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  • provisions of section 64 (2)
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  • provisions of section 64 (2)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner attended a public auction advertised in the Statesman (Calcutta edition) and Amrita Bazar Patrika in January 1981 for certain unserviceable goods belonging to respondent no. 1 (Calcutta Port Trust). The petitioner was declared the highest bidder for lot numbers 31 (op) to 39 (op). Pursuant to the sale terms, he paid Rs. 1,20,000 on 28 January 1981 (a little more than 25% of the value) and the balance of Rs. 3,50,000 plus sales tax of Rs. 18,800 on 4 February 1981.

The petitioner relied on section 64(2) of the State Goods Act, 1930 to contend that the sale was complete between the parties. On 5 March 1981 the controller of stores of respondent no. 1 wrote to the auctioneer (respondent no. 4) stating that lots 31 (op) to 39 (op) had been finally decided to be withdrawn from the auction sale by order of the chairman of respondent no. 1. The petitioner challenged that decision in this application, seeking relief against withholding of the release order for those lots.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the withdrawal of lot nos. 31 (op) to 39 (op) from the auction sale by the Calcutta Port Trust was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious and therefore amenable to judicial review.
  2. Whether the petitioner could invoke the writ jurisdiction (Article 226) in respect of rights that arose from an auction sale/contract, or whether his remedy was limited to contractual remedies (as contended by respondents relying on Kulchhinder Singh).
  3. Whether Article 14 of the Constitution applies only to cases of discrimination/unreasonable classification or also applies to arbitrary or unreasonable exercises of power by the State.
  4. Whether the withdrawal without giving the petitioner an opportunity to show cause violated the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The withdrawal of the lots by the port authorities was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious.
  • The action violated principles of natural justice because the petitioner was not given any opportunity to show cause before his purported right to property (arising from the completed sale) was taken away—invoking audi alteram partem.
  • By virtue of section 64(2) of the State Goods Act, 1930 the sale had become complete between the parties, giving the petitioner a right to the goods.

Respondents' Arguments (Calcutta Port Trust and its counsel)

  • The petitioner's rights arise from a contract; therefore, he should not invoke the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to enforce contractual rights (relying on Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh Brar, AIR 1976 SC 2216).
  • An anonymous letter dated 30 January 1981 alleged irregularity—specifically that nine lots were clubbed together by the auctioneer and that the author (purportedly interested in lots 36 and 37) was prevented from bidding—which justified the chairman's order to withdraw the nine lots from sale.
  • The petitioner had not suffered prejudice because he would be entitled to participate in a fresh auction to be held for those lots.
  • Contractual/general conditions of sale (clauses 12 and 13) provided that no sale shall be vitiated because of error/omission/irregularity in catalogue or conduct of the sale, and that the decision of the controller (as specified in clause 13) is final and binding; the controller's report (dated 10 February 1981) stated the auction was conducted correctly and there was no malpractice as alleged in the anonymous letter.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kulchhinder Singh and ors. v. Hardayal Singh Brar and ors., AIR 1976 SC 2216 The principle (as cited by respondents) that the remedy under Article 226 is generally unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract; writ jurisdiction should not be used to enforce ordinary contractual rights. The respondents relied on this decision to argue that the petitioner should pursue contractual remedies rather than writ jurisdiction; the court considered but did not accept this contention as decisive in the present circumstances.
Ramana v. The International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 Authority for the proposition that the State must act reasonably and not arbitrarily in both statutory exercises and in discharge of contractual obligations; Article 14 applies to arbitrary or unreasonable state action beyond mere discrimination. The court relied on this decision to hold that the petitioner could invoke writ jurisdiction and that Article 14 protects against arbitrary/unreasonable action by the State; the case supported review of the port trust's withdrawal decision for arbitrariness.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded methodically, applying legal principles stated in the opinion to the undisputed factual matrix:

  1. Sale completion: The court accepted that under section 64(2) of the State Goods Act, 1930 the sale had become complete between the parties. This factual/legal point was not disputed by the respondents' counsel.
  2. Writ jurisdiction vs. contract remedy: The court considered the respondents' submission—based on Kulchhinder Singh—that contractual rights should not be enforced via Article 226. The court rejected the absolute force of that contention in light of Ramana v. International Airport Authority, holding that where the State acts (whether in statutory power or contractual sphere) it must do so reasonably; arbitrariness permits invocation of writ jurisdiction.
  3. Scope of Article 14: The court interpreted Ramana as expanding Article 14's protection to include not only discrimination/unreasonable classification but also arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power by the State. Consequently, the petitioner could challenge the port trust's action on grounds of arbitrariness under Article 14.
  4. Factual examination of asserted irregularity: The respondents relied on an anonymous letter alleging clubbing of nine lots and asserted that the chairman's withdrawal order remedied that irregularity. However, the controller of stores (whose decision clause 13 declared final and binding) had submitted a report dated 10 February 1981 stating the auction sale was conducted correctly and there was no malpractice as alleged.
  5. Natural justice: The petitioner was not given any opportunity to show cause before the withdrawal order was made. The court held that depriving the petitioner of a valuable right of property without an opportunity to be heard violated the audi alteram partem principle and thereby vitiated the impugned action.
  6. Conclusion of arbitrariness: Weighing the controller's report, the lack of any opportunity afforded to the petitioner, and the requirements of reasonableness under Article 14, the court found the port trust's decision to withdraw the lots to be arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE APPLICATION SUCCEEDS; THE RULE IS MADE ABSOLUTE.

