AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

An election petition challenging the election of respondent No. 1, Shivpratap Singh, to the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly from Guna Constituency No. 27, was presented to the High Court on 26-4-1972. When received by the Deputy Registrar (Judicial), his endorsement recorded presentation by the petitioner's advocate (Shri A. R. Choubey) on 26th April 1972 and noted that the petition was accompanied by an affidavit and a receipt. Office staff later recorded a note expressing doubt whether the petition had been "properly presented" because sub-section (1) of section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 permits presentation only by the candidate or an elector.

The matter was placed before Dwivedi, J., on 14-11-1972; the petitioner then appeared personally with counsel and sought time for submissions. On 29-11-1972 counsel was heard and the Judge reserved orders. On 14-12-1972 the Judge directed registration of the petition subject to any later objection about proper presentation. Respondent No. 1 later raised a specific plea in his return (filed 16-2-1973) that the petition was not properly presented. Issues were framed (including one on invalidity of presentation) and the respondent sought a preliminary hearing of that issue. The petitioner, belatedly (16-12-1974), asserted for the first time that he had been personally present when his counsel presented the petition. The Court permitted the belated plea to be raised but examined the evidence and the procedural record, and ultimately held that the petition was not presented by the candidate personally or in his immediate presence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an election petition was validly presented where it was physically handed to the Deputy Registrar by the petitioner's counsel (or counsel's clerk) rather than by the candidate himself, in the context of section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  2. Whether presentation by a counsel (or his clerk) in the immediate presence of the candidate — including situations where the candidate is outside the room but available to be called — can be treated as presentation by the candidate within the meaning of section 81.
  3. Whether the issue of invalidity of presentation should be heard preliminarily, because a favourable decision on that issue could dispose of the petition without addressing merits.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Counsel for the petitioner (Shri J. P. Gupta) initially argued that presentation by the counsel would suffice to comply with section 81(2)(a)(ii) of the Representation of the People Act (i.e., presentation by counsel was a proper presentation).
  • The petitioner later (after a significant delay) testified that he had accompanied his counsel to Jabalpur and was present when Shri A. R. Choubey presented the petition to the Deputy Registrar; he said he left after taking leave of his counsel on the afternoon of 26th April and recollected writing the date '26' below the verification clause that day.
  • The petitioner's counsel contended that presence within the room was not necessary if the candidate was available to be called by the Deputy Registrar (i.e., immediate presence outside the room should be sufficient).

Respondent No. 1's Arguments

  • The respondent raised a specific plea in his return that the petition was not properly presented and relied on the Office-note and the Deputy Registrar's endorsement to support that plea.
  • Respondent's counsel argued the petitioner's belated claim of personal presence (raised two years later) was suspicious and likely an afterthought; if the petitioner had been present, he would have promptly produced affidavits or evidence to the contrary when the Office objection was first raised.
  • Respondent relied on the formal statutory requirement of section 81 and the presumption of correctness attaching to the Deputy Registrar's endorsement and the Office objection, contending that presentation by counsel (in the absence of the candidate) did not satisfy the statutory mode of presentation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sheodan Singh v. Mohan Lal (Supreme Court) Held that presentation of an election petition by an Advocate's clerk in the immediate presence of the petitioner amounted in substance to presentation by the petitioner and was therefore proper presentation. The court considered this authority, but distinguished or rejected its broader applicability on the facts: it concluded that the formality of presentation by the candidate himself is mandatory under section 81 and that presentation by counsel (or clerk), even if the candidate was nearby but not shown to be in immediate presence, did not satisfy the statutory requirement in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded through the following steps, strictly following the text of the opinion:

