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  • Section 115 of the CPC 5 of 1908
  • Order 41, Rules 4
  • here), O. 41, Rule 4,
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  • Section 115 of the CPC 5 of 1908
  • Order 41, Rules 4
  • here), O. 41, Rule 4,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Revision under Section 115 CPC)

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a revisional application under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) brought by three surviving plaintiffs (appellants) challenging an order of the learned Subordinate Judge that declared the whole appeal abated after two of the five appellants died during the pendency of an appeal.

The underlying suit was instituted by the legal representatives (two sons and three daughters) of Sahadutunessa for recovery of Khas possession of plot No. 952 (0.0113 acre) against Durga Charan Das, the sole defendant, whom they treated as a trespasser. The land had earlier been the subject of an ejectment action (suit No. 239 of 1938) against Dwark Chandra Das (a Korfa tenant), culminating in a compromise decree on February 23, 1939 which postponed eviction for a grace period; thereafter Dwark was permitted to remain as a licensee and died in 1949. His son Durga remained in occupation and refused to quit, prompting the suit for possession on September 27, 1951.

The suit failed in the trial Court and the appellate court on the ground that the suit was barred by Section 47 CPC; on second appeal, Chatterjee, J. of this Court reversed that decision on the Section 47 point and remitted the matter to the lower appellate Court with this direction: "If the Court finds that he is still a tenant the suit will be dismissed. If the Court finds that the defendant is not a tenant, the suit should be decreed."

While the appeal on remit was pending, two of the appellants (Bibi Jobeda Khatoon and Bibi Jinnatanessa) died and no steps were taken for substitution of their legal representatives. The Subordinate Judge held that the entire appeal abated. The three surviving appellants moved this revisional application seeking to set aside that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, where two of five appellants die during the pendency of an appeal and the appeal as against those deceased appellants abates for want of substitution of legal representatives, the appeal as a whole abates — i.e., whether the surviving appellants' appeal is rendered incompetent.
  2. Whether the appellate Court (or revisional Court) could, in the circumstances, rely on or invoke Order 41 Rules 4 and 33 CPC (or otherwise exercise its discretion) to prevent total abatement of the appeal.
  3. Relatedly, whether principles in cited Supreme Court decisions (notably Rameshwar Prasad and Daya Ram) or interlocutory practice (e.g., substitution where some heirs are already on record) require a different outcome on the facts before the Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Bijan Behari Das Gupta)

  • The surviving appellants contend that the appeal does not abate as a whole simply because two of the five appellants died and the appeal abated against them for want of substitution.
  • They rely on principles that a co‑owner can sue a trespasser for the benefit of all co‑owners and that the Court can mould a decree (for example, awarding joint possession) leaving adjustment of shares to a partition action.
  • They also rely on Supreme Court authority (Daya Ram v. Shvam Sundari) and an interlocutory order (Sk. Md. Elias v. Bibi Samudannessa) establishing that where legal representatives are brought on record after bona fide/diligent inquiry or where some heirs are already on record substitution may be ordered to cure defects.

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Jnanendra Nath Bakshi)

