The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Koshi, C.J:— This Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal arises out of an application to cancel the confirmation of a court sale held on 25-1-1954 in O.S No. 590 of 1950 on the file of the District Munsiff of Hosdrug. The sale took place pursuant to a final decree passed in a suit for arrears of rent wherein a charge was claimed on the leasehold interest. When the judgment-debtors, the appellants herein, committed default in paying the debt within the time specified by the preliminary decree, the decree-holder (Respondent 1) applied for and obtained a final decree directing the sale of the leasehold interest. Subsequently he took out execution seeking to sell that interest and at the sale held on 25-1-1954, respondent 2 to this appeal, a stranger, purchased it. The court confirmed the sale on 1-3-1954 and the application giving rise to the appeal was filed on 2-4-1954. The ground on which cancellation of the confirmation was sought was that it was done in contravention of the provisions of the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Act, 1954 (Act V of 1954) which came into force on 6-2-1954. The sale took place before the Act was enacted, but the confirmation was subsequent to the Act. Likewise the full amount of the purchase-money was made good only after the Act, namely on 8-2-1954. The two lower courts namely the Court of the District Munsiff of Hosdrug and the Court of the District Judge of South Kanara, negatived the claim of the Judgment-debtors to have the confirmation of the sale cancelled. This Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal was therefore filed before the High Court of Madras and consequent on the re-organisation of the States the appeal was transferred to the file of this Court.

2. The appeal first came up for hearing before Kumara Pillai, J. who referred it for decision by a Division Bench as it raised questions of law which were uncovered by any decision of this Court. What we have to decide here is whether the lower courts went wrong in refusing to cancel the confirmation. Admittedly the two appellants are ‘agriculturists’ within the meaning of Madras Act V of 1954. Before the lower courts it was, however, contended on behalf of the auction-purchaser that Section 4 of the Act relating to ‘Stay of Proceedings’ contained no inhibition against the confirmation of a court sale which had taken place before the Act came into force. That contention found favour with the District Munsiff as also with the District Judge. The appellants' learned counsel challenged the correctness of that view while on behalf of the auction purchaser it was strenuously contended that the view was right. A further argument was raised on behalf of the purchaser that Section 4 had no application to the case inasmuch as the decree pursuant to which the sale was held was not ‘a decree for payment of money passed in a suit for the recovery of a debt’, as required therein. For a proper appreciation of the two questions mentioned above it is necessary to look into the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 2 clause (b) defines a ‘debt’ and that definition is in these terms:—

“‘debt’ means any sum of money which a person is liable to pay under a contract (express or implied) for consideration received and includes rent in cash or kind which a person is liable or deliver in respect of the lawful use and occupation of land.”

3. There is an explanation added to it and that is as follows:—

“Explanation—It is immaterial that the sum or produce is recoverable only by sale of property in enforcement of a mortgage or charge or that the contract was entered into by the person's predecessor-in-title or by the manager of the joint Hindu family or the karnavan of the tarwad or tavazhi or the yajaman of the kutumba or kavaru of which such person was or is a member.”

4. Section 3 relates to “Bar of suits and applications” and the Section reads:—

“No suit for the recovery of a debt shall be instituted, no application for the execution of a decree for payment of money passed in a suit for the recovery of a debt shall be made, and no suit or application for the eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of a debt shall be instituted or made, against any agriculturist in any civil or revenue court before the expiry of a year from the date of commencement of this Act.”

5. Three Explanations are added to this Section of which Explanation III alone is of relevance here. It runs thus:—

“Explanation III— A suit shall be deemed to be a suit for the recovery of a debt notwithstanding that other reliefs are prayed for in such suit, and a decree shall be deemed to be a decree for payment of money passed in such suit notwithstanding that other reliefs are granted by such decree.”

6. There is a proviso added to this Explanation, but that is irrelevant for purposes of this appeal. Section 4, as stated earlier relates to ‘Stay of proceedings’ and we are here concerned only with Sub-section (1). That sub-Section is as follows:—

“(1) All further proceedings in suits and applications of the nature mentioned in section 3 in which relief is claimed against an agriculturist, not being proceedings for the amendment of pleadings or for the addition, substitution, or the striking off of parties, but otherwise inclusive of proceedings consequent on orders or decrees made in appeals, revision petitions, or applications for review, shall subject to the next succeeding sub-section, stand stayed until the expiry of a year from the date of commencement of this Act:”

7. A proviso added to this Sub-Section is of no use to us in this appeal. No other provision of the Act was referred to in the arguments, nor do we think that any other provision should be quoted here.

