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  • section 11, explanation 6, of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Agriculturists Relief Act
  • Order XXXIV, rule 1,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • section 11, explanation 6, of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Agriculturists Relief Act
  • Order XXXIV, rule 1,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (all minors except plaintiff No. 1) sued for a declaration that their interest in the plaint property was not liable to be sold in execution of the decree passed in Suit No. 116 of 1910 and for an injunction restraining the defendant from selling their right, title and interest in the execution proceedings; alternatively they sought an account under the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act and leave to redeem the mortgage.

Factual matrix: Narayan Yeshwant (the plaintiffs' grandfather) mortgaged his property to the defendants. The defendants instituted Suit No. 116 of 1910 against Narayan (the mortgagor) with his sons as parties and obtained a decree which was confirmed on appeal and in second appeal (reported as Pandurang Narayan v. Bhagwandas Atmaramshet).

The present plaintiffs include Nos. 1 and 2 (sons of Pandurang) and other plaintiffs who are sons of other sons of Narayan. Only plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 were born in 1910; the court treated the other plaintiffs (not in existence at the date of the 1910 suit) as having no locus standi for the purpose of this appeal.

Procedural history: The Subordinate Judge of Bassein framed two preliminary issues: (1) whether the present suit was res judicata by reason of Suit No. 116 of 1910; and (2) whether the suit was maintainable. The Subordinate Judge held the suit was not barred by res judicata but that it was not maintainable, and dismissed the suit. On appeal the District Judge of Thana held the suit was barred by res judicata and not maintainable, and dismissed the appeal. The plaintiffs brought the present second appeal, raising the same two issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit is barred by res judicata by reason of the decision in Suit No. 116 of 1910.
  2. Whether the present suit is maintainable, in particular whether the mortgage (said to be to discharge antecedent debts) binds the minor plaintiffs.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Section 11, Explanation 6 of the Civil Procedure Code has no reference to the facts of the present litigation and does not bar the suit.
  • All coparceners are necessary parties to a mortgage suit and the present plaintiffs were not represented by their fathers in the 1910 suit.
  • Reliance on authorities said to show that minors or absent coparceners were not necessarily bound where representation was insufficient; specific case reliance included Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayan (argued to rest on Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar and Lala Surja Prosad v. Golab Chand), Padmakar Vinayak Joshi v. Mahadev Krishna Joshi, Debi Prosad Sahi v. Dharamjit Narayan Singh, and the Full Bench Allahabad decision in Jagdish Prasad v. Hoshyar Singh (contention as to interpretation of 'debt' in Brij Narain).
  • Challenged earlier observations (in Pandurang v. Bhagwandas) on the basis of rules in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The fathers (managing members) effectively represented their minor sons in the 1910 litigation and, therefore, the matter is res judicata as regards the present plaintiffs; reliance was placed on Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar and Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayan.
  • The mortgage was to discharge antecedent debts and is therefore binding on the estate (and on the minor plaintiffs); reliance on the finding in Pandurang v. Bhagwandas and the Privy Council ruling in Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pandurang Narayan v. Bhagwandas Atmaramshet (report of the High Court) Previous decision in the 1910 litigation; finding that the mortgage's object was to pay antecedent debts incurred by the father prior to the mortgage. Used as the prior adjudication which concluded that the mortgage was to discharge antecedent debts; the court treated that finding as concluding the issue of antecedent debt for present purposes.
Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayan Authority for the proposition that minors may be represented by adult members of a Hindu joint family (the karta/father) in litigation. Relied upon to hold that the minor plaintiffs were sufficiently represented by their father Pandurang in the 1910 suit, supporting res judicata.
Govind v. Sakharam Illustrative of representation by adult family members; distinguished because it was not a suit on a mortgage. Distinguished from the present mortgage context; cited to show that specific circumstances (suit type) matter.
Ramchandra Narayan v. Shripatrao Held that abatement of a suit by one member of an undivided Hindu family did not necessarily deprive coparceners of the right to sue where there was no indication of representative capacity. Noted as a case concerning adult coparceners (a brother), and thus distinguished from the present father-minor relationship.
Debi Prosad Sahi v. Dharamjit Narayan Singh Held that the karta of a joint Hindu family was bound in a suit on a mortgage to join as a party where a family member had a joint interest. Observed to be a case of a major and where the objection as to parties was taken in the suit itself; used by appellants but treated as distinguishable on facts.
Padmakar Vinayak Joshi v. Mahadev Krishna Joshi Where a major brother had brought a suit during plaintiffs' minority and it was dismissed, a subsequent redemption suit by the plaintiffs was held not barred if plaintiffs were not sufficiently represented. Relied on by appellants to argue insufficient representation; the court considered it but found the present facts different (father actively contested for himself and thereby represented minors).
Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar (Privy Council) Held that plaintiffs who sued to redeem after foreclosure were properly and effectively represented in the mortgage suit by managing members of the joint Hindu family; principle of effective representation by family managers. Relied on by respondents and followed by the court to support the conclusion that the minors were represented by their father; treated as of general application.
Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad (Privy Council) Laid down five propositions about a managing member's power to burden an undivided estate, including that a mortgage purporting to burden the estate binds it if it is to discharge antecedent debt (and that antecedent debt means antecedent in fact as well as time). The court applied propositions from this case (particularly Nos. 2–4 and 3) to hold that the mortgage here—admitted to be to discharge antecedent debts—binds the minor plaintiffs, making the suit not maintainable.
Jagdish Prasad v. Hoshyar Singh (Allahabad Full Bench) Held that the word "debt" in proposition No. 2 of Brij Narain does not include mortgage debt (as applied in that case). Cited by appellants; the court distinguished it because in the present case there was a finding of antecedent debt and thus Brij Narain's proposition No. 3 applied to bind the estate.
Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar Referenced as an antecedent authority underpinning representation principles relied on in Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayan. Cited as background authority for representation principles; the court noted the chain of reliance but found Ramkrishna still good law.
Lala Surja Prosad v. Golab Chand Referenced as an authority in the lineage of decisions concerning representation; the appellants suggested a later overturning, but the court observed Ramkrishna had not been dissented from. Cited in discussion of conflicting authorities on representation; treated as part of the authorities considered but not decisive here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court separated the questions and considered them in order.