  • The respondent (defendant) supports the Subordinate Judge's view that the entire appeal abates when the appeal against two appellants abates, relying on a strict application of the procedural abatement rules.
  • He invokes the Supreme Court decision in Rameshwar Prasad v. Shambehari Lal Jagannath (AIR 1963 SC 1901) to argue that when an appeal is filed by all appellants, Order 41 Rule 4 ceases to be available and Order 22 governs the situation; consequently, the discretionary power in Order 41 Rule 33 cannot be used to nullify abatement that has occurred.
  • He also emphasizes the apparent lack of diligence by the surviving appellants in bringing the legal representatives of the deceased appellants on record, and questions the ascertainability of the shares of the surviving appellants (observing that the lower Court record shows a claimed 5/7th share but that this is no more than a claim).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Joy Gopal Singha v. Probodh Chandra Bhattacharjee, 40 Cal WN 81; AIR 1935 Cal 646 The well-settled practice in this Court to give a decree for joint possession together with the trespasser and leave the plaintiff to work out further rights by a suit for partition; such a form of decree is not unusual. The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the appellate Court can grant a decree for joint possession to the surviving plaintiffs (co-owners) rather than a decree of Khas possession after eviction, thereby avoiding the necessity for all co-owners to be on record to obtain effective relief against a trespasser.
Shew Prasad Agarwalla & Anr. v. Anil Ganguli & Anr., (1964) 68 Cal WN 786 at p.802 : 1963 Cal LJ 75 Collects a long line of decisions on related points concerning co-owners and suits for possession; cited as supporting precedents. Quoted by the Court (including the judge referring to his own prior decision) as part of the established line of authority that a co-owner may sue a trespasser for the benefit of all and that decrees may be fashioned to give joint possession and allow partition later.
Jhuman Karti v. Debu Lal Singh, 22 Cal LJ 415; AIR 1915 Cal 816 It is proper for the Court to mould a decree for delivery of Khas possession even if no specific prayer for such relief appears, to avoid meaningless technicality; "the greater includes the less." The Court applied this principle to justify that, if appropriate, a decree may be moulded to give surviving plaintiffs joint possession rather than strictly enforcing a formal prayer, thereby avoiding abatement consequences.
Santosh Kumar Mondal v. Nandalal Chakrapani, AIR 1963 Cal 289 (Full Bench) The Full Bench had relied on Order 41 Rules 4 and 33 to exercise discretion in certain cases (as noted by the Court). The Court observed that reliance on that Full Bench would have made the task easier, but that the decision is effectively limited by the subsequent Supreme Court ruling in Rameshwar Prasad; therefore the Full Bench approach cannot be invoked here for the same effect.
Rameshwar Prasad v. Shambehari Lal Jagannath, AIR 1963 SC 1901 Holds that when an appeal has been filed by all appellants, Order 41 Rule 4 (operating at institution) ceases to be available and Order 22 (operating during pendency) governs; the discretionary power under Order 41 Rule 33 cannot be employed to nullify abatement occurring under Order 22. Mr. Bakshi relied on this decision to support the order of total abatement. The Court distinguished Rameshwar Prasad on the ground that that case dealt with an ejectment action against a tenant where the decree was joint and indivisible, whereas the present litigation is by Mahomedan co-owners with ascertainable shares against a trespasser, so the rule in Rameshwar Prasad is not directly applicable.
Daya Ram v. Shvam Sundari, AIR 1965 S.C 1049 Holds that the intention of Rule 4 sub-rules 1 and 3 is not that omission to bring all legal representatives on record must produce abatement where, after diligent or bona fide inquiry, the legal representatives are ascertained and brought on record within the prescribed time; legal representatives so impleaded suffice to bind the whole estate. The appellants relied on this authority. The Court noted the rule but found that Daya Ram could not help the petitioners here because there was an absence of diligence: the identities of some legal representatives were already evidenced in the record (as averred in the defendant's affidavit) and could have been brought on record.
Sk. Md. Elias v. Bibi Samudannessa, First Appeal No. 652 of 1961 (Cal), interlocutory order dated August 26, 1966 Interlocutory order holding that where some heirs of a deceased respondent are already on record, substitution of those left out can be ordered to cure a formal defect or irregularity and make the record complete. The Court observed this order but stated there were insufficient materials before it to find that the surviving appellants were heirs of the deceased; the Court left it open for the lower appellate Court to decide on evidence whether substitution and completion of the record should be ordered.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the central question (whether the appeal as a whole abates when two of five appellants die and no substitution is made) and rejected the Subordinate Judge's governing principle that "the principal relief, namely, recovery of possession, cannot be granted unless the entire body of owners are represented in the suit" so that a suit by fractional sharers alone is incompetent.

