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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • provisions of section 12 (1) (e) and (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961,
  • section 12 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961,
  • provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
  • DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT 1952
  • clauses (e) and (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12,
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961,
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • clause (e) of section 12 (1)
  • section 2 (g) of that Act,
  • section 12 (6) (b)
  • section 12 (J) (t)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 12 (1) (e) and (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961,
  • section 12 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961,
  • provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
  • DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT 1952
  • clauses (e) and (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12,
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961,
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • clause (e) of section 12 (1)
  • section 2 (g) of that Act,
  • section 12 (6) (b)
  • section 12 (J) (t)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit for ejectment under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The demised premises were granted by a kirayanama dated 1-11-1955 as a composite lease for both non-residential and residential purposes at a monthly rent of Rs. 250. The premises are located in the business locality of Satna town: the ground floor was used for a cloth business carried on by the defendant partnership firm, and the first floor for residential purposes.

The plaintiff (Sakhi Gopal) instituted proceedings seeking possession on the ground of his bona fide requirement to start a Medical Stores and for residence. The lower courts found that the plaintiff had established bona fide requirement for both business (non-residential) and residence. The appellant challenged that decree in this appeal, urging points of law about the effect of a composite lease and the scope of section 12(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a composite lease (residential and non-residential together) can be split by the Court for purposes of granting ejectment under clauses (e) or (f) of section 12(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, when there is no specific statutory provision permitting such division.
  2. What is the proper construction of the opening non-obstante clause and the word "except" in section 12(1) of the Act — i.e., whether no suit for eviction can be entertained except on the grounds enumerated therein.
  3. How to determine the dominant purpose of an accommodation let for both residential and non-residential uses (i.e., the method for classifying such accommodation as either residential or non-residential under the Act).
  4. Whether section 12(6)(b), concerning compensation on eviction of tenants of non-residential premises, precludes passing of a decree or only affects execution (and whether that provision applies to the town in question).
  5. Whether the landlord must be a resident of the city or town where the accommodation is situate to claim relief under section 12(1)(e) or (f).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Relying on the kirayanama (lease) of 1-11-1955, the appellant contended that the demised premises were let for a composite purpose (both residential and non-residential) and that the contract of tenancy is one and indivisible.
  • Because the Madhya Pradesh Act (section 12(1)) contains no specific provision for composite tenancies, it was argued that the plaintiff's suit for ejectment based on composite need is not maintainable; the Court cannot divide the tenancy into separate residential and non-residential contracts and grant relief under clauses (e) or (f).
  • The appellant relied on Supreme Court decisions (Dr. Gopal Dass Verma and Miss S. Sanyal) to support the proposition that a court has no power, in the absence of statutory provision, to break up a single tenancy contract into parts and grant relief applicable to one portion only.
  • It was further suggested that the absence of a provision for composite premises is a lacuna in the Act and cited the differing approach of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, which contemplates a separate category for mixed-purpose premises.

Respondent's / Plaintiff's Position (as found and relied upon by the courts below)

