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Concise Analytical Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

One Vithobaji died leaving five sons and a widow: Mahadeo Rao, Khushal Rao, Ganpat Rao, Sham Rao, Vasant Rao and Savitribai. Mahadeo Rao filed a suit for possession of the suit property against purchasers who had acquired the property from other brothers and the mother, and who had been put in possession by their vendors. The plaintiff alleged that the suit property was joint family property of himself, his brothers and his mother and that sales by some members were not binding on him because they were not for legal necessity nor for benefit of the estate; he therefore sought possession from the defendant‑purchasers.

The defendants pleaded inter alia that the sales were for legal necessity and for the benefit of the estate; alternatively they contended that there was no joint Hindu family on the date of sale because Khushal Rao had, by a written statement dated 17-12-1959 in Civil Suit No. 33-A of 1959, made an unequivocal declaration of separation, thereby disrupting the joint family as from that date.

At trial the plaintiff's suit was dismissed on the ground that there was no joint Hindu family on the date of the sale because of the written statement of Khushal Rao. On appeal the lower appellate court held that Khushal Rao's statement did not constitute a clear and unequivocal intention to separate and restored a decree for possession in favour of Mahadeo Rao. Multiple second appeals followed; the present judgment governs second appeals nos. 440 of 1964, 441 of 1964, 803 of 1965 (and the final order also references second appeal no. 819 of 1965).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the statement of Khushal Rao in his written statement in Civil Suit No. 33-A of 1959 had the effect of disrupting the joint family of Mahadeo Rao, his brothers and widowed mother (i.e., whether it constituted an unequivocal declaration of intention to sever the joint status).
  2. Relatedly, whether sales of joint family property by some members (to the defendant-purchasers) were binding on Mahadeo Rao, given the question of severance/continuation of the coparcenary and whether the sales were for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff (Mahadeo Rao) — Core Contentions

  • The suit property was joint family property of the plaintiff, his brothers and mother.
  • The sale by some members of the joint family was neither for legal necessity nor for any benefit to the estate, and hence not binding on the plaintiff.
  • He therefore sought possession of the suit land from the defendant‑purchasers.

