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  • sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.16.
  • sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure.17.
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 35 and of sub-rule (5) of Rule 32;
  • Order 21, Rule 32 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 or sub-rule (1) of Rule 35
  • O. 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • 7 as under:6. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32,
  • Clause (e) of Section 51 of the Code
  • Rule 32 (1) of Order XXI of the Code
  • provisions of O. 21, Rule 35.
  • clause (e) of Section 51.11.
  • sub-rule (5) of Order 32
  • sub-rule (5) of Rule 32
  • O. 21, R. 32 sub-rule (5),
  • Section 151 of C.P.C
  • O. 21, Rule 32 (1),
  • sub-rule (5)
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Citation Codes
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  • sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.16.
  • sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure.17.
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 35 and of sub-rule (5) of Rule 32;
  • Order 21, Rule 32 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 or sub-rule (1) of Rule 35
  • O. 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • 7 as under:6. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32,
  • Clause (e) of Section 51 of the Code
  • Rule 32 (1) of Order XXI of the Code
  • provisions of O. 21, Rule 35.
  • clause (e) of Section 51.11.
  • sub-rule (5) of Order 32
  • sub-rule (5) of Rule 32
  • O. 21, R. 32 sub-rule (5),
  • Section 151 of C.P.C
  • O. 21, Rule 32 (1),
  • sub-rule (5)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition challenges an ex parte order of the executing court dated 31st August, 1979, which ordered the issue of warrants of possession in respect of disputed immovable property. The background facts stated in the opinion are as follows:

  • Respondent No. 1, Mulakh Raj, instituted a suit for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the petitioners, Sunder Das and Bishamber Lal, from interfering with his possession of plots Nos. 32, 33 and 35, Wazir Nagar, Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi. The suit was decreed on 27th January, 1971 and a permanent injunction was granted in favour of Mulakh Raj.
  • Despite the decree, the petitioners allegedly disobeyed it and Mulakh Raj was dispossessed from the property.
  • Mulakh Raj applied for execution under Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a result of that application, Sunder Das and Bishamber Lal were ordered to be detained in civil prison.
  • The judgment-debtors' appeal against detention failed; this Court dismissed their Execution Second Appeal (E.S.A. 19/1973) by order dated 23rd May, 1974 but reduced the period of detention to six weeks.
  • On 31st August, 1975, the decree-holder made an application purportedly under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking, inter alia, issuance of warrants of possession under the Court's inherent powers to put the decree-holder in possession.
  • Subsequently, the executing Court passed the impugned order dated 31st August, 1979 directing the issue of warrants of possession. The present revision petition was filed against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an executing court may, in exercise of its inherent powers (or under Section 151 CPC), or by reliance on sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21, order the issue of warrants of possession to restore a decree-holder to possession where the decree is for a permanent injunction but there is no decree for delivery of immovable property.
  2. Whether the specific modes of execution provided by the Code (notably Order 21, Rule 32(1) and Order 21, Rule 35) exclude resort to the Court's inherent powers for issuing warrants of possession in such circumstances.
  3. Whether sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21 can be read as authorising a court to direct that the decree-holder (or a person appointed by the court) may, so far as practicable, do the act required by the decree (including obtaining physical possession) at the expense of the judgment-debtor.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Judgment-debtor Sunder Das) Arguments

  • The mode of execution of a decree for permanent injunction is specifically provided by Order 21, Rule 32(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure; because there is no decree for delivery of immovable property, the executing court had no power to issue warrants of possession.
  • Reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision of this Court reported as AIR 1972 Delhi 142 (Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh) to support the proposition that execution must follow the procedure in Rule 32 and that inherent powers or other provisions (such as Rule 35 or clause (e) of Section 51) cannot be used to obtain delivery of possession where the Code prescribes a different mode of execution.