  • The plaintiff established, and the courts below found (concurrently), that he bona fide required the accommodation for starting a Medical Stores (non-residential) and for residence for himself and family; this factual finding was not challenged on appeal.
  • Evidence (including testimony from a partner of the defendant firm) indicated the dominant purpose of the lease was non-residential (business on the ground floor) and the residential use of the first floor was incidental.
  • The plaintiff's primary need was non-residential (Medical Stores), and his need was treated as bonafide by the trial and appellate courts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S.K. Bhardwaj & another, AIR 1963 SC 337 Authority for the proposition that, absent specific statutory provision, the Court cannot break up a single contract of tenancy into separate contracts (residential and non-residential) and grant relief applicable only to part. The court acknowledged the principle but held it was not applicable to the present case because the Madhya Pradesh Act's classification and wording differ from the Delhi and Ajmer Act on which the decision turned.
Miss S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand, AIR 1968 SC 438 Same principle as above: the tenancy contract is single and indivisible; a court has no jurisdiction to disintegrate a composite letting in absence of statutory provision. The court noted the principle but distinguished the decision because the Delhi and Ajmer Act contemplates a third category (residential-non-residential) and language different from the Madhya Pradesh Act; hence the decision was not applied to negate relief here.
Moolchand alias Norangilal v. Sheodutt Paliwal and another, 1973 MPLJ 378 Explains the method of determining whether accommodation is let for residential or non-residential purposes when lease is silent: infer purpose from surrounding circumstances and decide the primary (dominant) purpose. The court adopted and expressly agreed with this reasoning, applying the approach to determine that the dominant purpose of the present lease was non-residential.
Sarvate T. B. v. Nemichand, 1966 MPLJ 26 (as cited) Authority for the principle that factual findings (e.g., bona fide requirement) on appreciation of evidence are binding in second appeal. The court treated the lower courts' concurrent finding of the plaintiff's bona fide requirement as binding and noted it was rightly not challenged on appeal.
Mattulal v. Rudhe La1, AIR 1974 SC 1596 (as cited) Supports the proposition that findings of fact are binding on appeal. The court relied on this authority in support of treating the lower courts' factual findings as binding.
Hamid Arab (Sheikh) v. Mumtaz Hussain, 1968 J LT Note 58 Interpretation that section 12(6) of the Act relates to post-decree matters and creates an impediment to execution rather than a bar to passing a decree. The court adopted this view to conclude that section 12(6)(b) does not prevent passing a decree under section 12(1)(f), and further held that the compensation provision was in any event inapplicable because the relevant notification for towns other than specified cities had not been issued.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by statutory interpretation and application of settled principles as follows:

  1. Interpretation of section 12(1): The opening non-obstante clause ("Notwithstanding anything to the contrary...") and the word "except" were read to mean that no suit for eviction from an "accommodation" (as defined in section 2(a)) can be filed unless it is based on one or more of the enumerated grounds in section 12(1). If a landlord files a suit without alleging any of those grounds, the suit discloses no cause of action and must be dismissed.
  2. Distinction from Delhi and Ajmer Act jurisprudence: Although the Supreme Court decisions in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma and Miss S. Sanyal establish the general principle that courts cannot split an indivisible tenancy contract absent statutory provision, those decisions were held to turn on the specific scheme and definitions in the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 — which contemplates three categories of premises (purely residential, purely non-residential, and residential-non-residential). The Madhya Pradesh Act, however, recognizes only two categories (residential and non-residential) under clauses (e) and (f) of section 12(1). Therefore the earlier decisions could not be applied mechanically here.
  3. Single and indivisible tenancy — determination of dominant purpose: Accepting the settled law that tenancy is single and indivisible, the court held it must determine which of the two purposes was dominant (the other being subsidiary or ancillary). The factors to be considered in that determination include the purpose mentioned in the lease or its user, constructional design, location, amenities, conveniences, and surrounding circumstances. The court expressly relied on the reasoning in Moolchand v. Sheodutt Paliwal that where the lease is silent or ambiguous on purpose, these surrounding circumstances must be used to infer the primary purpose.
  4. Application to the facts: The demised premises were in a market area where ground floors are mainly used for business. Testimony from a partner of the defendant firm indicated the dominant purpose of the lease was non-residential (business), with residential use of the first floor being incidental. The plaintiff's stated requirement (to start a Medical Stores and to reside) thus had a primary non-residential component. The court found the lower courts' concurrent factual findings that the plaintiff bona fide required the premises to be supported by evidence and binding on second appeal.
  5. Section 12(6)(b) (compensation) and post-decree effect: The court treated section 12(6) as relating to post-decree/execution matters (citing Hamid Arab (Sheikh) v. Mumtaz Hussain) — i.e., it does not prevent the passing of a decree under section 12(1)(f) but may impede execution unless conditions are met. Moreover, the compensation provision under section 12(6)(b) operates only when the accommodation is situated in certain specified cities or such other towns as the State Government may notify; no notification had been issued for the town in the instant case, so the provision did not apply.
  6. Residency of the landlord: The court rejected the submission that the landlord must be a resident of the city or town to benefit from clauses (e) or (f). The Act uses the word "landlord" (lessor) without distinguishing resident or non-resident owners, and the court concluded there was no warrant to limit the provisions to resident landlords.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

The final decision was to dismiss the appeal with costs. The court confirmed the concurrent finding of the lower courts that the plaintiff had a bona fide requirement for the accommodation (primarily for non-residential use to start a Medical Stores, and incidentally for residence), and that conclusion was binding on appeal. Costs were awarded and counsel's fee was to be paid as per schedule if certified.

