifies as a "judgment" within the meaning of s. 369.
Chamanlal Kevalchand v. Bai Ruxmani (unreported) Held that a subsequent revisional application was competent where an earlier order in a reference read "no order," treating that earlier order as not a final order under s. 439. The present Court examined this decision, found that section 369 was not considered there, and concluded that it is difficult to treat the formal order as merely a note; held that Chamanlal Kevalchand is not in accordance with law for present purposes.
Emperor v. Kohna Ram Distinguished on facts: there, a revisional application was maintainable because the previous reference was only for enhancement of sentence and the subsequent application was on the merits and not the same point. Held to be clearly distinguishable and not controlling for the present case where the earlier order was on the merits.
Sheo Saran Vaish v. Jitendra Nath Das Reference was rejected because the Sessions Judge had no power to make it at an interlocutory stage; hence no judgment on the merits. Distinguished: in the present case the High Court's order was on the merits and not on competency grounds.
Bibhuty Mohun Roy v. Dasimoni Dass Order on reference was made in default of appearance of both parties without considering merits; such orders are open to being set aside when notice is issued and natural justice requires hearing. Distinguished: the present order was not made in default and was, in the Court's view, a final order on the merits.
Kishen Singh v. Girdhmi Lal Case involved default of appearance and decision not on the merits. Distinguished on similar grounds; not applicable to the present factual matrix where the earlier order was on merits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a structured analysis:

  1. Nature of the proceedings: The Court observed that a reference by the Sessions Judge under section 438 is, in effect, a matter "reported for orders" of the High Court and that the High Court's power on such a reference is revisional under section 439. The Court accepted the petitioner's concession that under section 440 there is no right to be heard before the High Court in revision and that s. 439(2) protects accused persons in enhancement-of-sentence cases but does not apply to the present case where the petitioner is not an accused and the High Court was being asked to confirm (or not) the lower Court's order.
  2. Validity of disposing of the reference without notice: From the preceding point the Court concluded that it was acting in revision in both proceedings (the reference and the present petition) and that the fact the Division Bench disposed of the reference without hearing the petitioner did not affect the validity of that order or its binding effect on the petitioner.
  3. Whether the order "No order on this reference" is a "judgment" under s. 369: The Court examined the absence of a statutory definition of "judgment" and relied on the description in Damu Senapati that a judgment is an expression of the Court's opinion after consideration. The Court noted that while trial-court judgments have prescribed form (s. 367) and appellate judgments have guidance (s. 424), there are no definite rules for High Court judgments in criminal jurisdiction, especially in revision where reasons are not required. Consequently, the Court found that there is essentially no practical distinction between an order and a judgment of the High Court disposing of a proceeding. Therefore, the phrase "No order on this reference" amounted to a judgment under s. 369.
  4. Effect of classifying the prior order as a "judgment": If the earlier disposal is a judgment within s. 369, that section bars alteration or review of the signed judgment except for clerical errors. The Court held that the present revisional petition effectively sought to alter or review that earlier judgment (by asking the Court to set aside the Additional District Magistrate's order, contrary to the earlier "No order" disposition) and was therefore barred by s. 369.
  5. Review of authorities relied upon by petitioner: The Court examined the cases cited by Mr. Shah and distinguished each on its facts or procedural posture:
    • Chamanlal Kevalchand v. Bai Ruxmani was an unreported decision; the Court observed s. 369 had not been considered there and rejected its reasoning for present purposes.
    • Emperor v. Kohna Ram was distinguishable because it concerned enhancement of sentence and a subsequent application on the merits different from the reference.
    • Sheo Saran Vaish and Kishen Singh concerned competency or default of appearance and not a judgment on merits; hence not applicable.
    • Bibhuty Mohun Roy involved an order in default where natural justice considerations enabled setting aside; again distinguishable.
    The Court concluded that it had not been shown an instance where a High Court order of the same character as the present one was held not to be a judgment under s. 369.
  6. Recognition of procedural anomaly and suggested remedial rule: The Court acknowledged a practical hardship: because of rule 26 of the Appellate Side Rules (which compels a party to apply first to a lower revisional Court before applying in revision to the High Court), an applicant whose case is recommended for quashing by the Sessions Judge may be prejudiced if this Court, on reference, is not satisfied with the Sessions Judge's reasons and disposes of the reference without issuing a rule or hearing the applicant. To mitigate this hardship, the Court recommended adding a rule requiring that references made by Sessions Judges recommending the setting aside of an order should be placed for hearing after issuing notices to all parties concerned. The Court noted this would involve delay and expense in some cases but preferred the balance of convenience in favour of hearing such references after notice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the Division Bench's order "No order on this reference" is a judgment within the meaning of section 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and the present revisional petition seeks to alter or review that judgment. Consequently, the revisional petition is barred by section 369 and is dismissed.

