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citation codes
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  • section 12 (1) (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
  • section 12(1) (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1951.
  • rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • SECTION 32 MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT 1951
  • Order 1, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961
  • MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT 1951
  • Order 1, rule 10 of the Code
  • M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951
  • M. P. Public Trusts Act
  • Order 1, rule 8
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 12 (1) (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
  • section 12(1) (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1951.
  • rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • SECTION 32 MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT 1951
  • Order 1, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961
  • MADHYA PRADESH PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT 1951
  • Order 1, rule 10 of the Code
  • M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951
  • M. P. Public Trusts Act
  • Order 1, rule 8
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sen, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit was brought by "Shrideo Janki Raman" through its mohatminkar for eviction of the defendant under section 12(1)(e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1951 (the Accommodation Control Act). The Courts below decreed the suit. On appeal, the matter was heard by Naik J., who referred the case to a larger Bench to examine the correctness of a view expressed by Bhargava J. in Agarwal Hosiery Shop v. Deity Radhakishan (1963 M P L J Note 46). One principal question was whether a suit by a public trust registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 must be joined by all trustees or whether one trustee suing was competent. The lower courts had upheld the plaintiff's suit; this opinion is the larger-Bench decision reversing that outcome.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in a suit by a public trust (including where a temple/idol and endowed properties are registered as a public trust under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951), all the trustees must join in filing the suit or whether one trustee may maintain the suit without joining the co-trustees.
  2. Whether a claim under section 12(1)(e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 — a claim based on the residential need of the deity (to consecrate the deity because the temple was in a dilapidated condition) — is maintainable when the demised premises were originally let for a non-residential (business) purpose.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Agarwal Hosiery Shop v. Deity Radhakishan etc., 1963 M P L J Note 46 Bhargava J.'s view that a trustee could represent the beneficiaries and it was therefore not necessary to join all the trustees in a suit. The court held that this decision was incorrect and must be overruled as not laying down good law; it rejected the proposition that any one trustee may, without reference to others, maintain such a suit.
President Badri Narayan v. Gulam Basool Fakhmddin, 1969 M P L J Note 77 Discussed the propriety of suits brought by one trustee; observed that the suit should have been brought under Order 1, rule 8 or in the names of the co-trustees; noted procedural points about applications under Order 1, rule 10. Used to support the view that a public trust suit should be instituted in the name of the co-trustees or under Order 1, rule 8 and that one trustee's unilateral suit is not proper; indicated that impleading other trustees under Order 1, rule 10 may be an appropriate remedy when necessary.
Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, I L R 52 Cal. 809 The principle that an idol may be a juridical person capable of suing and being sued (ownership of endowment vests in the idol in an ideal sense). Relied upon to explain that, although the idol is a juridical person, in practical terms suits are prosecuted through human agents (shebait/manager) and that the suit must be instituted by a proper legal person capable of suing.
Jagadindra Nath v. Hetnanta Kumari Debi, I L R 32 Cal. 129 Held that an idol may be regarded as a juridical person but the possession and management of dedicated property belong to the shebait, and rights of suit are vested in the shebait not the idol. Applied to explain that although the idol is juridical, the shebait is ordinarily the proper party to bring suits for protection of dedicated property.
Kisan & others v. Shree Maroti Sansthan, Mohori & others, 1947 N L J 527 = I L R 1947 NAG. 819 (Vivian Bose J.) Stated that ordinarily an idol must be represented by its duly appointed manager or shebait; exceptions exist when the guardian/shebait has an adverse interest, permitting a worshipper or other interested person to sue as next friend if they show a personal interest. Used to justify that, in exceptional circumstances (e.g., when shebait has adverse interest), a worshipper with personal interest may sue on behalf of the idol; reinforced the principle that ordinarily the shebait or all shebaits must represent the idol.
Pramatha Nath Mullick; Pashu-patinath Seal v. Pradyumna Kumar Mallik, I L R 64 Cal. 454; Maruti v. Gopal Krishna, AIR 1932 Bom 305 = 34 Bom. L R 41; Kazi Hassan v. Sagun Balkrishna, I L R 24 Bom 170; Venkatarama Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar, AIR 1967 S C 1044 These cases were cited as instances where the rules about representation of idols and exceptions (when an outsider may sue) were applied by courts. Referred to as supporting authorities showing historical application of the principle that shebaits ordinarily represent the idol and that exceptions exist only in special circumstances.
Bishwanath & another v. Shri Thakur Radha Ballabhji & others, A I R 1967 S C 1044 Held that a suit for declaration of title and possession brought by a worshipper in the name of the idol is maintainable where the person who should represent the idol leaves it in the lurch; recognised an ad hoc power of representation in interested persons. Relied upon to confirm that when the regular representative abandons the idol or refuses to act, a person interested in the idol's worship may be clothed with a power to represent it and bring suit.
Lala Man Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad & others, A I R 1945 P C 23 Explained that co-trustees hold office jointly and must perform duties in their joint capacity; if any trustee refuses or is incapable of joining, administration must devolve on the Court; an act of one trustee done with sanction of a co-trustee may be treated as act of both but such sanction must be strictly proved. Applied by the court to support the proposition that when there are multiple trustees they constitute one collective body and must act together; it also underpins the requirement that sanction or approval of co-trustees be strictly proved if a single trustee sues.
Burabani Goal Co. v. Gokulanand, LR 61 I A 35 Illustrated that one of multiple shebaits cannot maintain a suit for recovery of rent to the extent of his share; an individual shebait's unilateral suit was held not maintainable. Used to demonstrate that when there are multiple shebaits (or trustees) they are treated as one body and a single member cannot unilaterally litigate matters affecting the collective estate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) the proper parties and representation in suits by or on behalf of a registered public trust that holds a temple and idol; and (B) the substantive maintainability of the eviction claim under section 12(1)(e) of the Accommodation Control Act.

