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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a second appeal from a decree and judgment of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Kakinada, confirming the decree of the District Munsif, Kakinada, in a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage and for possession. On 17-11-1947 one Ramineedi Govindarao and his sons executed a usufructuary mortgage of the plaint schedule lands to the defendant for Rs. 3,000. The deed provided that the principal would be paid "within a period of ten years from this day i.e., by the end of November 1957." It also contained a further clause that, if the mortgagors paid the principal within the stipulated period, the mortgagee would nevertheless "enjoy the schedule mentioned property" until the end of the stipulated period by carrying on cultivation and pay the mortgagors an annual makta (specified paddy).

The plaintiff purchased the equity of redemption from the mortgagors and filed O.S. No. 429 of 1951 for recovery of possession and incidental reliefs. The defendant contended the suit was premature because it was filed before 30-11-1957, the date said to be fixed for repayment. The District Munsif decreed the suit; the Additional Subordinate Judge confirmed that decree holding that (a) the plaintiff could redeem prior to the date fixed in the document and (b) the clause enabling the mortgagee to remain in possession after redemption was a clog on the equity of redemption. The defendant appealed; the present opinion addresses that appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the mortgagor (plaintiff/respondent) was entitled to redeem the mortgage prior to the date expressly stated in the deed (i.e., before the end of November 1957), given the wording of the instrument.
  2. Whether the clause in the mortgage deed that, if the mortgagor redeemed earlier, required the mortgagee to continue in possession (and receive makta / rent) until the stipulated date is a valid collateral advantage or is void as a "clog on the equity of redemption."

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (counsel: Mr. B. V. Subrahmanyam)

  • The mortgage fixed a definite term for repayment ("within a period of ten years ... by the end of November 1957"), so by the co-extensive principle of the right to redeem and the right to foreclose the plaintiff could not redeem before that date.
  • The mortgagors' right to redeem earlier (if any) was hedged by a condition that the mortgagee should remain in possession — the term is indivisible and cannot be separated; the mortgagors could not ignore that condition and claim an express right to redeem unconstrained.
  • The clause permitting the mortgagee to continue in possession after redemption was a collateral advantage agreed between the parties and therefore valid (i.e., not a clog on redemption).

Respondent's Arguments (counsel: Mr. Ramachandra Rao)