Direct consequences for the parties: The petition filed by the editor and publisher of Sandesh is dismissed and the earlier disposition by the High Court stands; the petitioner may no longer seek to alter or review that particular judgment in the present manner because of the bar in s. 369.

Procedural implication and court's recommendation: The Court expressed concern about a procedural anomaly produced by rule 26 of the Appellate Side Rules, which can deprive a party of an opportunity to be heard by the High Court when a Sessions Judge's favourable recommendation is disposed of by the High Court without notice. The Court recommended that a new rule be added to require issuance of notice and hearing in cases where a Sessions Judge makes a reference recommending the setting aside of an order, thereby removing the hardship illustrated by the present case. This recommendation is procedural in nature and does not amount to an alteration of the legal effect of s. 369 itself.

Final disposition as recorded in the opinion: "The application is dismissed." (Rule discharged.)

    Imperator v. Nandlal Chunilal Bodiwala (Original Petitioner), Editor And Printer Of Sandesh News-Paper

    Divatia, J.:—This application has been referred to the full bench particularly for the determination of the following question, viz.,

    “When on a reference made by the Sessions Judge under s. 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a Division Bench of this Court passes an order without issuing notice, viz. ‘No order on this reference,’ whether the applicant at whose instance the Sessions Judge made the reference is entitled to make an application in revision to this Court in the same matter, in view of the provisions of s. 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code?”

    The facts are shortly these:—The Additional District Magistrate at Ahmedabad issued an order on January 26, 1944, under r. 40 of the Defence of India Rules prohibiting a daily paper called Sandesh from publishing, selling or distributing its special issue to be published on January 26 in connection with the celebration of the “Independence Day”. In a revisional application against the said order filed by the editor and publisher of the paper, the learned Sessions Judge was of the opinion that the Additional District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass the order, and that in any case r. 40, did not apply to a case where, as was found in this case, the document was only likely to contain a prejudicial report, etc., when published. For these reasons he made a reference to this Court under s. 439, Criminal Procedure Code, with a recommendation that the said order should be quashed. The said reference No. 101 of 1944 came up before a division bench of this Court and without issuing any notice to the parties it passed an order “No order on this reference.” Thereafter the present petitioner the Editor and Publisher of Sandesh filed this revisional application into this Court on November 30, 1944, praying that the order of the Additional District Magistrate should be quashed.

    An objection of a preliminary nature was taken by the Assistant Government Pleader that this application was incompetent under s. 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code after the order passed by this Court in the reference. Under that section no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same, except to correct a clerical error. The contention is that the question about the legality of the order of the Additional District Magistrate, which arises in this revisional application, is the same question which was the subject-matter of the reference which also came before this Court in its revisional jurisdiction, and the order of this Court “No order on this reference” in the latter proceeding is a judgment within the meaning of that term in s. 369, which, after it was signed, cannot be altered or reviewed in this application. It is clear that the powers which this Court exercises in a reference under s. 438 are revisional powers under s. 439 as the matter “has been reported for orders” of this Court. It is also rightly conceded on behalf of the petitioner that under s. 440 no party has a right to be heard before this Court in revision and that the provision of sub-s. (2) of s. 439 that no order shall be made to the prejudice of the accused unless he had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by pleader applies to a case of enhancement of sentence of the accused and not to a case like the present where the petitioner is not an accused person and the order of the lower Court is only confirmed. The result is that this Court is acting in revision in both the proceedings and that the fact that the order in the reference was made without hearing the petitioner does not affect its validity or its binding on the petitioner.