Respondent No. 1 (Decree-holder Mulakh Raj) Arguments

  • If the decree for permanent injunction is violated, the court has inherent powers to order restoration of possession by issuing warrants of possession. The decree-holder relied upon sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21 to justify relief.
  • Authorities cited in support included: Magna v. Rustam (AIR 1963 Raj 3), Sachi Prasad Mukherjee v. Amar Nath Rai Chowdhury (AIR 1919 Cal 674), and Thukalan Poulo Avira v. Basselios Gheevarghese (AIR 1954 Trav Co 117).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh, AIR 1972 Delhi 142 (Full Bench) Execution of a decree for injunction must follow Order 21, Rule 32; issue of a warrant for delivery of possession is not justified by Rule 35 or clause (e) of Section 51 where Rule 32 provides the mode. The Court relied on the Full Bench's observations to support the proposition that the execution procedure prescribed by Rule 32 governs and excludes resort to inherent powers or other provisions to obtain a warrant for delivery of possession in this context.
Murari Lal v. Nawal Kishore, AIR 1961 Punj 547 (Division Bench) Modes in Section 51 are to be guided by the procedure laid down in the schedule; a decree for mandatory injunction is to be executed by attachment, sale and detention as provided by Rule 32(1) and clause (e) of Section 51 is not available where the schedule applies. Cited (via the Full Bench) to demonstrate that where a statutory procedure exists for execution, the residuary clause cannot be invoked to override that procedure.
Anandi Lal v. Ram Sarup, AIR 1936 All 495 (Full Bench of Allahabad High Court) Similar principle to Murari Lal regarding applicability of schedule procedures and limitations on using clause (e) of Section 51. Used as antecedent authority cited by the Division Bench in Murari Lal and relied upon in the Full Bench analysis reproduced in the opinion.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lal Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008 (Supreme Court) Courts must ensure justice is done according to law; there are limitations on the powers of the courts and inherent powers cannot be invoked contrary to statutory provisions. Cited to support the general principle that inherent powers cannot be used to circumvent specific statutory rules of the Code.
Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 (Supreme Court) Where specific provisions of the Code deal with a topic and exhaust the scope of court's powers, the inherent power cannot be invoked to cut across the powers conferred by the Code. The Court applied this dictum to conclude that specific Code provisions (Order 21 rules) exclude exercise of inherent powers to order delivery of possession in the present case.
Magna v. Rustam, AIR 1963 Raj 3 Related to violation of an interim injunction during the pendency of the suit and permitted re-delivery of possession while the suit was pending. The Court observed this authority did not bear on the present facts because it concerned interim relief during pendency rather than execution after decree.
Sachi Prasad Mukherjee v. Amar Nath Rai Chowdhury, AIR 1919 Cal 674 Held that a suit for mandatory injunction (to demolish part of a wall beyond the height limited by a permanent injunction) was not maintainable and the remedy was by execution under sub-rule (5) of Rule 32. The Court found this decision not helpful to the decree-holder's case in the present circumstances and distinguished it on facts.
Thukalan Poulo Avira v. Basselios Gheevarghese, AIR 1954 Trav Co 117 (Travancore-Cochin) Observed that the remedy for violation of a decree is enforcement under Order 21, Rule 32 (i.e., to enforce the decree already obtained, rather than seeking a fresh injunction). The Court noted this decision actually went against the decree-holder's submission and supported the position that execution under Rule 32 is the appropriate remedy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the nature of the decree, the statutory modes of execution provided by the Code, the submissions of the parties and the authorities cited. The analysis and its logical steps were:

  1. The decree in favour of Mulakh Raj was for a permanent injunction; the Code provides specific modes of execution for such decrees, notably Order 21, Rule 32(1).
  2. The executing court had earlier proceeded under Order 21, Rule 32 to detain the judgment-debtors in civil prison following the decree-holder's execution application; the judgment-debtors' appeal against detention failed subject to a reduction in the period of detention.
  3. The decree-holder later applied (purportedly under Section 151 CPC) for warrants of possession, invoking the Court's inherent powers to obtain physical possession. The executing court granted the order directing issue of warrants on 31st August, 1979.
  4. The Court considered whether sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 or the inherent powers (or other provisions like Rule 35 or clause (e) of Section 51) could justify ordering delivery of possession to the decree-holder where there was no separate decree for delivery of immovable property.
  5. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision (Sarup Singh) and earlier authorities to conclude that where the Code contains specific provisions dealing with execution of a particular class of decrees, those provisions govern and exclude resort to inherent powers. The Supreme Court's dictum in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar was cited for the same principle.
  6. The Court analysed sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 and explained its practical scope: that it authorises the Court to direct that an act required by the decree may, so far as practicable, be done by the decree-holder or another person appointed by the Court at the judgment-debtor's cost. The Court observed, by reference to the statutory illustration and the language of the rule, that the act contemplated is one which the decree-holder (or an appointee) can perform voluntarily and practically — not an act which, in essence, requires the removal of the judgment-debtor's possession without the judgment-debtor's will.
  7. The Court pointed out a linguistic and functional distinction between sub-rule (3) of Rule 35 (where possession is to be delivered through court officers) and sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 (where the act is to be done by the decree-holder or another person, and not through court officers). From this distinction, the Court inferred that sub-rule (5) cannot be read to permit the court to have the decree-holder or appointee physically evict the judgment-debtor to obtain possession.
  8. Consequently, the Court concluded sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 cannot aid the decree-holder to obtain dispossession of the judgment-debtor, and one cannot convert a suit and decree for injunction into a suit and decree for recovery of possession with consequential relief in the execution department.
  9. As the Code prescribes the mode of execution for decrees of injunction (Order 21, Rule 32(1)) and since there was no decree for delivery of immovable property under Order 21, Rule 35 in the present case, the executing court had no power to issue warrants for delivery of possession by invoking inherent powers or Section 151 CPC.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition was allowed and the order of the executing court dated 31st August, 1979 ordering the issue of warrants of possession was set aside. (The opinion concludes: "Petition allowed.")