Implications:

  • The court applied the principle that a tenancy is single and indivisible but, where a lease is for mixed use, the court must determine the dominant purpose from surrounding circumstances; if the dominant purpose falls within a category recognized by the statute (residential or non-residential), the landlord may seek eviction under the corresponding clause in section 12(1).
  • The non-obstante clause in section 12(1) was construed to give the enumerated grounds overriding effect; a suit not based on the listed grounds discloses no cause of action.
  • Section 12(6)(b) was held to be inapplicable in the present matter (both because it relates to post-decree/execution and because the statutory notification extending compensation to other towns had not been issued for the town concerned).
  • The decision directly affects the parties by upholding the ejectment decree in favour of the plaintiff; the opinion does not purport to lay down any broader novel precedent beyond applying established principles and distinguishing earlier Supreme Court decisions on their statutory context.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed." Costs awarded; counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.

    Panjumal Daulatram Firm v. Sakhi Gopal Thakurdin Agrawal

    -

    Points of law urged in the appeal may be shortly stated. Relying on the kirayanama dated 1-11-1955, it is urged that the demised premises having been let for a composite purpose, i. e., for non-residential as well as residential purposes, in the absence of a specific provision made in that behalf in section 12 (1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, the plaintiff's suit for ejectment based on his composite need, is not main­tainable. The demised premises is situate in the heart of the business locality in Satna town. The defendant is a partnership firm carrying on cloth business from the ground floor, and the first floor is used for residential purposes. The kirayanama, Ex. P-1, shows the creation of a composite lease on a monthly rent of Rs.250. It is urged that the contract of tenancy is one and indivisible, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect, it is not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts one of letting for non-residential pur­poses, and the other for residential purposes, and to gram relief under clauses (e) or (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. It is said that unlike the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, there is no provision made for evic­tion of tenants from residential-cum-non-residential. This, it is said, a lacuna in the Act. The submission is based on the opening words of section 12 (1) of the Act, which read as follows:-

    "12. Restriction on eviction of tenants (1).-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-"

    Emphasis is laid on the non-obstante clause, "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract", and the word "except", for the submission that no suit for eviction of a tenant from any accommodation as defined in section 2 (a) can be entertained unless it is based on one or more of the grounds mentioned therein. The word "except" must, in the context, mean-'on no other grounds.'

    2. Reliance is placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma v. Dr. S.K. Bhardwaj & another AIR 1963 S C 337, and Miss S. Sanyal v. Gian Chand AIR 1968 S C 438, in support of the contention.

    3. The decisions of their Lordships are an authority for the proposition that, in the absence of a specific provision in the statute, the Court has no power to break up the unity of the contract of letting and attribute incidents and obligations to a part of the subject-matter of the contract which are not applicable to the rest. They proceed on the principle that the contract of tenancy is a single and indivisible contract, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect, it is not open to the Court to divide it into two contracts one of letting for residential purposes, and the other for non-residential pur­poses, and to grant relief accordingly.

    4. In Dr. Gopal Dass Verma case (supra), the premises in dispute were originally let for residential purposes; but subsequent to the letting, they were, with the consent of the landlord, used both for residential and non-residential purposes. The premises, therefore, by their user ceased to be premises let for residential purpose alone. In Miss S. Sanyal's case (supra), there was a compo­site letting, i.e., for purposes non-residential as well as residential. In both the cases, the respective landlords brought suits for ejectment under sec­tion 13 (1) (e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, on the ground that they required the premises bonafide for their own residence. In Dr. Gopal Dass Verma's case (supra), their Lordships held that the premises in that case had, by their user ceased, because of the consent of the landlord, to be premises let for residential purposes alone and since that were so, the Court had no jurisdiction to decree ejectment under section 13 (1) (e) of the Act.