Defendant‑Purchasers — Core Contentions

  • The sale was for legal necessity and for the benefit of the estate (a defence to the claim that sale was void as against the plaintiff).
  • Alternatively, on the date of sale there was no joint Hindu family consisting of the plaintiff and his brothers and mother because Khushal Rao had, by a written statement dated 17-12-1959 in Civil Suit No. 33-A of 1959, unequivocally declared separation, which disrupted the joint family and severed the coparcenary.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj; AIR 1916 PC 104 (cited as 43 I A 151 / 12 NLR 113) Partition requires a definite and unequivocal indication of intention by a member of a joint family to separate; such indication (if clear and communicated) brings about severance of joint status. The Court relied on this principle to analyse whether Khushal Rao's written statement was a definite and unequivocal intention to separate; it concluded the statement was not such an unequivocal declaration.
Raghavamma v. Chenehamma; AIR 1964 S.C. 136 The form of intimation of intention to separate depends on circumstances; uncommunicated intention may be no more than an internal thought and is insufficient. The Court noted that what form intimation should take depends on circumstances and used this to assess whether the written statement amounted to an intimation to other family members; it found no satisfactory evidence that the statements were made known to the other members.
Suraj Narain v. Ikbal Narain; 40 I A 40 The institution of a suit for partition by a member of a joint family is an unequivocal intimation of intention to separate and severs joint status from the date of institution. The Court distinguished the present statements (made as defendants in a suit by a stranger-purchaser) from an initiating partition suit; it held the statements were not equivalent to instituting a partition suit and thus not an unequivocal intimation of separation.
Kawal Main v. Prabhulal; AIR 1917 PC 139 (44 I A 159) Part of the authorities describing effects of instituting a partition suit on severance of status. Used in conjunction with other authorities to show that filing a partition suit can effect severance, but the Court examined whether the present facts matched that scenario and concluded they did not.
Kedar Nath v. Ratan Singh; 37 I A 161 If a partition suit is withdrawn before trial because the plaintiff does not desire separation, there is no severance of joint status. Cited as authority that initiation of proceedings is not inevitably decisive; the Court considered conduct as a whole (including failure to press the partition) and found no severance.
Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatacharla Moniagar; AIR 1925 PC 49 (52 I A 83) Similar to Kedar Nath: withdrawal of partition suit before trial indicates no severance. Again relied upon to support the proposition that isolated procedural steps, if not pursued, do not effect severance; the Court noted the suit in which the statements were made was not pressed.
Shankersingh v. Gulabchand; 1945 NLJ 172 = AIR 1945 Nag. 138 = ILR Nag. 444 Summarised conclusions: (1) severance by unequivocal intention evidenced by overt act; (2) whether intention expressed is a question of fact; (3) if appropriately expressed severance is then and there; (4) effect may be nullified if all interested consent (express or inferred). The Court invoked these four conclusions as a framework to assess if the statements and conduct of the family members amounted to severance; applying them, the Court found no severance because the statements were not unequivocal and there were no overt acts or evidence of communication/consent.
Rukhmobai v. Laxminarayan; AIR 1960 S.C. 335 Referenced in relation to judging intention by conduct as a whole rather than by isolated incidents. The Court applied this approach, examining the totality of conduct (including not pursuing the partition and continuation of joint relations) and concluded the statements did not evidence separation.
Venkatapctithi Raju v. Venkatanarasimha Raju; AIR 1936 PC 264 = 63 I A 397 The Judicial Committee observed that statements sometimes serve a purpose and that relations with the estate (not mere statements) should be considered when determining separation. The Court relied on this cautionary principle to treat the written statements with scrutiny and to focus on the parties' relations with the estate (which remained joint) when deciding that no severance occurred.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by identifying the controlling question — whether Khushal Rao's written statement of 17-12-1959 had the effect of disrupting the joint family. It examined the context in which the statements were made: they were filed by Khushal Rao, Ganpat Rao and Sham Rao as defendants to a partition suit (Civil Suit No. 33-A of 1959) filed by Govind Rao, a stranger who had purchased a house from members of the joint family. The statements were not pleadings by plaintiffs claiming partition but were statements “having no objection” to a partition decree sought by the plaintiff in that suit.

The Court reviewed the authorities on what constitutes severance: a definite and unequivocal indication of intention to separate, communicated to co‑sharers or the Karta, and ideally evidenced by an overt act. It noted that initiation of a partition suit ordinarily constitutes such an unequivocal intimation, but also recognized authorities that a suit withdrawn before trial shows no severance, and that the question of intention is one of fact to be judged by the totality of conduct rather than isolated incidents.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found several reasons why the written statements did not amount to severance:

  • The statements were made as defenses in a suit brought by a stranger-purchaser, not as plaintiffs claiming partition; they expressed no positive claim to partition but merely “no objection” to partition.
  • The plaint in the partition proceedings was not pressed by Govind Rao or by the family members; therefore there was no follow‑through or overt act confirming separation.
  • The subsequent conduct of the brothers (failure to pursue partition and continuing to treat the property as joint) indicated they had no unequivocal intention to separate.
  • There was no satisfactory evidence that the written statements were communicated to, or known by, the other members of the joint family; mere filing in proceedings to which all were defendants was not enough to infer communication without proof of service or participation.
  • The relations of the family to the estate remained joint, which, together with the conduct and lack of overt acts, belied any claim of disruption of the joint family based on the statements.