  • There was no absolute term fixed such that redemption was only on expiry; the deed contains a clear provision enabling redemption earlier than the end of the stipulated period.
  • Once the mortgagors are entitled to redeem earlier, any clause that prevents them from taking possession after redemption (i.e., forcing them to allow the mortgagee to remain) operates as a clog on the equity of redemption and is void.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kreglinger v. New Patagonia Meat and Cold Storage Co. Ltd. (House of Lords) Collateral advantages in mortgage transactions are permissible provided they are not unfair/unconscionable, do not constitute a penalty/clog, and are not repugnant to the contractual/equitable right to redeem. Used as the leading statement of English authority on when collateral advantages may be upheld; the court applied this to test whether the possession clause was collateral and permissible or a clog.
Musammat Bakhtwar Begam v. Musammat Husaini Khannam (Judicial Committee) Parties can contract to the contrary and confer upon the mortgagor a right to redeem earlier than the mortgage term fixed in the deed. Supported the proposition that a specific contractual provision can allow redemption before the fixed term; the court relied on it to assess whether the document created such a right.
Rose Ammal v. Rajarathnam Ammal A provision stating repayment "within" a fixed date can be construed to allow redemption "on or before" that date; a mortgagor may be permitted to redeem before the fixed date. Cited as authority for construing words such as "within" and for holding that mortgagors may redeem before the nominal due date.
Chandu alias Srinivasa Pai v. Koaja Poojari (Madras Division Bench) Words like "within the end of [date]" in a mortgage deed can mean the mortgage is redeemable before that date. Reinforced the construction that "within" indicates "on or before" a date; court cited it to show consistent precedents permitting early redemption by construing similar words.
Chinnaswami Reddiar v. Krishna Reddy Construction of particular words in mortgage deeds may permit redemption on or before the stated date. Used to support the interpretation of timing words in mortgage instruments; the court referenced it among consistent decisions.
Bhagavantulayya v. Venkandora (Madras Full Bench) Concurred with view that words indicating payment by a date mean "on or before" that date. Cited as additional authority for construing timing clauses as permitting earlier payment/redemption.
Dhanammal v. Raju Gramani Krishnaswami Naidu Observations that prior decisions construing the word "within" held it to mean "on or before". Referred to for its discussion of construction of "within" in mortgage deeds; supported the textual interpretation analysis.
Mehrban Khan v. Makhna Equity will not permit devices or contrivances designed to prevent or impede redemption; after payment the land must be free and unfettered. Relied upon to show that provisions keeping mortgagor out of possession after redemption are contrary to equitable principle and should be struck down.
Noakes & Co. Ltd. v. Rice (Lord Macnaghten excerpt) Equity will not allow arrangements that prevent or impede redemption; after repayment the mortgagor should be unfettered in enjoyment of the property. Quoted (via Mehrban Khan) to underline the broad equitable principle against fettering redemption.
Ankinedu v. Subbiah (Madras Division Bench) A clause that contemplates the mortgagee remaining in possession after payment of the mortgage debt is unenforceable as a fetter upon the right to redeem. Described as "on all fours" with the instant case; the court agreed with its reasoning and applied it as persuasive Indian authority invalidating possession-after-redemption clauses.
Paramanand v. Mata Din Bai A mortgage clause allowing the mortgagee to retain property after redemption on payment of fixed rent is a clog on redemption and unenforceable. Cited to reinforce the principle that contemporaneous provisions reserving possession post-redemption are void and the mortgagor is entitled to possession on payment.
In re Cuban Land and Development Co. Ltd. Collateral advantages (here, a share in surplus assets) may be valid where they are truly collateral and do not impede redemption; such advantages can fall due after repayment. The court treated this decision as distinguishable and not helpful to the appellant because, in that case, the advantage was collateral and did not impede the mortgagor's right to redeem.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the controversy in two linked stages: (A) the proper construction of the mortgage deed to determine whether it conferred an express right of redemption before the fixed date; and (B) whether the clause requiring the mortgagee to remain in possession (if the mortgagors redeemed earlier) was a permissible collateral advantage or an impermissible clog on the equity of redemption.

A. Construction of the deed and timing of redemption

  • The court analysed the specific wording of the deed. It noted the recital that the principal of Rs. 3,000 was to be paid "within a period of ten years ... by the end of November 1957."
  • The court reviewed authorities construing words such as "within" and instruments providing repayment "on or before" a specified date, citing Rose Ammal, Chandu, Chinnaswami Reddiar and Bhagavantulayya. Those authorities supported the view that such words can operate to permit repayment and thus redemption on or before the stated date.
  • More importantly for the present instrument, the deed contained an explicit clause stating that "if within the stipulated period we find it convenient to pay the principal sum ... in full discharge of the debt, it has been agreed that till the end of the stipulated time you shall enjoy the schedule mentioned property ... and shall deliver to us every year ... a makta ...". The court treated this clause as a specific contractual concession that presupposes a right in the mortgagors to redeem earlier than the fixed period.
  • Thus the court concluded (on textual reading and by reference to authority that parties may contract for earlier redemption) that the document did create an express right in the mortgagors to redeem before the end of the stipulated period.