    The next question is whether the order is a judgment under s. 369. The term judgment is not defined either in the Criminal Procedure Code or in the Indian Penal Code. It is described as “the expression of the opinion of the Court arrived at after due consideration of the evidence and of the arguments, if any”: Damu Senapati v. Sridhar Rajwar. This applies to the judgment of a trial Court and s. 367 prescribes what the form and contents of the judgment of a trial Court ought to be. Section 424 dealing with the judgment of the appellate Courts says that the rules relating to the judgments of a trial Court shall apply, so far as may be practicable, to judgments of appellate Courts other than a High Court. It must follow, therefore, that there are no definite rules as to what the judgment of a High Court acting in its appellate as well as revisional jurisdiction should contain. This is quite natural because the judgment of the High Court in its criminal jurisdiction is ordinarily, final and does not, therefore, require the statement of any reasons, especially in a revisional application where the parties are not bound to be heard. There is, therefore, practically no distinction between an order and a judgment of a High Court disposing of a proceeding before it. That being so, the order in the reference “No order on this reference” is a judgment under s. 369 and as such cannot be altered or reviewed. That judgment means that this Court does not see any reason to set aside the order of the Additional District Magistrate as recommended by the Sessions Judge. In the present application the petitioner really asks us to alter or review that judgment by urging that although the Court did not set aside the order of the Additional District Magistrate on the grounds given by the Sessions Judge in his order of reference, it should do so because the petitioner had no opportunity to address this Court on his reasons in support of the grounds given by the Sessions Judge or by urging fresh grounds for setting aside the order. That, in our opinion, comes within the prohibition of s. 369 as the previous order of the High Court is a judgment which could be passed in its revisional jurisdiction without hearing a party.

    Mr. Shah relies on some decisions of this and other High Courts in support of his argument that this application is competent. The first is an unreported decision of our High Court in Chamanlal Kevalchand v. Bai Ruxmani The facts in that case were no doubt similar to those in the present case. There also the order was that no order was to be made in the reference and a subsequent revisional application by the party was held to be competent. It was observed:—

    “We do not think that it can be accepted as a rigid rule, merely because the High Court on a previous occasion has had before it a case upon which it had power to take action under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code and did not consider on the facts as then appeared to it that it was necessary to take action, that, when the case again conies before the High Court on a future occasion, it is debarred from exercising the power of interference in revision, which earlier it did not consider necessary to exercise. The order of the Bench of this Court, as already mentioned, is really not an order under s. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is not more than a note that, as at present advised, no order under that section is proposed.”

    The provisions of s. 369 were not brought to the notice of the Court, and it was taken for granted that the order passed in the reference was not more than a note that no order under s. 439 was proposed. In our opinion it is difficult to hold this formal order disposing of the reference as a mere note. In law the order amounted to a judgment, and, therefore, was not open to review under s. 369. We do not think, therefore, that decision is in accordance with law. The next decision relied upon is Emperor v. Kohna Ram. But it is clearly distinguishable from the present case. There the revisional application was maintainable because the previous reference was only for enhancement of sentence and the subsequent application was on the merits and not on the point raised in the reference. There was, therefore, no question there whether the order on the reference was a judgment on the merits and as such governed by the provisions of s. 369. In Sheo Saran Vaish v. Jitendra Nath Das, the reference was not rejected on the merits but on the ground that the Sessions Judge had no power to make it at an interlocutory stage. There was, therefore, no judgment on the merits of the points involved in the subsequent revision application. In the present case the order of this Court was on the merits and not on the ground that the reference was not competent. In Bibhuty Mohun Roy v. Dasimoni Dass, the order on the reference was made in default of appearance of both parties without considering the merits of the case. It was open to the Court to set aside the order passed in default of appearance on proper grounds when notice was issued to the parties and it is in accordance with the principles of natural justice that if the parties are asked to appear, the case should not be decided till they are heard, and that if the matter is disposed of in their absence, they should have an opportunity to show that they were prevented from appearing on account of a reasonable cause. On that principle, a subsequent revisional application would lie on the same ground on which an application to restore a case dismissed for default would lie. That, however, is not the case here. The last decision relied on by the petitioner is Kishen Singh v. Girdhmi Lal, and that also was a case of default of appearance and the decision was not on the merits.