The Court's analysis proceeded in stages:

  1. Nature of the suit: The Court emphasized that the suit is a suit by Mahomedan co-owners for recovery of possession from a trespasser, not an action in ejectment against a tenant. In such suits, each co-owner has a separate right in accordance with his or her ascertainable share; therefore the decree appealed against is not necessarily joint and indivisible.
  2. Established practice and moulding decrees: Citing Joy Gopal Singha and other authorities (including the Court's own earlier collection of decisions), the Court noted the settled practice in the High Court to grant decrees for joint possession against a trespasser and allow the successful plaintiffs to work out rights among themselves in a partition suit. The Court applied the principle that the greater includes the less and that the Court may mould its decree to suit the exigencies of the situation.
  3. Consequences of abatement against some appellants: The Court reasoned that abatement of the appeal as against two deceased appellants would simply make final the primary Court's dismissal of the suit against those appellants; that outcome would not prevent the surviving appellants from obtaining a decree for joint possession with the trespasser and pursuing partition to ascertain shares. The Court found no real risk of inconsistent or contradictory decrees in the situation at hand.
  4. Orders 41 and 22; Rameshwar Prasad: The Court acknowledged that invoking Order 41 Rules 4 and 33 might have simplified the process, but said the Supreme Court decision in Rameshwar Prasad limits that approach: where an appeal has been filed by all appellants, Order 41 Rule 4 (at institution) gives way to Order 22 during pendency, and the discretionary power under Order 41 Rule 33 cannot be used to negate an abatement under Order 22. The Court therefore declined to rely on O. 41 R. 33 to nullify the abatement.
  5. Distinguishing Rameshwar Prasad: The Court distinguished Rameshwar Prasad on the basis that that case arose out of an ejectment action against a tenant with a joint and indivisible decree, whereas the present case involves co-owners with ascertainable shares suing a trespasser; accordingly the policy and result in Rameshwar Prasad do not control here.
  6. Diligence and Daya Ram: The Court considered Daya Ram (which held that where legal representatives are ascertained and brought on record after diligent inquiry there is no abatement) but found the present petitioners had not shown the necessary diligence. The record contained material (an affidavit by the defendant identifying possible heirs of one deceased appellant) that made substitution easy; in short, the omission to bring legal representatives on record here was not a case of bona fide unavoidable omission.
  7. Interlocutory orders and substitution (Sk. Md. Elias): While recognizing an interlocutory order allowing substitution where some heirs are on record, the Court found there was insufficient material before it to determine family relationships or heirship definitively and therefore left the matter to the lower appellate Court to decide upon evidence whether substitution should be ordered and whether the surviving appellants are heirs of the deceased.
  8. Directions to the lower appellate Court: The Court set out two possible routes for the appellate Court on remit: (a) if the lower appellate Court finds the surviving appellants are heirs of the deceased appellants, it should bring those heirs (previously not impleaded) on record and proceed with the appeal in light of Chatterjee, J.'s directions; (b) if not, the appeal will be treated as having abated as to the deceased, and the appellate Court should hear the remainder of the appeal in accordance with Chatterjee, J.'s directions supplemented by the present opinion.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The rule in revision succeeds; the order of the learned Subordinate Judge declaring total abatement of the appeal is set aside. The learned appellate (lower appellate) Court is directed to hear the appeal in the light of the directions contained in this opinion and in the earlier directions of Chatterjee, J. Each party is to pay and bear its own costs. The records are to be sent down to the lower appellate Court within a fortnight and compliance reported to the Registrar, Appellate Side.