B. Validity of the clause requiring continued possession after early redemption

  • Having concluded the deed conceded an earlier right of redemption, the court turned to whether the subsequent clause that the mortgagee may remain in possession (and receive makta) after such earlier redemption was effective.
  • The court applied the established equitable principle — repeatedly stated in English and Indian authorities (Noakes, Kreglinger, Mehrban Khan, Ankinedu, Paramanand) — that equity will not permit any device, contrivance or term forming part of the mortgage transaction that prevents or impedes redemption. After full payment, the mortgagor must be free to enjoy the property unfettered.
  • While Kreglinger allows collateral advantages where they are not unfair, unconscionable, penalty-like, or repugnant to the equitable right to redeem, the court found that the possession clause in the present deed did not operate as a mere collateral advantage; rather it was part and parcel of the mortgage transaction and directly restricted the mortgagor's right to take possession even after discharge of the debt.
  • The court emphasised that if the instrument confers an express right to redeem earlier, then any clause that effectively takes that right away (by requiring the mortgagor to allow the mortgagee to remain in possession after redemption) must yield. Accepting the appellant's argument would mean what the mortgagor was given by the deed would be taken away by another part of the same deed.
  • Consequently, the court held that the clause enabling the mortgagee to continue in possession after redemption was a clog on the equity of redemption and therefore void.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The court held that the mortgagors (and hence the plaintiff who purchased the equity of redemption) were entitled to redeem the mortgage before the term fixed in the deed, and that the provision enabling the mortgagee to remain in possession (and receive makta) after such redemption operated as a clog on the equity of redemption and was void.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The plaintiff/respondent was entitled to exercise the right of redemption prior to the end of November 1957 (as the deed itself permitted earlier repayment).
  • The clause purporting to allow the mortgagee to continue in possession and receive annual makta after an earlier redemption cannot be enforced because it impedes the mortgagor's equitable right to redeem and take possession after payment.

The opinion grounds this outcome on established equitable principles and precedents; it does not purport to overrule those precedents or to announce a novel principle, but applies them to the construction and effect of the particular deed before the court.

    Yendru Satyavatamma v. Gundapuneedi Padmavatamma .

    (1) This is a second appeal against the decree and judgment of the court of the additional subordinate judge of kakinada, confirming that of the district munsif, kakinada in a suit for redemption of a mortgage and for possession. One ramineedi govindarao and his sons executed a usufructuary mortgage in respect of the plaint schedule lands for rs. 3,000/ - in favour of the defendant on 17 - 11 - 1947. Underthedocument, it was agreed that the amount would be paid within a period of ten years from the date of execution i. E. By the end of november 1957 and that, if within the stipulated period the mortgagors paid the principal amount due under the deed in full discharge of the debt, the mortgagee should enjoy the schedule - mentioned property paying every year the fixed maktha to the mortgagors. The plaintiff purchased the equity of redemption from the mortgagors and filed o. S. No. 429 of 1951 on the file of the court of the district munsif, kakinada for recovery of possession and for other incidental reliefs. The defendant, inter, alia, contended that the suit was premature as it was filed before the expiry of the term fixed under the mortgage deed, namely 30 - 11 - 1957. The learned district munsif negatived the contention and decreed the suit. On appeal, the learned subordinate judge held that the plaintiff was entitled to redeem the mortgage prior to the date fixed in the document and that the condition in the mortgage deed entitling the mortgagee to continue in possession after the mortgage was redeemed was a clog on the equity of redemption. He confirmed the decree of the first court. Hence, the appeal. Mr. B. V. Subrahmanyam, learned counsel for the appellant contends that a definite term was fixed in the mortgage deed and, therefore, on the principle that the right to redeem and the right to foreclose are co - extensive, the plaintiff would not be entitled to redeem the mortgage before the time fixed, that the term in the mortgage enabling the mortgagors to redeem earlier was hedged in, with a condition that she should be allowed to continue in possession, that the term was one and indivisible and that the mortgagors could not ignore that condition and contend that there was an express contract to redeem. He would'also argue that, that condition was not a clog on redemption as it was a collateral agreement between the parties providing for an additional advantage to the mortgagee. Mr. Ramachandra rao, on the other hand, argues that there was no term fixed for payment, that there was a clear term providing for redemption earlier and that once it is conceded that the mortgagors were entitled to redeem earlier, the term providing for continuation of possession was bad as a clog on the equity of redemption. As the arguments mainly turn upon the terms' of the mortgage deed, it would be convenient at this stage to read the relevant portions of the document. The document after reciting that a sum of rs. 3,000/ - is paid by the mortgagee and that the mortgagee should be in possession till the debt is discharged, proceeds to state:

    " as regards the principal amount of rs. 3,000/ - the debt due under the said deed any one of us will pay the same to you within a period of ten years from this day i, e. , by the end of november 1957, have the debt due under this deed discharged and take possession of the schedule property mentiond in this deed."