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the impugned order directing issuance of warrants of possession is quashed and the executing court's direction is removed.
  • The Court ordered that the parties shall bear their own costs in the present proceedings.
  • The reasoning emphasises that where the Code of Civil Procedure provides specific procedures for execution (here Order 21 provisions), those procedures must be followed and do not permit the executing court to resort to its inherent powers or Section 151 CPC to obtain a mode of execution that the Code does not provide in the given circumstance. The opinion does not state that a new precedent is being laid down beyond applying and following existing authorities; its holding rests on applying established principles.

    Sunder Dass v. Mulakh Raj And Others

    This revision petition is directed against the ex parte order of the executing court dated 31st August, 1979 ordering the issue of warrants of possession of the property in dispute.

    2. It appears that the respondent No. 1, Mulakh Raj, filed a suit for a decree for permanent injunction restraining petitioner, Sunder Das and one Bishamber Lal from interfering with his possession in relation to plots Nos. 32, 33 and 35, Wazir Nagar, Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi. The suit of Shri Mulakh Raj was decreed on 27th January, 1971 and a decree for permanent injunction was granted in his favour.

    3. In spite of the decree, the petitioner and Bishamber Lal disobeyed the decree and Mulakh Raj was dispossessed from the aforesaid property.

    4. Mulakh Raj then applied for execution on the terms contained in O. 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In view of the application of the decree-holder both Sunder Dass and Bishamber Lal were ordered to be detained in civil prison.

    5. The appeal of the judgment-debtors against their detention in civil prison failed and this court by order dated 23rd May, 1974 dismissed the Execution Second Appeal of behalf of the judgment-debtors (E. S.A 19/1973).

    6. The result of the aforesaid execution appeal was that the appeal was dismissed but the period of detention was reduced to six weeks.

    7. It appears that on 31-8-1975, practically eight years after the decree, the decree-holder made an application purporting to be under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating inter alia, “that the judgment-debtors have taken unauthorised possession of the premises in suit that application is being moved under Section 151 of C.P.C submitting before this Hon'ble Court that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue warrants of possession against the judgment-debtors under the inherent powers and even the orders be made to put the decree-holder in possession”.

    8. Thereafter the impugned order dated 31st August, 1979 was passed by the executing Court ordering the issue of warrants of possession of the property in dispute.

    9. Mr. Rawal, who appears for Sunder Das, judgment-debtor, has contended that the mode of execution of decree for permanent injunction is provided for in Order 21, Rule 32 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and since there is no decree for delivery of immovable property no orders could be passed for issue of warrants of possession. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the judgment-debtor relied on the Full Bench decision of this Court reported as AIR 1972 Delhi 142, Sarup Singh… v. Daryodhan Singh… Singh.

    10. It is true that the decree in that case was for mandatory injunction. The observations of the Full Bench in paragraphs 9 and 10 are relevant and are reproduced below :—

    “9. The learned counsel for the respondent has lastly urged that the Court cannot allow its decree to be disobeyed contumaciously and it must device some procedure under Clause (e) of Section 51 of the Code and in exercise of the said power, the execution court must use force to compel the judgment-debtor to vacate the premises. Clause (e) contains a residuary provision which comes into play where the decree in question cannot be executed according to clauses (a) to (d) or any other provision of law. Section 51 itself begins with the qualifying phrase “subject to such conditions and limitation” as may be prescribed, that is to say prescribed by statutory rules of the Code as defined by Section 2. This clause came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Murari Lal v. Nawal Kishore, AIR 1961 Punj 547, where S.S Dulat and D.K Mahajan, JJ. followed a Full Bench authority of the High Court of Allahabad, Anandi Lal v. Ram Sarup, AIR 1936 All 495 and observed that all the various modes mentioned in Section 51 were not open to an execution Court in every case and it was to be guided by the procedure laid down in the schedule and must resort to the method appropriate to each case and that a decree for mandatory injunction had to be executed by attachment and sale of the judgment-debtors property and by detention in civil prison as provided by Rule 32 (1) of Order XXI of the Code and since this guide had been provided, no resort could be had in clause (e) of Section 51.

    11. The Division Bench repelled the argument advanced before it that the decree would be rendered useless unless it was executed in accordance with sub-rule (5) and the Court observed that the decree had to be executed in accordance with Rule 32 (1) and merely because another mode of execution which was sought and was not available, would not render the decree useless. The counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon an authority of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lal Pancham, AIR 1965 SC 1008, in support of the proposition that there are certain limitations which the law confers upon the powers of the Courts and it is duty of a Court of law not only to do justice but to ensure that justice is done only according to law and not otherwise. Reference may also be made to Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993, where the Court observed that where there are specific provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic and they expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the powers of the Court or jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to a matter, the inherent power of the Court cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code; the prohibition contained in Code need not be express, but may be implied or be implicit from the very nature of things that it makes for covering the contingencies to which it relates.