Implications (direct effects on the parties and case):

  • The appeal does not automatically abate as a whole merely because two of five appellants died without substitution; whether there is abatement as to the deceased appellants depends on factual findings about heirship and whether substitution is appropriate.
  • If the lower appellate Court finds the surviving appellants are heirs of the deceased appellants, the Court shall bring the omitted heirs on record and proceed with the appeal; no abatement will be treated as having occurred in that respect.
  • If the lower appellate Court finds the surviving appellants are not heirs of the deceased appellants, the appeal will stand abated as to those deceased appellants but the appellate Court will proceed with the remainder of the appeal (and may grant a decree such as joint possession, leaving partition to resolve shares as appropriate).
  • The Court declined to exercise (or to allow invocation of) the discretionary relief under Order 41 Rule 33 to nullify abatement in the face of the Supreme Court decision in Rameshwar Prasad; instead the Court distinguished that authority on the facts and applied established principles about co-owners and remedies against trespassers.
  • No wider or novel procedural doctrine is announced beyond the application and reconciliation of existing authorities; the decision directs the lower appellate Court how to proceed on the factual questions of heirship and substitution and preserves the option of moulding relief (joint possession) to avoid meaningless technicality.

Order: Rule made absolute. Records to be sent down within a fortnight. Each party to bear its costs.

    Abdul Hamid And Others v. Durga Charan Das Opposite Party.

    1. If two of the five appellants die during the pendency of their appeal arising out of a suit instituted by them for recovery of Khas possession of a certain plot of land, reckoning the sole defendant as a trespasser thereon, and if the appeal against the two dead appellants abates, no steps having been taken for substitution of their legal representatives, will the appeal as a whole abate? That is the main question debated in this revisional application under Section 115 of the CPC 5 of 1908 at the instance of the three surviving plaintiffs appellants. The learned Subordinate Judge, seized of such appeal, holds, the appeal as a whole abates. Mr. Bijan Behari Das Gupta, appearing for the appellants petitioners, submits, it does not. Mr. Jnanendra Nath Bakshi appearing for the respondent opposite party, contends for the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge.

    2. The facts which have led up to this revisional petition need not be referred to further than as follows:

    The land in controversy is plot No. 952 under Khatian No. 581 of mouza Maheshmati within the jurisdiction of Englishbazar Municipality and police station: Englishbazar being the name by which the municipality and police station of the town of Maldah are known. A plot as this admeasures .0113 acre of land: vide the relevant Khatian, exhibit A. One Dwark Chandra Das held it as a Korfa tenant on a rent of Rs. 10 under Sahadutunessa in an action in ejectment brought by her it was suit No. 239 of 1938—a compromise decree, exhibit 1, came to be recorded on February 23, 1939. By virtue thereof, eviction of Dwarak was ordered. But its effect was postponed. Dwarak having been given a grace period of three years: 1346 to 1348 B.S, during which he was permitted to stay where he was namely, in the land in controversy, on payment of Rs. 10 a year as rent (Khajna), The further stipulation was that should Dwarak fail to quit by 1348's end, Sahadutunessa would be able to put her decree for eviction to execution. Dwarak did not quit, as he had agreed to do, on the expiry of 1348 B.S Sahadutunessa was about to levy execution of the compromise decree, as indeed she was entitled to do in terms thereof. But in the end she took pity on her quondam tenant, as is stated on her behalf, and allowed him to stay on for his life as a licensee on a licence fee of Rs. 10 While in occupation so, and running a shop there, he died in 1949. Durga Charan Das, the sole opposite party before me, is his son. His father's licence having been no more, he was asked to quit time and again. But he refused. Hence the suit on September 27, 1951, by Sahadutunessa's five legal representatives two sons and three daughters—(Sahadutunessa having died meanwhile) for recovery of possession of plot No. 952 after eviction of Durga, a mere trespasser, therefrom.

    3. The suit failed in the Court of first instance. An appeal taken against that came to little. The first Court, as also the Court of appeal, held that the suit was barred by Section 47 of the CPC. On the question of tenancy or licence, the first Court found that the position of Dwarak, and after his death, of Durga continued “in the land as of a tenant”; whereas the appellate Court confined its finding to Dwarak having been a tenant. In a second appeal taken to this Court, Purushottam Chatterjee, J. reversed the decision of the Courts below on S. 47 having stood between the plaintiffs and their success. More, his Lordship directed a remit to the lower appellate Court with a view to coming to a finding as to the status of the defendant, making it clear:

    “If the Court finds that he is still a tenant the suit will be dismissed. If the Court finds that the defendant is not a tenant, the suit should be decreed.”