A. Representation and parties:

  • The court first addressed Bhargava J.'s earlier conclusion that a trustee could represent beneficiaries and that it was unnecessary to join all trustees. The court rejected that conclusion as unsupportable and held it must be overruled as not laying down good law.
  • The court observed a lacuna in the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951: the Act does not expressly provide that a registered public trust acquires a distinct legal personality capable of suing in its own name. Because a temple (though registered with its endowed properties) is not a legal person capable of suing, the suit must be instituted in the name of a legal person capable of suing — typically the idol (recognized as a juridical person in precedent) or the trustees/she-baits in their proper representative capacity.
  • The court relied on authorities establishing that an idol is a juridical person in an ideal sense but that the shebait (manager) ordinarily possesses the right to bring suits to protect the dedicated property; when there are multiple shebaits or co-trustees they form a single collective trustee and must act jointly. If one trustee sues without others, that is generally impermissible unless the single trustee can show sanction and approval of co-trustees, and such sanction must be strictly proved.
  • The court accepted the exception that a worshipper or other interested person may be permitted to sue on behalf of an idol when the shebait or manager has an adverse interest or abandons the idol, but emphasized that these are exceptions and are founded on stringent conditions as reflected in the cited authorities.
  • The court then synthesized the authorities and stated the correct legal position: when a temple and its endowed properties are registered as a public trust, the suit must be brought in the name of the idol by all the trustees acting together; alternatively, a suit may be brought by one trustee only with the sanction and approval of his co-trustees, but that sanction or approval must be strictly proved.

