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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 13 (3) (a) (iii) and (b) of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (8 of 2006 BK),
  • clauses (a), (f), (g) and (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
  • section 12 (1) (a), (f), (g) and (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
  • section 21 (1) (g) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961,
  • 1970 M P 1 (F B), the provisions of section 13 (1)
  • section 12 (1) (h).
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 13 (3) (a) (iii) and (b) of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (8 of 2006 BK),
  • clauses (a), (f), (g) and (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
  • section 12 (1) (a), (f), (g) and (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.
  • section 21 (1) (g) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961,
  • 1970 M P 1 (F B), the provisions of section 13 (1)
  • section 12 (1) (h).
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought by the plaintiff, Abdul Hamid (landlord), against the judgment of the IInd Additional District Judge, Jabalpur dated 11 April 1975, which affirmed the judgment and decree of the IInd Civil Judge, Class II, Jabalpur dated 24 July 1973 dismissing the plaintiff's suit for eviction. The suit sought ejectment of the defendant, Hakeem Ahmedullah Khan, from house No. 866, Omti, Marhatal Ward, Jabalpur, on multiple statutory grounds under section 12(1)(a), (f), (g) and (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

The substantive factual allegations by the plaintiff included arrears of rent since December 1967 amounting to Rs.600 (at Rs.20 per month), his bona fide requirement of the accommodation to continue his business in scents and perfumed hair-oils with no suitable alternative accommodation in the city, that the house was dilapidated and unsafe for habitation and could not be repaired without vacation, and that substantial additions and alterations required vacation of the premises. The defendant denied the allegations and contested entitlement to ejectment. Both Courts below had negatived the plaintiff's claim, prompting this appeal.

The appellate court observed that it was unnecessary to consider the (f) ground because both lower courts had found the premises were let for residential purposes (and thus not available for non-residential use), and the appellant had not pressed the (f) ground on appeal. The appellate court, however, found the appeal must succeed on grounds under clauses (a), (g) and (h) of section 12(1) because the Additional District Judge had not applied his mind properly to whether the requirements of those clauses were fulfilled; both parties agreed the matter should be remanded for fresh decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to eject the defendant under section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 on the ground of arrears of rent, taking into account any compliance by the defendant with section 13(1) of the Act (initial deposit of arrears and subsequent month-by-month deposits on the 15th).
  2. Whether the plaintiff proved his bona fide requirement under section 12(1)(g) (repairs) and/or section 12(1)(h) (rebuilding or substantial additions/alterations), and whether the lower courts properly distinguished between clauses (g) and (h).
  3. Whether the three-fold pre-requisites under section 12(7) (which restrain passing a decree under section 12(1)(h)) were pleaded and proved and whether they existed on the date of passing of any decree.
  4. Whether payments/deposits made by the defendant (including a deposit of Rs.600 and subsequent deposits during the pendency of the suit and appeals) satisfied the temporal and manner-of-payment requirements of section 13(1), including any required court order granting an extension of time.
  5. Whether the courts below properly evaluated the evidence (expert report and photographs) and whether inspection of the premises and correct application of the legal distinction between repair and reconstruction were required before deciding the claim under clauses (g) and (h).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The defendant was in arrears of rent from December 1967 to the date of suit (total alleged arrears Rs.600 at Rs.20 per month) and did not pay despite notice, justifying eviction under section 12(1)(a).
  • The plaintiff bonafidely required the accommodation to continue his business in scents and perfumed hair-oils and had no suitable alternative accommodation in the city, invoking section 12(1)(g) and/or (h).
  • The premises were dilapidated and unsafe for habitation and could not be repaired without the defendant vacating; the plaintiff sought to make substantial additions and alterations which could not be carried out while occupied.

Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The defendant denied the plaintiff's allegations and contested entitlement to ejectment.
  • The defendant pleaded that he had deposited Rs.600 as rent for the period stated in the record (the opinion notes an apparent mistake in the pleaded months), and that rents due thereafter were being deposited in Court.
  • Counsel for the respondent filed a chart showing payments made; the chart suggested that rent was deposited month by month during the pendency of the suit until shortly before judgment, with some delays attributed to circumstances such as the Court being closed, and included lump-sum deposits at specific times (e.g., Rs.60 for three months and Rs.100 on receipt of a notice of second appeal).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Firm Ratanchand Darbarilal, Satna & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Khoobchand & Ors., 1969 MPLJ 672 = AIR 1970 M P 1 (Full Bench) Establishes that the provisions of section 13(1) (deposit of arrears and continuing monthly deposits) are applicable in an appeal or second appeal by the landlord. The court applied this principle to hold that the defendant was bound to comply with the requirements of section 13(1) not only in the lower appellate court but also during the pendency of appeals up to this Court; thus the Additional District Judge should decide whether there was due compliance with both requirements of section 13(1).
Panchamal Narayan Shenoy v. Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy, (1970) 2 Supreme Court Journal 601 (Supreme Court) Interpreting a provision in terms identical with section 12(1)(h) (in that case section 21(1)(g) of the Mysore Rent Control Act): the landlord's desire to put property to a more profitable use after demolition/reconstruction may be relevant; immediate demolition need not be established. The court relied on the principle that under section 12(1)(h) the condition of the building is immaterial and the landlord's bona fide requirement for reconstruction may suffice; the desire to put the property to a more profitable use can be a relevant factor in assessing bona fides.
Neta Ram & Ors. v. Jiwan Lal & Anr., AIR 1963 SC 499 Holds that the condition of the building was one of the relevant circumstances under a differently worded provision (section 13(3)(a)(iii) and (b) of a Punjab ordinance). The court distinguished that authority, observing that its reasoning proceeded from differently worded provisions and is not directly determinative of section 12(1)(h), though the condition of the building may be a relevant circumstance under some other statutory formulations.
Wasudeo Hari Sathe v. Jagdish Prasad, Second Appeal No. 946 of 1967 (decided 23-4-1971) Decision dealing with section 12(1)(h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act. The court noted having earlier occasion to deal with section 12(1)(h) in this authority and cited it as part of the jurisprudential context for interpreting bonafide requirement under clause (h).
Ved Prakash & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Bai, Second Appeal No. 73 of 1976 (decided 2-3-1976) This decision was mentioned by the Court for consideration in deciding compliance with section 13(1) and related appellate questions. The court drew attention to this decision and to Gaurishankar v. Bhagwandas for the learned Additional District Judge to consider in his fresh decision; the opinion does not elaborate the specific rule from this case.
Gaurishankar v. Bhagwandas, Second Appeal No. 762 of 1969 (decided 5-3-1976) This decision was mentioned by the Court for consideration in relation to section 13(1) compliance and appellate effect. The court directed that the Additional District Judge should take note of this decision when deciding afresh; the opinion itself does not set out the detailed principle from this decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps, each tied to the statutory framework and the evidence on record:

  1. On clause (f): The court deemed it unnecessary to examine clause (f) because both lower courts found the premises were let for residential purposes; the appellant did not press clause (f) on appeal.
  2. On clauses (a), (g) and (h): The court held that the appeal must succeed with respect to these clauses because the learned Additional District Judge had not applied his mind to whether the requirements of these clauses were fulfilled. The parties agreed the matter should be remanded for a fresh decision.
  3. On section 12(1)(a) and section 13(1): The trial judge had dismissed the claim under section 12(1)(a) on the ground that the defendant was not in arrears; the Additional District Judge refused to interfere on the ground that the plaintiff had not appealed the arrears dismissal. The appellate court rejected both views:
    • The trial judge was wrong if she thought mere payment or deposit by the defendant necessarily non-suited the plaintiff on the eviction claim; the court still had to enquire whether the defendant complied with section 13(1)'s two requirements (initial deposit within one month of service of summons or within further time allowed; and subsequent month-by-month deposits on or before the 15th of each succeeding month).
    • The Additional District Judge was wrong in treating the plaintiff's failure to appeal the arrears claim as fatal to the eviction claim; arrears recovery and eviction are distinct matters, and the fact that the defendant had deposited Rs.600 in Court (on 29-7-1970) meant the plaintiff could not practically claim arrears in appeal.
  4. On evidence about deposits and compliance: The court examined the pleadings and the record and identified uncertainty: the defendant pleaded a deposit for certain months but the court noted an apparent mistake in the pleaded months; it remained unclear whether the deposit included rent for December 1967 or whether it was to the credit of the plaintiff; there was no express court order under section 13(1) granting extension of time, only an order declining to strike off the defence under section 13(6). The court concluded that the Additional District Judge must decide whether there was due compliance with both requirements of section 13(1).
  5. On continuing obligation under section 13(1) during appeals: Relying on the Full Bench decision (Firm Ratanchand Darbarilal), the court held the requirements of section 13(1) apply during the pendency of appeal and second appeal; the defendant was therefore bound to comply with both requirements throughout the appellate process; the record contained indications that on some occasions the defendant did not deposit rent by the 15th of the succeeding month (three months identified), though explanations were offered (court closure) and lump-sum deposits were made later.
  6. On distinction between clauses (g) and (h): The court criticized the Additional District Judge for failing to mark the legal difference between clause (g) (repairs) and clause (h) (building, re-building, substantial additions or alterations). The court emphasized that if the requirement is for rebuilding or substantial additions, the matter falls under clause (h) and the condition of the building (per se) is not the central consideration for clause (h).
  7. On the assessment of expert evidence and inspection: The Additional District Judge relied on an expert's report (Ex. P-3) and photographs (Exs. P-6 and P-7) but the appellate court found that reliance on the outer photographs alone was inadequate to determine internal dilapidation and whether certain works could be carried out without vacation. The court said that dismantling of parts of the roof or first floor might require vacation, and that the Additional District Judge should inspect the premises if necessary before deciding.
  8. On clause (h) and section 12(7): The court reiterated that under clause (h) the condition of the building is immaterial; what matters is proof of the landlord's bona fide requirement for reconstruction and fulfillment of the three-fold pre-requisites in section 12(7), which must exist on the date of the decree. The court found the plaintiff's pleadings defective for not pleading the existence of those three-fold requirements and noted there was no specific issue framed on those requirements at trial.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL ALLOWED. The judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge are set aside and the matter is remanded to the Additional District Judge for fresh decision on the grounds under section 12(1)(a), (g) and (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

Implications / Consequence for the parties:

  • The case will be reheard (or reconsidered) by the Additional District Judge who must: (a) examine whether the defendant complied with both requirements of section 13(1) throughout the suit and appeals; (b) properly distinguish and apply clauses (g) and (h) of section 12(1) and, where appropriate, consider inspection of the premises; and (c) address whether the three-fold pre-requisites of section 12(7) were pleaded and exist as of the date of any decree under clause (h).
  • The appellate order directed that costs shall abide the event; hearing fee as per schedule, if certified.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent; it remands for proper application of existing statutory provisions and cited authorities.

Appeal allowed. (Direct effect: setting aside of the Additional District Judge's judgment and remand for fresh decision; costs to abide the event.)

    Abdul Hamid v. Hakeem Ahmad Ullah Khan

    -

    This appeal by the plaintiff is directed against a judgment of the IInd Additional District Judge, Jabalpur, dated 11th April 1975, affirming the judgment and decree of the Ilnd Civil Judge, Class II, Jabalpur dated 24th July 1973, dismissing the plaintiff's suit for eviction under section 12 (1) (a), (f), (g) and (h) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961.