8. We shall first deal with the question whether the decree in question was one falling within the purview of Section 4. Unlike the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Temporary Relief) Ordinance, 1953 (Madras Ordinance V of 1953) which was repealed by Act V of 1954, the definition of the term ‘debt’ in the Act (V of 1954) includes rent as well, but the argument which Mr. Achuthan Nambiar raised on behalf of the purchaser was that the decree for sale which contained no provision for personal relief against the debtors was not a decree for payment of money so as to attract the application of Sections 3 and 4. No doubt there is conflict of judicial opinion whether a mortgage (or charge) decree for sale is a decree for money for purposes of certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, but here the Legislature steers clear of that controversy by adding an Explanation to the definition of the term ‘debt’. The Explanation states inter alia that to constitute a ‘debt’ it is immaterial whether the sum or produce is recoverable only by the sale of the property in enforcement of a mortgage or charge. The fact that at the stage when execution was sought there was no personal decree against the debtors is therefore of no consequence at all for purposes of the Act. It is interesting here to mention that Mr. Achuthan Nambiar conceded that if the relevant Act were the Madras Indebted Agriculturists (Repayment of Debts) Act, 1955 (Act I of 1955) this argument would not have been open to him. There, in defining a debt the body of the definition itself includes secured as also unsecured debts. In Act V of 1954 secured debts are brought within the definition of the term ‘debt’ by the Explanation. That is the only difference we notice and to our minds both the definitions cover both secured and unsecured debts. In view of the Explanation which the Legislature added to the definition of the term ‘debt’ we have no hesitation to hold that the decree pursuant to the execution of which the sale in question took place, was a decree for payment of money passed in a suit for the recovery of a debt within the meaning of Section 3 and that had the execution application been filed after the Act came into force, that is, after 6-2-1954, that application would have been hit by Section 3. Explanation III to Section 3 also leads to the same conclusion. If Section 3 prohibited the institution of execution proceedings with respect to such a decree after the date of the Act, Section 4 enjoined a stay of further proceedings in an execution proceeding that was pending on the date of the Act regarding such a decree. The point raised on behalf of the auction-purchaser-respondent as to the nature of the decree in question has therefore to be repelled and we decide accordingly.

9. The next question is whether confirmation of the sale which took place after the Act came into force is hit by Section 4. That section states inter alia that all further proceedings in suits and applications of the nature mentioned in Section 3 in which relief is claimed against an agriculturist shall stand stayed until the expiry of one year from the date of the commencement of the Act. The point for decision is whether confirmation is a further proceeding in the execution application pursuant to which the sale was held. The learned District Judge thought that it was merely a ministerial act and therefore not hit by the Section. To our minds the distinction between judicial and ministerial acts would appear to be irrelevant. The language of the Section makes no such distinction, and it is comprehensive enough to include both. No doubt, normally, in the absence of an application to annul the sale on any of the grounds sanctioned by the Code of Civil Procedure, the court which held the sale is bound to confirm it, but the point for decision is as stated above whether confirmation of a sale is a proceeding in the application for the execution of a decree. The court's volition is required to effect the confirmation and that, to our minds, as observed by Patanjali Sastri, J. (as he then was) in Narayanaswami v. Rudrappa, A.I.R 1944 Madras 314 “is part of the proceeding to execute the decree in the sense that it relates to the discharge or satisfaction of the decree”. It is a recognised cannon of interpreting ameliorative statutes like the one before us that their words must be construed so far as they reasonably admit so as to secure that the relief contemplated by the statute shall not be denied to the persons intended to be relieved see Raghuraj Singh v. Hari Krishnan, A.I.R 1944 Privy Council 35 at p. 38 and Rai Ram Taran v. Mrs. Hill, A.I.R 1949 Federal Court 135 at 139.

10. Mr. Achuthan Nambiar contended that by the sale, a right had been created in a third party and that supervening legislation cannot be taken to have intended to defeat those rights. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Nanhelal v. Utnrao Singh, A.I.R 1931 Privy Council 33 was referred to in this context. That was a case where after a purchase by a third party at an execution sale, the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor entered into a compromise arrangement which in effect sought to nullify the decree and thus remove the very foundation of the court's power to execute the decree. Their Lordships pointed out that the provisions in Order 21 Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code contemplated a stage in execution proceedings when the matter was solely between the judgment debtor and the decree-holder, when no other interest had come into being, and that right cannot be invoked after a sale at which a third party purchased the property. It was further pointed out that there was nothing in the said rule to suggest that the third party's rights were to be disregarded by an adjustment of a decree after a sale had taken place. No question regarding the effect of any statute other than the Civil Procedure Code arose there. No doubt in the Madras case cited above, Narayanaswami v. Rudrappa, Patanjali Sastri, J. has referred to this Privy Council decision, but what the learned Judge considered there was whether the provision of law sought to be depended upon by the judgment-debtor-appellant namely, Section 7 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (Act IV of 1939), contained any inhibition against the court confirming the sale. In that case the sale was held on 19-9-1935 and pending an application under Order 21 Rule 20, Civil Procedure Code, to set aside the sale the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act came into force on 22-3-1938. Section 23 thereof provided for setting aside of a sale or foreclosure of any immovable property sold or foreclosed on or after 1-10-1937. The appellant while conceding that Section 23 was of no avail to him, contended that Section 7 impliedly prohibited the confirmation of the sale even though it had taken place before 1-10-1937, the date specified in Section 23. In repelling that contention Patanjali Sastri, J. observed that in confirming the sale the court was not allowing the property already sold ‘to be proceeded against’ in execution of the decree. Paragraph 2 of Section 7 on which reliance was placed runs as follows:—

“No sum in excess of the amount as so scaled down shall be recoverable from him or from any land or interest in land belonging to him; nor shall his property be liable to be attached and sold or proceeded against in any manner in the execution of any decree against him in so far as such decree is for an amount in excess of the sum as scaled down under this Chapter”.

