Kania, J.:—
This case which involves a sum of three thousand rupees only has been fought out as a test case to determine certain points in the diamond trade in Bombay. [His Lordship then stated the facts as set out above and after finding on the evidence that the 173 diamonds in Court were plaintiffs' property and had not been sold by them, that there was no fraud or criminal intention on the part of defendant No. 1, when he received the diamonds, that defendant No. 4 had no knowledge that the diamonds had come to defendant No. 3's possession from defendant No. 1 and that he had no knowledge that the plaintiffs were the owners of the diamonds, continued:—]
The main contest between the parties is on the defence formulated in paragraph 9 of defendant No. 4's written statement. That is covered by issues Nos. 7 to 11. The defence is based on s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act. The first question in that connection is whether there was a sale by defendant No. 3 to defendant No. 4. [After discussing the evidence his Lordship found that the point was not free from doubt but if it was necessary to decide it, that defendant No. 4 had failed to establish that the diamonds were sold to him by defendant No. 3 and continued:—]
If a different view is taken the material question is whether such a sale (even if proved) is valid and binding on the plaintiffs and is any answer to the plaintiffs' claim. Section 27 of the Sale of Goods Act deals with the transfer of title. The section incorporates the well-known rule that a person who is not the owner of goods and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner cannot give to the buyer a better title than the seller himself has. In the present case there is no evidence to show that defendant No. 3 was the owner of the goods. On the other hand defendant No. 3 denied it, and, as I have pointed out, the evidence clearly establishes that the plaintiffs were the owners of the goods. The evidence also does not establish that defendant No. 3 sold the goods under the authority or with the consent of the plaintiffs. Amritlal of the plaintiff firm emphatically denied that he had authorised anyone to sell the diamonds on his behalf. Defendant No. 3 in his turn denied that he had any communication with the plaintiffs or had any authority to sell the same from the plaintiffs. Therefore defendant No. 4 can only rely on the proviso to that section for his defence. In paragraph 9 of his written statement he has only relied on the proviso and not on the body of the section for his defence. The proviso runs in the following terms:
“Provided that, where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, in possession of the goods or of a document of title to the goods, any sale made by him, when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent, shall be as valid as if he were expressly authorised by the owner of the goods to make the same; provided that the buyer acts in good faith and has not at the time of the contract of sale notice that the seller has no authority to sell.”
In support of his contention that the sale by defendant No. 3 was binding on the plaintiffs Mr. Amin for defendant No. 4 relied on Durgabai v. Sarasvatibai, Oppenheimer v. Attenborough & Son,(2) and Folkes v. King.(3)
In my opinion this contention of defendant No. 4 entirely fails. Turning to the words of the proviso it is clear that if defendant No. 3 is considered a mercantile agent, he was not in possession of the goods with the consent of the owners. Plaintiffs who were the owners gave the goods to defendants Nos. 1 and 2: they had not given the goods to defendant No. 3 and defendant No. 3's possession was therefore not with the consent of the owners. If on a construction of the terms contained in exhibit A defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are held to be mercantile agents within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act, those defendants were in possession of the goods with the consent of the owners, but they had not sold the goods to defendant No. 4 or to anyone. In that view also the case is not covered by the proviso. Apart therefore from the question of good faith and notice, the words of the proviso do not cover the present case at all. Durgabai v. Sarasvatibai is not a case on this point. That case was decided under s. 178 of the Indian Contract Act the words whereof were different from the words of s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act. The particular distinction which may be noted is that under s. 178 (as it stood when that decision was given) the word “person” found place in the section in place of “mercantile agent”. On going through the judgment again it is clear that the learned Judge held that the person in possession was himself a dealer in diamonds. The decision proceeded on that footing as is clearly stated in the concluding part of that judgment. The learned Judge held that if a dealer was in possession of diamonds, and a purchaser or pledgee for value from him acted bona fide, such purchaser or pledgee had a good title and he could not be ordered to hand over the goods to the owner. Oppenheimer v. Attenborough was a case on the construction of s. 2 of the factors act and dealt with the authority of a mercantile agent, who, having general authority, acted in the ordinary course of business. The decision was that if according to the ordinary course of business there was a general authority, any particular trade-custom could not restrict it. I am not concerned in the present case with an instance where the mercantile agent in the ordinary course of business had general authority to sell diamonds. My attention has been drawn to an unreported decision of the Appeal Court in Emperor v. Hiralal Jivraj, where the term jangad came to be interpreted. I am told that it has considerably disturbed the position of diamond brokers and dealers and has created confusion in the trade. I am, therefore, particularly reluctant to express any opinion on the general relations of a diamond broker and dealer in respect of the sale of diamonds through a broker, except to the extent it is essential to decide the present case. Plaintiffs handed over their diamonds to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on terms which are reduced to writing and are found in exhibit A. Having regard to that position, I refrain from stating to what extent, if the facts were applicable, the decision in Oppenheimer v. Attenborough would affect the diamond trade in Bombay.
