Dixit C. J.:-
By this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued for quashing an order of the opponent No. 1, the Janapada Sabha, Burhanpur, inflicting on him the punishment of suspension from 1st December 1954 to 25th December 1958.
2. The material facts are that the petitioner was working as a Head Clerk in the office of the Janapada Sabha, Burhanpur, getting a salary of Rs. 150 per month. On 19th August 1954 he was appointed as Superintendent in the grade of Rs. 150-5-175. He was suspended on 1st December 1954 pending an enquiry into certain charges against him. On or about 18th March 1955 he was supplied with a copy of the statement of charges framed against him by the Administrative Committee of the Janapada Sabha. The charges were to the effect that on the death of one Badriprasad, an employee of the Sabha, his widow Ramkali became entitled to receive Rs. 283-4-0 from the Sabha; and that the applicant, who was dealing with the matter of payment to Ramkali, paid her Rs. 188 only obtaining from her a false receipt for Rs. 283-4-0 and thus misappropriated the difference. The petitioner submitted his reply on 8th June 1956 denying the charges levelled against hinii Thereupon an enquiry into, the charges was conducted by the then Chief Executive Officer, Shri C. N. Rabra, who was, however, transferred before the enquiry could be completed. The enquiry was resumed by Shri Singh, the succeeding Chief Executive Officer, who on the statements recorded by his predecessor made a report to the Sabha on 30th September 1957 after hearing the arguments advanced by the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner made an application to the Sabha for being supplied with a copy of the report submitted by Shri Singh and a copy of the decision or resolution of the Administrative Committee thereon, and praying for a hearing. The applicant did not get these copies or a freeh hearing before any authority. It appears that on the report submitted by the Chief Executive Officer, the Administrative Committee resolved on 3rd April 1958 that the charges against the petitioner had been proved and that the penalty of suspension from 1st December 1954 up to 3rd April 1958 should be imposed on him for those charges. The opponent No. 2 approved this decision of the Janapada Sabha, and later on on 26th December 1958 the Chief Executive Officer communicated to the applicant the decision of the Administrative Committee and the approval of the Government to it and the penalty of suspension imposed on him. Thereafter the petitioner resumed his duties.
3. There is no dispute as to the facts narrated above. The grievance of the applicant as put forward by Shri Jakatdar, learned counsel appearing for him, is that the petitioner was the holder of a specified post within the meaning of section 68 of the C. P. and Berar Local Government Act, 1948; that the appointment of any officer to a specified post could be by the Sabha only with the previous approval of the State Government; that the Administrative Committee had no power to take the action that it did against him; and that its decision inflicting on him the punishment of suspension was a nullity and so also the approval of the State Government to that decision. It was also said that the petitioner had no reasonable opportunity of defending himself against the charges framed; that Shri Singh had come to a conclusion as to his guilt on the statements recorded by his predecessor and not upon an evaluation or assessment of his own on any evidence recorded by himself; and that the Administrative Committee or the Sabha never gave him an opportunity to contend that the charges alleged against him had not been proved and that even if they had been proved he did not merit the punishment of suspension proposed to be meted out to him. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant was entitled to this opportunity on the principles of natural justice even if Article 311 (2) of the Constitution did not apply to him. He relied on P. L. Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 and Khemchand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 300 to support the contention that the applicant's suspension from 1st December 1954 to 25th December 1958 entailing a forefeiture of his salary for that period amounted to punishment and that the 'reasonable opportunity' pointed out in Khemchand's case, AIR 1958 SC 300 was never given to the applicant.
4. In reply, it was submitted on behalf of the opponents that the Administrative Committee was empowered under section 70 (2) of the Act to exercise the power of the Sabha to appoint officers and servants; that, therefore, it was competent to take disciplinary action against the applicant; that the petitioner was given ample opportunity by Shri Rabra to defend himself against the charges; that he actually cross-examined the -witnesses tendered to support the charges; that when Shri Singh, who succeeded Shri Rabra, resumed the enquiry, the applicant never prayed that Shri Singh should examine the witnesses afresh; that, on the other hand, the applicant, though aeked to lead further evidence, declined to do so and asked that the case should be fixed for arguments; that under the rules framed under section 182 (2) (xv) of the Act the petitioner was not entitled to any show cause notice against the charges or against the punishment of suspension; and that specific rules having been framed under the Act regulating the procedure to be followed where the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank was intended to be imposed on any servant of the Sabha, the principles of natural justice could not be invoked.
5. In our view, the order imposing on the petitioner the punishment of suspension cannot be sustained. The Administrative Committee was no doubt competent to take decision about the punishment inflicted on the petitioner. But that decision is vitiated by the facts that it was reached without giving the applicant an opportunity of showing cause against the charges and the action proposed to he taken in regard to them. The petitioner was undoubtedly holder of a specified post on the date of his suspension. As such, under section 68 (2) of the Act he could be punished only by the Sabha with the approval of the State Government. Now, under section 5 the Janapada authorities charged with carrying out the provisions of the Act are, inter alia, the Sabha and the Standing Committee. Section 23-A requires that after the appointment of the Standing Committees and the election of their Chairman, every Sabha shall appoint a committee to be called the Administrative Committee. sub-section (6) of this section says that the Administrative Committee shall, for all purposes of the Act, be deemed to be a Standing Committee. The powers of the Administrative Committee have been defined by the rules framed under section 182 (2). Section 10 (2) of the Act provides that the power of the Sabha to appoint officers and servants under sub-section (1) shall be exercisable by the Administrative Committee.