    After stating some other conditions, with which we are not now concerned, the document continues to state :

    " if within the stipulated period we find it convenient to pay the principal sum of rs. 3,ooo/ - due under the said deed in full discharge of the debt, it has been agreed that till the end of the stipulated time you shall enjoy the schedule mentioned property by carrying on cultivation etc and towards the profits therefor shall deliver to us every year by the 15th january a makta of 26 weighed bags of excellent white paddy weighing 166 ibs. Per bag at medapadu village."

    Thereafter, the document provides that, in case the amount was not paid within the stipulated date, it would be treated as a sale deed. Relying upon the words "within a period of ten years i. E. By the end of november 1957," it is contended that a definite term is fixed under the document and, therefore, it is not redeemable before that time. Before answering this question, it may be convenient to refer, at this stage, to the relevant case law on the subject. The fundamental principle of the mortgage law as stated by lord parker in kreglinger's case'. Is that "till the specified date has passed, there was no right to redeem and a bill either to redeem or foreclose would have been demurrable". The same idea is expressed neatly and succinctly thus: the right to redeem and the right to foreclose are co - extensive. In india, this rule is embodied in section 60 of the transfer of property act, which reads:

    " at any time after the principal money has become due, the mortgagor has a right on payment or tender, at a proper time and place, of the mortgage money, to require the mortgagee (a) to deliver to the mortgagor the mortgage deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee (b) where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor, and (c) at the cost of the mortgagor, either to retransfer the mortgaged property to him or to such third person as he may direct or to execute and where the mortgage has been effected by a registered instrument to have registered an acknowledgment in writing that any right in derogation of his interest transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished."