  1. Statutory framework: The court examined section 81(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which prescribes that an election petition may be presented to the High Court by "any candidate at such election or any elector" within the prescribed period. It also referred to section 87, which permits the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to be applied in the trial of election petitions, and to the application of the Indian Evidence Act where appropriate.
  2. Limited role of CPC: The court reasoned that the CPC may be invoked only where the Act or rules made thereunder are silent; where the Act prescribes a particular procedure (here, the mode of presentation), the CPC cannot be used to enlarge or alter that statutory prescription. The court emphasised that election law is statutory and mandatory and must be strictly observed.
  3. Interpretation of "candidate": Although section 81 does not use the explicit words "in person" or "himself," the court read the statutory phrasing "any candidate at such election" as specifying that presentation must be by the candidate in person. If the Legislature had intended to permit presentation by an authorised agent, it could have expressly done so or made reference to recognized agent rules (for example, Order 3, Rule 1 of the CPC), but it did not.
  4. Presumptive force of official endorsement and timing of the petitioner's claim: The court placed weight on the Deputy Registrar's endorsement and the Office-note expressing doubt about presentation, treating them as carrying presumptive value. The petitioner did not, at the time the Office objection was recorded or when the matter was first before the court, assert that he had personally been present. The petitioner's assertion of personal presence was made two years later and was therefore treated with suspicion as possibly an afterthought.
  5. Evaluation of evidence: The petitioner testified he was present; Shri A. R. Choubey (his counsel) could not positively support that claim and stated he could not recollect whether the petitioner accompanied him, and said the date under the verification clause was the handwriting of his clerk. A witness examined by respondent (Babulal) gave inconsistent testimony. The court found the petitioner's uncorroborated testimony unreliable in view of the official endorsement and other notes.
  6. Conclusion on validity: On the combined legal and evidentiary analysis, the court concluded that the petition was presented by counsel and not in the immediate presence of the petitioner, and therefore the presentation did not comply with the mandatory requirement of section 81.
  7. Consequence under the statute: The court invoked section 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, which enjoins the court to dismiss a petition where presentation did not comply with section 81. Because the presentation was invalid, dismissal was required.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the election petition was not validly presented under section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, and therefore DISMISSED the petition.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision: the election petition challenging respondent No.1's election was dismissed; the petitioner was ordered to pay respondent No.1's costs (counsel's fee Rs. 500 was specified).
  • Administrative consequence: the Office was directed to communicate the result to the Election Commission and the Speaker of the State Legislature as required by section 103 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  • On broader law: the court applied a strict interpretation of section 81 and emphasised that presentation by the candidate is a mandatory formal requirement; the opinion did not expressly state that it was laying down a novel precedent beyond its reasoning on strict compliance, and it relied on statutory prescription and the Court's established view that election law requirements must be strictly observed.

Petition dismissed.

    Ramanlal Surajbhan Premy v. Shivpratap Singh And Another

    This election petition, calling in question the election of the respondent No. 1 Shivpratap Singh to the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly from Guna Constituency No. 27, was presented to the High Court on 26-4-1972. The Deputy Registrar (Judicial) who is the person authorised to receive such petitions, made the following endorsement at the time of receiving the petition:

    "Presented by Shri A. R. Choubey, Advocate for the petitioner Ramanlal, who is said to be a candidate, on this 26th April, 1972, at 1.45 P. M.. It is accompanied by Receipt No. 31 Book No. 84994 dated 25-4-1972. Shri Choubey is personally known to me. The petition is accompanied by an affidavit."

    2. The petition was, thereafter, checked by the Office and Reader to the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) reported that it was doubtful if the petition could be treated as "properly presented" since it was not presented by the candidate himself but by his counsel, and under sub-section (1) of section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 the election petition could be presented only by the candidate at such election or by an elector.

    3. The election petition was placed before Hon'ble Dwivedi, J. on 14-11-1972, drawing His Lordship's attention to the said Office-note. On this day, the petitioner had appeared before the Court personally along with his counsel Shri J. P. Gupta. Their attention was invited to the Office-note and Shri Gupta, having been engaged on that very date, asked for ten days's time to make his submissions. The hearing stood adjourned for 29-11-1972.

    On 29-11-1972, the counsel was heard and the Hon'ble Judge reserved the case for orders. On 14-12-1972, the Judge passed the orders in the following terms:

    "According to Shri J. P. Gupta, the presentation by the counsel would be sufficient compliance with the provisions of section 81 (2) (a) (ii) of the Act. The question of proper presentation will be considered if and when such objection is taken by the other side. In the meantime subject to any objection regarding the proper presentation which may be subsequently raised, this petition be registered."

    4. It would be pertinent to note here itself that though the petitioner and his counsel were apprised of the Office objection regarding the invalidity of presentation, the petitioner did neither personally nor through his counsel, assert before the Court on either of these two dates that he was personally present when the petition was presented to the Deputy Registrar by his counsel and that the fact of his presence was not noted by him either due to inadver-tance, or because he or his counsel omitted to disclose that the person accompanying the counsel was none else but the petitioner-candidate himself.