    2. The plaintiff Abdul Hamid who is the landlord, brought the suit for ejectment of the defendant Hakeem Ahmedullah Khan from house No. 866, Omti, Marhatal Ward, Jabalpur, on the ground that the defendant was in arrears of rent from December 1967, i.e., for the period from 5-12-1967 to 4-4-1970, amounting to Rs.600 (5 Rs.20 per month and did not pay the same despite notice, that he bonafide requires the suit accommodation for continuing his business in scents and perfumed hair-oils which he is carrying on from a rented premises, and he has no other alternative suitable accommodation of his own in the city for that purpose, that the house was in a dilapidated condition and unsafe for human habitation, and it cannot be repaired without the defen­dant vacating it, and that he wants to make substantial additions and alterations thereto which cannot also be carried on without the accommodation being vacated, under clauses (a), (f), (g) and (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. The defendant contested the claim of the plaintiff and denied all the allegations and pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree for ejectment. Both the Courts below have negative the plaintiffs claim, hence the appeal.

    3. It is not necessary to go into the ground specified in clause (f) of sub­section (1) of section 12 of the Act, inasmuch as the Courts below have found, as a fact, that the demised premises were let out for residential purposes and, therefore, cannot be had by the plaintiff for any non-residential purpose. In view of this, learned counsel for the appellant did not press the ground under section 12 (1) (f) of the Act.

    4. The appeal must, however, succeed with respect to the grounds mentioned in clauses (a), (g) and (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, as the learned Additional District Judge, I am constrained to say, has not applied his mind to the question whether the requirements of these clauses are fulfilled or not. Both the parties, indeed, agree that the appeal be remanded to him for a decision afresh.

    5. The learned trial Judge had dismissed the claim under section 12 (1)(a) on the ground that the defendant was not in arrears of rent. In appeal, the learned Additional District Judge declined to interfere on the ground that the plaintiff having filed no appeal against the dismissal of the suit in so far as arrears of rent was concerned his claim for eviction of the defendant under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act could not be considered. I am afraid, the view taken by both the Courts cannot be accepted. If the learned trial Judge was of the view that mere payment or deposit of the arrears by the defendant, was sufficient to non-suit the plaintiff so far as his claim under section 12 (1) (a) was involved, she was laboring under a misconception of law. The Court has still to enquire whether the defendant has or has not complied with the require­ments of section 13 (1) of the Act. The learned Additional District Judge was also wrong that the failure of the plaintiff to claim in appeal the arrears of rent must result in dismissal of his suit for ejectment under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. Merely because the plaintiff did not appeal against the dismissal of his claim for arrears of rent, that would not entail in dismissal of his suit for ejectment in appeal. These are two distinct and separate matters. There was, indeed, no occasion for the plaintiff to have preferred an appeal claiming arrears of rent and manse profits inasmuch as the arrears of rent due on the date of suit, amounting to Rs.600 had been deposited by the defendant in Court on 29-7-1970 and the rents falling due thereafter were being deposited by him. Due to this, the plaintiff, could not obviously claim anything by way of arrears of rent in appeal.

    6. It is well settled that a tenant against whom a suit for eviction is brought under section 12 (1) (a), must, in order to get the benefit of protection of section 12 (3) of the Act against eviction under section 12 (1) (a), must comply with both the requirements of section 13 (1), namely, (i) he has to deposit or pay to the landlord the arrears due, within one month of the service of the writ of summons on him or within such further time as may be allowed and (ii) thereafter, continue to deposit or pay month by month a sum equivalent to the rent, on the 15th day of each succeeding month.

    In the present case, the defendant had pleaded that he had deposited Rs.600 as rent from January 1969 to June 1970. This was obviously a mistake. The rent of the demised premises is Rs.20 per month. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant was in arrears from December 1967, i. e., for 30 months as on the date of suit, which was brought on 8-5-1970. The deposit of Rs.600 was, therefore, for 30 months, from January 1968 to June 1970. The question still remains whether the defendant had or had not deposited the rent for December 1967 in Civil Suit No. 277-A of 1967. There is nothing on record to substantiate this. It has also to be seen whether the said deposit was to the credit of the plaintiff. There appears to be no order of the Court under section 13 (1) expressly granting an extension of time for deposit. The only order is that of the learned Judge dated 21 -11-1970 by which she declined to strike off the defence under section 13 (6) of the Act.