On res judicata: the court confined consideration to plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 (only those born in 1910). The trial judge had held the suit was not barred because the present plaintiffs were not parties and claimed in their own right. The District Judge held the suit barred under section 11, Explanation 6, Civil Procedure Code, reasoning that the fathers had litigated in respect of a private right claimed in common for themselves and their children.

The present court held that the minor plaintiffs were sufficiently represented by their father Pandurang in the prior litigation. The court relied on the principle that the Hindu joint family is represented in its transactions by the karta and that Order XXXIV, rule 1, does not interfere with the Hindu-law rule that a Hindu father can represent his sons. The court cited and followed authorities (Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayan; Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar) establishing occasions where the manager of a joint family speaks for and binds the family. The court noted the father (Pandurang) was the principal contesting defendant in 1910 and had raised every objection that could be taken, including an objection that his minor sons should be made parties (albeit late), and that had the minors been placed on record the result would have been the same. For these reasons the court concluded the matter was res judicata as to the minors. The court also observed that this conclusion was reached independently of any reliance on section 11, Explanation 6, whose applicability was regarded as perhaps doubtful.

On maintainability: both lower courts had found the suit not maintainable because the mortgage was for an antecedent debt binding on the plaintiffs. The court considered the High Court's finding in Pandurang v. Bhagwandas that the mortgage's object was to pay antecedent debts incurred by the father prior to the mortgage. The appellants argued that Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad modified or overruled that view, but the court analysed Brij Narain's five propositions and concluded that they supported, rather than contradicted, the High Court's finding in Pandurang.