    5. On 16-2-1973, the respondent No. 1 filed his return. In para 18, he raised a specific plea that the petition was not properly presented, reiterating how the Office had raised an objection regarding it and the petitioner taking a firm stand that the presentation by a counsel was a proper presentation, acd nowhere suggesting that he either personally presented it or was present at the time of its presentation by the counsel.

    The petitioner filed no rejoinder to this. On 16-3-1973, Dwivedi, J. framed issues and the issue No. 11 related to the plea of invalidity of presenta­tion. The petitioner did not come forward with a statement that the issue would hardly be relevant since he was personally present at the time the peti­tion was presented to the Deputy Registrar.

    6. The issues were recasted by me sometime in September, 1974, and issue No. 13 relates to invalidity of presentation. The respondent No. 1 prayed that this issue be heard preliminarily since the decision on it, if it went favourable to him, the petition could be thrown out without going into merits. The petitioner, then, for the first time, came with an application on 16-12-1974 pleading that he was present at the time his counsel Slid A. R. Choubey presented the petition to the Deputy Registrar. I permitted this plea of fact to be raised though it was belated. The matter had so long proceeded on the assumption that the presentation of the petition was made by the counsel in the absence of the petitioner. The endorsement of the Deputy Registrar, the Office-note by the Reader to the Deputy Registrar and the note of the Judge dated the 14th December, 1972, proceeded on the basis that the petitioner was not present at the time of the presentation of the petition. The plea that the petitioner was present at the time of its presentation, came two years after, and it was bound to be shrouded with suspicion and susceptible of an attack that the plea was an after thought and against all probabilities. The learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 argued that sooner the office raised the objection of validity of the presentation, had the petitioner been present at the time of its presentation, he would have rushed in with affidavits of his own and of his counsel, or of any of his companions who was present et that time, to point out that the Office endorsement of presentation was wrong, and that he was personally present. Instead, the plea was that the presentation by a counsel was a proper presentation. Such a plea admitted of no other inference than that the petitioner was not present. Such an inference would be consistent with the course of natural human conduct. Besides, the Office endorsement and the Office objections have their own presumptive value. The Deputy Registrar (Judicial) was not a Ministerial Officer. He was an officer belonging to Judicial Service, of the rank of an Additional District Judge, and he knew the implications of presentation; the person who should present and the manner in which the presentation ought to be made. Had the petitioner been present along with the counsel, the Deputy Registrar would definitely have endorsed the fact of his presence. He would not have raised the office objection regard­ing the invalidity of presentation, with reference to the provision of law as contained in section 8l of the Representation of the People Act which was, presumably, in his mind at the time he received the petition.

    7. Be that as it may, the petitioner has examined himself and Shri A. R. Choubey to prove that he was present at the time of the presentation of the petition. The petitioner says that he and his counsel Shri Jain came to Jabalpur on the night of the 23rd April. They had travelled in Shri Jain's car. On the 25th April, he got the election petition prepared. He gave Vakalatnama on the 25th to Shri Choubey. On that very day, he had deposited the security amount and had sworn the affidavit. But certain documents remained to be typed and the petition though ready on the 25th, could not be presented on that day. He had, therefore, to stay on. On the 26th, he went along with his counsel to the Deputy Registrar's chamber and his counsel presented the petition, very much in his presence. He left Jabalpur on the 26th afternoon after taking leave of his counsel. The petitioner says that he does not recollect whether he had signed the petition on the 25th or on the 26th. But he positively recollected that the date '26' below the verification clause was put by him on the 26th itself. That would show that he was present here at Jabalpur on the 26th. And for a man who had come all the way from Guna for presentation of a petition, it would be reasonable to expect, his counsel contends, that he would get it presented in his presence before taking leave to go.

    8. Strangely enough, Shri Choubey is not willing to support him on two vital points. He says that he cannot recollect whether the petitioner had accompanied him and was present with him when the petition was handed over to the Deputy Registrar. As far as he recollected, he met the petitioner some­where outside the Deputy Registrar's room when he came out after presentation of the petition.

    As regards the date under the verification clause is concerned, Shri Choubey says that the date was in the handwriting of his clerk. This belies the petitioner that he had put the date on the 26th.

