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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Farashar Singh, was employed as General Manager of manganese mines near village Tirodi, Madhya Pradesh, originally owned by Shyamji Narainji. The 1st defendant, Hindustan Manganese Mines Ltd., was formed in 1953 to purchase these mines, managed by the 2nd defendant, Bhikabhai Purshottamdas and Sons Ltd., a managing agency company. The 3rd defendant, Natwarlal, was a promoter and Managing Director of the managing agency. The plaintiff's employment was approved by the 1st defendant’s Board of Directors in August 1953, with specified salary and commission terms. The plaintiff claimed an oral agreement that his services could only be terminated under certain conditions with two months' notice and at a higher commission rate. In March 1954, the defendants notified the plaintiff that commission payments would cease, which the plaintiff rejected, leading to termination of his services. The plaintiff filed suit in 1957 seeking arrears of remuneration and damages for wrongful dismissal. The trial court partially decreed the plaintiff's claim, awarding arrears and one month's remuneration as notice pay. The plaintiff appealed for a larger decree, and the 3rd defendant cross-objected to avoid liability.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's employment contract included an oral agreement for permanent service terminable only for just cause with two months' notice.
  2. Whether the termination of the plaintiff's employment was wrongful and constituted a repudiation of contract.
  3. What is the appropriate measure of damages for wrongful dismissal in this case.
  4. Whether the 3rd defendant could be held liable in tort for procuring a breach of contract.
  5. Whether the 3rd defendant could be held liable on contract for the breach of the plaintiff's employment contract.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff contended that there was an oral agreement supplementing the written terms, entitling him to permanent employment terminable only for just cause or adverse mining conditions, with two months' prior notice.
  • The plaintiff argued that his termination was wrongful and amounted to repudiation of contract, entitling him to damages for the period he remained unemployed.
  • The plaintiff asserted that the 3rd defendant acted beyond his authority in terminating his employment and was liable for the tort of procuring breach of contract.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The defendants denied any oral agreement beyond the written resolution of 12th August 1953, which contained all terms of employment.
  • They contended that the plaintiff resigned or accepted the variation in terms, and that the termination was not wrongful.
  • The 3rd defendant argued that as an agent of the company, he could not be held liable either in tort or contract for the termination of the plaintiff's employment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Murlidhar Chatterjee v. International Film Co., AIR 1943 PC 34 Repudiation of contract by employer entitles employee to treat contract as terminated and sue for breach under Section 39 and Section 75 of the Contract Act. The court held that the defendants’ letter discontinuing commission was a repudiation of contract entitling the plaintiff to treat it as wrongful dismissal.
In re Rubfi Bronze Metal Company, Limited and Vos., (1918) 1 KB 315 Wrongful dismissal may be effected by conduct that substantially repudiates essential terms of employment contract. The court cited this to support that refusal to pay agreed commission constituted wrongful dismissal.
Beckliam v. Drake, (1849) 2 H L C 579 Measure of damages for breach of promise of employment depends on usual wages and time to find similar employment; employee must use diligence to find new work. The court applied this principle to determine damages for wrongful dismissal.
S. S. Shetty v. Bharata Nidhi Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 12 Damages for wrongful dismissal are assessed by reference to wages and time to obtain new employment; no compensation for injured feelings or difficulty finding work. The court relied on this to affirm the measure of damages and rejection of plaintiff’s claim for extended compensation.
Lumley v. Gye, (1843-60) All E R 208 Definition of tort of procuring breach of contract where a third party wrongfully induces breach causing damage. The court acknowledged the principle but limited its application to third parties, excluding agents acting within authority.
Said v. Butt, (1920) All E R Rep. 240-241 Agents or servants acting within scope of employment are not liable in tort for procuring breach of their principal’s contract. The court applied this to hold that the 3rd defendant, as agent, was not liable in tort.
Scarnmdl G. and Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley, (1929) 1 KB 419 Application and approval of Said v. Butt principle restricting tort liability of agents. Supported the court’s view excluding tort liability of the managing agent.
D. C. Thompson and Co. Ltd. v. Deakin, (1952) 2 All E R 361 Reaffirmation of restriction that agents acting within authority are not liable in tort for procuring breach. Reinforced court’s conclusion that the 3rd defendant was not liable in tort.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the evidence and found that the terms of the plaintiff's employment were fully contained in the Board resolution dated 12th August 1953. The plaintiff’s claim of additional oral terms, including permanence of employment and two months' notice, was disbelieved due to lack of corroboration, contradictory statements, and absence from official records. The court held that the defendants’ letter dated 30th March 1954 discontinuing commission payments constituted a repudiation of the employment contract under Section 39 of the Contract Act, entitling the plaintiff to treat the contract as terminated and sue for breach.