The court applied relevant propositions from Brij Narain (notably that a father may lay the estate open to execution for debts he incurred, that a mortgage will bind if it discharges an antecedent debt, and that "antecedent debt" means antecedent in fact as well as time). Because the consideration for the mortgage was admitted (Rs. 700 owed to the mortgagee and Rs. 799 to pay off other antecedent debts), and there was a finding that these were antecedent debts in fact, the court held the mortgage binds the estate and therefore binds the minor plaintiffs. The court distinguished contrary authority (Jagdish Prasad) on the ground that in the present case there was a finding of antecedent debt.

Based on the above analyses the court concluded that (1) the present suit was res judicata in respect of plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, and (2) in any event the mortgage, being to discharge antecedent debts, bound the minor plaintiffs and so the suit was not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed and the decree is confirmed.

Implications:

  • The court held that plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 were bound by the decree in Suit No. 116 of 1910 because they were sufficiently represented by their father in the prior litigation; the matter is therefore res judicata as to them.
  • The mortgage in question was held to be to discharge antecedent debts and therefore binds the minor plaintiffs; as a consequence the present suit is not maintainable.
  • The immediate effect is dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims and confirmation of the decree in the earlier suit. The opinion does not announce any new legal principle beyond applying existing authorities to the facts; it does not state that it sets a novel precedent or departs from binding authorities.
Decree confirmed.

Delivered by Baker, J.; appeal dismissed with costs. (B.G.R)

    Madhusudan Pandurang Samant v. Bhagwan Atmaram

    Baker, J.:—

    This appeal involves important questions of law. The plaintiffs who are all minors except plaintiff No. 1 sued for a declaration that their interest in the plaint property is not liable to be sold in execution of the decree passed in Suit No. 116 of 1910 and for an injunction, preventing the defendant from selling their right, title and interest in the execution proceedings now pending, and in the alternative praying that an account should be taken under the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act and they might be allowed to redeem the mortgage. The facts are that Narayan Yeshwant, grandfather of the present plaintiffs, who had six sons, mortgaged his property to the defendants. The defendants brought Suit No. 116 of 1910 against the mortgagor, his sons also being parties, and obtained a decree which was confirmed in appeal by the District Court and in second appeal by the High Court, the case being reported in Pandurang Narayan v. Bhagwandas Atmaramshet.

    The present plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 are sons of Pandurang Plaintiffs Nos. 3 and 4 are sons of Yeshwant. Plaintiff No. 6 is the son of Mahadev and plaintiff No. 7 is the son of Waman. Their respective fathers were parties to the suit of 1910. It appears that they are being put forward to contest the mortgage last resort. The plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 alone were born in 1910, consequently the other plaintiffs who were not in existence at the date of the suit in 1910 have no locus standi and may be disregarded. The first Court, the Subordinate Judge of Bassein, framed two preliminary issues. (1) Whether the suit was or was not res judicata by reason of the decision in Suit No. 116 of 1910? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable? He found that the suit was not barred by res judicata but that it was not maintainable. He accordingly dismissed the suit. On appeal, the District Judge of Thana held that the suit was barred by res judicata and that it was not maintainable. He accordingly dismissed the appeal. The plaintiffs make this second appeal and the same two points arise. The first question is whether the suit is barred by res judicata by reason of Suit No. 116 of 1910, in which all questions relating to the mortgage were decided as between the fathers of the plaintiffs and the mortgagees, the defendants. We are now only concerned with plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, sons of Pandurang; the other plaintiffs not being born at the date of the suit in 1910. The property is ancestral property and the trying Judge decided that the suit was not barred by res judicata, on the short ground that the present plaintiffs were not parties to the suit of 1910, and they claim not through their fathers but in their own right and that the grandsons take an inherent interest in the ancestral property as such.