The decision in Folkes v. King is equally inapplicable because there the owner of a car had delivered it to a mercantile agent for sale. The mercantile agent sold the car to a third party, who in his turn sold it to the defendant. No case of notice of fraud or want of good faith having been established, the Court held that the defendant has acquired a good title under the Factors Act. In the present case if defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had received the diamonds merely as brokers (without any writing as in exhibit A) and had sold them to defendant No. 4 directly or had sold them to defendant No. 3, who in his turn had sold them to defendant No. 4, the applicability of this case may have to be considered.
It will be useful to examine first the terms on which defendant No. 1 received the diamonds from the plaintiffs. They are in the form of a letter written by the firm of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 and addressed to the plaintiffs. The opening words clearly set out, in express terms, the purpose and conditions on which the goods were delivered by the plaintiffs, to defendant No. 1. Taking the printed terms together, it is clear that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 admitted that they received the goods only for the purpose of showing them to intending purchasers; that defendant No. 1's firm had no authority whatsoever to sell, mortgage or pledge the goods; that the ownership of the goods remained all along in the plaintiffs and the first and/or second defendants had no right to or interest in and them; and that till the goods were returned in the condition in which they were received or if they were not returned, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were liable and responsible for the same.
It is not disputed that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are brokers in jewellery and are working as such for many years past. The first question to be considered is whether having regard to these terms they were mercantile agents under the Sale of Goods Act. The effect of these terms on the relation between the parties, and the possession of the goods in the hands of the broker, was considered by Madgavkar, J. in an unreported judgment in Kanga Jaghirdar & Co. v. Fatehchand Hirachand. At that time the relative section of the Indian Contract Act did not contain the expression “mercantile-agent” but the word “person”. On a consideration of the terms mentioned above the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the possession obtained under a document worded as aforesaid was not juridical possession within the meaning of s. 178 of the Indian Contract Act. As regards the term jangad used in the document the learned Judge observed as follows: “Assuming that jangad in Gujerati ordinarily means ‘approval’ there is no reason to assume that the goods entrusted jangad are goods to be sold on approval, rather than goods to be shown for approval”. I respectfully agree with that conclusion about the meaning of the conditions found in exhibit A in this case. The relation of a dealer and a broker is that of a principal and agent and not of a seller and a buyer. The extent of the authority of the agent is to be found in the document under which the goods are delivered to him. As between the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 and 2, therefore, it is clear that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had no authority to sell the goods.
