Salil Kumar Datta, J.:-

(1) This is an appeal by the shalimar rope works ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the company) against a decree passed by the employees insurance court against it and others for a sum of rs. 3307. 99 p. With interest. The employees' state insurance corporation (hereinafter referred to as the corporation) filed an application on march 27,1963 in the said court under section 75 (2) (a) of the employees' state insurance act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the said act) stating that the company as the principal employer of the factory came under the purview of the said act and was under the statutory obligation to insure all employees of its factory and to pay both employer's and the employees' contribution at rates provided in section 39 read with the first schedule of the said act. The company more or less complied with the provisions of the said act though after due dates when evasions therefrom were detected. On an inspection of the records of the company carried out by the inspector of the corporation it transpired that the company, during the period from september 1, 1955 to december 31, 1961. Failed to pay the employees' contribution on over - time wages of rs. 1,32,316. 10 p. Particulars whereof were given in schedule 'a' to the application. The employees' contribution on the said over - time wages at the rate of 21/2% amounted to rs. 3307. 99 p. Which remained due inspite of demands. On the contrary, the company denied its liability therefor on september 17, 1962 when the cause of action of the present proceeding arose. The corporation in the circumstances filed the application on march 27, 1963 in the insurance court praying for a decree for the said amount with interest against the company, its manager and its managing agents bangur brothers ltd.

(2) The company, its manager and the managing agents filed a joint written statement contending, inter alia, that the amount involved in the case was not wages under the act, but payments made to casual stray coolies for odd jobs and accordingly, no contribution was payable in respect thereof. It was further contended that entries in some eases as over - time wages were made in the books through misconception, mistake or inadvertance, while, in fact, they were not wages. It was also contended that the claim was barred by limitation. An additional written statement was filed by the company wherein it was stated that delivery of the raw materials to the factory site and transport of finished products were done by the head office by engaging stray coolies and they were paid by the head office and not by the factory. Persons so engaged were not connected with manufacturing process of the factory and the figures referred to in schedule 'a' to the petition appeared to have been taken from the head office register and not from any record maintained by the factory. The application which was filed, was, in the circumstances, liable to be dismissed.

(3) The employees' insurance court, on trial on evidence, held that the application was not barred by limitation as the indian limitation act had no application to the claim in dispute. On merits, the court found that the record of june, 1958 which was produced showed the relevant entries as payments o. F over - time allowance. The court also found on evidence that according to the company the payments were made to stray casual coolies through sarkars, hut there were no vouchers or accounts from sarkars who, according to o. P. W. 2, accountant of the head office, received the amounts for payments to such coolies. The court also examined the cash book, ext. A (3) and was satisfied that the payments were made as overtime wages and not for hiring coolies for the purpose of loading and unloading as contended. As the payments were for wages it was presumed that they were made to the employees of the company which was accordingly liable far the employees' contribution in respect thereof. The application, in 'the circumstances, was allowed and a decree for the amount claimed was passed. The present appeal is by the company and its manager against the said decision.

(4) Mr. Amiya narayan mukherji, the learned counsel for the appellant, has contended before us that the application was barred by limitation. He further contended that the finding of rthe insurance court that the amount in question was paid as over - time wages to the employees of the company is erroneous, as there was no material before it to warrant the finding.

(5) Mr. Prosanta kumar ghosh, the learned counsel for the respondent, the employees state insurance corporation, disputed the above contentions. It was submitted that the limitation act had no application to the instant proceedings and, accordingly the present application was not barred by limitation. Regarding the finding of the insurance court about the amount being paid as over - time wages to the employees of the company, it was pointed out that such finding was a finding of fact on the evidence on the record and cannot be interfered with in this appeal as in view of the provisions of section 82 (1) and (2) of the said act an appeal on. An issue of fact is incompetent. No question of law, far less any substantial question of law, was involved in this appeal.

(6) Mr. Mukherjee, however, contended in rejoinder that once an appeal is admitted for hearing, the entire case is open before this court and there is no fetter on it in law to come to a decision of its own on all issues including those on facts. Accordingly, the present appeal was maintainable and this 'court can enter into the question of fact at the final hearing of the appeal after its admission.