    7. Even if the defendant had complied with the first requirement of sec­tion 13 (1) of the Act, i. e., paid the arrears due on the date of suit within one month of the service of writ of summons, that would not confer on him protec­tion against eviction under section 12 (3) of the Act, it is shown that had also complied with the second requirement of section13 (1),. i.e., there­after, after making the initial deposit, he paid the rents far the subsequent months on the 15th day of each month during the pendency of the suit as well as the proceedings in appeal and second appeal. In view of the decision of the Full Bench in Firm Ratanchand Darbarilal, Satna & Ors. v. Rajendra Kumar Khoobchand & Ors. 1969 M P L J 672=AIR 1970 M P 1 (F B), the provisions of section 13 (1) are applicable in an appeal or second appeal by the landlord. The defendant was, therefore, bound to-comply with the requirements of section 13 (1) not only in appeal before the Lower Appellate Court, but also during the pendency of the appeal in this Court. There is nothing on record to show that the defendant has complied with the second requirement of section 13 (1) of the Act.

    8. Learned counsel for the respondent has, however, filed a chart showing the various payments made by the defendant from time to time. From this chart, it appears that the defendant paid the rent during the pendency of the suit month by month till the month previous to the judgment, but rents for 3 months were not deposited by the 15th day of the succeeding month, viz., for December 1971, May 1972 and May 1973. It is said that the delay was due to circumstances beyond the control of the defendant because the Court was closed. It also appears that the defendant made a lump sum deposit of Rs.60 towards the rent for the months of July, August and September, 1973. This, it is mentioned, was done on receipt of the notice of appeal on 24-7-1973. This again appears to be a mistake. The appeal was not filed till 5-9-1973 and it was admitted on 18-9-1973. The defendant must have been served with the notice thereafter. During the pendency of the appeal, the defendant appears to have deposited rent month by month till the disposal of the appeal. He stopped making deposits with the dismissal of the appeal, and made a lumpsum deposit of Rs.100 on 10-9-1975 on receipt of the notice of the second appeal.

    9. The learned Additional District Judge should decide whether there was due compliance of both the requirements of section 13 (1) of the Act. I may draw the attention of the learned Additional District Judge to the decisions in Ved Prakash & Anr. v. Smt. Prabha Bai Second Appeal No. 73 of 1976, decided on 2-3-1976,and Gaurishankar v. Bhagwandas Second Appeal No. 762 of 1969, decided on 5-3-1976.

    10. I am afraid, the learned Additional District Judge has failed to mark the difference between clauses (g) and (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act. If the requirement is for the purpose of building or re-building or making substantial additions or alterations, the matter goes out of the scope of clause (g) and comes within the purview of clause (h). There is a clear distinction between "repairs" and "building or re-building or making substantial additions or alterations". The discussion on the point is contained in para 16 of his judgment. I regret to say, the Courts below have mixed up both the clauses (g) and (h).

    11. In dealing with the plaintiff's claim, the learned Additional District Judge observes:-

    "In his report Ex. P-3, in the concluding para, plaintiff's expert witness S. D. Sharma has stated that the ground floor is dangerous as the ceiling may fall down. The first floor is wholly unfit for habitation as the flooring has become useless and the tiled roof is liable to fail down due to rotten rafters and bamboo. The building warrants dis­mantling of roof, walls and flooring of the first floor and major alterations, additions and remodeling in the ground floor are required as per approved plan and this is only possible when the building is vacated completely. The photos of the suit premises Exs. P-6 and P-7 give an idea about the nature of construction of the suit premises. From their perusal, it appears that the suit house is in quite a sturdy condition."
    Then again, he continues stating:-