The therefore next question to be considered is whether the addition of the word “jangad” in the signature made any difference. It was urged that when there were printed terms and written conditions the written conditions must prevail, and as the word “jangad” was written in manuscript, the effect of the document was that the diamonds were delivered to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 for “sale or return”. The authorities clearly show that when in one document there are printed as well as written conditions, the Court's duty, as far as possible, is to reconcile all the terms; but, when that is not found possible, the written conditions are to be given greater weight than the printed ones. The dictionary meaning of the word “jangad” is “approval”. As stated by Madgavkar, J. in the passage quoted above, having regard to the printed terms in this case, there appears no reason to assume that the diamonds were entrusted to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to be sold on approval and not that they were given to them to be shown for approval. In my opinion, taking the document as a whole, it is clear that they were given to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 to be shown for approval only. I am unable to accept the contention of defendant No. 4 that the term jangad means “sale or return” wherever the same is found. I am also unable to accept his contention that having regard to the term jangad used in the signature the printed terms should be given no meaning at all. In my opinion having regard to the terms on which the goods were delivered to defendants Nos. 1 and 2 they are not mercantile agents within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act having general authority to sell. As I have pointed out, even if they were, the case does not fall under s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act because they have not sold the goods to defendant No. 4.
The terms on which defendant No. 3 received the goods from defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are not clear on the evidence. Defendant No. 3 stated that he had received them on jangad. He did not say whether he had signed any writing like exhibit A or not. He further admitted that he was working as a broker in jewellery at the time. It is, therefore, clear that by the delivery of 173 diamonds to him, even on jangad terms, no property can pass to him under s. 24 of the Sale of Goods Act. On behalf of defendant No. 4 it was urged that in respect of 84 diamonds of the plaintiffs defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had acted as dealers. On the evidence I am unable to accept that contention. For this purpose it is necessary to bear in mind the terms on which the diamonds were originally handed over by the plaintiffs to those parties. According to the evidence of Amritlal, which stands uncontradicted, these diamonds were delivered to those defendants on terms similar to those found in exhibit A. The subsequent dealings with the diamonds and the entry in the plaintiffs' books, as if there was a sale to them, cannot affect the original relations established between the parties by the document, unless there was proof of a new contract. According to Amritlal defendants Nos. 1 and 2 informed him that the diamonds were sold, but as they did not disclose the name of the purchaser, in the plaintiffs' books the goods were debited to them. In answer to some leading questions put in cross-examination Amritlal did state that those diamonds were sold to defendants Nos. 1 and 2, but the remaining evidence quite clearly shows that the goods were not sold to them as merchants but the price was debited to them because they did not disclose the name of the purchaser and they were responsible for the price. I am, therefore, unable to consider that in respect of 84 diamonds defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had acted with the plaintiffs as dealers.
Under s. 19(3) of the Sale of Goods Act, passing of property is a question of intention. When the Indian Contract Act governed the sale of goods there were no express words of that kind in the Act. The rule found in s. 24 is to govern when there is no intention to the contrary. In considering the decisions given under the old sections of the Indian Contract Act this distinction has to be carefully remembered.
In support of his contention that jangad meant “sale or return” defendant No. 4 relied on an unreported judgment of Beaumont, C.J and N.J Wadia, J. in Emperor v. Hiralal Jivraj. The accused Hiralal Jivraj (whose name was repeatedly mentioned in the evidence in this suit by defendant No. 3) had appealed against his conviction under s. 406 of the Indian Penal Code. After considering that the first charge framed was not sufficiently particular, the judgment proceeded to discuss the charge of criminal misappropriation of eighty-four diamonds given by Purshottam (defendant No. 3 in this case) to the accused. In the opinion of the Appeal Court the learned Chief Presidency Magistrate was in error in convicting the accused. It was stated that the diamonds were given to Purshottam on jangad and became the property of Purshottam. If Purshottam in his turn gave the diamonds to the accused, on jangad terms, they became the property of the accused and he could not be charged with criminal misappropriation of the same. The evidence was that Purshottam received the diamonds jangad from one Shantilal and delivered them to the accused on jangad. The judgment thereafter runs in the following terms:—
“That being so, the property would pass to the accused under s. 24 of the Sale of Goods Act either when he signified his approval or acceptance to the seller or did any other act adopting the transaction, and if he did not signify his approval or acceptance to the seller but retained the goods without giving notice of rejection, then, if a time had been fixed for the return of the goods, on the expiration of such time, and, if no time had been fixed, on the expiration of a reasonable time …The learned Government Pleader has argued that the accused was a broker, but there is not a particle of evidence of brokerage. The transaction is stated to be a transaction on jangad. That places the parties in the relationship of seller and buyer, that is, principal and principal. If the person who takes [the property] on jangad sells the property at a price in excess of that which he has agreed to pay to the seller, he keeps the difference and he does not have to account to the seller as an agent. On the other hand, if the purchaser from him does not pay, he is still liable to pay on his own contract with his seller.”
