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  • M. P. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961. Rule 8
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • rule. Sub-rule (1) of rule 8
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  • sub-rule (5)
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citation codes
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  • M. P. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961. Rule 8
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • rule. Sub-rule (1) of rule 8
  • Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8
  • Rule 8 of the rules
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule
  • Sub-rule (4)
  • sub-rule (5)
  • Sub-rule (6)
  • sub-rule (2).
  • sub-rule (1),
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Smart Summary

Case Summary — Maheschhandra Srivastava (petitioner)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Maheschhandra Srivastava, was appointed as Curator of the Mahant Ghasidas Memorial Museum, Raipur, on probation for two years by a State Government order dated 17 February 1968, and he took charge on 15 April 1968. By an order dated 7 August 1973 the State Government terminated the petitioner's services by giving one month's notice. The petitioner challenged that termination by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the correct construction of Rule 8 (Probation) of the M. P. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961, in particular the Note appended to sub-rule (2)?
  2. Whether the initial two-year period of probation, together with the one-year extension permitted by sub-rule (2), means that a probationer who continues in service beyond three years without an express confirmation must be deemed to be confirmed by implication?
  3. Whether a person who, on expiry of the initial probation, is continued in service pursuant to the Note (i.e., deemed to have been continued in service subject to one calendar month's notice by either side) remains a probationer or ceases to be one, with consequent effects on the power to terminate service?
  4. Whether the State Government's termination of the petitioner's services by one month's notice (in the circumstances of this case) was valid.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The initial period of probation was two years and sub-rule (2) permits extension by only one additional year; therefore the maximum probation is three years.
  • Even if there is no express order of confirmation, a probationer who continues in post beyond the maximum permissible probationary period must be deemed to be confirmed immediately after the expiry of three years.
  • The petitioner relied on several authorities to support the proposition that implied confirmation arises where a person remains in post beyond the maximum period: State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh; Raghuvansh Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh; Narayan Singh Thakur v. Excise Commissioner; and Chhatarsal Singh Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh.

Respondent's (State / Advocate General) Arguments

  • The Advocate General argued that Sub-rule (6) requires "successful completion of probation and the passing of the prescribed departmental examinations" and thus confirmation cannot be inferred without an application of mind; implied confirmation should not be assumed.
  • The Advocate General suggested that sub-rule (2)'s limitation on extension might be directory rather than mandatory, relying on Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1974 SC 2192) as authority for treating a service rule prescribing a prima facie maximum period as directory in the context of other rules.
  • He challenged the correctness of the earlier decisions relied upon by the petitioner (Raghuvansh Kumar, Narayan Singh Thakur, Chhatarsal Singh Yadav), but the Court did not find it necessary to decide on the correctness of those cases in this petition because this petition was governed by the Note attached to Rule 8 rather than by sub-rules (2) and (6).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh Where service rules fix a maximum probation period and an employee continues beyond that period without express confirmation, an inference of implied confirmation may be drawn. The Court held Dharam Singh inapplicable to the present case because the rule construed in Dharam Singh did not contain a proviso/Note analogous to the Note in Rule 8. Thus the principle in Dharam Singh could not be directly applied to cases falling within the Note of Rule 8.
Raghuvansh Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (M.P. No. 65 of 1968, decided 2 Mar 1970) Was relied on for the proposition that if the period of probation is extended under sub-rule (2) and the civil servant continues beyond three years, implied confirmation may be inferred. The Court distinguished this case on facts: there the initial period had been extended under sub-rule (2), so it was not a Note-case; therefore Raghuvansh Kumar did not control the present circumstance.
Narayan Singh Thakur v. Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior and others (1971 MPLJ 496) Used to support implied confirmation where sub-rule (2) was used to extend probation and the civil servant continued in post beyond the maximum permissible period. The Court treated this authority as distinguishable because the probation period in those cases had been extended under sub-rule (2), unlike the present case governed by the Note.
Chhatarsal Singh Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1973 MPLJ 98) Included observations to the effect that continuance in service under the Note would be only up to the maximum period of probation and that thereafter implied confirmation could arise. The Court held that those observations were obiter in Chhatarsal Singh Yadav (because that case actually involved an extension under sub-rule (2)) and were made without appreciating the full implications of the Note; the Court rejected those obiter observations as not correct as to the Note's effect.
Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1974 SC 2192) Relied on by the Advocate General to argue that the rule limiting extension of probation might be directory rather than mandatory, in light of other rules. The Court noted the Advocate General's reliance on Samsher Singh but stated that it was not necessary to examine the correctness of that submission for deciding the present petition (because the petition was governed by the Note).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by construing Rule 8 of the M. P. Civil Services (General Conditions of Service) Rules, 1961. It noted:

  • Sub-rule (1) provides that a person appointed by direct recruitment shall ordinarily be placed on probation for such period as may be prescribed; "prescribed" is defined by Rule 2(f) as meaning prescribed by other rules or by general or special executive instructions. The Executive instructions in the present administrative framework prescribed an initial probation of two years, which applied to the petitioner.
  • Sub-rule (2) empowers the appointing authority, for sufficient reasons, to extend the period of probation by a further period not exceeding one year. Thus, taken together, sub-rules (1) and (2) permit a maximum probation of three years where an extension is validly made under sub-rule (2).
  • The Note appended to sub-rule (2) states that a probationer whose period of probation is not extended under sub-rule (2), but who has neither been confirmed nor discharged at the end of the period of probation, "shall be deemed to have been continued in service, subject to the condition of his service being terminable on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side."

The Court focused on the legal effect of the Note. It reasoned:

  • The Note does not state that the civil servant shall be deemed to have continued as a probationer; rather he is deemed to have been continued in service subject to the new condition of termination on one calendar month's notice. Consequently, where the initial probation is not extended, the civil servant ceases to be a probationer on the expiry of the initial period and continues on the terms laid down in the Note.
  • Sub-rules (4), (5) and (6) expressly apply to a probationer — they govern termination during probation, termination at the end of probation for failure in departmental examinations or unsuitability, and confirmation upon successful completion and passing of examinations. Those provisions do not apply to a person who has ceased to be a probationer by operation of the Note.
  • Because the Note creates a legal fiction that changes the conditions of service at the expiry of the initial probation, one cannot automatically import the doctrine of implied confirmation applicable in cases where probation was extended under sub-rule (2). In other words, the implication of confirmation after three years (based on the limitation in sub-rule (2)) arises only in cases where the period of probation was extended under sub-rule (2); it does not arise for employees who are continued in service under the Note.
  • The Court distinguished the petitioner's case from authorities where the period of probation had been extended under sub-rule (2) and implied confirmation was held: those cases are not applicable because the Note changes the character of service after the initial probation unless an extension under sub-rule (2) is effected.
  • The Court further observed that some obiter observations in Chhatarsal Singh Yadav suggesting implied confirmation for Note-cases were incorrect because they failed to appreciate the effect of the Note.

Applying this construction to the facts, the Court found that since the petitioner was continued in service by operation of the Note (and there was no extension of probation under sub-rule (2)), he had ceased to be a probationer after the initial two-year period and remained employable on the condition that either side could terminate employment by giving one calendar month's notice.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The Court held that the petitioner could not be taken to have been confirmed after the expiry of three years; instead, the petitioner continued in service under the deeming provision contained in the Note to Rule 8, subject to termination on one calendar month's notice. The State Government's order terminating the petitioner's services (by one month's notice) was therefore valid.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's challenge to the termination failed; the termination order was upheld as valid. The petition is dismissed without any order as to costs, and the security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner (as ordered by the Court).
  • Broader implications: The Court confined its decision to the construction of Rule 8 and the Note; it distinguished earlier authorities where probation had been extended under sub-rule (2). The opinion does not purport to lay down a general rule beyond this interpretation of the Note: the direct effect is limited to distinguishing Note-cases from cases where probation was extended under sub-rule (2).

