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citation codes
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  • S. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • S. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • S. 62 by Act 20 of 1948, Madras
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • S. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • S. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • S. 62 by Act 20 of 1948, Madras
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking certiorari (or other appropriate writ) to quash order Ext. P.1 dated 29-9-1958 of the Regional Transport Authority (1st respondent), Cannanore, which granted temporary permits to Respondents 2 and 3.

The petitioners had earlier applied for a pucca (permanent) permit for a stage carriage on the Cannanore–Mambaram via Chala route (11 miles). By order dated 31-10-1957 a pucca permit was granted to T.T. Narayanan. The petitioner appealed that grant to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Trichur; the appeal is pending and the Appellate Tribunal stayed operation of the pucca-permit order. Subsequently, respondents 2 and 3 applied for temporary permits for the same route; the Regional Transport Authority granted each of them a temporary permit to run a bus “till the disposal of the appeal or for a period of 4 months, whichever expires first” (Ext. P.1). The petition challenges Ext. P.1 as without jurisdiction and bad for other reasons.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Regional Transport Authority had jurisdiction to grant temporary permits (Ext. P.1) during the pendency of an appeal against the grant of a pucca permit to another applicant.
  2. Whether the factual need for additional stage-carriage services on the route was of a temporary nature (permitting the grant under S. 62) or of a permanent nature (making a temporary permit inappropriate).
  3. Whether the impugned order (Ext. P.1) was bad for want of recorded reasons for the grant.
  4. Whether the petitioner was precluded from approaching the High Court under Article 226 because an alternative statutory remedy under S. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act was available and should have been invoked.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Regional Transport Authority acted without jurisdiction in granting temporary permits (Ext. P.1) while an appeal against a pucca permit was pending.
  • There was no temporary need justifying temporary permits; the need for additional service was permanent (as shown by the grant of a pucca permit to another party).
  • The impugned order did not state reasons for its grant and therefore was bad.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The 3rd respondent denied the alleged infirmities in Ext. P.1 and contended that the Regional Transport Authority had jurisdiction to grant the temporary permits.
  • Respondents argued that the petitioner should have sought redress under S. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., by moving the State Transport Authority) before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226; the availability of that statutory remedy was pleaded as a bar to the petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 Where a statute provides remedies for redress/ correction of errors, those remedies should generally be relied upon rather than resorting at once to constitutional writ jurisdiction. The court relied on this principle to treat the availability of S. 64(a) as a relevant consideration and to emphasize the regular administrative hierarchy established by the statute for permit regulation.
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh, 1958 SCR 595 : AIR 1958 SC 86 The writ of certiorari is discretionary; it may be issued despite the availability of other remedies only in exceptional cases of patent jurisdictional error, manifest excess of jurisdiction, or conduct violating basic rules of natural justice such that the decision bears an indelible stamp of infirmity. The court applied this authority to hold that the petitioner did not establish circumstances of that exceptional kind; accordingly, the High Court should not exercise its discretion to issue certiorari when the statutory remedy under S. 64(a) remained available and not shown to be ineffective.
Mohammad v. Regional Transport Authority, Trichur, 1957 Ker LT 879 : AIR 1958 Kerala 140 Interpretation that the proviso to S. 62 (prohibiting grant during pendency of an application under S. 46 or S. 54) operates when the application is pending before the Regional Transport Authority itself, not when it is pending on appeal before the appellate authority. The court agreed with this view and applied it to reject the petitioner's contention that the proviso barred the grant of a temporary permit because of the pendency of the appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main stages: (A) consideration of the preliminary objection based on availability of the statutory remedy under S. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act; and (B) merits analysis under S. 62 governing temporary permits.

(A) Preliminary objection under S. 64(a)

  • The respondents argued that the petitioner should have sought revision or other relief from the State Transport Authority under S. 64(a) before invoking Article 226. The court reviewed the statutory scheme and decisions of the Supreme Court (Veerappa Pillai) emphasizing that where a statute prescribes remedies for correction of errors, those remedies are ordinarily to be used.
  • The court also applied the Supreme Court's decision in State of U.P. v. Mohammed Nooh, which recognizes that certiorari is discretionary and will ordinarily be declined where statutory remedies exist, except in exceptional circumstances of patent illegality or conduct infecting the decision with an indelible vice.
  • The court found that the petitioner did not show that revision before the State Transport Authority would be ineffective or that circumstances of the exceptional type existed. Therefore the court declined to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction on that ground.