    By act xx of 1929, the word 'payable' was substituted by the word "due" making it clear thereby that the right to redeem is co - extensive with the right to enforce the mortgage, thus bringing the law in conformity with that obtaining in england. The judicial committee in musammat bakhtwar begam. V. Musammat husaini khannam. Laid down that there can be a contract to the contrary between the parties conferring upon the mortgagor a right to redeem earlier than the term for which the mortgage was created. Mr. Ameer ali, who delivered the judgment on behalf of the board, observed at page 477 : " ordinarily, and in the absence of special condition entitling the mortgagor to redeem during the term for which the mortgage is created, the right of redemption can only arise on the expiration of the specified period and take back the property. Such a provision is usually to the advantage of the mortgagor. " the well - established principle, therefore, is that ordinarily the right to redeem cannot be exercised till the mortgage amount becomes due unless there is a specific term conferring such a right on the mortgagor to redeem it earlier. The learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, attempts to establish that, under the mortgage deed, there is a definite term and that the mortgage amount became due only on the expiry of the term fixed. Reliance is placed upon the words "within a period of ten years" and it is contended that those words, if properly construed, would mean only on the expiry of the term fixed. In rose ammalv. Rajarathnam ammal, certain premises were mortgaged with possession in 1896, the mortgagor in the instrument of the mortgage covenanting to repay the mortgagee money within 20th of april, 1904. In 1898, he called upon the mortgagee to receive the principal and interest due and to deliver up possession. On the mortgagee refusing on the ground that the mortgage was not redeemable till 1904, he filed the suit for redemption. Shephard j. In holding that he was entitled to reedeem observed at page 36: " before the act the mortgagor could not redeem before the money became payable, neither can he do so now. That is no reason why, when the money is payable he should not be allowed to redeem before it has become due. " learned counsel for the appellant contends that this judgment, based upon the aforesaid reasoning, is no longer good law as the legislature presumably with the knowledge of the interpretation of the word "payable" had designedly substituted the word "due" for the word "payable". That may be so. After the amendment of section 60 by act xx of 1929, the mortgagor's right to redeem and that of the mortgagor's to enforce his right have become co - extensive. But, as was held by the judicial committee, it is subject to a specific contract between the parties. Any how, the word 'within' as construed by the learned judge, whether legal or otherwise, can only mean at any time before the fixed date. So, too, a division bench of the madras high court in chandu alias srinvasa pai v. Koaja poojari held that the words "within the end of march 1952" in the mortgage deed meant that it was redeemable before the end of march 1952. At page 87, the learned judges observed: " notwithstanding these observations, we think we are at liberty to hold following rose ammal v. Rajaratnam ammal (i. L. R. 23 madras 33) and chinnaswami reddiar v. Krishna reddy ( 16 m. L. J. 146) that a provision providing for payment by the mortgagor on or before a certain date is a sufficient indication of an intention to allow him to redeem before that date especially where as here a stipulation is made applicable only to the balance of the mortgage debt". A full bench of the madras high court in bhagavantulayya v. Venkandora endowed the view of wadsworth j. When they stated at page 771 : " the learned judge held that the words " we shall pay all the principal and interest payable under this document by 10th september 1928 " to be found in the deed meant payable ' on or before ' that date, and we have no hesitation in concurring in this opinion. " in dhanammal v. Raju gramani krishnaswami naidu j. While considering the question, incidentally says at page 978 : "two other decisions relied upon on behalf of the appellant, namely chinnaswami reddiar v. Krishna reddi (16 m. L. J. 146) and chandu alias srinioasa pai v. Koaja poojari ( 29 m. L. J. 86) proceeded on the construction of the particular words in the mortgage deeds under consideration. In these decisions where the word construed being 'within' it was held to mean " on or before ".

    " in the present case in view of the fact that a period was fixed under the document and the redemption was to be at the said period, it will not be correct to hold that either the mortgagor was required to pay the amount within that period or the mortgagee became entitled to foreclosure, if the mortgage amount was not paid within the period. The word ' within ' does not anywhere appear in the mortgage deed in the present case."