Regarding damages, the court applied established principles from Beckliam v. Drake and S. S. Shetty v. Bharata Nidhi Ltd., holding that damages should be based on one month's remuneration plus arrears, as the plaintiff failed to prove he was unemployed for a full year. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim for extended damages due to contradictory evidence about his employment status post-termination.

On the question of tort liability, the court reasoned that the 3rd defendant, as Managing Director of the managing agency and agent of the company, was not a third party but the alter ego of the company. Citing Said v. Butt and related cases, the court held that an agent acting within the scope of his authority cannot be held liable in tort for procuring breach of contract of his principal. Further, the court found no evidence of mala fide or unauthorized action by the 3rd defendant. The court also noted that any tort claim was barred by limitation.

Lastly, the court accepted the 3rd defendant’s argument that he could not be held contractually liable as he was an agent and not a party to the contract between the plaintiff and the company.

Holding and Implications

The court DISMISSED the plaintiff's appeal and ALLOWED the 3rd defendant's cross-objection, modifying the trial court's decree to dismiss the suit against the 3rd defendant. The decree against the other defendants was upheld with costs. The direct effect is that the plaintiff recovers arrears and damages only from the company defendants, and the 3rd defendant is absolved from liability both in tort and contract. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles regarding repudiation, damages for wrongful dismissal, and agent liability.

    Parasharsingh v. Hindustan Manganese Mines Ltd. And Others

    Singh J.:-

    This first appeal is by the plaintiff and arises out of a suit filed by him for arrears of remuneration and damages for wrongful dismissal.

    2. The facts and circumstances leading upto this appeal may first be stated. Certain manganese mines situated near village Tirodi in district Balaghat of Madhya Pradesh and known as Tirodi Group and Mines were owned by one Shyamji Narainji of Nagpur. The plaintiff Farashar Singh was an employee of Shyamji Narainji and since 1948 was working as General Manager of the Manganese mines. The 1st defendant, Hindustan Manganese Mines Ltd., is a company which was registered at Nagpur on 17th February, 1953 and was form­ed with the object of purchasing from Shyamji Narainji the Tirodi Group of Mines and to carry on mining business. This company wag at all relevant times managed by the 2nd defendant, Bhikabhai Purshottamdas and Sons Ltd. a manag­ing agency company which was also registered at Nagpur on 17th February, 1953 and was formed for the management of the mining concerns of the 1st defendant company. The defendant No. 3 NatwarM was one of the promoters of 1st defendant company and at all relevant times was its Director as also the Manag­ing Director of the 2nd defendant company. On 27th January, 1953, the pro­moters of the 1st defendant company entered into an agreement with Shyamji Narainji for the purchase of Tirodi Group of Mines. From 1st February, 1953 the mines were worked for the benefit of the promoters and their nominees. The State Government sanctioned the transfer of the mines in favour of the 1st defendant company some time in June 1953 and thereafter the mines were formally transferred in the company's favour. The plaintiff, as already stated, was the General Manager of the mines and his services were continued by the promoters and the 1st defendant company till 31st March, 1954.

    3. The plaintiff's appointment as General Manager was approved by a resolution of the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant company passed on 12th August, 1953. According to this resolution the plaintiff was to receive Rs. 625 as monthly salary. In addition to this the plaintiff was to receive Rs. 1-4-0 per ton as commission on manganese ore extracted from February, 1953 to July, 1953 and Re. 1 per ton as commission on the manganese ore railed by the company out of the production after July, 1953.

    4. According to the plaintiff in addition to the above terms it was orally agreed that the plaintiff's services will not be terminated except for adverse circumstances resulting in stoppage of the mines or working of the mines on profitable basis or for any other just cause and in that eventuality he will be entitled to two months' prior notice and to his allowance at Rs. 1-4-0 per ton on the manganese ore raised and not at Re. 1 per ton on the ore railed.