    5. In Miss. S. Sanyal's case (supra), the High Court held that where there is a composite letting, it was open to the Court to disintegrate the contract of tenancy, and if the landlord proves his case of bonafide requirement for his own occupation, to pass a decree in ejectment limited to that part which is being used by the tenant for residential purposes. Their Lordships held that the High Court was in error as the contract of tenancy being a single and indivisible con­tract, the Court had no jurisdiction to break up the unity of the contract of letting, in the absence of any statutory provision in that behalf, and grant relief under section 13 (1) (e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. I fail to see how the principle enunciated in both these cases, applies to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    6. In the interpretation of statutes, the Courts decline to consider other statutes proceeding on different lines and including different provisions, or judicial decisions thereon. [See, Crazies on Statutes, 6th Edn. p. 133]. The two decisions of their Lordships turn on the scheme of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The word "premises", as denned in section 2 (g) of that Act, contemplates three categories of premises depending upon the nature of user, namely, (i) purely residential, (ii) purely non-residential, and (iii) residential-non-residential. The Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, however, by clauses (e) and (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12, recognizes only two categories of buildings- (i) residential and (ii) non-residential. There is no third category, i.e., both residential and non-residential. The two Acts differ widely in their scope; and even when they happen to deal with the same subject, their wording is not the same. The decisions are, therefore, not applicable for the interpretation of the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

    1. The true effect and meaning of the language of section 12 (1) of the Act is that no suit for eviction of a tenant from an 'accommodation', as defined in section 2 (a) of the Act, can be brought unless it is based on one or more of the grounds mentioned there in. The construction suggested on the opening words "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract", and the word 'except' appearing therein, is the only construction possible. The Act, by the non abstain clause, gives to section 12 (1) an over­riding effect over all other laws including the Transfer of Property Act. There can also be no contracting out by the tenant of his statutory protection. The Act enjoins that any contract between the parties, if it is contrary to the provi­sions of the Act, will be inoperative, and the Court will not enforce it. The words "no suit shall be filed" mean, on the one hand, that the landlord is pro­hibited from filing a suit for eviction against a tenant unless it is based on one or more of the grounds mentioned in section 12 (1), and on the other, if he has filed a suit, i. e., without its being based on any of the grounds specified therein, the Court shall not entertain such a suit and dismiss it as disclosing no cause of action. The existence of one or more of the grounds mentioned in sec­tion 12 (1) of the Act, therefore, constitutes a necessary part of the cause of action in a suit for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation.

    8. In clauses (a) to (p) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, the Legislature has specified the various grounds upon which a suit for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation can be based. The Act, with respect to the bonafide requirement of the landlord, has put accommodations into two cate­gories, (a) residential and (b) non-residential. There is no third category viz., residential-cum-business. Clauses (e) and (f) make separate provisions for these two categories of accommodation. In case of accommodation let for residen­tial purposes, the bona fide requirement of the landlord under clause (e) should be for residence. In case of accommodation let for non-residential purposes, his bona fide requirement under clause (f) should only be for non-residential purposes. Any need not in conformity with the purposes for which the accommodation was let, or inconsistent with its actual user, is, therefore, not a 'bona fide requirement' for purposes of either of these clauses.

    9. The absence of a provision relating to a composite premises viz., premises let for residential as well as non-residential purposes, does not neces­sarily mean that no suit can be filed by landlords for eviction of tenants from such premises. That would result in manifest absurdity. The Legislature cannot be attributed with the intention of leaving a hiatus, i. e., of placing a blanket ban against eviction of such tenants. As is manifest, the Act recognises only two categories of buildings, residential and non-residential. In view of the settled law, that the contract of tenancy being a single and indivisible con­tract, the Court has no power to break up the unity of the contract of letting and attribute incidents and obligations to a part of the subject-matter of the contract which is not applicable to the rest. The Court has, therefore, to determine as to which of the two purposes was the dominant purpose, the other being subsidiary and ancillary to it. This depends on various factors, i. e., pur­pose for which the accommodation was let, or its user, its constructional design, situation, amenities available, conveniences provided, etc.