    All the aforesaid decisions give the plain meaning of the word 'within' and its corresponding telugu words indicate without any ambiguity that payment can be made on or before the date fixed. In this case, the term of the contract enabling the mortgagors to redeem earlier need not be drawn from the cryptic word ' within' but is specifically expressed. As extracted above, it was agreed that, if within the stipulated period the mortgagors found it convenient to pay the principal of rs. 3,000/ - under the said deed, in full discharge of the debt, till the end of the stipulated period the mortgagee should enjoy the schedule mentioned property by carrying on cultivation. This term pre - supposes the existence of a right in the mortgagors to redeem earlier than the time fixed in the document. This imposes a condition that, in case that right was exercised, the mortgagee should be allowed to continue in possession. A fair reading of the document, therefore, leaves no doubt in my mind that there is a specific contract enabling the mortgagors to redeem it earlier than the period fixed. Even so, it is contended, that, though the parties can agree to confer a right of redemption earlier than the term fixed, in this case the parties agreed to do so subject to a condition and, therefore, the mortgagors could not rely upon the contract to the contrary ignoring the condition imposed on them to allow the mortgagee to continue in possession. If i may say so, a fallacy underlies this argument. Whether there is such a contract to the contrary or not should be ascertained from a reading of the entire document. In the first part of the document, the mortgagors are enabled to redeem the mortgage within the period fixed i. E. On or before november 1957. On the assumption that the contract enables the mortgagors to redeem earlier, the subsequent condition says that, in case the mortgagors redeemed earlier, they should allow the mortgagee to continue in possession. When once the right to redemption is conceded, no clog on that right can be allowed to stand. Under the document, the mortgagors' right to redeem before the amount falls due is conceded and, therefore, the condition, if it be a clog on redemption, is void. To accept the argument of the learned counsel would mean that there is no such right to redeem conferred under the document, for what is given by one hand is taken away by the other. I, therefore, hold that, if the condition is a clog on redemption, it must give way to the express right of redemption conferred under the document. The next question is whether the condition enabling the mortgagee fo continue in possession paying rent even after the mortgage was redeemed is good in law. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the said term conferring a benefit on the mortgagee is collateral to the contract of mortgage and, therefore, is valid and does not operate as a clog on redemption. The law on the subject has been restated with authority by the house of lords in kreglinger v. New patgonia meat and cold storage company ltd. And it is unnecessary to travel in english law beyond that decision. The facts there were : by an agreement dated august 24, 1910, a, firm of wool - brokers agreed to lend to a company carrying on the business of meat preservers a sum of. 10,000/ - at 6 per cent. If the interest was punctually paid, the loan was not to be called in until september 30, 1915, but the company might pay off at any time on giving one calender month's notice. The loan was secured by a floating charge on the undertaking of the company. The agreement provided that, for a period of five years from the date thereof, the company should not sell sheepskins to any person other than the lenders so long as the latter were willing to buy at the best price offered by any other person and that the company should pay to the lenders a commission on all sheepskins sold by the company to any other person. The loan having been paid off by the company in january 1913, in accordance with the agreement, the lenders claimed to exercise their option of pre - emption notwithstanding the payment of the loan. The house of lords held that the stipulation for the option of pre - emption formed no part of the mortgage transaction but was a collateral contract entered into as a condition of the company obtaining the loan and that it was not a clog on the equity of redemption or repugnant to the right to redeem. Lord parker of waddington in his speech summarised his view thus at page 60:

    " my lords, after the most careful consideration of the authorities i think it is open to this house to hold, and i invite your lordships to hold that there is now no rule in equity which precludes a mortgagee, whether the mortgage be made upon the occasion of a loan or otherwise, from stipulating for any collateral advantage, provided such collateral advantage is not either unfair and unconscionable or (2) in the nature of a penalty clogging the equity of redemption, or (3) inconsistent with or repugnant to the contractual and equitable right to redeem."

    In mehrban khan v. Makhna. , the facts were : under the mortgage, the mortgagees were entitled to possession for 19 years. At the end of the period, if the mortgagor paid off the mortgage money, the property was to belong, as to a limited interest therein only, to the mortgagor and, as to the major interest therein, to the mortgagees. If the mortgagor failed to pay off the mortgage money at the end of the 19 years, the property was apparently to belong to the mortgagees absolutely. Lord tomlin quoted with approval the following psssage of lord macnaghten in noakes and co ltd v. Rice.

    " it is inherent in the thing itself and it is, i think, as firmly settled now as it ever was in former times that equity will not permit any device or contrivance designed or calculated to prevent or impede redemption. It follows as a necessary consequence that when the money secured by a mortgage of land is paid off, the land itself and the owner of the land in the use and enjoyment of it must be as free and unfettered to all intents arid purposes as if the land had never been made the subject of security. It seems to me to be contrary to principle that a mortgagee should stipulate with his mortgagor that after full payment of principal, interest and costs he should continue to receive for a definite or an indefinite period a share of the rents and profits of the mortgaged property as the result of an obligation arising from the contract made when the mortgage was created."