B. Maintainability under section 12(1)(e) of the Accommodation Control Act:

  • The plaint pleaded the residential need of the deity under section 12(1)(e), alleging the temple was dilapidated and the demised premises were needed for consecrating the deity — treated as a residential purpose in the opinion.
  • The court examined the statutory distinction between "residential" and "non-residential" accommodations under the Accommodation Control Act and relied on common-law understandings of "residence" (citing Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law) to characterize "residence" as involving habitation (eating, drinking, sleeping) and not necessarily permanent or exclusive.
  • Crucially, the court found that the demised premises had been initially let to the defendant for a non-residential (business) purpose. Given that the premises were let for a non-residential purpose, the court held that the accommodation could not be got vacated for a residential purpose under section 12(1)(e). Consequently, the claim under that provision was not maintainable on the facts pleaded.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Holding:

  • The judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed.
  • There shall be no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • The court overruled the contrary view of Bhargava J. in Agarwal Hosiery Shop (1963 M P L J Note 46), declaring that view not to lay down good law. The opinion restates that where a temple and endowed properties are registered as a public trust, the suit must be brought in the name of the idol by all trustees acting together, or by one trustee only with the strictly proved sanction and approval of co-trustees.
  • On the substantive point, the decision directly affects the parties by dismissing the eviction suit founded on section 12(1)(e) because the premises were originally let for non-residential purposes; the court held that such premises cannot be vacated for a residential purpose under that statutory provision.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a novel rule beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities; it corrects and clarifies prior appellate authority (Agarwal Hosiery Shop) and emphasizes the joint nature of the trustees' office and the limited exceptions for ad hoc representation of an idol.

End of summary — based exclusively on the provided opinion text.

    Laxman Prasad v. Shrideo Janki Raman

    Sen, J.-

    This was a suit brought by Shrideo Janki Raman through its Mohatminkar for eviction of the defendant under section 12(1) (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1951. The Courts below have decreed the suit. The appeal came up for hearing before Naik J., and he referred the case to a larger Bench for examining the correctness of the view expressed by Bhargava J., in Agarwal Hosiery Shop v. Deity Radhakishan etc., 1963 M P L J Note 46. One of the questions that arose in the appeal was whether in a suit by a public trust registered under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 all the trustees must join in filing the suit or whether the suit by one of the trustees was competent. Bhargava J., in Agarwal Hosiery Shop's case (supra), after making a contrast between rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that a trustee could represent the beneficiaries and it was, therefore, not necessary to join all the trustees.

    2. With great respect to the learned Judge, the view that all trustees need not join in a suit can hardly be supported. In President Badri Narayan v. Gulam Basool Fakhmddin, 1969 M P L J Note 77, one of us (Sen J.) had occassion to deal with the question. There, the suit was brought by one of the trustees as representing “Shri Rajulal Trust” which was registered under the M. P. Public Trusts Act, 1951 for reimbursement. It was pleaded by the defendants that the suit, as framed, was not maintainable. Due to this, the trustee applied under Order 1, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for permission to continue the suit in a representative capacity as representing all the trustees. That application, however, was rejected on the ground that no prior permission of the Court had been obtained. But while refusing the application, the Court observed that the trustee could apply under Order 1, rule 10 of the Code for impleading other trustees as co-plaintiffs in the suit. While dealing with the question, it was observed:

    “The Trust admittedly is a Public Trust, and the suit could have been instituted in its name, if there was a provision in the M. P. Public Trusts Act enabling a Public Trust to sue in its name. Perhaps, the plaintiff felt that in the absence of such a provision the suit had to be brought in his own name. In making that assumption, the plaintiff committed an honest mistake. The suit had to be brought under Order 1, rule 8 or in the name of the co-trustees as in the case of a private trust.

    There is obviously a lacuna in the M. P. Public Trusts Act in that unlike other enactments, it nowhere provides that upon registration of a Public Trust under the provisions of the Act, the Trust will have a legal, personality, capable of instituting and defending suits and other legal proceedings in its name.