    10. In Moolchand alias Norangilal v. Sheodutt Paliwal and another 1973 M PL J 378. Singh J. states:

    "The question whether an accommodation is let for residential purposes or for non-residential purposes is a simple one when the contract of tenancy specifies the purpose of the tenancy. But the question becomes a vexed one when the lease, whether oral or written, is silent on that point. The expression "the accommodation let for residential purposes" as used in clause (e) of section 12 (1) and the expression "the accommodation let for non-residential purposes" as used in clause (f) of the same section prima facie refer to the pur­pose mentioned in the lease. But when a lease is created without any restriction as to purpose, the tenant is free to use it for any purpose and strictly speaking in such a case it is difficult to say that the letting is for any particular purpose. But if this view is taken, clauses (e) and (f) will be inapplicable to a case where tenancy is created without any express or implied limitation as to purpose and the landlord will not be able to claim possession of the accommodation even if he needs it for his own use. Such a result does not seem to have been intended by the Legislature. Therefore, even if the lease does not specify any purpose, its purpose has to be inferred by recourse to surrounding circumstances, such as the structural design of the accommodation, its location, the use to which it is put by the tenant etc. Another difficulty arises because of the fact that the Act creates only two cate­gories of purpose viz. residential and non-residential. Therefore, if an accommodation is let or used for both residential and non-residential purposes, the Court has to decide as to what is the primary purpose for which the accommodation is let or used. 1 f the primary purpose is residential the accommodation will be classified as residential even if it is also used for some non-residential purposes; and vice-versa."

    11. I entirely agree with the view expressed by him. In the present case, the demised premises is situate in the market area of Satna Town. The ground floor of buildings there, it is said, is mainly used for carrying on business. The defendant is a partnership firm registered under the Partnership Act, and is doing business in cloth from the demised premises. Now, though the kirayanama, Ex. P-1, mentions that the premises was let for a composite purpose, the primary purpose undoubtedly was non-residential. This is clear from the testimony of Panjumal (D. W. 4), a partner of the defendant-firm, to the effect:-

    The dominated purpose of the lease was, therefore, non-residential, and the residential use of the first floor was merely incidental to it. The plaintiff, Sakhi Gopal, (P.W. 1) and his two brothers, Shrikrishna (P.W. 2) and Dr. Biharilal (P.W. 3), state that the plaintiff needs the ground-floor for starting a Medical Stores, and that the plaintiff being married, needs the first-floor for his residence. The plaintiff's primary need is, therefore, the same, i.e., non-residential. The first point, therefore, fails.

    12. The Courts below have concurrently found that the plaintiff has established that he bonafide requires the suit accommodation for starting a Medical Stores as also as residence for himself and for members of his family. That is a finding based on appreciation of evidence, and the finding is binding in second appeal. [See, Servate T. B. v. Nemichand 1966 M P L J 26 (S C), and Mattulal v. Rudhe La1 AIR 1974 S C 1596. The finding as to his 'bonafide requirement' was rightly not challenged before me.

    13. No doubt, the burden of proving bonafide requirement for his business as well as residence, as also the fact that the plaintiff had no reasonably suitable accommodation of his own, lay upon the plaintiff. Whether in a given case that burden is discharged by the evidence on record, is again a question of fact. [See Sarvate T. B. v. Nemichand (supra)].