Disposition: Petition dismissed; security refunded; no order as to costs.

    Maheshchandra Madhosaran Srivastava (Petitioner) v. State Of Madhya Pradesh ().

    Singh J.-

    The petitioner, Maheschhandra Srivastava, was appointed to the post of Curator, Mahant Ghasidas Memorial Museum, Raipur, on probation for a period of two years by the State Government by order dated 17th Feb­ruary 1968. The petitioner took over charge of his post on 15th April 1968. The State Government, by order dated 7th August 1973, terminated the services of the petitioner by giving one month's notice. The petitioner then filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order of the State Government.

    2. It is not disputed before us that the conditions of service of the peti­tioner were governed by the M. P. Civil Services (General Conditions of Ser­vice) Rules, 1961. Rule 8 is the relevant rule on the point which reads as follows:

    "8. Probation-(1) A person appointed to a service or post by direct recruitment shall ordinarily be placed on probation for such period as may be prescribed.

    (2) The appointing authority may, for sufficient reasons, extend the period of proba­tion by a further period not exceeding one year.

    Note.-A probationer whose period of probation is not extended under this sub-rule but who has neither been confirmed nor discharged from service at the end of the period of probation shall be deemed to have been continued in service, subject to the condition of his service being terminable on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side.

    (3) A probationer shall undergo such training and pass such departmental examina­tions during the period of his probation as may be prescribed.

    (4) The services of a probationer may be terminated during the period of probation if in the opinion of the appointing authority he is not likely to shape into a suitable Govern­ment servant.

    (5) The services of a probationer who has not passed the departmental examinations or who is found unsuitable for the service or post may be terminated at the end of the period of his probation.

    (6) On the successful completion of probation and the passing of the prescribed depart­mental examinations, the probationer shall be confirmed in the service or post to which he has been appointed"

    3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that on a proper construction of the rule, the initial period of probation, which in the instant case was two years, could not be extended beyond one year and that the petitioner, immediately after the completion of three years, became a con­firmed employee. The argument is that even if there is no express order of con­firmation, a probationer must be deemed to be confirmed immediately after the expiry of three years, which is the maximum period of probation permitted under the rule. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the following cases: (i) State Of Punjab v. Dharam Singh.1, (ii) Raghuvansh Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh M.P No. 65 of 1968 decided on 2nd March 1970, (iii) Narayan Singh Thakur v. Excise Com­missioner, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior and others 1971 M P L J 496, and (iv) Chhatarsal Singh Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1973 M P L J 98.

    4. To appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to consider as to what is the correct construction of the rule. Sub-rule (1) of rule 8 says that a person appointed by direct recruitment shall ordinarily be placed on probation for such period as may be prescribed. The word 'prescribed' has been defined in Rule 2 (f) to mean prescribed by other rules or by general or special executive instructions. We are told that there are some general executive instructions issued in the matter which require that a person appointed by direct recruitment shall be initially placed on a probation of two years. In the instant case also, it will be seen that the petitioner was placed on probation for two years. sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 then says that the appointing authority may, for sufficient reasons, extend the period of probation by a further period not exceeding one year. It is clear from sub-rule (2) that the period of probation under this provision cannot be extended for more than a year. So if a person is appointed initially on probation for two years, the maximum period of probation under sub-rules (1) and (2) can be three years. If on the expiry of the initial period of probation, the period of probation is extended by an exercise of power under sub-rule (2), the civil servant concerned will continue to remain on probation. It is also possible that instead of extend­ing the period of probation, the services of the civil servant may be terminated on the ground of unsuitability. Another alternative is that in case the civil servant has passed the departmental examinations, if any, for the post and his work is satisfactory, he may be confirmed. But what happens when on the expiry of the initial period of probation, the civil servant is neither confirmed or discharged nor his period of probation is extended in exercise of the power under sub-rule (2). The answer to this question depends upon the proper con­struction of the Note which is appended to sub-rule (2). Such a civil servant, in terms of the Note,