This passage from the judgment clearly shows that, on the facts proved, the accused was not a broker and the diamonds were not delivered to him as a broker. Although the judgment does not record that the diamonds were delivered over to the accused as a buyer or had been received by Purshottam as a buyer on jangad from the previous holder or the owner, the relation of buyer and seller between all parties is assumed. The facts in that case also do not show that at the time of receiving the diamonds the parties had signed a document, like exhibit A in the present suit. That judgment therefore does not govern the facts of this case. I think the discussion in that judgment about the applicability of s. 24 of the Sale of Goods Act, when goods are received on jangad terms, requires an explanation. Goods or jewellery may be delivered by the owner to the buyer, with the intention that he may inspect the same and ultimately purchase it. The goods in such cases are stated to be delivered for approval, i.e jangad. Section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act covers that situation. On the other hand, the owner of the goods may deliver, the same to a mercantile agent, as defined in the Sale of Goods Act. According to that definition of a mercantile agent, in the customary course of business, he has Authority to sell the goods. Goods may be handed over to such a mercantile agent also jangad meaning to be shown for approval to his customers. Under those circumstances, if the mercantile agent effects a sale, the title of the purchaser is protected under s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act provided there is no want of good faith. On a comparison of the words of s. 24 and s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act, it is clear that the mercantile agent who receives goods on jangad acquires no property by reason of s. 24, because he is not a buyer. He has, therefore, no title to pass on the property by reason of s. 24. This is important because if want of good faith is established, the sale can be avoided under s. 27. But if the case was governed by s. 24, no question of want of good faith arises and the property must pass. The third contingency is where the owner delivers goods to an agent (who is not a mercantile agent falling within the definition of that expression as given in the Sale of Goods Act) on terms arranged between the owner and the agent. As one of the terms of delivery the goods may be given jangad, i.e for approval by a prospective customer or to be shown for approval. To such a case neither s. 24 nor s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act applies, and the extent of the authority of the agent depends on the terms of his agency, and the provisions governing the relations of principal and agent as found in the Indian Contract Act. It is clear that in that case also no property passes from the owner to the agent under s. 24, not is a sale by him protected under s. 27. If this authority enables him to sell the goods, the sale is authorised and binding on the owner. If the authority is exceeded, the question will have to be considered in the light of ss. 227 and 228 of the Indian Contract Act. The judgment of the Appeal Court which treats jangad as equivalent to sale or return must be read as applicable only when the goods are delivered to a buyer.
[His Lordship next dealt with the evidence and held that there was no proof of sale of the diamonds by defendants Nos. 1 or 2 to defendant No. 3 and that defendant No. 4 was not protected under s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act as there was want of good faith on his part in the transaction; and continued:—]
In addition to the want of means of defendant No. 4 and the manner in which he dealt with the 173 diamonds after he got possession of the same, his evidence about the making-up of account of sale also shows considerable room for suspicion in this transaction. According to defendant No. 4 when the account of the sale was made up he deducted the full discount of six and a quarter per cent and received credit for Rs. 25 by way of interest. Defendant No. 4 alleged that as the diamonds were weighed on November 11, he was liable to pay the price fifteen to twenty days thereafter. He gave a cheque to defendant No. 3 on or about November 11, post-dated November 20. Therefore,, at best he made a payment earlier by about five to ten days. Working out the figure of Rs. 25 as interest for that period, it shows that for obtaining a post-dated cheque defendant No. 3 (according to the case of defendant No. 4) gave credit at the rate of about three per cent per month. It is really a matter of surprise that a dealer in diamonds would give credit for interest at thirty-six per cent per annum for obtaining payment by a post-dated cheque five to ten days earlier. It is not suggested that this rebate of Rs. 25 was given otherwise than for interest. If defendant No. 3 was a mercantile agent within the meaning of s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act, this way of making accounts, in my opinion, indicates that in the matter of this sale he was not acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent. For these reasons, if necessary, I would hold that defendant No. 4 was not protected under s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act because there was want of good faith on his part in the transaction.