    3. It is true that section 32 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951 forbids trial of a suit on behalf of a public trust, which expression by the definition of “public trust” contained in section 2(4) includes a temple, unless the public trust is registered. It is common ground that the temple in which the idol of Shrideo Janki Raman is installed together with all its endowed properties, is registered as a public trust. But the temple is not a legal person and is incapable of suing. The suit had to be instituted and prosecuted in the name of a legal person capable of suing. The plaintiff-deity in whom the property was vested alone could have brought the suit. No doubt, the idol is itself a juridical person with the power of suing and sued. See Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick and another, I L R 52 Cal. 809. In Jagadindra Nath v. Hetnanta Kumari Debi, I L R 32 Cal. 129 P C. their Lordships stated the legal postion as follows:

    “There is no doubt that an idol may be regarded as a juridical person capable as such of holding property, though it is only in an ideal sense that property is so held.”

    Dealing with the position of the shebait of such an idol, their Lordships proceeded to state:

    “It still remains that the possession and management of the dedicated property belong to the shebait. And this carries with it the right to bring whatever suits are necessary for the protection of the property. Every such right of suit is vested in the shebait, not in the idol.”

    4. In Kisan and others v. Shree Maroti Sansthan, Mohori and others, 1947 N L J 527 = I L R 1947 NAG. 819 Vivian Bose J., stated :

    “Now it is beyond dispute that ordinarily an idol must be represented by its duly appointed manager or shebait. No other person has a right to sue on its behalf any more than in the normal course a third person can sue on behalf of a minor or a lunatic. In either case it must be the proper guardian or committee. But this rule is subject to exceptions, one of which is when the legal or de facto guardian has an adverse interest. In that event, a third party appointed by the Court is permitted to sue with its permission which permission has in every case to be properly obtained and when the right to sue is challenged the matter has to be investigated and decided. The same rule obtains in the case of an idol except that there the person suing must show that he had a personal interest in the idol, as for example, that he is a worshipper or a donor of the property in question or a settler of the trust which embraces the subject-matter of the suit. But once that is established, and it is shown that the shebait or manager who would ordinarily represent the idol has an adverse interest, then the suit lies. These rules are founded on good sense and have long been accepted by the Courts. They will be found set out in Mayne's Hindu Law, 10th Edition, page 927, and have been applied by the Courts in the following, among other cases: Pramntha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, Pashu-patinath Seal v. Pradyumna Kumar Mallik, I L R 64 Cal. 454., Maruti v. Gopal Krishna, A I R 1932 Bom 305 = 34 Bom. L R 41, Kazi Hassan v. Sagun Balkrishna, I L R 24 Bom 170 and Venkatarama Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar, A I R 1967 S C 1044.

    In the ultimate analysis, Bose J, held that though ordinarily, an idol must be represented by its duly appointed manager or shebait, a worshipper in that suit may be permitted under the circumstances there, to sue on behalf of the idol as its next friend and the plaint should be amended showing the idol to be the plaintiff and adding a prayer that the endowed property should be placed in the possession of the wahiwatdar for and on behalf of the idol.

    5. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Bishwanath and another v. Shri Thakur Radha Ballabhji and others, A I R 1967 S C 1044 have also held that suit for declaration of title and possession brought by a worshipper in the name of the idol is maintainable, when the person representing it-leaves it in the lurch. In such circumstances, a person interested in the worship of the idol is clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to protect it. In dealing with the question, their Lordships have reviewed the law on the subject. In particular, their Lordships relied upon a passage from Dr. Bljan Kumar Mukherjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, 2nd Edn. p. 249:

    “(i) An idol is a juristic person in whom the title to the properties of the endowment vests. But it is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner. It has to act through human agency, and that agent is the shebait, who is, in law, the person entitled to take proceedings on its behalf. The personality of the idol might, therefore, be said to be merged in that of the shebait.”

    (ii) Where, however, the shebait refuses to act for the idol, or where the suit is to challenge the act of the shebait himself as prejudicial to the interest of the idol, then there must be some other agency which must have the right to act for the idol. The law accordingly recognises a right in persons interested in the endowment to take proceedings on behalf of the idol.”