11. Once the sale had taken place, it was held that by the confirmation the court cannot be taken to be allowing the property “to be proceeded against in executing the decree”. The words of Section 4 of Act V of 1954 with which we are concerned here are as noticed earlier, entirely different and states (omitting unnecessary words) that “further proceedings……in applications of the nature mentioned in Section 3 in which relief is claimed against an agriculturist,…… shall…….stand stayed……”.

12. The attempt of Mr. Achuthan Nambiar to use the decision in Narayanaswami v. Rudrappa as authority for the position that confirmation of a sale will not be ‘a further proceeding’ in execution of a decree for the sale of an agriculturist's property; recalls to our minds the observations in a recent Supreme Court decision that it is not a sound principle of construction to interpret expressions in one Act with reference to their use in another Act and that the meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear vide Ram Narain v. The State of U.P, A.I.R 1957 Supreme Court 18. In the Madras case there were specific provisions in the concerned Act for annulling a sale which had taken place even some months prior to the coming into force of that Act and the words were also different. No doubt a question common to this case, namely, the validity of the confirmation of the execution sale, arose for decision there, but we are concerned here with different words occuring in another statute. That decision negativing the judgment-debtor's contention is therefore no authority for our present purpose. Indeed as pointed out in earlier part of this judgment, the learned Judge had observed that ‘confirmation of a sale held in execution of a decree is part of the proceeding to execute the decree in the sense that it relates to the discharge or satisfaction of the decree’.

13. Mr. Achuthan Nambiar also referred to a series of decisions of the Nagpur High Court construing an analogous provision in Section 21 of the C.P Debt Conciliation Act (II of 1933). We need here only to refer to the last case in the series, namely, Akbar Ali v. Sobharam, A.I.R 1939 Nagur 282. It is a Bench decision where the prior rulings on the question are all reviewed. The question there was whether after a debt conciliation application was made to a Board constituted, under the Act, a court sale held prior to that application could be confirmed. The answer given was in the affirmative, but with respect, we venture to think we cannot accept that decision as correct. Section 21 of the concerned Act is in these terms:—

“When an application has been made to a Board under section 4, any suit or other proceedings then pending before a civil court in respect of any debt for the settlement of which application has been made shall be suspended until the Board has dismissed the application or an agreement registered under sub-section (2) of section 12 has ceased to subsist.”

14. When the section states (omitting unnecessary words) that “other proceedings then pending before a civil court……..shall be suspended……….” confirmation would be wrong if, as pointed out by Patanjali Sastri, J. in Narayanaswami v. Rudrappa, it is part of the proceeding to execute the decree in the sense that it relates to the discharge or satisfaction of the decree. We have already expressed ourselves to be in agreement with that view.

15. As for the decision in the Nagpur case we desire to point out that there was conflict of opinion on the question in the Nagpur High Court itself and in giving the decision in the case cited, the Division Bench consisting also of one of the Judges who had taken a similar view earlier, observed that though there was much to be said in favour of both views, they preferred the view to which one of them had already committed himself. Further, the decision states that the Debt Conciliation Act being a coercive measure intended to affect vested interests and rights and to bring pressure upon creditors to effect a settlement with their debtors, however beneficent it may be from the point of view of debtors, it operated to the detriment of creditors and consequently, the Act must, in accordance with the ‘usual rules of construction’, be construed strictly. The learned Judges even observed that any ambiguity in its clauses must therefore be resolved along lines which interfere as little as possible with existing rights unless the contrary is unmistakably indicated in other parts of the Act. We have earlier referred to the high authority of the Privy Council and the Federal Court of India to the effect that the words of such remedial statutes must be construed so far as they reasonably admit so as to secure that the relief contemplated by the statute shall not be denied to the class intended to be relieved. We cannot therefore accept the cannon of construction adopted in the Nagpur case as proper. To do so would be to refuse to extend the benefits of the Act to persons intended to be benefited by it.

16. Yet another case cited by Mr. Achuthan Nambiar was the decision of the Lahore High Court in Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Haq, A.I.R 1936 Lahore 191 and that in our opinion does not carry the matter further to sustain the decision of the lower courts. There, as in the Madras case, there was no law prohibiting any further proceeding being taken after the sale was held. The Civil Miscellaneous Second Appeal has therefore to be allowed and in reversal of the decisions of the two courts below we annul the confirmation of the sale ordered by the execution court on 1-3-1954. Neither of the courts below has made any order for costs in this proceeding. In the circumstances of the case we consider that to have been the most proper order. We also do not make any order for costs in this appeal.

17. Order accordingly.