    5. On 30th March, 1954 the defendant No. 3 intimated by a letter to the plaintiff that from 1st March, 1954 the plaintiff will not be entitled to any com­mission. The plaintiff did not accept this variation and his services were dis­continued after 31st March, 1954. The plaintiff according to his case in the plaint remained out of service till 31st March, 1955 when he got employment with J. B. Thakkar and Best Minerals Ltd., another mining concern, The plaintiff on 30th March, 1957 brought the suit, which has given rise to this appeal for recovery of Rs. 54,580-8-0 against all the defendants. The plaintiff per Schedule B to the plaint claimed Rs. 3,592-12-0 as arrears of commission after deducting the amounts drawn by him for the period 1st August, 1953 to 31st March, 1954 at the rate of Ks. 1-4-0 per ton on the ore raised, Rs. 1,250 as salary and Rs. 5,482 as commission for notice period of two months, Rs. 115-5-0 as bonus and Rs. 3,758-7-0 as interest at 1% p. m. The total claim per Sche­dule B is Rs. 14,198. In addition to this the plaintiff claimed, per Schedule C, Rs. 7,500 as salary and Rs. 32,892 as commission, in all Rs. 40,392 for the period from 1st April, 1954 to 31st March, 1955.

    6. The trial Court decreed the plaintiff's claim to the extent of Rs. 8,190 against all the defendants. The Court found that the arrears of commission should be calculated at the rate of Re. 1 per ton on the ore railed and the plain­tiff was entitled to receive RB. 3,547 on that account. The Court also found that the plaintiff was further entitled to receive one month's salary and com­mission, i. e. Rs. 625 and Rs. 2,747, respectively, as notice pay. It also allowed Rs. 1,277 as interest for three years on arrears of commission.

    7. The plaintiff has appealed against the decree claiming that his suit to the extent of Rs, 47,613-25 P. ought to have been decreed. The defendant 3 has filed a cross-objection that no decree should have been passed against him.

    8. The first contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that according to the terms of contract his employment was permanent and his services could not be terminated except for adverse circumstances resulting in stoppage of the mines or working of the mines on profitable basis or for other just cause and by giving two months' notice. These terms according to the plaintiff were orally agreed upon in between him and the defendant No. 3. The plaintiff in his evidence as P. W. 3 in para 7 stated that the defendant No. 3 did show him the resolution of the Directors of the 1st defendant company passed on 12th August, 1953, containing his terms of employment and he did notice that the aforesaid terms were not contained in the resolution. He further stated that the defendant No. 3 assured that he need not worry about the omission and the defendant No. 3 will be responsible for the observance of those terms. The defendant No. 3 who was examined as D. W. 1, denied that any terms in addit­ion to those contained in the company's resolution of 12th August, 1953 were agreed in between him and the plaintiff regarding his employment. The plain­tiff's version about the additional terms of employment, which do not find place in the company's resolution, is wholly unbelievable. Had the plaintiff's version been true, he would have lodged written protest against the company's resolution and would not have felt satisfied with the oral assurance of defen­dant No. 3. Further, the plaintiff is contradicted by his own notice (Ex. P. 14) where in paragraph 3 he enumerated his terms of employment but did not mention that his service was permanent and could be terminated in certain eventualities alone; rather in para 3 (d) of the notice he stated that the service was terminable on two months' notice at the desire of either side. Even this term as to two months' notice is not in the resolution. In our opinion, the terms on which plaintiff was employed are all contained in the resolution of the 1st defendant company which was passed on 12th August, 1953, and which reads as follows:

    "The Directors after thoughtful consideration resolved that the Managing Agents be and they are hereby authorised to appoint Mr. P. B. Biseu as General Manager at the Mines on monthly salary of Bs. 625 including all allowances plus Ka. 1-4-0 per ton as commission on manganese ore extracted from Mines from February 1953 to July, 1953 and upto Re. 1 per ton as commission on manganese ore that may be railed by the com­pany after the transfer of mines, out of the production after July 1953."
    It may also be mentioned that the plaintiff has produced Jethalal (P. W. 5) who was one of the Directors of the 1st defendant company- Jhethalal did not corroborate the plaintiff about the additional terms except that of notice. As already stated, even this alleged term of two months' notice does not find place in the resolution of the company which has been quoted above. Jethalal was confronted in para 15 of his deposition with the resolution passed on 12th August, 1953 as also with the minutes of the proceeding of the next meeting held on 19th December, 1953 when the minutes of the prior meeting were confirmed and he had no reasonable explanation to offer for the omission of the term of two months in the company's resolution. It may further be noticed that the plaintiff in his letters dated 31st March, 1954 and 13th April, 1954 (Exs. P-9 and P.11) did not mention any special terms including that of notice. This term of notice was first mentioned in the notice Ex. P-14 and the other addition­al terms were first mentioned in the plaint. As we have already said, in our opinion, all terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment with the 1st defen­dant company are contained in the company's resolution of 12th August, 1953 and the plaintiff has failed to prove the additional terms pleaded by him.