On this factual and legal analysis the Court concluded that the written statements of Khushal Rao (and similarly Ganpat Rao and Shamrao) did not constitute a clear and unequivocal declaration of intention to separate; therefore there was no severance of the joint Hindu family status as alleged by the defendant‑purchasers.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling): The Court decided the appeals as follows: second appeals nos. 440 of 1964 and 441 of 1964 are allowed with costs; second appeals nos. 803 of 1965 and 819 of 1965 are dismissed with costs. In each case the decree shall direct that the defendant‑purchasers deliver possession of the whole of the suit property to the plaintiff, leaving the defendant‑purchasers to pursue their rights by a suit for general partition if they so choose.

The Court further ordered procedural consequences regarding execution: the execution of the decree is stayed for three months in each case to enable the defendant‑purchasers to file a suit for general partition; if such a suit is filed the stay shall continue until the final decision of that suit; if no such suit is brought within the three‑month period, the stay of execution shall stand vacated without further reference to the Bench.

Implications: The direct effect is restoration (in the relevant appeals) of the plaintiff's decree for possession and an order for delivery of possession by the defendant‑purchasers, while preserving the purchasers' procedural right to seek partition. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond its application of existing authorities to the facts; it applies established principles concerning what constitutes an unequivocal intention to sever joint family status.

    Narayan And Others v. Mahadeorao

    The judgment in this appeal shall also govern second appeals nos. 440 of 1964, 441 of 1964 and 803 of 1965.

    2. One Vithobaji died leaving five sons and a widow, namely, Mahadeo Rao, Khushal Rao, Ganpat Rao, Sham Rao, and Vasant Rao and Savitribai.

    3. Mahadeo Rao filed a suit for possession of the suit property against the defendants who are the purchasers of the same property from the other brothers and the mother of the plaintiff and who had also been put in its possession by their vendors. The suit was based on the allegation that the suit property was the joint family property of the plaintiff, his brothers and mother, and that its sale by some of the members of the joint family, which was neither for legal necessity nor for any benefit to the estate, was not binding on the plaintiff. He, therefore, claimed possession of the suit land from the defendant-purchasers.

    4. The defence inter alia was that the sale was for legal necessity as also for the benefit to the estate. In the alternative it was pleaded that on the date of the sale by the brothers and mother of the plaintiff there was no joint Hindu family consisting of the plaintiff and his brothers and mother because in the written statement filed by Khushal Rao in Civil suit No. 33-A of 1959 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Class II, Sausar, he had made an unequivocal declaration to separate from the joint family which had the effect of disrupting it as from that date, i.e. from 17-12-1959.

    5. The trial Court dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding inter alia that though there was no legal necessity for the sale, there was no joint Hindu family with the plaintiff as one of its member when the sale in question was held and as there was thus no coparcenary on the date of the suit, the suit claiming exclusive possession of the suit property from the defendant-purcha­sers was liable to be dismissed. It was held that the written statement dated 17-12-1959 filed by Khushal Rao in Civil Suit No. 33-A of 1959 had the effect of disrupting the joint family.

    6. On appeal it was held that the statement of Khushal Rao in his written statement in civil suit no. 33-A of 1959 did not constitute a clear and unequivocal intention to separate. There was no severance of the status of the Joint Hindu family consisting of the plaintiff and his brothers and mother. A decree for possession was accordingly passed.

    7. The defendant-purchasers have come up in appeal.

    8. Similarly, in second appeal no. 803 of 1965 the defendant-purchaser Laxman Patil had purchased the property comprised in the suit from the other brothers and mother of the plaintiff and it had been held by the lower appellate Court that the sale was neither for legal necessity nor for the benefit of the family. It was also held negativing the defence of the defendant-purchaser that the statement of Khushal Rao in his written statement in Civil Suit No. 33-A of 1959 did not have the effect of severing the joint status of the joint Hindu family. As the suit for possession of the suit property filed by the plaintiff-respondent Mahadeo Rao had been decreed, the defen­dant-purchaser has come up in second appeal. This is second appeal No. 803 of 1965.