The court issued writs in the nature of mandamus: it commanded the respondents to recall, cancel and withdraw the impugned order/decision dated 5 March 1981 (annexure 'b' to the petition) and the letter dated 7 March 1981 issued by respondent no. 4 (also referred to as annexure 'b' in the petition), and to forbear from giving effect to those instruments. The court also directed the respondents to forthwith issue a release order in respect of lots nos. 31 (op) to 39 (op) in favour of the petitioner.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The respondents are required to withdraw the impugned administrative instruments and issue the release order for the specified lots to the petitioner; the petitioner's proprietary right arising from the auction must be recognized and effectuated by the respondents.
  • Broader legal implications: The opinion applies established Supreme Court authority (Ramana) to confirm that writ jurisdiction and Article 14 may be invoked to challenge arbitrary action of the State even when contractual rights are involved. The opinion does not purport to set a new legal doctrine beyond the principles it applies from existing precedent.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion; no information has been added or inferred beyond the text.

    Sudhu Ram Yadav v. Board Of Trustees, Calcutta Port Trust

    (1) In this application the petitioner challenges the withholding of the release order in respect of certain lots, being nos. 31 (op) to 39 (op) which according to the petitioner was collectively sold to him.

    (2) Pursuant to an advertisement in the statesman, calcutta edition and amrita bazar patrika on diverse dates in january, 1981 the petitioner attended the auction sale in respect of the certain unserviceable goods belong to the respondent no. 1.

    (3) It is not in dispute that the petitioner was declared the highest bidder in respect of the abovementioned lots in that auction sale.

    (4) Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the sale the petitioner paid a sum of rs. 1,20,000/ - in cash on the 28th january, 1981 which sum represented a little more than 25% of the total value of the goods in respect of which the petitioner became the highest bidder. It is further not in dispute that the petitioner paid the balance sum of rs. 3,50,000/ - plus sales tax amounting to rs. 18,800/ - on the 4th february, 1981.

    (5) It is the contention of the petitioner by virtue of the provisions of section 64 (2) of the state of goods act, 1930 the sale became complete in so far as the parties are concerned. It must be stated that this legal proposition was not disputed by mr. Dutt who appeared on the behalf of the calcutta port trust authorities.

    (6) Thereafter on the 5th march, 1981 a letter was addressed to m/s. Egbert andrews auction mart, respondent no. 4 herein by the controller of stores of the respondent no. 1 stating that lot nos. 31 (op) to 39 (op) in respect of which the petitioner became the highest bidder as mentioned above has been finally decided to be withdrawn from the auction sale as per the order of the chairman of the respondent no. 1.

    (7) It is this decision to withdraw these lots from the auction sale which is challenged before me in this application. Miss chaturvedi appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits before me that this action on the part of the port authorities is arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. This action is also challenged being contrary to all principles of natural justice in as much as a valuable right of property of the petitioner has been taken away without giving him any opportunity of showing cause. This, it is contended, is violative of the well - known principle audi alteram partem.

    (8) Mr. Dutt, appearing for the port trust authorities does not really dispute any of the factual aspects of this case. According to mr. Dutt the petitioner is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction because whatever rights the petitioner has clearly flow from a contract. Mr. Dutt draws my attention to the decision of the supreme court in the case of (1) kulchhinder singh and ors. V. Hardayal singh brar and ors. , reported in air 1976 sc 2216, where v. R. Krishna iyer, j. Observed, inter alia, as follows : at its best, the writ petition seeks enforcement of a binding contract but the neat and necessary repellent is that the remedy of article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract qua - contract. We fail to see how a supplier of chalk to a government school or cheese to a government hospital can ask for a constitutional remedy under article 226 in the event of a breach of a contract, by passing the normal channels of civil litigation? (paragraph 11 of the report).

    (9) In my view this contention of mr. Dutt is no longer valid in view of the supreme court decision in the well - known case of (2) ramana v. The international air port authority of india, reported in air 1979 sc 1628. This decision of the supreme court is clear authority of the proposition that whether in the field of exercise of statutory power or in discharge of its contractual obligation the state must act reasonably and not arbitrarily. In other words, this indict against arbitrariness and unreasonableness would apply to the state whether it has exercised statutory power or discharged contractual obligation. A small passage is quoted from the above judgment as follows: ?the government cannot be permitted to say that it will give jobs or enter into contracts or issue quotas or licenses only in favour of those having grey hair or belonging to a particular political party or professing a particular religious faith. The government is still the government when it acts in the matter of granting larges and it cannot act arbitrarily. It does not stand in the same position as a private individual?.