    9. The second contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the termination of his employment from 1st April, 1954 was wrongful. The finding of the lower Court is in favour of the plaintiff on this point, but as this finding was contested before us on behalf of the respondent the point requires further examination. The argument of the respondents is that the plaintiff in fact resigned his service. The question depends on the construction of two letters which are Exhibits P-8 and P.9. Ex. P-8 is a letter dated 30th March, 1954 which the defendant No. 3 wrote on behalf of the 1st defendant. By this letter the plaintiff was intimated that from 1st April, 1954 he will not be paid any commission and will receive only his monthly salary. The material portion of the letter reads as follows: -

    "It has been decided to discontinue the additional payment of commission to you on manganese ore railed in future. This arrangement will have effect from 1st April, 19.T4 You will thereafter be entitled to draw your monthly salary only which is already agreed upon.

    We regret that adverse circumstances have compelled us to take the above course and hope at the same time that the new terms shall be acceptable to you.

    Please intimate to us whether you agree to the above proposal".

    The language of this letter is clear enough to show that the company took a decision not to pay any commission to the plaintiff from let April, 1954 and the plaintiff could continue in service only if he accepted this variation. It must be remembered that the term as to payment of commission at the rate of Re. 1 per ton on the manganese ore railed was a very important term of employ­ment and in fact as the accounts show the commission far exceeded the monthly salary of Rs. 625. After receiving this letter the plaintiff declined to accept the variation and the new arrangement and claimed that the letter P. 8. amounted to premature notice of termination of service. It is thus that the plaintiff wrote:

    "I am in receipt of your letter under reference, acting as a premature notice of termination of ray services with respect to the previous agreement and inviting emphatic no from me to your proposed new arrangement, based on imaginary adverse circum­stances.

    Kindly arrange for payment of my dues resultant to termination of service, which I hope as a gentleman and millionaire your goodself will not fail in the test of main­taining your previous agreement and promise, without creating unpleasant complications.

    Kindly also name in writing the person to whom I should hand over charge and the specific items of charges besides the manganese ore stacks on siding and mines." (Exh. P. 9.)

    The point for consideration on these two letters is whether the plaintiff resigned or whether his services were abruptly brought to an end by the defendants. In our opinion, the letter Exh. P. 8 amounted to a repudiation by the defendants of the previous contract of employment and the plaintiff was within his rights to put an end to the contract by accepting the repudiation as a breach of con­tract by the defendants. Putting in other words the letter, Exh. P. 8, intimat­ing that the plaintiff in future will be paid only his salary and not the agreed commission was a refusal by the defendants to perform the promise in its entirety within the meaning of section 39 of the Contract Act and the plaintiff could put an end to the contract and sue for breach under section 75: Murlidhar Chatterjee v. International Film Co., AIR 1943 PC 34. The expression 'wrongful dis­missal' in itself includes a repudiation by the master of the essential obligation laid on him by the contract. As observed by Mo Cardie J.:

    "Dismissal may be effected by conduct as well as words. A man may dismiss his servant if he refuses by word or conduct to allow the servant to fulfil his contract of employment. The refusal must of course be substantial in the sense that it is not a mere repudiation of some minor rights of the servant or of non-vital provisions of the contract of employment. The question is ever one of degree. If the conduct of the employer amounts to a basic refusal to continue the servant on the agreed terms of the employ­ment, then there is at once a wrongful dismissal and repudiation of the contract. I see no distinction in such a case as the present between repudiation by the defendants of their contractual obligations and "a wrongful dismissal" in the ordinary sense of that phrase." [In re Rubfi Bronze Metal Company, Limited and Vos., (1918) 1KB 315 at p.323].

    The employment of the plaintiff by the defendants not being for any fixed duration was in the nature of general hiring and the plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable notice before his contract of employment was brought to an end. As the defendants by notice Exh. P. 8 issued on 30th March 1954, decided to change the contract in its essentials abruptly from 1st April 1954, they were clearly liable for damages on the footing that the plaintiff's contract of service was wrongfully terminated.

    10. The next question is on what basis the plaintiff should be awarded damages. The plaintiff in addition to arrears of remuneration has been awarded one month's remuneration (salary and commission) as damages for wrongful termination by the defendants of plaintiff's contract of service. On behalf of the plaintiff it has been urged that the plaintiff could not secure employment for nearly a year and, therefore, one year's remuneration should be awarded as compensation.