    No authority has been brought to our notice in which an order of the High Court similar to the one we have here was not held to be a judgment under s. 369. In the absence of anything to show that the order was passed on a preliminary ground without going into the merits of the point raised in the reference, it must, in our opinion, be presumed that the order is a final order on the merits and as such amounts to a judgment. Accordingly we hold that the present revision petition really seeks us to alter or review a judgment already passed in a former proceeding and is, therefore, barred by the provisions of s. 369.

    Although we are constrained to come to this conclusion on the previsions of law, we are not unaware that the applicant has a grievance that his position has been worsened and not improved by the Sessions Judge being in his favour, because if the recommendation of the Sessions Judge is tuned down without hearing the petitioner, as has happened in this case, he is worse off, while if the Sessions Judge would have been against him he could have still applied to this Court in revision and got an opportunity to put his case before us. This is no doubt an anomaly, and it is caused by the provisions of r. 26 of the Appellate Side Rules which compels a party to apply to a lower revisional Court before applying in revision to the High Court. Under s. 439 it is open to a party to apply in revision to the High Court against the order of any inferior Court which is not appealable. Under s. 435 it is open to him to apply in revision to any Court superior to the trial Court and inferior to the High Court in a matter in which he can also directly apply in revision to the High Court. Such revision Court, however, if it is of the opinion that the decision of the trial Court is illegal or improper, cannot itself set it aside but has to make a reference for doing so to the High Court under s. 438. There is thus a concurrent remedy to the aggrieved party. Thus, if r. 26 had not been there, the petitioner could have applied to this Court directly under s. 439 against the order of the Additional District Magistrate and would have had an opportunity to place his arguments before the High Court, but under r. 26 he has got to apply in revision first to the Sessions Court. If the Sessions Judge had dismissed his application he could then have applied to, and Argued his case before, this Court, but because the Sessions Judge was in his favour and had therefore got to make a reference to this Court recommending it to set aside the order and because this Court was not satisfied with the reasons for the recommendation, and disposed of it without issuing a rule, the petitioner is now debarred from arguing his arguments before this Court. It may be that the reasons given by the Sessions Judge for the recommendation may be weak or may be insufficient, whereas the petitioner, if he appears, may be able to urge cogent and sufficient reasons for setting aside the original order. He thus suffers on account of the provisions of the rule which deprives him of an opportunity to come to this Court in revision in the first instance. We think this position does cause hardship to the party and it should be effectively remedied. We do not see any reason to delete r. 26 altogether from the Appellate Side Rules. It is a salutary provision and has otherwise worked well, but we think a new rule should be added to the effect that a reference made by a Sessions Judge recommending the setting aside of an order of the trial Court should always be placed for hearing after issuing notices to all the parties concerned. Such a rule woald remove the hardship like the one in the present case by enabling the party to urge, his arguments in support of the reference. It is true that this procedure will involve delay and expense in cases where references are made on obviously untenable grounds, but the balance of convenience is in favour of hearing all such references after notice to the parties. If the proposed rule is adopted, it may be hoped that a good deal of time and expense would be saved if the lower revisional Courts take care in making references to this Court only in cases where the decisions involve a point of law of general importance which may govern other cases or where in their opinion there has been substantial injustice and not merely where a different view of the case can be taken on appreciation of evidence.

    The application is dismissed.

    Rule discharged.
    J.G.R
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    Comments

    Imperator v. Nandlal Chunilal Bod...
    (Sep 18, 1945)