(7) As to the question of limitation, it is sought to be contended that article 181 of the limitation act which provides for a limitation of three years was a bar at least to a part of the claim. It would, however, appear that in the employees' state insurance act itself there is no provision for limitation. The provision for limitation, however, was introduced by a subsequent amending act being act 44 of 1966 whereby a new sub - section as l (a) to section 77 of the said act was inserted whereby limitation of three years from the date of cause of action was provided. The provision of this act, however, was not made retrospective. It appears that this amending act was brought into force with effect from june 17, 1967.

(8) It was held in the casa of (1) bombay gas co. Ltd. V. Gopal bhiva, reported in a. I. R. 1964 s. C. 752 that article 181 of the limitation act applies only to an application under the code of civil procedure. It was observed in that case that where the legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness and justice. This decision was followed in (2) wazir chand mahajan and anr. V. Union of india a. I. R. 1967 s. C. 990 a case under the arbitration act where it was observed as follows:

"the terms of article 181 are general, and are apparently restricted to the applications under the code of civil procedure. But that article is included in the group of articles which fall under the head 'third division applications. " as originally enacted, all applications contemplated to be made under articles 158 to 180, were applications made under the code of civil procedure and there was a catena of authorities holding that in article 181 the expression 'under the code of civil procedure' must be deemed to be necessarily implicit. The reason which persuaded the courts to hold that the expression 'under the code' was deemed added to the article 181 has now disappeared (in view of the provision of the arbitration act, 1940) , but on that account the expression 'application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule' in article 181 cannot be given a connotation different from the one which prevailed for nearly 60 years before 1940. "

Mr. Mukherji has referred to some other decision of this court in (3) sarvomangala dasi v. Paritosh kumar das, reported in i. L. R. 1953 (1) calcutta, 106 in which it was observed by way of obiter that article 181 of the first schedule to the indian limitation act should not be confined to application under the code of civil procedure alone. In view, however, of the decision of the supreme court, referred to above, there is no further scope, in our opinion, to argue that the provision of article 181 of the limitation act applies to the facts of the present case.

(9) Mr. Mukherjee further argued that the employees insurance court iis a civil court and as such, an application made to that court would be also an application governed under the code of civil procedure. This argument, in our opinion, is without substance, inasmuch as the present application is one under section 75 (2) of the employees' state insurance act. Further, under section 78 (1) of the act, the employees insurance court has been only given the powers of a civil court for certain purposes. It would, therefore, be not correct to say that merely because powers under the code of civil procedure iis exercisable by the insurance court, tke application should be deemed to be an application under the code.

(10) The next point that has been contended by mr. Mukherji is that this court is entitled to enter into the question of fact once the appeal is admitted. Reliance was placed on the decision in (4) a. Raghavamma and anr. V. Chenchamma and anr. Reported in a. I. R. 1964 s. C. 136 in which it was observed that once a certificate under article 133 of the constitution is given the terms of the certificate could not circumscribe the scope of the appeal and the supreme court had undoubtedly power as a court of appeal, to consider the correctness of the decision appealed against from every standpointwhether on question of fact or of law. It was observed that once the certificate was good the provision of article 133 did not confine the scope of the appeal to the certificate. On this analogy, mr. Mukherji argued that this court can interfere with the findings of the insurance court on fact after its admission.

(11) The relevant provisions of the employees' state insurance act, 1948 are as follows :

"sec. 82 (1). Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an employees' insurance court. (2). An appeal shall lie to the high court from an order of an employees' insurance court if it involves a substantial question of law."

It is well known that appeal is a creature of the statute and no one has any vested right of appeal apart from the statute. The statute providing for an appeal from the decision of the employees' insurance court circumscribes it only to substantial questions of law and save as expressly provided as above, no appeal has been provided from any order of such court. In the case of article 133, the conditions for grant of certificate have been prescribed but as has been noticed by the supreme court, also in the case cited above, there is no provision in the said article confining the scope of the appeal to the certificate. On the other hand, in the statute before us, it is clear that the appeal itself is confined only to substantial question of law. It is, therefore, not possible in appeal under the said act to traverse beyond the substantial questions of law, if any, involved in the appeal and apart front such questions, the appeal is incompe tent. The findings of fact, arrived at) by the insurance court, accordingly, are outside the scope of this appeal and mere admission of the appeal under order 41, rule 11 of the code of civil procedure cannot enlarge the scope of the appeal so admitted. As all contentions raised before us on behalf of the appellant fail, this appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.