    4. During the carriage of the appeal on remit, this question of abatement arose. The two daughters of Sahadutunessa, Bibi Jobeda Khatoon (appellant No. 3) and Bibi Jinnatanessa (appellant No. 4), died. No steps were taken for substitution of their legal representatives. In the circumstances, the learned Subordinate Judge held that “the entire appeal” had abated. Hence this rule. The principle the learned Judge has governed himself by is, in his own words:

    “The principal relief, namely, recovery of possession, cannot be granted unless the entire body of owners are represented in the suit. A suit for possession cannot be decreed in a suit brought by a fractional sharer alone. Applying this principle, the present appeal by the surviving appellants alone is incompetent.”

    5. I am unable to consider this a sound principle to go by, the nature of the suit being what it is: a suit for recovery of possession from a trespasser. Whether the suit is good or bad on merits is another matter. As Chatterjee, J. has directed, if the learned appellate Judge finds Durga to be a tenant, the suit will fail, the death of the two of the appellants and the consequential abatement being then neither here nor there. If however the finding is that Durga is not a tenant, but a trespasser, the suit shall succeed, as the further direction of Chatterjee, J. is. In this context, it matters little that the appeal has abated, if that, against two of the five appellants Because, it is now well held that a co-owner is entitled to sue a trespasser for the benefit of all And what a type of co-owner do see here? A Mahomedan co-owner to ascertain whose share all you have to do is a little arithmetic. To run on with the principle I go by, there is the observation of Rankin, C.J (as his Lordship then was) in Letters Patent Appeal No. 104 of 1928, quoted by Nasim Ali, J. in Joy Gopal Singha v. Probodh Chandra Bhattacharjee, 40 Cal WN 81 : (AIR 1935 Cal 646): the well settled practice in this Court is to give a decree “for joint possession together with the trespasser and leaving it to the plaintiff to work out his further rights by a suit for partition”. It is no good sniffing at such a decree, about which the learned Chief Justice says further:

    “I do not think there is anything unusual in the form of the decree.”

    6. On a point as this, there is a long line of decisions, some of which I collected in a judgment rendered by me, if I may quote my own decision without any impropriety on my part, in Shew Prasad Agarwalla & Anr.…Plaintiffs; v. Anil Ganguli & Anr.…Defendants., (1964) 68 Cal WN 786 at p. 802 : 1963 Cal LJ 75

    7. So, why should the whole suit fail? And why should the appeal as a whole abate? If a co-owner with an ascertainable share dies and if the appeal abates against him, his co-owner with an ascertainable share too though living, ‘dies' too, and the appeal abates against him as well. That I venture to think, is neither reason nor law. It may, however, be said that the suit is for recovery of possession after eviction of the defendant, not for recovery of joint possession with the defendant. That against matters little. Take a case where, only confirmation of possession, the suing party prays the Court for. When it comes to the recording of a decree, it transpires from the evidence that the plaintiff was not in possession at the date of the institution of the suit. The Court thereupon passes a decree for delivery of Khas possession, no specific prayer is there though to that end such a decree is above reproach. Indeed, not to pass such decree would be a meaningless technicality, as held by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee sitting with Beachcroft, J. in Jhuman Karti v. Debu Lal Singh, 22 Cal LJ 415 at p. 418 : (AIR 1915 Cal 816 at p. 818). The same principle will apply here. The greater includes the less. And it is always open to the Court to mould its decree to suit the exigencies of the situation (as it obtains here) by granting the surviving plaintiffs appellants, the petitioners before me, a decree for joint possession with the defendant opposite party instead of a decree for recovery of Khas possession after evicting him: just what they had originally prayed the Court for, provided that they succeed in proving the defendant to be not a tenant, but a trespasser, in terms of Chatterjee, J.'s direction.