"It is plain from these provisions that the Administrative Committee has jurisdiction to decide whether any penalty should or should cot be inflicted on the officers and servants of the Sabha"
. There is, therefore, no substance in the objection of the applicant that the Administrative Committee had no power to take any disciplinary action against him.
6. The main question to consider in this case is whether the petitioner had a right to be heard in his defence before the Administrative Committee and a right to be told of the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. As the applicant is an employee of the Janapada Sabha constituted under the C. P. and Berar Local Government Act, 1948, he is clearly not a member of a civil service of the Union or a civil service of a State or a person who holds a civil post under the Union or a State within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution, and, therefore, Article 311 cannot apply to his case. The question then is whether under any statutory rules or on the principles of natural justice the applicant was entitled to reasonable opportunity to show cause before the Administrative Committee against the charges levelled against him and against the proposed punishment. Now, the rules framed under section 182 (2) (xv) mention suspension as one of the penalties that can be inflicted on servants other than menial servants of the Sabha. Rule 2 of the rules framed under the aforesaid provision lays down that an enquiry into the conduct of an officer or a servant may be made by the Chief Executive Officer. Under the rules, if the punishment proposed to be awarded is suspension, the Chief Executive Officer is required to submit the proceedings of his report for final order to the authority which has power to make appointment. Rule 3 prescribes the procedure to be followed in the case of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of an officer or a servant. The rules are silent as to the procedure to be followed if the punishment intended to be given is one of suspension. The applicant does not base his claim of reasonable opportunity on these rules. His contention is that the suspension imposed on him was a punishment which entailed forfeiture of his right to get emoluments and other benefits attached thereto during the period of suspension and that on the principle of audi alterant partem the Administrative Committee should have heard him in his defence and on the action intended to be taken against him before proceeding to resolve that he should be meted out the punishment of suspension for the period mentioned above. The contention must, in our opinion, be accepted.
7. The rules framed under section 182 (2) (xv) of the Act make it abundantly clear that the enquiry leading to the administrative decision of the competent authority whether or not to impose penalties on an officer or servant of the Sabha is a guasi-judicial process. The decision has to be arrived at within the limits of the rules and in conformity with them. The rules no doubt prescribe a special procedure in serious cases of penalties, such as removal, dismissal or reduction. It is well settled that when a non-judicial body or person is saddled with quasi-judicial duties, it or he must follow the procedure, if any, laid down by the Legislature for it or him, or it or he must act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. In other words, such body or person must hear the parties, or at all events the party against whom he or it is giving a decision fairly and must decide the matter himself or itself after due consideration. The decision must not be the result of arbitrament and chance. The fact that no specific procedure is laid down in the case of the penalty of suspension does not mean that the appointing authority imposes the penalty acting purely in an administrative manner. If suspension is a penalty involving forfeiture of emoluments and other benefits attached thereto, then even if the Sabha has not framed any rules regulating the procedure to be followed in inflicting this punishment it would still be under an obligation to observe the rules of natural justice. The rules of natural justice require that a party must be heard before any decision affecting him adversely is taken. If there is no positive rule requiring that an officer or a servant shall be heard before the punishment of suspension is imposed on him, yet the justice o the common law will supply the omission of the Legislature. The applicability of the rules of natural justice necessarily follows on the position of the Sabha being required to act in a quasi- judicial manner in imposing any penalty on its officers and servants. It was not disputed that the petitioner was never given hearing of any kind by the Administrative Committee. He had no opportunity of defending himself before the Administrative Committee or to make his submissions against the punishment or suspension. The opponents, however, contended, on the authority of Nagendra Nath v. Commissioner of Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 398 that the rules of natural justice could not be invoked when specific rules relating to the procedure to be followed in the case of certain punishments had been prescribed under section 182 (2) (xv). The observations of the Supreme Court relied on are as follows:
" ....the rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitution of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the Act under which they function; and the question whether or not any rules of natural justice bad been contravened should be decided not under any pre-conceived notions, but in the light of statutory rules and provisions."
These observations do not lend any support to the argument advanced on behalf of the opponents that the rules of natural justice could not be applied in the present case. They are only intended to point out the limits within which the rules of natural justice can be imported into a matter when it is governed by specific statutory rules. We do not read those observations as meaning that where there is total absence of rules regulating a matter resulting in a decision adverse to a party, the rules of natural justice cannot be invoked and the party likely to be affected cannot be heard as an allied matter is governed by specific rules. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that inasmuch as special procedure is laid down in the case of punishments of removal, dismissal or reduction and no such special procedure has been prescribed for imposing the punishment of suspension, therefore, the applicability of the rules of natural justice is ruled out. Even if there is no special rule regulating the procedure to be followed in the case of imposition of suspension as a penalty, yet the applicant was entitled on the principles of natural justice to a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges and to show cause against, the action proposed. That the penalty of suspension deprived the petitioner of his emoluments and other benefits attached thereto during the material period is not disputed. That, therefore, the petitioner's suspension amounted to a penalty is clear enough from the decision in P. L. Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36. The applicant was not given hearing of any sort by the Administrative Committee, In taking the decision of imposition of suspension as punishment on the petitioner, the Committee omitted to do that which justice required and contravened the elementary principle of natural justice that no party ought to have his case decided without being afforded an opportunity of hearing the case which he has to meet as well as stating his own case.
8. For these reasons, the decision of the opponents imposing on the applicant the penalty of suspension for the period from 1st December 1954 to 25th December 1958 is quashed. The petitioner shall have his costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at Es. 100. The outstanding amount of security be refunded to the petitioner.
Petition allowed.