(B) Merits under S. 62 (temporary permits)

  • S. 62 permits temporary grants for enumerated purposes (a)-(d). The petitioner argued the need was permanent (pucca permit already granted to another) and not temporary, so a temporary permit could not properly be granted.
  • The court observed that in the Malabar area the Madras amendment (Act 20 of 1948) to S. 62 added a sub-clause (d) allowing the Regional Transport Authority to grant temporary permits "in such circumstances as may, in the opinion of such authority, justify the grant of such permit." The court emphasised that this sub-clause confers a discretionary judgment to be made by the Authority and is not confined to grounds analogous to (a)-(c).
  • The court noted the petitioner's concession that the existing stage carriage on the route could not cope with traffic (a factual finding in the record). The pucca permit could not be acted upon because of the appellate stay. The limited duration of the temporary permits (till disposal of the appeal or four months) indicated that the Authority was satisfied additional temporary facilities were necessary for public convenience during the period specified.
  • As to the argument based on the proviso to S. 62 (that a temporary permit cannot be granted during the pendency of an application under S. 46 or S. 54), the court followed the previously reported decision (Mohammad v. RTA, Trichur) that the proviso operates only where the application is pending before the Regional Transport Authority itself, not where the matter is pending on appeal. The court accepted this view and rejected the petitioner's contention that the appeal rendered the application "pending" for purposes of the proviso.
  • On the merits, therefore, the court concluded that the Regional Transport Authority's grant of temporary permits under the Madras-amended S. 62 was justified in the circumstances described.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Original Petition under Article 226 is dismissed.
  • The petitioners were ordered to pay costs, including counsel fees of Rs. 100 to each of the respondents.

Broader implications: The court applied established statutory-interpretation principles and existing authorities to decline discretionary writ relief where statutory remedies were available and to uphold the Regional Transport Authority's discretion under the Madras amendment to S. 62. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond its application of existing decisions.

Disposition: Petition dismissed with costs (including counsel fee of Rs. 100 to each respondent).

    New Kerala Bus Transport v. Regional Transport Authority, Cannanore And Ors.

    Judgement

    This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or order quashing the order Ext. P. 1 dated 29-9-1958 of the 1st respondent, the Regional Transport Authority, Cannanore, granting temporary permits to Respondents 2 and 3.

    2. The petitioners case is that the 1st respondent has called for applications for a pucca permit for a stage carriage along the Cannanore-Mambaram via Chala route covering a distance of 11 miles. After hearing all the applicants a permit was granted to one T.T. Narayanan by order dated 31-10-1957. The petitioner preferred an appeal from the said order to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Trichur and the same is now pending disposal. On the application of the petitioner the Appellate Tribunal stayed the operation of the order granting permit to T.T. Narayanan. The 1st respondent then received applications from respondents 2 and 3 for temporary permits on the same route and the applications were granted by order Ext. P. 1 dated 29-9-1958. A temporary permit to run a bus till the disposal of the appeal or for a period of 4 months, whichever expires first, was granted to each of the respondents and it is this order which is sought to be quashed. The petitioners case is that the order is without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed.

    The main grounds relied on by the petitioner are that there was no temporary need as distinguished from a permanent need, that the 1st respondent had no jurisdiction to grant a temporary permit during the pendency of the appeal from the order granting pucca permit and that the order is bad inasmuch as it does not state reasons for the grant. He therefore prays for the issue of a writ or order as stated above.

    3. Respondents 2 and 3 opposed the petition. The 3rd respondent has filed a counter affidavit denying the alleged infirmities in the order and contending that the 1st respondent had jurisdiction to grant the same. It is also contended that the original petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has not cared to pursue the remedy provided by S. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, before moving this court under Art. 226.

    4. The preliminary objection raised by Respondents 2 and 3 may be considered. This is based on S. 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act which is as follows :

    "The State Transport Authority may either on its own motion or on an application made to it call for the records of any case in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Authority that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal the State Transport Authority may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit."

    It is contended by the respondents that the petitioner should have moved the State Transport Authority for redress before approaching this court for the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction. The existence of the remedy, provided by S. 64(a) is thus pleaded as a bar to tins petition. I may in this connection refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192, where the validity of the order passed under the Motor Vehicles Act was in question.

    It was pointed out that there was the regular hierarchy of administrative bodies established to deal with the regulation of transport by means of Motor Vehicles and that there was a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities.