    (10) Mr. Dutt next contended that even assuming that article 14 can be invoked in this jurisdiction by the petitioner it would be available only in a case of discrimination. In other words, the complaint of the petitioner can be valid only if he can establish that somebody else has been preferred to the petitioner. In other words, unless there is unreasonable classification article 14 has no application. In my view this contention of mr. Dutt is also without any substance. This is because international air port authority case to which i have referred to above is also a clear authority for the proposition that article 14 not only applies to a case of discrimination or unreasonable classification but also applies to any arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power by the state. This, as mr. Justice bhagwati has pointed out in the above case, is a new dimension added to the contents of the constitutional guarantee of article 14. In my view, the petitioner is entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court in view, of what i have stated above. I am clearly of the opinion that the action of the port trust authority which is undisputably the 'state' within the meaning of article 12 of the constitution of india is extremely arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. I may mention in this connection that on the factual aspects the case of the respondent, port authority has been that on the 30th january, 1981 anonymous letter was addressed to the chairman, calcutta port trust which is annexure 'a' to the affidavit - in - opposition on behalf of the respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 and affirmed by sayed md. Abdullah parviz ishaque on the 9th june, 1981. That letter contained an allegation that nine out of the lots were clubbed together by the auctioneer and if they were sold individually the calcutta port trust would be gaining at least rs. 3/4 lakhs more. It is further alleged that the author of the anonymous letter was interested in lots 36 and 37 and was ready with the necessary funds but was prevented from bidding in view of the clubbing of 9 lots by the auctioneer.

    (11) On the strength of the above letter mr. Dutt contended that, this amounted to an irregularity by reason of which the chairman has ordered to withdraw of those 9 lots from the auction sale. Mr. Dutt submitted that the petitioner has not really suffered any prejudice and would be entitled to bid in the fresh auction which is to be held in respect of those lots.

    (12) Miss chaturvedi, in answer to this contention, drew my attentions to clauses 12 and 13 of the general conditions of sale of the above auction. Clause 12 provides as follows: - 'no sale shall be vitiated because of any error, omission or irregularity in printing the catalogue or goods or in conducting the sales?. Clause 13 provides; ?in case of any dispute of difference over the interpretation or working of those of condition the decision of the controller, calcutta port trust, shall be final and binding on all concerned?.

    (13) My attention was next drawn to a report of the controller of stores who is the authority mentioned in paragraph 13 of the general conditions of sale and whose decision is, according to the clause binding on all persons. That report is annexure 'b' to the abovementioned affidavit - in - opposition at page 40. That report is dated 10th february, 1981 addressed to the secretary, calcutta port trust. One paragraph from that report would indicate the contention of miss chaturvedi. The paragraph is as follows: - ?from the above facts, it will be clear and evident that the auction sale was conducted correctly and properly and within the frame work of the terms and conditions of auction sale and there is no question of any malpractice as alleged in the anonymous letter in question.

    (14) According to miss chaturvedi this report of the controller is final and binding all concerned and clearly shows that there has been no irregularity justifying the withdrawal of those lots from auction sale. This also, according to miss chaturvedi, illustrates an extreme arbitrariness of the action which is complained of in this rule. In my view, this contention of miss chaturvedi is absolutely sound and should be accepted. This aspect of the matter is, in my view, clearly arbitrary and capricious action on the part of the port trust authority.

    (15) Finally, i accept the contention of miss chaturvedi that the action of the port trust authority in withdrawing lot nos. 31 (op) to 39 (op) from the auction sale is contrary to principles of natural justice. It is not in dispute that before the impugned action was taken no opportunity of any kind whatsoever was given to the petitioner. In my view, the petitioner has been deprived of a very valuable right of property without being given an opportunity of showing cause. This infirmity also vitiates the entire action.

    (16) For the reasons given above, this application succeeds and the rule is made absolute. There will be a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to forthwith recall, cancel and withdraw the impugned order and/or decision dated 5th march, 1981 which is annexure 'b' to the petition and the letter dated 7th march, 1981 issued by the respondent no. 4 which is annexure 'b' to the petition and to forbear from giving effect in any manner thereto. There will be also a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forthwith issue a release order in respect of the lots nos. 31 (op) to 39 (op) which was the subject - matter of the auction sale held on the 28th january, 1981 in favour of the petitioner. Application succeeds.

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    Sudhu Ram Yadav v. Board Of Trustees, Calcutta Port Trust
    (Sep 16, 1981)