    9. Second appeals nos. 440 of 1964 and 441 of 1964 are by the plaintiff-appellants Mahadeo Rao and Vasant Rao and Mahadeo Rao respectively because in those suits the suit of the plaintiffs against the defendant-purcha­sers from Khushal Rao and from the other brothers and mother of the plaintiff Mahadeo Rao had been dismissed on the ground that the statement of Khushal Rao in his written statement in Civil Suit No. 33-A of 1959 had the effect of disrupting the joint Hindu family so that the suit of the plaintiff for exclusive possession of the suit property could not succeed.

    10. All the appeals thus involve a common question whether the state­ment of Khushal Rao in his written statement in civil suit no. 33-A of 1959 had the effect of disrupting the joint family of Mahadeo Rao and his brothers and widowed mother.

    11. The aforesaid statement of Khushal Rao was made in the follow­ing circumstances:

    The brothers and mother of Mahadeo Rao had transferred a joint family house to one Govind Rao in 1944. Mahadeo Rao, therefore, filed a suit against Govind Rao in the Court of Civil Judge, Class II, Sausar, for possession of the suit house. The suit was decreed by the High Court with the condition that the execution of the decree shall be stayed till Govind Rao filed his suit for partition of the joint family property for which three months' time was granted to him. Govind Rao filed his suit, Civil Suit No. 33-A of 1959, for a general partition against Mahadeo Rao, his brothers and mother. In that suit Khushal Rao filed his written statement (Exh. D-2) on 17-12-1959, and Ganpat Rao and Sham Rao filed their written statement (Exh. D-3) on 14-3-1960. The contention of the defendant-purchasers in these appeals is that these statements had the effect of severing the joint status of the joint Hindu family.

    12. The relevant statements of Khushal Rao in Exh. D-2 are as follows:-

    "The defendant no. 1 Khushalrao had no objection if the house is allotted to his (plaintiff's) share in the partition,"

    "This defendant does not deny the claim of the plaintiff and he has no objection if a decree for partition of joint family properties of the defendants is passed."
    Similarly, the relevant statements of Ganpatrao and Shamrao in Exh. D-3 are as follows:-

    "These defendants have no objection if the house is allotted to the share of Khushalrao so as to give an equitable relief to the plaintiff."

    "These defendants do not deny the claim of the plaintiff and they have no objection if a decree for partition of joint family properties is passed and the equitable relief as sought by the plaintiff is given to him."

    "13. Partition is a severance of joint status and as such is a matter of individual volition. Once the decision has been unequivocally expressed and clearly intimated to his co-sharers, his right to obtain and possess the share to which he admittedly has a title is unimpeachable. Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj; AIR 1916 PC 104= 43 I A 151= 12 NLR 113 P.C. All that is necessary, therefore, to constitute a partition is a definite and unequivocal indication of his intention by a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty. There should, however, be an intimation, indication or representation of such intention to the other members or the Karta, though what form this intimation should take would depend on the circumstances of each case because uncommunicated intention may be no more than entertaining in one's mind the intention to separate which is not enough. See Raghavamma v. Chenehamma; AIR 1964 S.C. 136"

    "14. The institution of suit for partition by a member of joint family is an unequivocal intimation of his intention to separate and there consequently is a severance of his joint status from the date when it is instituted: Suraj Narain v. Ikbal Narain; 40 I A 40 Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj (supra) and Kawal Main v. Prabhulal; AIR 1917 PC 139= 44 I A 159. But if the suit is withdrawn before trial, the plaintiff not desiring separation, there is no severance of joint status: Kedar nath v. Ratan Singh; 37 I A 161 and Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatacharla Moniagar; AIR 1925 P C 49= 52 I A 83. To explain the apparent contradiction in the aforesaid statements of the Judicial Committee, a Division Bench of this Court in Shankersingh v. Gulabchand; 1945 NLJ 172= AIR 1945 Nag. 138= ILR Nag. 444 has said that the question of intention must be judged by looking to the man's conduct as a whole and not merely to some isolated incident like the filing of a plaint. As stated by the Supreme Court in Rukhmobai v. Laxminarayan; AIR 1960 S.C. 335."