    11. The principles to be applied in determining the quantum of damages for wrongful dismissal were laid down by Erie J., in an oft-quoted passage which runs as follows:

    "The measure of damages for breach of promise now in question is obtained by considering what is the usual rate of wages for the employment here contracted for, and what time would be lost before a similar employment could be obtained. The law consi­ders that employment in any ordinary branch of industry can be obtained by a person competent for the place, and that the usual rate of wages for such employment can be proved, and that when a promise for continuing employment is broken by the master, it is the duty of the servant to use diligence to find another employment."
    Beckliam v. Drake, ( 1849) 2 H L C 579, p. 606= 81 R R 301, p. 318.

    The question was examined by the Supreme Court in S. S. Shetty v. Bharata Nidhi Ltd., AIR 1958 SC 12 and after stating that "the master who wrongfully dismisses his servant is bound to pay him such damages as will compensate him for the wrong that he has sustained':. Their Lordships quoted with approval the following passage from Chitty on Contracts:

    "They are to be assessed by reference to the amount earned in the service wrong­fully terminated and the time likely to elapse before the servant obtains another post for which he fitted. If the contract expressly provides that it is terminable upon, e. g. a month's notice, the damages will ordinarily be a month's wages..........No com­pensation can be claimed in respect of the injury done to the servant's feelings by the circumstances of his dismissal, nor in respect of extra difficulty of finding work resulting from those circumstances. A servant who has been wrongfully dismissed must use diligence to seek another employment and the fact that he has been offered a suitable post may be taken into account in assessing the damages."

    12. The plaintiff, according to his caae as laid in the plaint, remained out of employment from 1st April 1954 upto 31st March 1955, when he got employ­ment with J. B. Thakar and Best Minerals Ltd, another mining concern. He stated the same thing in his examination-in-chief as P. W. 3 (para. 17). How­ever, in cross-examination (para. 36) he deposed, when confronted with his previous statement in a criminal case, that he was out of employment for some time during the period and for some time was employed by Shyamji Narayanji. It thus becomes clear that the plaintiff was not out of employment for the whole year as initially alleged and deposed by him. Moreover, by making contradictory statements the plaintiff failed to make out as to what period was lost before he was able to obtain a similar employment as he had with the defendants. In this state of the evidence, it cannot be said that the Court below was wrong in concluding that one month's remuneration (salary and commission), in addition to arrears due, will be proper measure of damages for wrongful termination of the plaintiff's employment.

    13. Realising the aforesaid difficulty it was urged on behalf of the appel­lant that the defendant No, 3, Natwarlal acted in excess of his powers in bring­ing about the plaintiff's termination of service and, therefore, he was liable for the tort of procuring a breach of contract. It may be recalled that the defend­ant No. 3 was a Director of the 1st defendant company and the Managing Director of the 3rd defendant company. The plaintiff's contract of service was with the 1st defendant company which was being managed by the 2nd defend­ant company under a managing agency agreement (Exh. P. 22). Under this agreement the 2nd defendant company had "the general conduct and manage­ment of the business and affairs" of the 1st defendant company subject to the control, directions and supervision of its Directors. The managing agents were, however, not authorised, except with the previous approval of the Board of Directors, to exercise certain enumerated powers one of them being power to engage staff on behalf of the managed company except staff whose remuneration was within the limits prescribed by the Directors of the said company. By a resolution of the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant company passed on 20th February 1955, the Managing Agents were given authority to engage employees on salary not exceeding Rs, 600 p.m. Since the plaintiff was get­ting salary in excess of Rs. 600 p m. his employment was approved by the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant company. The letter Exh. P. 8, which has already been quoted and which brought about the termination of plaintiff's employment was written by defendant No. 3 as Managing Director of the Managing Agents for the isto defendant company. The argument is that as the plaintiff was getting a salary in excess of Rs. 600 p. m. and as his appointment was actually confirmed by the Board of Directors of the 1st defendant com­pany, the termination of his employment was not within the power of the Managing Agents and, therefore, by writing letter Exh. P. 8 the defendant No. 3 procured a breach of the contract existing between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant company.