In exhibit A at the time of putting his signature defendant No. 1 had added the word jangad. It was contended that the word jangad meant “sale or return” and under s. 24 of the Sale of Goods Act the diamonds became the property of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. They had, therefore, title to pass on that property to defendant No. 3, by delivery on jangad terms, and defendant No. 3 in his turn could pass it on to defendant No. 4 by sale. When it was pointed out that this case was not pleaded in the written statement, Mr. Amin, for defendant No. 4, at the close of his final address, applied for an amendment of the written statement to raise this contention. In the present suit on the pleadings it is nobody's case that when defendants Nos. 1 and 2 received the diamonds they were the “buyers” of the diamonds. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have not alleged that case in their written statement. Nor is that case put forth in the written statement of defendant No. 4. This argument raises a question of fact, as to the position of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 when they received those diamonds. That question of fact not having been pleaded in the written statement, I do not think it is permissible to defendant No. 4 now to amend his written statement and raise that question. If the amendment was allowed, it would involve the re-opening of the bulk of evidence and calling further witnesses. Mr. Amin's application for amendment is, therefore, rejected.
Mr. Amin next urged that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 having received the diamonds on the terms contained in exhibit A (including the word jangad), they had authority to hand over the same to defendant No. 3 on jangad. I repeatedly asked Mr. Amin if there was any authority for that proposition, but he failed to point out any. He urged that if defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had authority to sell, the authority to give possession to defendant No. 3 was a smaller authority and was therefore included in the larger one. In my opinion this argument is unsound. Under s. 190 of the Indian Contract Act an agent has no power to delegate his authority to any one except when it is done according to the custom of trade or from the nature of the agency it must be done. Neither of those contingencies are alleged in the pleadings nor suggested in the course of evidence. No issue has been raised on the point. Unless such a right to appoint a sub-agent was established, under s. 193 of the Indian Contract Act this act of the agent is not binding on the principal and he is entitled to repudiate the same. The authority of defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in the present case was defined by the writing which they executed. That writing did not give them any power to sell the goods. There is no authority express or implied in that writing to pass on the goods to a third party, with a power to the third party to deal with the same as if he was the owner. In my opinion if such a privilege was sought to be established, it had to be expressly pleaded and proved by evidence. The power goes to the root of the relations between principal and agent and cannot be lightly inferred because it was urged in the course of argument by counsel. The argument about passing of property to defendant No. 3 and the right of defendant No. 3 to sell is based on s. 24 which is assumed as applicable to an agent who received goods to sell. This is due to ignoring the fundamental distinction between a buyer and a seller and a principal and agent. In my opinion, therefore, the argument that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had authority to pass on the goods to defendant No. 3 for any purpose is unsound and unwarranted on the evidence.
[His Lordship then discussed the claim of defendant No. 4 to be repaid the sums of Rs. 1,324 and 950 and found that no money was paid by him in respect of the 173 diamonds and his claim to recover that sum before he was ordered to hand over the diamonds failed and on the plaintiffs intimating that they did not press for a decree against defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 passed the decree as follows].
There will therefore be a decree for the plaintiffs against defendant No. 4 for a return of the diamonds. In due course the diamonds E.F would be handed over to the plaintiffs.
Attorneys for plaintiffs: Messrs Surajmal & Co.
Attorneys for defendants Nos. I and II: Messrs Motichand & Devidas.
Attorneys for defendant No. 4: Messrs Mankodi & Co.
Decree accordingly.
N.K.A