    This is authority also for the position that, as a result of [he obligation arising from the contract of mortgage, the mortgagor, cannot be prevented from enjoyment of the property mortgaged, either completely or partially, though he discharged the debt. A division bench of the madras high court in ankinedu v. Subbiah , held that a provision in a mortgage deed whereby the mortgagee is to remain in possession after payment of the mortgage debt is unenforceable as it acts as a fetter upon the right to redeem. The document, in that case, contemplated that the mortgagee should remain in possession notwithstanding the payment of the mortgage money and provided that, after deducting the expenses, the balance should be paid to the, mortgagor as rent. The learned judges, in holding that that condition was a clog on the equity of redemption, observed at page 749 :

    " we do not think the lease can be regarded as an independent transaction. It is part and parcel of the mortgage transaction and its effect is to keep the mortgagor out of possession of the mortgaged property notwithstanding the discharge by him of the mortgage debt. Leases between a mortgagor and a mortgagee to last during the pendency of a mortgage are not bad in themselves. But in the case before us the documents expressly contemplated the continuance of the lease after the discharge of the mortgage debt. We think this is a fetter on the equity of redemption which the court ought not to enforce."

    This decision is on all fours with the instant case and i agree with the aforesaid observations. In paramanand v. Mata din bai, the mortgage deed contained an agreement that, even - after redemption, the mortgagee would have the right to retain the property on payment of a fixed rent. The learned judges held that the mortgagor was entitled to recover possession of the mortgaged property on payment of the amount due on the mortgage. Sulaiman j. As he then was observed :

    " although the principle underlying the rule of a clog on redemption is very old, yet, it still prevails and will not permit any device or contrivance being part of the mortgage transaction or contemporaneous with it, to prevent or impede redemption. It follows that any covenant under which some right to retain possession is reserved to the mortgagee even after the property is redeemed is a clog on redemption as it both prevents and impedes redemption. That such a clause amounts to a clog on redemption is covered by authority."

    The decision cited by the learned counsel for the appellant viz. , in re cuban land and development co, ltd. , does not help him. There, a private company in 1912 created an issue of 20,000/ - 6 per cent debenture stock secured by a document dated june 12, 1912, which gave the debenture holders a right in a winding upto 50 per cent of the surplus assets. The debenture stock, of which 15,950 was issued, could be paid off at any time by the company on six month's notice. The question was whether a condition enabling the debenture holders to get a share in the surplus assets was a clog on the equity of redemption. Lawarence j. Observed :

    " the effect of the bargain made with the 6 per cent debenture stock holders is that such stock - holders, in addition to the principal money secured, are to receive a collateral advantage in the shape of an additional sum of money which will become payable on a winding up lord parker in the new patgonia meat co's case (1914 a. C. 25, 58) points out that there is no objection to a mortgagee stipulating for a payment falling due after the principal moneys advanced are repaid."

    As found by the learned judge in that case, the stipulation to give a share in profits was collateral to the mortgage contract. That was an additional advantage given to the mortgagee and it did not, in any way, impede, obstruct or destroy the mortgagor's right to redeem. It is clear from the aforesaid decisions that collateral advantages are enforceable, provided certain conditions are complied with. One of such conditions is that it is not repugnant to the mortgagor's right to redeem and does not impede or obstruct his right. The right of redemption is an important term of a contract of mortgage. Under section 60 of the transfer of property act, the incidents of that right, among others, are : the mortgagor has a right to pay the money at a proper time and place and the mortgagee has the duty to deliver to the mortgagor the mortgage deed and all the documents relating to the mortgaged property and, where the mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged property, he has to deliver possession thereof to the mortgagor. Any condition, therefore, which enables thd mortgagee to continue in possession after the mortgage is redeemed, entrenches upon his right to redeem. Such a condition certainly impedes his right to redeem. Notwithstanding the redemption of the mortgage, the mortgagee is enabled to continue in possession till the prescribed date. It is not a collateral advantage given to the mortgagee after the discharge of the mortgage. But, it is really a restriction imposed on the mortgage contract itself restraining the mortgagor from taking possession of the property even after the debt is discharged. This is not a collateral advantage simpliciter but a condition directly inconsistent with or repugnant to the contractual or equitable right to redeem. I, therefore, hold that the respondent was entitled to redeem the mortgage before the term fixed in the deed.

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    Comments

    Yendru Satyavatamma v. Gundapuneedi Padmavatamma .
    (Feb 8, 1956)