    14. The argument stated above assumes that since the Managing Agents could not appoint a person whose salary was in excess of Rs. 600 p. m, they could not also terminate such a person's employment. The Managing Agents had within their power "the general conduct and management of the business and affairs" of the 1st defendant company. This general power will also include the power to terminate the services of the employees unless it could be said that as a matter of general principle the power to terminate the employ­ment of the staff which could not be appointed by the Managing Agents could not vest in them. No such general principle was brought to our notice. Restrictions on the power to appoint staff whose remuneration exceeded a parti­cular limit was pleased with the object of avoiding excessive financial burden on the managed company, but that object does not hold good in restricting the power of termination of employment. In our opinion, the powers of the Managing Agents in the matter of terminating the services of the staff as distin­guished from appointment were not restricted and that power could be exercis­ed, even in respect of an employee drawing more than Rs. 600 p. m., as a part of the general power of management of the business and affairs of the company.

    15. Even otherwise, we are not satisfied that the Managing Agents or their Managing Director could be made liable for the tort of procuring a breach of contract with the managed company. The position of the managing agents or their Managing Director in relation to the managed company is that of an agent. It is true that in Lumley v. Gye, (1843-60) All E R 208 the tort was defined in very wide language:

    "A person who, during the continuance of a contract of personal service, whether it be executory or not, wrongfully interrupts the relation subsisting between the parties to the contract by procuring one of them to commit a breach of the contract whereby the other party to the contract suffers damage commits a tort for which he is liable to the injured party in damages."
    [Lumley v. Gye, (1843-60) All E R 208 quotation from head-note.]

    But later cases have shown that the tort is primarily restricted to third persons and a servant or agent is not liable in tort for procuring a breach of his master's or principal's contract with another. The reasons for the restriction of the tort were well stated in Said v. Butt, (1920) All E R Rep. pp. 240 and 241:

    "But the servant who causes a breach of his master's contract with a third person seems to stand in a wholly different position. He is not a stranger. He is the alter ego of his master. His acts are in law the acts of his employer. In such a case it is the master himself, by his agent, breaking the contract he has made and, in my view, an action against the agent under the Lumleg v. Gye, (1843-60) All E R 208 principle must, therefore, fail, just as it would fail if brought against the master himself for wrongfully procuring a broach of his own contract. This, I think, is the true answer to the ingenious arguments of counsel on behalf of the plaintiff on this point. To hold otherwise might create at least three actions whenever a managing director or other authorised agent, knowingly procur­ed a breach of the employer's contract. First, an action based on contract against the employer for the pecuniary loss caused by the breach of the contract; secondly, an action for tort against the agent who had procured the breach of contract, wherein the damages would be at large and might include every element of annoyance, inconvenience, or indignity; and, thirdly, an action against the employer himself for the tortious wrong committed by his authorised agent in procuring the employer to break his contract with the plaintiff. This extraordinary result shows, I think, that the contention of the plaintiff in this case cannot be sound. If the plaintiff here be right in his submission, then the flood gatos of litigation would indeed be widely opened."

    Reference in this connection may also be made to Scarnmdl G. and Nephew Ltd. v. Hurley, (1929) 1 K B. 419 and D. C. Thompson and Co. Ltd. v. Deakin, (1952) 2 All E R 361, p. 370 where Said v. Butt, (1920) All E R Rep. pp. 240 and 241 was applied and approved. The result may be different where the servant or agent acts mala fide and outside the course or scope of employment or authority. But that is not the position in the instant case. In our opinion, the defendant No. 3 was not liable in tort to the plaintiff.

    16. There is another reason why the argument seeking to fasten liability on the basis of tort must fail. The tort, if any, was committed on 1st April 1954 when the plaintiff's employment with the 1st defendant company was brought to an end. The suit was filed on 30th March 1957 and although within limitation for a cause of action on breach of contract was barred by time on a cause of action on the basis of tort under Article 36 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which prescribed a period of limitation of two years for such a suit.

    17. We will now advert to the cross-objection filed by the defendant No. 3 which seeks to avoid any liability of the defendant. The only argument addressed is that the claim in suit being based on breach of contract, the defendant No. 3 who was in the position of an agent of 1st and 2nd defendants cannot be made liable. This argument has to be accepted. We have already held that there can be no liability on the 3rd defendant on the basis of tort. As regards liability on contract, the defendant No. 3 was in the position of an agent and cannot be made liable for breach of contract.

    18. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The cross-objection is allowed and the decree of the trial Court is modified to this extent that the plaintiff's suit will stand dismissed as against defendant No. 3. There will be no order as to costs of the cross-objection.

    Appeal dismissed; cross-objection allowed.

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    Parasharsingh v. Hindustan Manganese Mines Ltd. And Others
    (Apr 22, 1968)