    14. The conclusion that the Courts have reached is the only conclusion possible on the evidence on record, in the light of the circumstances appearing. The plaintiff is M.Sc. In 1966, after completing his studies, he returned to Satna where his brothers Shrikrishna (P.W. 2) and Dr. Biharilal (P.W. 3) reside. Dr. Biharilal and his wife are both practising there as doctors. His brothers wanted to settle him in life, and, therefore, the plaintiff started a Medical Stores in partnership with his brother Shrikrishna (P.W. 2) with Himanshu, minor son of Dr. Biharilal, admitted to the benefits of the partner­ship. In May, 1968, the plaintiff's brothers got him married. Unfortunately, the business did not prosper and, therefore, the partnership was dissolved. The plaintiff, however, continued the Medical Stores as his separate business. The three brothers with their families were residing in the house of Shrikrishna but the accommodation was not sufficient for them. The plaintiff, therefore, shifted his residence from Satna to Nagod, which is a place 17 miles away, and from there he used to come daily to Satna, and look after the business. This the plaintiff found to be rather inconvenient. In November, 1968, he therefore, shifted his Medical Stores to Nagod. Now, he wants to shift from Nagod to Satna, and start his Medical Stores from the suit accommodation. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's need was a mere pretence. The Act was not meant to deprive the owner of the beneficial enjoyment of his own property.

    15. Two other points are taken, namely, (i) in case of a composite lease, i.e. premises let for residential as well as non-residential purposes, the Legislature has not in section 12 (6) (b) provided any measure for calculating the compensation payable; and since the contract of tenancy is one and indivisible, and the tenancy cannot be split up and, therefore, the Court cannot apportion the rent between the residential and the non-residential portions, inasmuch as the stipulated rent is one for the entire leased premises, and (ii) the need of a person under section 12 (1) (e) or (f) of the Act has to be the need of one who is a resident of the city or town concerned where the accommodation is situate, and no outsider, i.e., a non-resident, can take benefit of these provisions. The contentions can easily be disposed of.

    16. The point regarding the inexcusability of the decree by reason of section 12 (6) (b) of the Act does notaries for two reasons. In the first place, section 12 (6) of the Act relates to a stage after the passing of a decree under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act. In Hamid Arab (Sheikh) v. Mumtaz Hussain 1968 J LT Note 58, I had taken the view that:

    "The provision creates no bar against the passing of a decree on the ground mentioned under section 12 (J) (t) but creates an impediment to the execution of such decree unless; certain conditions are fulfilled. In other words, the provision contained in section 12 (6) relates to post-decree matters which arise upon its execution. The opening words of the provision clearly restrict the operation of the provision to a stage subsequent to the passing of a decree."

    Perhaps that view was correct because the Supreme Court declined to grant special leave. In the second place, the provision for payment of compensation to the tenant evicted under section 12 (I) (f) of the Act, comes into play when such accommodation is situate in cities of Gwalior (including Lashkar and Morar), Indore, Ujjain, Ratlam, Bhopal, Jabalpur, Raipur or Durg or such other towns or cities specified by the State Government by a notification in that behalf. The State Government has so far issued no notification in regard to other towns. That being so, the provision in section 12 (6) (b) of the Act is not

    applicable at all to the instant case.

    17. The provision for payment of compensation to tenants evicted from non-residential premises, is confined to the larger cities for valid reasons. Where such tenants on being evicted, they are put to substantial loss resulting from disruption of their business from premises from where they have earned good­will and reputation in the market, by dint of their exertion. The Legislature by making the provision for payment of compensation, tries to balance the interest of the landlord against that of the tenant. While the bona fide need of the landlord must prevail, he must in such a case, indemnify the tenant to a certain extent against the loss sustained by him. Presumably, the paucity of non-residential accommodation in smaller towns is not so acute.

    18. It would be a fallacy to suggest that the provisions of clauses (e) and (f) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act were meant for the benefit of land­lords, who are residents of the city or town where the accommodation is situate. The provisions have been enacted for the benefit of the landlord' which means the lessor, irrespective of whether he is a resident of the city or town concerned or not. Non-resident landlords are, therefore, not deprived of the right to get tenants evicted from residential as well as non-residential premises, where they are in bonafide requirement of such premises. There is no occasion why a person who owns a residential or non-residential accommodation should not get the same for his own use, merely because he is residing outside the city or town. The Act makes no such classification and in my view, there is no warrant for limiting the provisions of section 12 (1) (e) and (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, in the manner suggested.

    19. The result, therefore, is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if certified.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Panjumal Daulatram Firm v. Sakhi Gopal Thakurdin Agrawal
    (Jan 21, 1976)