    8. Mr. Bakshi raises the point that what the share of the surviving appellants comes to is not known. The record of the Court of appeal below reveals that they claim 5/7th share. True, it is no more than a claim. But that is of the least materiality. What is of the utmost materiality is that they, the legal representatives and heirs of Sahadutunessa, have certain shares, to be sure. And that will be worked out in a suit for partition, If they otherwise succeed in the present litigation.

    9. Could I have called in aid Order 41, Rules 4 and 33, as a Full Bench of this Court did in Santosh Kumar Mondal v. Nandalal Chakrapani, decided on August 17, 1962 and come into the reports in May 1963, AIR 1963 Cal 289 (FB), my task would have been so much the easier. But in view of the Supreme Court decision in Rameshwar Prasad v. Shambehari Lal Jagannath decided on May 3, 1963, and come into the reports in December of the same year: AIR 1963 SC 1901, it is no longer open to me to do so. Once an appeal has been filed by all the appellants (as here), O. 41, Rule 4, operating at the institution of the appeal, ceases to be available, and O. 22, operating during the pendency of the appeal, rules its carriage. The discretionary power O. 41, R. 33, invests the appeal Court with, cannot be exercised to nullify the effect of abatement of the appeal against the two deceased appellants (as here). Nor is R. 33 intended to apply to an appeal rendered incompetent against the two deceased appellants by reason of the abatement (also as here). Such is the law laid down by Raghubar Dayal, J., speaking for the Court, in Rameshwar's case, AIR 1963 SC 1901 (supra), making the Full Bench decision of this Court, in so far as it goes by O. 41, Rr. 4 and 33, bad law. And on the strength of this very case, Mr. Bakshi wants me to reach the same conclusion the learned Subordinate Judge has come to. There, in a second appeal filed by nine plaintiffs, Kedar Nath, the third appellant, died. And no application having been made within the prescribed time for bringing his legal representatives on record, the appeal abated against him in view of the combined effect of Rr. 3 and 11 of O. 22. Furthermore, the appeal abated as a whole. Similarity as this appears to be deceptive. Because, that was an action in ejectment against a tenant and a tenant's tenant. Had the litigation in hand been just so, certainly I would have come to the same conclusion. The decree appealed against would have been then joint and indivisible. But the litigation in hand is a litigation by Mahomedan co-owners, each of whom has a share, specific and certain, for eviction of a trespasser. The decree appealed against is not, therefore, joint and indivisible. Each co-owner has his separate right on the foot of his or her ascertainable share against such a one: a trespasser. More, the result will not be two inconsistent or contradictory decrees. The abatement of the appeal against the appellants numbering 3 and 4 means that the dismissal of the suit against them by the primary Court has become final and beyond the reach of the appellate Court. Be it so. The decree, if any, obtained by the surviving appellants will be a decree for joint possession only, with the trespasser, they being at liberty to work out their further rights in proportion to their shares by a suit for partition, without impinging in any way on the primary Court's decree of dismissal against the appellants numbering 3 and 4. Where then is the inconsistency between two decrees—a position which the Court always avoids? Therefore, the Supreme Court decision Mr. Bakshi relies upon appears to be clearly distinguishable. The mark of distinction is this. That decision rests on an action in ejectment against a tenant. The impugned decision in hand rests on an action by Mahomedan co-owners for eviction of a trespasser. The outlook in one cannot be the outlook in another.

