1. The Court: This is an application under s. 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act for drawing up a proceeding for contempt for alleged violation of the orders, dated 4th May, 1996 and 1st June, 1996, passed by the learned Judge, 2nd Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta, in Misc. Case No. 2237 of 1994.
Learned advocate, appearing in support of the application, strongly relied upon the language of s. 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, on that basis, argued that he has a right to pay that the matter be dealt with in contempt jurisdiction of this court, although the orders alleged to have been violated had been passed by a subordinate court. It is to be noted that the order was passed by the learned Judge of the court below, in connection with a proceeding under Order 39 read with s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court below, being a Court of records, has ample jurisdiction to take appropriate steps for violation of its orders including by invocation of provisions of Order 39 Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure. If all these available remedies are allowed to be skipped over, the inevitable result will be opening up of flood gate for such applications before this Court, which is already over-loaded with litigations, which cannot be proceeded with in other form thus materially affecting the disposal of such matters. Similar situation had been taken note of by a Division Bench of this Court, presided over by Mr. Anil Kumar Sen, J. in the case of Calcutta Medical Stores v. Stadmed Private Ltd. & Ors., reported in 1977 CHN page 72 wherein the learned Judges relied upon an observation of Sir George Jessel, M.R in the case of Clements Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger reported in (1876) 46 LJ Ch (375) at page 383. We feel tempted to requote the said observation in our order:
“It seems to me that this jurisdiction of committing for contempt being practically arbitrary and unlimited should be most jealously and carefully watched and exercised, if I may say so, with the greatest reluctance and the greatest anxiety on the part of Judges to see whether there is no other mode which is not open to the objection of arbitrariness and which can be brought to bear upon the subject. I say that a Judge should be most careful to see that the cause cannot be fairly prosecuted to a hearing unless this extreme mode of dealing with persons brought before him on accusations of contempt should be adopted. I have myself had on many occasions to consider this jurisdiction and I have always thought that necessary though it be, it is necessary only in the senses in which extreme measures are sometimes necessary to preserve men's rights, that is, if no other pertinent remedy can be found.”
The Division Bench also declined to initiate any proceeding in the summary jurisdiction before the High Court on the ground that a specific remedy for such breach is available in terms of the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure and because there was no person advanced in the said case as to why the Subordinate Court would fail to provide an efficacious and effective relief. According to the Division Bench that would have amounted to by-passing the specific remedy under the law and should not have been encouraged.
In respectful agreement with the reasons given in the said Division Bench Judgment which apply with full force in the present case, we dismiss this application. There will, however, no order as to costs.
Liberty, however, is granted to the petitioner, if so advised, to move appropriate forum.
Appeal dismissed.
A.N.S