    "Though, prima facie a document clearly expressing the intention to divide brings about a division in status, it is open to a party to prove that the said document was a sham or a nominal one not intended to be acted upon but was conceived and executed for an ulterior purpose."

    In Venkatapctithi Raju v. Venkatanarasimha Raju; AIR 1936 PC 264=63 I A 397 the Judicial Committee observed:

    "It sometimes happens that persons make statements which serve their purpose, or proceed upon ignorance of the true position; and it is not their statements, but their rela­tions with the estate, which should be taken into consideration in determining the issue."

    Now, adverting to Shankershing's Case (supra) once again I note that the Division Bench has at page 453 set down their conclusions on the point in the following words which according to it do not conflict with the Privy Council decisions in Kedar Nath v. Ratan Singh (supra) and Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenkatacharla Moniagar (supra) :

    "(1) a member of a joint family can sever his interests by expressing an unequivocal intention to do so and evidencing it by an appropriate overt act;"

    (2) Whether such an intention has been expressed is a question of fact;

    (3) if it is expressed in an appropriate way, then the severance is effected then and there; but

    "(4) the effect of this can be nullified provided all interested consent. The consent can either be express or it can be inferred from the circumstances."

    15. Now, if we examine the facts of our cases in the light of the principles detailed above, we find that the statements had been made by Khushal Rao, Ganpat Rao and Sham Rao not as plaintiffs claiming a partition but as defendants in a suit filed by one Govind Rao, a stranger-purchaser, from one or more of the members of the joint family for partition. No doubt, in a partition suit even the defendants are deemed to be in the position of plaintiffs but even so the fact remains that the statement was not one claiming partition but one not objecting to the partition. Such statement, in my opinion, cannot be called unequivocal declaration of the intention of Khushal Rao, Ganpat Rao and Shamrao to partition the family property. Then again it is apparent that when the plaint was returned to the plaintiff Govind Rao for presentation to proper Court, the suit was not pressed either by Govind Rao or by the members of the joint family whose property was sought to be partitioned. The statements were thus not unequivocal declarations of intention to separate of Khushal Rao, Ganpat Rao and Shamrao, but were made as defences to a suit for partition and their subsequent conduct in not pursuing the matter shows that they themselves had no unequivocal intention to separate either then or ever. There is also the fact that the members of the family continued joint and did not by any overt act confirm their intention to separate if they had any such intention ever. Their relation to the estate which remained joint and was treated by them as joint family property belies the contention that the statements were their unequivocal declaration of their intention to separate by disrupting the joint family. I may here also note that there is no satisfactory evidence that these declarations were made known to the other members of the joint family. The mere fact that these statements were made in a suit to which all the members of the joint family were party-defendants cannot be conclusive of the question unless it were shown that they were taking part in the proceedings, were served with the copies of the statements or were otherwise informed of them. I do not agree with the observations of the learned District Judge that as the declarations were made in written state­ments in Civil Suit No. 33-A of 1959 in which all the brothers and mother were the defendants, it would be reasonable to hold that the declarations were made known to other members.

    "16. In the result, second appeals nos. 440 of 1964 and 441 of 1964 are allowed with costs and second appeals nos. 803 of 1965 and 819 of 1965 are dismissed with costs, subject to this that in each case the decree shall be that the defendant-purchasers shall deliver possession of the whole of the suit property to the plaintiff, leaving the defendant- purchasers to work out their right in a suit for general partition. The execution of the decree shall, how ever, be stayed for three months in each case to enable the defendant-purchasers to file a suit for general partition and if the suit is filed the stay shall continue till the final decision of the suit, but if no such suit is brought with in the period, then the stay of execution shall stand vacated without further reference to this Bench."

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    Narayan And Others v. Mahadeorao
    (Mar 23, 1968)