    "shall be deemed to have been continued in service, sub­ject to the condition of his senile being terminable on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side."
    It will be seen that the Note does not say that such a civil servant shall be deemed to have been con­tinued as a probationer; he is deemed to have been continued in service on the condition that either side may terminate the service by one month's notice. In our opinion, if the probationary period initially fixed is not extended under sub-rule (2), the civil servant ceases to be on probation and he continues in service on the terms and conditions prescribed by the Note. It will be seen that a proba­tioner cannot be discharged from service excepting on the ground of unsuitability or on the ground that he has not passed the departmental examinations as is pro­vided in sub-rules (4) and (5). But, a civil servant who continues in service on the terms and conditions prescribed by the Note, can be discharged from service without assigning any reason, simply by giving a month's notice. Such a civil servant cannot be said to be on probation. Sub-rule (4) enables the appointing authority to terminate the services of a probationer during the period of pro­bation if he is not likely to shape into a suitable Government servant. Similarly, sub-rule (5) enables the appointing authority to terminate the services of a pro­bationer who has not passed the departmental examinations or who is found unsuitable for the service or post at the end of the period of his probation. Sub-rule (6) directs that on the successful completion of probation and the pissing of the prescribed departmental examinations, probationer shall be confirmed in the service or post to which he has been appointed. A reading of sub-rules (4), (5) and (6) will show that all of them apply to a probationer. They do not apply to the case of a civil servant who has ceased to be a probationer by operation of the Note after the expiry of his initial period of probation in cases where there was no extension of the period by an order passed under sub-rule (2). The question that period of probation cannot be extended beyond one year under sub-rule (2) and, therefore, a probationer who is continued in service beyond one year after expiry of the initial period of probation of two years must be deemed to be confirmed, does not arise in those cases where the Note applies, for the simple reason that a person falling under the provisions of the Note ceases to be a probationer after the expiry of the initial period of probation. In cases where the initial period of probation is extended under sub-rule (2), the Note has no application. In these cases, as the period of probation is extended and as the Note does not apply, the probationer continues as a probationer, It may be possible in these cases to say that as the period of probation could not be extended beyond three years, the civil servant concerned, after the expiry of three years, would be deemed to be confirmed. But, in cases falling within the Note, any implication of confirmation after expiry of three years is negative for the reason that the civil servant concerned, after expiry of two years which is the initial period of probation prescribed by sub-rule (1), ceases to be a proba­tioner because of imposition of new conditions of service by the deeming clause contained in the Note. In such cases, the conditions of probation are abro­gated and the civil servant continues in service on the new conditions that his service shall be terminable on the expiry of a notice of one calendar month given in writing by either side. Now as this is the result of the fiction created by the Note which comes into play at the expiry of initial period of probation of two years, it is difficult to say that at the end of three years, the person concerned must be deemed to be confirmed. We are clearly of opinion that a civil servant who continues in service after the initial period of probation and in whose case, the period of probation is not extended under sub-rule (2), cannot be taken to have been impliedly confirmed after expiry of three years. Such a person's case falls within the Note and his services can be terminated by giving a month's notice even after expiry of three years.

    5. The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that if a civil servant whose period of probation has not been extended under sub-rule (2) and whose case falls within the Note does not continue as a probationer, then he cannot be confirmed even if the Government subsequently is of the opinion that his work is satisfactory. The learned counsel points out that such a result is not con­templated by the Rule which shows that a civil servant whose case falls within the Note is also continued as a probationer although his period of probation is not extended by any express order. The argument assumes that a civil ser­vant whose case falls within the Note and who, according to its true construc­tion does not continue as a probationer, cannot be confirmed by the Govern­ment later on. If the Government wants to confirm such a person, the Govern­ment can confirm him retrospectively from the date of completion of the initial period of probation. The Government may also extend retrospectively the period of probation under sub-rule (2). By such an order, the Note will cease to be applicable and the confirmation of the civil servant concerned can be made under Sub-rule (6). But, if no artier is passed extending the period of probation under sub-rule (2), the continuance in service of the civil servant concerned, as already explained, will not be as a probationer and his continu­ance in service in such a case will be on the condition laid down in the Note that the services will be terminable on a month's notice given by either side.