    The Supreme Court held that where remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors were provided in the Statute itself it was to these remedies that resort must generally be had. The latest decision of the Supreme Court on this point is the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammed Nooh, 1958 SCR 595 : (AIR 1958 SC 86). On the question whether a writ of certiorari should issue when other remedies are open it was held :

    "On the authorities referred to above it appears to us that there may conceivably be cases - and the instant case is in point - where the error, irregularity or illegality touching jurisdiction or procedure committed by an inferior court or tribunal of first instance is so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves on its decision an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or cured on appeal or revision. If an inferior court or tribunal of first instance acts wholly without jurisdiction or patently in excess of jurisdiction or manifestly conducts the proceedings before it in a manner which is contrary to the rules of natural justice and all accepted rules of procedure and which offends the superior courts sense of fair play the superior court may, we think, quite properly exercise its power to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari to correct the error of the court or tribunal of first instance, even if an appeal to another inferior court or tribunal was available and recourse was not had to it or if recourse was had to it, it confirmed what ex facie was a nullity for reasons aforementioned. This would be so all the more if the tribunals holding the original trial and the tribunals hearing the appeal or revision were merely departmental tribunals composed of persons belonging to the departmental hierarchy without adequate legal training and background and whose glaring lapses occasionally come to our notice. The superior court will ordinarily decline to interfere by issuing certiorari and all we say is that in a proper case of the kind mentioned above it has the power to do so and may and should exercise it. We say no more than that."

    The issue of a writ of certiorari is discretionary, and the existence of another remedy may be taken into consideration in the exercise of discretion. The petitioner has no case that a revision before the State Transport Authority would have been ineffective. I do not consider this a fit case for exercising the discretion in favour of the petitioner as circumstances such as are mentioned in 1958 SCR 595 : (AIR 1958 SC 86), do not exist in this case. This will be clear from what is stated below.

    5. The grant of temporary permits is regulated by S. 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act which enables the Regional Transport Authority to grant temporary permits (a) for the convenience of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings or (b) for the purpose of a seasonal business or (c) to meet a particular temporary need or (d) pending decision on an application for renewal of a permit. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that though there was actually need for additional stage carriages on the route, such need was not of a temporary nature as seen from the fact that the 1st respondent decided to give pucca permit to operate a stage carriage on the route. This shows that the need was of a permanent nature and the fact that an additional Stage Carriage could not be put on the route on account of the order of stay passed by the Appellate Tribunal cannot convert such permanent need to one of a temporary nature. This position has been upheld by decisions of this Court as well as other courts but it is unnecessary to refer to the decisions cited on the point as the position was not controverted. However the respondents rely on an amendment to S. 62 by Act 20 of 1948, Madras which introduced a sub-clause as sub-clause (d) which is in these terms :

    "In such circumstances as may, in the opinion of such authority, justify the grant of such permit."

    It may be stated that cl. (d) as it appears in the Central Act was added by a Central enactment on a later date. Section 62 as it is now in force in the State of Madras thus has really 5 clauses of which two are numbered as (d) by reason of State and Central enactments. This case is one from the Malabar area and it is governed by S. 62 as amended by Act 20 of 1948 (Madras). According to the Madras amendment a temporary permit can be granted in such circumstances as may in the opinion of the Regional Transport Authority, justify the grant of such permit. This, sub-clause is not Hedged in by conditions as the earlier ones and all that is required is that the Authority should be satisfied of the necessity to put an additional Stage carriage on the route.

    It is conceded by the petitioner that the Stage carriage plying on the route could not cope with the traffic and that there was need for providing additional facilities. The pucca permit granted could not be availed of on account of the order of stay issued by the appellate authority. The duration of the permit viz. till the disposal of the appeal or 4 months whichever should expire first, shows that the 1st Respondent was satisfied that there should be additional facilities for the convenience of the public during the said period. This in my opinion justified the grant of a temporary permit under sub-clause (d).

    6. It is however necessary to consider two points raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. The first was that sub-clause (d) could be availed of only on some ground analogous to those in sub-clauses (a) to (c). There is nothing in sub-clause (d) which supports this argument. Another was that the 1st Respondent could not issue a temporary permit during the pendency of the appeal from the order granting pucca permit.

    This argument is based on the second proviso to S. 62 which prohibits such grant during the pendency of an application for a permit under S. 46 or S. 54. It is argued that the application should be deemed pending in view of the appeal from the order granting the permit. There is at past one reported decision of this court holding that the pendency of the application should be before the Regional Transport Authority and not in appeal before the appellate Authority, if the proviso is to come into operation. See Mohammad v. Regional Transport Authority. Trichur, 1957 Ker LT 879 : (AIR 1958 Kerala 140). I am in agreement with this view and the argument of the petitioner cannot therefore be accepted. The petition must therefore fail as the petitioner has no case on the merits either.

    7. In the result, the Original Petition is dismissed with costs including Counsels fee of Rs. 100/- to each of the respondents.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    New Kerala Bus Transport v. Regional Transport Authority, Cannanore And Ors.
    (Dec 23, 1958)