    Another pertinent fact to be taken notice of is that the petitioner had signed the petition on the 25th itself before he proceeded to the Deputy Registrar' Office for an affidavit on that day. Shri Choubey says that the affidavit could be sworn in only after the petition was ready and duly signed. The petitioner saying that he signed the petition on the 26th, would not be correct.

    9. It appears that the party thought that an election petition could be presented by his counsel and, therefore, it was not necessary for him to accompany the counsel to the Deputy Registrar's room. He stayed behind and took leave of the counsel after he came out of the room; or may be that he had left for Guna on the 25th evening itself, leaving behind someone to remind the counsel to present the petition on the 26th positively. Shri Choubey recollects that someone was reminding him on the 26th that he had to present the election petition. Who should that person be? Was he the petitioner's counsel Shri Jain or the petitioner himself? Shri Choubey could not positively say that.

    10. The fact remains that the petition was presented by Shri Choubey and there is no definite and reliable evidence that it was done in the immediate presence of the petitioner. The petitioner's uncorroborated testimony does not deserve to be accepted in view of the endorsement of the Deputy Registrar and the Office-noting going against him.

    I hold that the petition was not presented by the petitioner or in his immediate presence.

    11. The respondent No. 1 has examined one witness by name Babulal who was an active worker of the respondent No. 1 during the election. He says that Shivpratap Singh had asked to him to find whether an election peti­tion was contemplated by the losing candidate. He happened to come to Guna and while alighting from the bus, he saw Ramanlal Premy alighting from the other bus which reached soon after. He asked Ramanlal if the election petition had been filed and the reply was that he had handed over the petition duly drafted and signed to his counsel a day before and it would be presented that very day (i. e. on the date of their meeting).

    In his cross-examination, a suggestion was made that Ramanlal had gone to Jabalpur in Shri Jain's car and had returned in the same car. The witness then fumbled and said that he had seen Ramanlal alighting from a bus which bad reached an hour after his bus had reached. Soon after, he said that he had not seen him alighting from any bus but after he had returned from the bazar, he casually met him at the bus-stand.

    12. It was difficult to believe a witness of this type. A person of a hostile camp, as he was, Ramanlal would not volunteer to give him all the details of the presentation. If he were to tell him anything, he would just say that the election petition had been filed.

    13. Though I do not believe this witness, yet the circumstances and probabilities as discussed above, lead me to hold that the petition was presented by the counsel, not in the immediate presence of the petitioner, but when he was somewhere away.

    14. The question then is whether this was a valid presentation of the petition; whether presentation by the counsel could be treated as presenta­tion by the candidate within the meaning of section 81 of the Representation of the People Act. Section 81 reads as under:

    "(1) An election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (11 of section 100 and section 101 to the High Court by any candidate at such election or any elector within forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date of election of the returned candidate, or if there are more than one returned candidate at the election and the dates of their election are different, the later of those two dates.

    Explanation:-ID this sub section "elector" means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates, whether he has voted at such election or not."

    Reference may be made to section 87 of the Act which permits the procedure of the Code of Civil Procedure to be applied in the trial of election petitions. It reads as under:

    "87(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made there under, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to the trial of suits:

    Provided that (he High Court shall have the discretion to refuse, for reasons to be recorded in writing, to examine any witness or witnesses if it is of the opinion that the evidence of such witness or witnesses is not material for the decision of the petition or that the party tendering such witness or witnesses is doing so on frivolous grounds or with a view to delay the proceedings.

    (2) The provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to apply in all respects to the trial of an election petition."