    10. Mr. Das Gupta relies on another Supreme Court decision: Daya Ram v. Shvam Sundari, AIR 1965 S.C 1049, where Ayyangar, J., speaking for the Court lays down the law thus: it is not the intention of the legislature in having enacted rule 4. Sub-rules 1 and 3, that unless each and every one of the legal representatives of the deceased defendants, where they are several, is brought on record, there is no proper constitution of the suit or appeal, with the result that the suit or appeal would abate. On the contrary, the true rule is that where a plaintiff or appellant after diligent or bona fide inquiry ascertains who the legal representatives of a deceased party are and brings them on record within the time limited by law there is no abatement of the suit or appeal. More, the legal representatives so impleaded sufficiently represent the estate of the deceased and a decision obtained with them on record will bind not merely those impleaded but the entire estate including those not brought on record. Such being the law laid down, it goes against Mr. Das Gupta. As Mr. Bakshi pertinently points out, what is seen here is not diligence, but utter lack of it, because nothing could have been easier for the surviving appellant than to bring on record the legal representatives of their deceased sisters, Jobeda Khatoon and Jinnatannessa, Yar Muhammad and Md. Munna having been stated by Durga, the defendant opposite party, in an affidavit filed in this court, to be the husband and son respectively of Jobeda with no denial by a counter-affidavit. So, Daya Ram's case AIR 1965 SC 1049 can do the petitioners little good.

    11. Mr. Das Gupta also refers me to an interlocutory order rendered by P.N Mookerjee and A.C Gupta, JJ. on August 26, 1966, in Sk. Md. Elias v. Bibi Samudannessa: First Appeal No. 652 of 1961 (Cal), where their Lordships hold that there would not be any question of abatement, some of the heirs of a deceased respondent having already been on record, and order substitution of those left out, in order to cure a formal defect or irregularity, or as Ayyangar, J. puts it in Daya Ram's case AIR 1965 SC 1049 (supra), with a view to “making the record complete”. But I have no materials before me on which I can find that the surviving appellants are the heirs of the two deceased ones. On the contrary if I have to go by the opposite party Durga's affidavit before me, Jobeda (appellant No. 3) died leaving behind her surviving her husband Yar Muhammad and a son Md. Munna in that case. Yar Muhammad's normal share would come to 1/4th as a sharer and Md. Munna's to 3/4th as a residuary, taking them as I do to be governed by the Hanafi law of inheritance, leaving nothing to the surviving appellants. But much more is needed than a bare affidavit by a stranger to the family of the appellants to come to a dependable finding. About Jinnatanessa (appellant ??? dead) I know next to nothing, save that ??? from the Bar that her husband is one ??? Hamid Dewan. In the circumstances, ??? is but right that I keep the whole matter open for decision by the lower appellate court upon evidence.

    12. If it finds that the surviving appellants are some of the heirs of the two deceased ones, Bibi Jobeda Khatoon and Bibi Jinnatanessa, no question of abatement there will be. The Court will then bring the heirs, not impleaded so long, on record, with a view to making its record complete, and proceed with the hearing of the appeal in the light of Chatterjee, J.'s directions. If, however, the court finds that the surviving appellants are not some of the heirs of either of the deceased ones, Jobeda or Jannatanessa the appeal will be taken as having abated as against them or one of them some of whose heirs the surviving appellants are not. And the court will proceed to hear the appeal in the light of Chatterjee, J.'s directions supplemented by mine.

    13. In view of all that goes before, it is clear to me that the learned appellate judge has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law. His order of total abatement of the appeal cannot therefore be sustained.

    14. In the result, the rule succeeds and be made absolute. The order complained of be set aside. The court of appeal below do hear the appeal in the light of directions contained herein before. Each party will pay and bear its costs.

    15. This is a revision case of 1961. Chatterjee, J. rendered his judgment in the second appeal on November 17, 1959: paragraph 2 ante. And the records reached the lower appellate court on September 8, 1960 some ten months later, as I find from the orders in the order-sheets. So that such a sorry state of affairs may not recur. I direct that the records be sent down within a fortnight from this date, and that compliance with this directive be reported to the Registrar. Appellate Side, of this court immediately thereafter.

    KS/AGJ/D.V.C

    16. Rule made absolute.

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    Comments

    Abdul Hamid And Others v. Durga Charan Das Opposite Party.
    (Sep 6, 1966)