    "In his report, S. D. Sharma (P.W. 4) has not mentioned as to which alterations, additions and remodeling are necessary on the ground floor. He has however stated in his report that dismantling of roof, walls and flooring of the first floor need to be carried out. He has admitted in his cross-examination that if the Ballis and Bamboos of the roof are replaced, the life of the roof can be extended. He has further admitted that the roof of the Varandah and the Kadias are strong. He has stated that 75% of the planks fitted in the roof of the room are rotten, same is the case with the rear Verandah. He however admitted that if the beam and Bamboos are replaced, the Verandah would be in a good condition."
    This, in my view, is not the proper approach.

    12. It is difficult to subscribe to the view that a landlord cannot make substantial repairs such as dismantling of the ceiling or the removal of the supporting walls and get the accommodation vacated, unless the house is actually on the verge of collapse. The photographs, Exs. P-6 and P-7, only give the outer view of the Verandah, and they have no relevance to the actual condition of the building inside. The learned Judge has relied upon the testimony of S. D. Sharma (P.W. 4). In his report, Ex. P-3, he states that the ground floor is in a dangerous condition as the ceiling may fall down. It is accepted before me that due to this the first floor is unoccupied and. therefore, not fit for human habitation. I cannot see how the dismantling of roof, walls and flooring of the first floor can be carried out unless the defendant vacates the premises. This is, however, a matter for the learned Additional District Judge to decide. He may also inspect the house before coming to a decision.

    13. Under clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Act, the condition of the building does not come into picture; and, the plaintiff, if he proves the bonafide nature of his requirement for the purpose of re-construc­tion, is entitled to a decree, provided he fulfills the condition pre-requisite in section 12 (7) of the Act. In Wasudeo Hari Sathe v. Jagdish Prasad Second Appeal No 946 of 1967, decided on 23-4-1971. I had occasion to deal with section 12 (1) (h). In Panchamal Narayan Shenoy v. Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy . (1970) 2 Supreme Court Journal 601, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, while inter­preting section 21 (1) (g) of the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961, which is in terms identical with section 12 (1) (h) ibid, stated as follows:-

    "In considering the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and re-construction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. It is not necessary that the landlord should go further and establish that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition."

    In a case falling under section 12 (1) (h), the condition of the building is, there­fore, immaterial. No doubt in Neta Ram & Ors. v. Jiwan lal & Anr. AIR 1963 S C 499, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with section 13 (3) (a) (iii) and (b) of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (8 of 2006 BK), had stated that the condition of the building was one of the relevant circumstances, but that view of theirs proceeded on slightly differently worded provision.

    14. The three-fold requirements under section 12 (7), which put a restraint on the passing of a decree under section 12 (1) (h), must according to the settled view, exist on the date of the passing of the decree. The question whether these requirements are fulfilled or not is essentially a question of fact which has to be tried on the evidence adduced by the parties. In this context, I am con­strained to observe that the pleadings of the plaintiff are defective. He has nowhere pleaded the existence of the three-fold requirements of section 12 (7) of the Act. There was consequently, no specific issue framed by the learned trial Judge as to whether the said requirements of section 12 (7) are fulfilled or not. The issue as framed namely, relating to the condition of the building, was wholly irrelevant for purposes of a suit under section 12 (1) (h) of the Act. To prove the bonafide of his requirements, the plaintiff's case is that the build­ing is in a dilapidated state; although that may not be, strictly speaking, a relevant consideration in cases falling under section 12(1) (h). That is only to show that his need for re-construction was bonafide and not just a pretence.

    15. The result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge are set aside, and the appeal is remanded to him for a decision afresh. The costs shall abide the event. Hearing fee, as per schedule, if certified.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Abdul Hamid v. Hakeem Ahmad Ullah Khan
    (Apr 14, 1976)