    15. Reading the two sections together, it is clear that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure could be invoked only where the Representation of the People Act or the Rules made thereunder made no such procedural provisions. But where the Act or the Rules provided for a particular proce­dure, the Code to that extent would stand excluded. The manner of presenta­tion of an election petition has been provided for in the Act itself and, there­fore, any reference to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of presentation of plaints or applications would be out of place. It would be wrong to suggest that since the trial of an election petition begins with the presentation of the petition and the "trial" used in a general sense, denotes taking judicial note of the State of affairs from the initiation of the petition till its final conclusion, the presentation of the petition would form an integral part of the trial, and because the Code applied for trial, it should also apply for the presentation of the petition by a counsel. Such a construction would render the opening words of section 87 (1) nugatory. The words are "subject to the provisions of this Act and of any Rules made there under, every election petition shall be tried....". It has been repeatedly said by the Supreme Court that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is purely statutory proceeding unknown to common law and that the Court possesses no common law power. And the general rule is well settled that a statutory requirement of election law must be strictly observed. If the statute rendered any particular requirement mandatory, the Courts posses­sed and could exercise no dispensing power to waive non-compliance. The Court has no implied power to cut down or enlarge the scope of the express provision of the Statute by invoking the provisions of the Code. The Code must operate subject to the provisions of the election law. If the election law directs the Court to act in a particular manner, it cannot have power to act in any other manner. The trial of the election petition must strictly be govern­ed by the Statute. Under Article 329 (b). a provision is made that "no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature". And where the manner of presentation is prescribed in the election law, its scope cannot be extended or enlarged by importing into the provisions something from the Code or from the general law.

    16. In this view of the matter, the presentation of the election petition ought to have been made by the candidate himself. Though the words 'himself or 'personally' have not been incorporated in the body of the section, the intention of the legislation is clear enough. "The candidate at such election" particularises the person as such. If the Legislature intended that the presenta­tion could be done by an authorised agent, the provisions of Order 3, Rule 1 of the Code were very much within their knowledge, and it could be so express­ed. Even in the provision of Order 3, Rule 1, the general rule of appearance or acting by the recognized agent or a legal practitioner, could be curtailed. The words 'except where otherwise provided' curtail the absolute operation of the general rule. As an illustration, the presentation of a plaint by a pauper under Order 33, Rule 3 has to be made by the pauper-plaintiff in person.

    The mode of presentation implies delivery of the document to the Court or to its Officer. There are three recognized modes in the Code of Civil Pro­cedure. Presentation by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by his pleader. And where the express provision, as contained in section 81, is presentation by a candidate, the meaning is implicit that the presentation has to be made by the candidate in person, though the words "in person" are not in the body of the section.

    17. The Court is enjoined by section 86 (1) of the Representation of the People Act to dismiss the petition if the presentation did not comply with the provisions of section 81. The manner of presentation, by ttoe very nature of penalty imposed for non-compliance, makes it obligatory, and the compliance ought to be strictly within the letters of the law. The Court has no power to act in any other manner. Where the Legislature has in its wisdom made the observance of certain formalities and provisions mandatory, the failure in that respect must be visited with a dismissal of the petition.

    18. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the authority of the Supreme Court reported in Sheodan Singh v. Mohan Lal, wherein the presenta­tion of an election petition by an Advocate's clerk in the immediate presence of the petitioner was held to be proper presentation. The Court said that it was in substance though not in form, presentation by the petitioner himself, and, therefore, the requirement of law was fully satisfied. The learned counsel says that the presentation, in the instant case, was made by the counsel, in the immediate presence of the candidate; whether the candidate was present in the room itself or outside, should hardly matter when he was available to the counsel if the Deputy Registrar had any questions to ask, which should be within the personal knowledge of the candidate, or if he had any doubts as to the identity of the person presenting the petition. The candidate did appear before the Deputy Registrar on the previous day for swearing an affidavit. The petition was kept duly signed on that day. The authenticity of the person was not in doubt. Should it not, therefore, be sufficient compliance if the forma­lity of presentation was done by the counsel and the candidate waited outside the room? If required, he could be called in.

    19. In my view, the formality of presentation by the candidate himself, howsoever insignificant it may appear under the circumstances, was yet a mandatory formality, the non-observance of which invalidated the presentation. If the candidate waited outside the room or was somewhere away, the presenta­tion could not be construed as one in his immediate presence, to imply pre­sentation by him personally. It was all the same presentation by a counsel.

    20. The result follows that the petition must be dismissed for non-compliance of section 81 (1) of the Representation of the People Act. It is, therefore, hereby dismissed. The petitioner shall pay to the respondent No. 1 alone his costs. Counsel's fee Rs.500.

    The Office shall communicate the result to the Election Commission and the Speaker of the State Legislature as required by section 103 of the Repre­sentation of the People Act, 1951.

    Petition dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ramanlal Surajbhan Premy v. Shivpratap Singh And Another
    (Mar 10, 1975)