    6. In State Of Punjab v. Dharam Singh. (supra], it was laid down by the Supreme Court that where the service rules fix a period of time beyond which the probationary period cannot be extended and an employee appointed or promoted to a post on probation is allowed to continue in that post after com­pletion of the maximum period of probation, without an express order of confirmation, he cannot be deemed to continue in that post as a probationer by implication and it is permissible to draw the inference that the employee has been confirmed in the post by implication. The rule that was construed in that case did not contain any provision similar to the Note in Rule 8 of the rules with which we are concerned. Dharam Singh's case has, therefore, no application to cases falling within the Note of Rule 8. In Raghuvansh Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Narayan Singh Thakur v. Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior and others and Chhatarsal Singh Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra], the initial period of probation was extended by order passed under sub-rule (2) of Rule 8. The civil servants concerned in these cases continued in service as probationer by the orders of extension passed under sub-rule (2) beyond the period of three years and it was held that even in the absence of an express order of confirmation, they must be taken to be confirm­ed by implication on the ground that the period of probation could not be extended beyond three years. These cases, therefore, are distinguishable on facts. It is true that in Chhatarsal Singh Yadav's case, there are observations that the continuance in service of a civil servant under the Note would be only up to the maximum period of probation provided by sub-rule (2) and that there­after such a person would also be taken to be confirmed by implication. But, those observations are obiter, for as already stated, in Chhatarsal Singh's case also, the period of probation had been extended under sub-rule (2). The obiter observations were made without realising the full implications of the deeming provision contained in the Note and without noticing that the condition of service prescribed by the deeming provision is entirely different from the condi­tion of service of a probationer. The proper interpretation of the Note cannot, therefore, be taken to be concluded by the decision in Chhatarsal Singh Yadav's case.

    7. The learned Advocate General contended before us that a careful reading of, Sub-rule (6) goes to show that no probationer can be taken to be impliedly confirmed even if he has been continued in service for more than the maximum period of probation permissible under sub-rule (2). It is pointed out that the requirements prescribed by Sub-rule (6) of "successful completion of probation and the passing of the prescribed departmental examinations" neces­sitate an application of mind by the appointing authority to find out whether the work of the probationer has been satisfactory and whether he has passed the departmental examinations. These matters cannot be taken to have been judged by implication. It is further argued that sub-rule (2) which says that the period of probation cannot be extended, beyond one year, should be con­strued as directory. Reliance for this submission is placed on the case of Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1974 S C 2192, where a service rule prescribing prima facie maximum period of probation was construed to be directory in the context of other rules. The learned Advocate General challenged the correctness of the view taken in Raghuvansh Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Narayan Singh Thakur v. Excise Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior and others and Chhatarsal Singh Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra). It is not necessary for us to examine the correctness of the argument, because the petitioner's case is not governed by sub-rules (2) and (6). It is solely governed by the Note. We have already stated that the obiter observations made in Chhatarsal Singh Yadav's case on the interpretation of the Note are not correct. Beyond this, it is not necessary for us to examine the correctness of the aforesaid cases.

    8. For the reasons stated above, the petitioner cannot be taken to have been confirmed after expiry of three years from the date of his appointment. He continued in service under the deeming provision contained in the Note on the condition that his services would be terminable on the expiry of a month's notice. The order of the State Government, terminating the services of the petitioner is, therefore, valid. The petition consequently fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. The security amount shall be refunded to the petitioner.

    Petition dismissed.

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    Maheshchandra Madhosaran Srivastava (Petitioner) v. State Of Madhya Pradesh ().
    (Apr 23, 1975)