    The learned District Judge was of opinion that the defendants in the former suit (the fathers of the present plaintiffs) were held to be litigating in respect of a private right claimed in common for themselves and their children, and the present suit is therefore barred by section 11, explanation 6, of the Civil Procedure Code. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that section 11, explanation 6, has no reference to the facts of the present litigation, that all coparceners are necessary parties to a mortgage suit and that the present plaintiffs were not represented by their fathers. I have already pointed out that plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2, the sons of Pandurang, who was defendant No. 1 in 1910, were alone born in 1910 and the question whether they, were bound by the decree was considered in that suit. Exhibit 33 is the judgment of the appellate Court (District Court of Thana). In that suit, issue No. 3 was, whether the share of defendant No. 1's (Pandurang's) sons is responsible for the debt? The finding was in the affirmative. The learned Judge said that though the minors were not parties, the Hindu joint family is represented in all its transactions by its karta and the sons by their father. Order XXXIV, rule 1, does not interfere with the rule of Hindu law that the Hindu father can represent his sons. Having regard to the late stage when such an objection was raised for the first time, this contention cannot be allowed. The minor sons of defendant No. 1 are sufficiently represented by their father, defendant No. 1. Compare Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayan. In that case the minor was not a party to the suit but he was represented by the adult members of the family and it was held that they represented him: cf. Govind v. Sakharam, which, however, is not the case of “a suit on a mortgage.” So far as appears from the report of the case in the High Court (Pandurang Narayan v. Bhagwandas Atmaramshet), this point was not taken in the second appeal. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayana rests on Ramasamayyan v. Virasami Ayyar(4) and Lala Surja Prosad v. Golab Chand,(5) and that this latter case was upset in Lala Suraj Prosad v. Golab Chand.(6) Ramkrishna v. Vinayak, however, has never been dissented from and is still good law and binding on me. Reference is also made to Ramchandra Narayan v. Shripatrao,(7) where it was held that the abatement of a suit by one member of an undivided Hindu family did not deprive his coparceners of the right to sue for redemption there being no indication that the suit was brought in any representative capacity. That, however, was the case of an adult coparcener, a brother, and not of the father and a minor son.

    The appellants further relied on Debi Prosad Sahi v. Dharamjit Narayan Singh where it was held that the karta of a joint Hindu family was bound in a suit on a mortgage to join as a party—one of the members of the family who had a joint interest with him in the mortgage. That also is the case of a major and the objection as regards parties was taken in the suit itself. The appellants also rely on Padmakar Vinayak Joshi v. Mahadev Krishna Joshi where the major brother of the plaintiffs during their minority had brought a suit to redeem the property in suit, which had been dismissed. It was held that the second redemption suit by plaintiffs was not barred as they were not sufficiently represented in the previous suit.

    The respondents rely on Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar where it was held by the Privy Council that the plaintiffs who sued to redeem a mortgage after foreclosure, on the plea that they had not been parties to the mortgage suit, were properly and effectively represented in the suit by the managing members of the joint Hindu family of which the plaintiffs were also members. Their Lordships saw no reason to dissent from the Indian decisions which showed that there were occasions, including foreclosure actions, when the manager of the joint Hindu family so effectively represented all the other members,—that the family as a whole was bound, and were of opinion that it was clear or the facts of this case, on the findings of their Lordships, that it was a case where that principle ought to be applied. There was not the slightest ground for suggesting that the managers of the joint family did not act in any way in the interest of the family itself.

    It is contended that this case was one where a foreclosure decree had been passed, which distinguishes it from the present case. But the remarks of their Lordships of the Privy Council appear to be of general application. In the present case the father of the minor plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 was the principal contesting defendant and took every possible objection to the suit which he could have taken—including the objection that his minor sons should be made parties, though this seems to have been taken at a late stage of the case—as appears from the judgment of the first appellate Court, Exhibit 33. If the minor plaintiffs had been brought on the record they would have been represented by their father Pandurang and the result of the suit would have been the same. In these circumstances, in view of the rulings in Sheo Shankar Ram v. Jaddo Kunwar and Ramkrishna v. Vinayak Narayan, I am of opinion that the plaintiffs must be held to have been represented by their father Pandurang in the previous litigation and therefore the matter is res judicata and cannot be reopened. I am of this opinion apart from section 11, Explanation 6, of the Civil Procedure Code, the applicability of which is perhaps doubtful. This is sufficient for the disposal of the appeal but as the other question, namely, the maintainability of the suit has been argued at some length I will deal briefly with that also.