    10. Applying the dictum of the Supreme Court, it follows that a decree for injunction must be executed in the manner provided by Rule 32, and the issue of a warrant for delivery of possession in execution of a decree for injunction is not justified either by R. 35 of Order XXI or clause (e) of Sec. 51.”

    12. Mr. D.L Malhotra, counsel for respondent No. 1, on the other hand, submitted that it the decree for permanent injunction is violated, the court has inherent powers to order restoration of possession by ordering the issue of warrants of possession. In this connection he relied upon sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He also referred to the decisions in Magna v. Rustam, AIR 1963 Raj 3; Sachi Prasad Mukherjee v. Amar Nath Rai Chowdhury, AIR 1919 Cal 674; and Thukalan Poulo Avira v. Basselios Gheevarghese, AIR 1954 Trav Co 117.

    13. Before I deal with O. 21, R. 32 sub-rule (5), it may be mentioned that none of these authorities have any bearing on the facts of the present case.

    14. The Rajasthan case relates to the violation of the interim injunction issued during the pendency of the suit and it was in this circumstance that while the suit was pending the Court directed for re-delivery of the possession.

    15. The decision given by the Calcutta High Court again is of no help to the decree-holder. In that case the plaintiff had brought a suit for mandatory injunction for demolition of a wall in so far as it was above the height limited by a permanent injunction awarded against the defendant by a decree made in the plaintiff's favour. It was held that the suit was not maintainable and the remedy of the plaintiff was by way of an application for execution of a decree as contemplated by sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    16. The judgment of the Travancore-Cochin, in fact, goes against the submission made on behalf of the decree-holder. In fact, the observations of Menon, J., was that the remedy was not to apply for a further injunction from the High Court but to enforce the decree, already obtained, under Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    17. I have already reproduced the observations of the Full Bench of this Court while dealing with the interpretation of sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. With regard to the scope of sub-rule (5) of Order 32 the Full Bench has observed in paragraphs 6 and 7 as under:—

    “6. sub-rule (5) of Rule 32, under which the decree-holder seeks relief, authorises the Court to direct that the act required to be done, may be done, -so far as practicable, by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court at the cost of the judgment-debtor. The statutory illustration illustrates the scope of the rule by an instance that were a person of little substance erects a building which renders a family mansion uninhabitable and the judgment-debtor, in spite of his detention in prison and attachment of property, declines to obey the decree, the Court may remove the building which the decree has directed to do and may recover the cost from the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings. This shows that the act which is authorised by sub-rule (5) to be done consists of something which may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder himself at the expense of the judgment-debtor. The decree of the Court directing the judgment-debtor to quit and vacate the premises cannot constitute an act which may, without the will and volition of the judgment-debtor, be done by the decree-holder.

    Obviously, the decree-holder cannot vacate the premises in place of the judgment-debtor and deliver its possession to himself and recover its costs. Reference may also be made to the distinction in the language of sub-rule (3) of Rule 35 and of sub-rule (5) of Rule 32; while in the former, the possession is to be delivered through its officers, in the latter the act is to be done by the decree-holder or by (and not through) another person. Consequently, obedience of the injunction to vacate cannot be done by any officer or other person appointed by the Court as well.

    7. As such, the conclusion is inevitable that sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 can, in the nature of things, not come to the aid of the decree-holder to obtain dispossession of the judgment-debtor and it would be impossible to convert a suit and a decree for injunction into a suit and decree for recovery of possession and afford consequential relief in the execution department.” (emphasis supplied)

    18. Therefore, resort cannot be had to sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 or sub-rule (1) of Rule 35 either. Since the made of execution of a decree for permanent injunction is specifically provided for in O. 21, Rule 32 (1), no resort can be had to the inherent powers of the Court.

    19. I have already quoted the observations of Supreme Court in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993, which have been noticed by Full Bench. Thus where there are specific provisions of the Code dealing with a particular topic either expressly or by necessary implication they exclude the exercise of inherent powers of the Court.

    20. As to when an order for delivery of possession can be passed, it can be gathered from the provisions of O. 21, Rule 35. There was no such decree in the present case and, therefore, no order could be passed for issue of warrants of possession.

    21. The result is that the revision petition succeeds. The order of the executing Court dated 31st August, 1979 is, therefore, set aside.

    22. On the facts of the case the parties are left to bear their own costs of the present proceedings.

    Petition allowed.
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    Sunder Dass v. Mulakh Raj And Others
    (Dec 10, 1980)