    6. When a suit Is brought on behalf of the deity either to recover possession of property held adversely by a stranger or for recovery of money payable to the Debutter estate, all the shebaits must join as plaintiffs. See: Mukherjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, 3rd Edn. p. 198. Dr. Mukherjea states:

    “One of the co-shebaits cannot maintain a suit for recovery of rent to the extent of his share. In Burabani Goal Co. v Gokulanand, LR 61 I A 35, four shebaits of a family deity had executed a mining lease of the idol's interest in a Mouza. A suit being instituted by one of the shebaits against the lease for a four-anna share in the royalties, it was held that a such a suit was not maintainable and that the irregularity was not cured by making the other shebaits parlies defendants.”

    When there are mote shebaiis than one, they constitute one body, in the eye of law, and all of them must act together. The management of the trust properties may be for practical purposes, in the hands of one of the shebaits who is called the managing shebait or the shebaits themselves may exercise their right of management by turns, but in neither case it is competent for one of the shabaits to do anything in relation to the Debutter estate without the concurrence either express or implied by his co-shebaits. This is, of course, subject to any express direction given by the grantor. Mukherjea's Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, 3rd Edn. p. 197-196.

    7. By parity of reasoning, when there are more trustees than one, the trustees must act together. In Lala Man Mohan Das v. Janki Prasad and others, A I R 1945 P C 23, their Lordships of the Privy Council stated the law, in the following terms:-

    “In this connection attention may be drawn to the following statement of law from Lewin on Trusts, Edn. 14, page 196:

    In the case of co-trustees the office is a joint one. Where the administration of the trust is vested in co-trustees, they all form as it were but one collective trustee, and therefore must execute the duties of the office in their joint capacity. It is not uncommon to hear one of several trustees spoken of as the acting trustee, but the Court knows no such distinction; all who accept the office are in the eyes of the law acting trustees. If any one refuse or be incapable to join, it is not competent for the others to proceed without him, but the administration of the trust must in that case devolve upon the Court. However, the act of one trustee done with the sanction and approval of a co-trustee may be regarded as the act of both. But such sanction or approval must be sirictly proved.”

    8. In view of this, the decision of Bhargava J., in Agarwal Hosiery Shop (supra), taking a view to the contrary must be overruled as not laying down good law. In our opinion, the learned Judge was not right that any one of the trustees without reference to the other trustees, may maintain a suit in the name of the idol or in invoking Order XXXI, rules I and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, in terms, are not applicable to a suit of this kind. Rule 1 deals with a suit between the beneficiaries and a third person, while Rule 2 pertains to a suit against the trustees. The correct legal position may be stated thus-

    When a temple where an idol is installed is registered, together with its endowed properties, as a public trust under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, the suit must be brought in the name of the idol, by all the trustees acting together. However, such a suit may be brought by one trustee with the sanction and approval of his co-trustees. But sanction or approval must be strictly proved.

    9. But the suit must also fail on another ground. The Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 makes a distinction between “residential” and “non-residential” accommodations. The claim as laid in the plaint pleads a, need under section 12 (1) (e) of the Act, i. e., the residential need of the deity. It is alleged therein that the temple where the deity is now installed is in a delapidated condition, and therefore, the demised premises are needed for consecrating the deity. That obviously is a residential purpose. In common parlance, “residence” means dwelling in a place. In Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, Vol. II, it is stated :

    “In the case of a person, residence connotes the idea of home, or at least of habitation, and need not necessarily be permanent or exclusive. The word denotes the place where an individual eats, drinks, and sleeps, or where his family or his servants eat, drink and sleep. R. v. North Curry (Inhabitants) (1825) 4 B & C at p. 959.”

    Admittedly, the demised premises were initially let to the defendant for a non-residential purpose, i. e., for business purposes. That being so, the demised premises having been let for a non-residential purpose, the accommodation cannot be got vacated for a residential purpose under section 12 (1) (e) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

    10. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Laxman Prasad v. Shrideo Janki Raman
    (Nov 24, 1972)