    As to the maintainability of the present suit both the Courts below are of opinion that it is not maintainable, as the mortgage was for an antecedent debt and binding on the plaintiffs. The point has been argued at great length. The consideration of the mortgage in question was admitted and it was held by the High Court in Pandurang v. Bhagwandasa that the object of this alienation by way of mortgage was to pay off the antecedent debts incurred by the father (Narayan) prior to the mortgage. These debts were partly due to the mortgagee himself and partly to others. This finding would appear to be a finding which concludes the matter, but the gist of the argument of the learned pleader for the appellants is that the observations of Shah, J., in Pandurang v. Bhagwandasa must be held to be incorrect in view of the rules laid down by the Privy Council in the subsequent case of Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad.

    In spite, however, of the lengthy and elaborate arguments advanced by the learned pleader for the appellants I am unable to see that Brij Narain's case overrules or dissents from any opinion expressed in Pandurang Narayan v. Bhagwandas Atmaramshet, on the contrary it supports the view expressed by Shah, J. Five propositions were laid down by the Privy Council in Brij Narain's case. They are as follows (p. 139):—

    “(1) The managing member of a joint undivided estate cannot alienate or burden the estate qua manager except for purposes of necessity; but

    (2) If he is the father and the other members are the sons he may, by incurring debt, so long as it is not for an immoral purpose, lay the estate open to be taken in execution proceeding upon a decree for payment of that debt.

    (3) If he purports to burden the estate by mortgage, then unless that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, it would not bind the estate

    (4) Antecedent debt means antecedent in fact as well as in time, that is to say, that the debt must be truly independent and not part of the transaction impeached.

    (5) There is no rule that this result is affected by the question whether the father, who contracted the debt or burdens the estate, is alive or dead.”

    We are not concerned with the first and the fifth propositions. As it was not contended by the father of the present plaintiffs that the debt was for an immoral purpose the second proposition will apply. The consideration was admitted as is shown by the report in Pandurang v. Bhagwandas and it consisted of Rs. 700 due to the mortgagee and Rs. 799 borrowed to pay off debts due to others. It was held by this Court that the object of this alienation by way of mortgage was to pay off the antecedent debts incurred by the father prior to the mortgage. These debts were partly due to the mortgagee and partly to others. I see no reason to suppose that the view of this Court that these were antecedent debts in fact as well as in time is not in accordance with the 4th proposition laid down by the Privy Council in Brij Narain's case.

    The learned pleader for the appellants has relied on a Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court in Jagdish Prasad v. Hoshyar Singh, in which it is laid down that the word ‘debt’ in proposition No. 2 in Brij Narain's case does not include mortgage debt. In that case, however, it was held that there was no antecedent debt, whereas in the present case there is a finding of this Court that there was an antecedent debt, and the present case is distinctly covered by proposition No. 3 in Brij Narain's case, which lays down that if the father purports to burden the estate by a mortgage, then unless that mortgage is to discharge an antecedent debt, it would not bind the estate. The mortgage in the present case being to discharge an antecedent debt, will bind the estate. In these circumstances I am of opinion that the case is distinctly within the ruling in Brij Narain's case. The mortgage debt is, therefore, binding on the minor plaintiffs, and the suit is consequently not maintainable. The appeal will, therefore, be dismissed with costs.

    Decree confirmed.
    B.G.R
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    Comments

    Madhusudan Pandurang Samant v. Bhagwan Atmaram
    (Nov 30, 1928)