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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
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  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 136 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) challenge a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 18-6-2013 that vacated an order of temporary injunction earlier granted by a Single Judge to the petitioner, Ramesh Vajabhai Rabari.

The dispute concerns 11,733 sq m of land at Village Ambivally, Mumbai:

  • 25-7-1973: An unregistered agreement to sell the land is executed by Edmond D’Mello (original owner) in favour of Shantilal Prabhubhai Patel, to be completed within two years.
  • 1975: Rights under that agreement are successively assigned—first to M/s Kirti Constructions and then to V.B. Patel & Co. (“V”). All three agreements are unregistered.
  • Edmond D’Mello dies in 1976, leaving four children. One heir, Betram D’Mello, files Suit No. 7584/2000 challenging V’s title but later abandons it.
  • 30-12-2005: Eight heirs of D’Mello family execute a development agreement with the petitioner for ₹1 crore (₹15 lakh earnest money) and a supplementary agreement stating the petitioner accepts their title “as-is-where-is”.
  • January 2006: V, claiming possession for 30 years, files suit for injunction; subsequently withdraws and files a comprehensive suit for declaration and specific performance, also challenging the petitioner’s 2005 agreement.
  • 2-4-2007: D’Mello heirs terminate the petitioner’s development agreement for failure to take development steps.
  • Post-termination: V, as surviving executor of D’Mello’s will, enters a development agreement with Respondent 1, Pratiksha Real Estate (P) Ltd.
  • 19-6-2007: Single Judge grants ad-interim status quo and later a temporary injunction in favour of the petitioner.
  • 18-6-2013: Division Bench reverses the injunction, holding the petitioner failed to satisfy prerequisites for interim relief.
  • The petitioner filed SLPs under Article 136 of the Constitution; they remain at admission stage and are now decided by the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, whose development agreement was terminated and who lacks both title and possession, satisfies the triple test (prima facie case, possession, balance of convenience) for grant of temporary injunction.
  2. Whether, in the absence of any substantial question of law, the Supreme Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 to interfere with the Division Bench’s order vacating the injunction.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner (Ramesh Vajabhai Rabari)

  • Relies on the development agreement dated 30-12-2005 with certain heirs of Edmond D’Mello for consideration of ₹1 crore.
  • Claims payment of ₹15 lakh earnest money and contractual right to develop the property once IOD/CC are obtained.
  • Alleges that the termination notice dated 2-4-2007 is invalid and that he is entitled to a decree of specific performance; seeks interim protection until final adjudication.

Respondent 1 (Pratiksha Real Estate (P) Ltd.) and V.B. Patel & Co.

  • Assert prior unregistered sale agreements starting from 1973 culminating in assignment to V.B. Patel & Co., coupled with delivery of possession which they claim to have enjoyed for more than 30 years.
  • Rely on the will of Edmond D’Mello, probated, which acknowledges the sale to V and V’s possession.
  • Contend that the petitioner has neither title nor possession and that his development agreement was validly terminated for inaction.
  • Maintain that the balance of convenience favours them because they hold longstanding possession and a superior contractual claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court conducted a detailed factual scrutiny despite noting at the outset that the matter raised no substantial question of law. Its reasoning proceeded as follows:

  1. Prima Facie Case: The petitioner’s sole basis—an unperformed development agreement—was terminated on 2-4-2007. He thus lacked even a semblance of title. Conversely, V.B. Patel & Co. produced evidence of an earlier agreement with the original owner and long-standing possession.
  2. Possession: The petitioner never obtained physical possession; he agreed to take the property on an “as-is-where-is” basis but took no steps to secure or develop it. Evidence showed V.B. Patel & Co. in possession for 30 years.
  3. Balance of Convenience: Because the petitioner had neither title nor possession and had been inactive for two years, the court found no hardship would result from refusing injunction. Granting injunction would instead prejudice parties with a superior, older claim and physical control.
  4. Pendency of Suit: The petitioner’s main suit (Suit No. 1280/2007) seeks specific performance; until a decree is obtained, the petitioner’s rights are inchoate and do not justify interlocutory protection.
  5. Appellate Scrutiny: The Division Bench correctly applied the settled three-factor test and furnished cogent reasons; the Single Judge’s contrary order was therefore unsustainable.
  6. Article 136 Threshold: Given the purely factual nature of the dispute and absence of a substantial legal question, interference by the Supreme Court would be unwarranted unless a clear miscarriage of justice appeared—which it did not.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED. The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench, vacated the injunction in favour of the petitioner, and dismissed the Special Leave Petitions.

Implications are confined to the parties: the petitioner loses interim protection and must pursue his pending suit for specific performance without the benefit of an injunction; Respondent 1 and V.B. Patel & Co. may proceed with their asserted rights, subject to any existing status-quo directions in other proceedings. The decision sets no new precedent, resting squarely on settled principles for grant of temporary injunctions and on the discretionary limits of Article 136.

    Ramesh Vajabhai Rabari v. Pratiksha Real Estate Private Limited And Others

    Gyan Sudha Misra, J.— These special leave petitions assail the judgment and order dated 18-6-2013 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Pratiksha Real Estate (P) Ltd. v. Ramesh Vajabhai Rabari Appeal No. 683 of 2012 which has reversed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge who was pleased to grant an order of injunction in favour of the petitioner, Ramesh Vajabhai Rabari. The special leave petitions are still at the admission stage and the entire dispute between the parties essentially revolves around the scrutiny of factual dispute and there is hardly any question of law much less substantial question of law involved in these special leave petitions so as to entertain the same under the parameters of Article 136 of the Constitution. In spite of this and in order to obviate any possibility of miscarriage of justice to either of the contesting parties on account of vacating the order of injunction, we granted liberty of hearing at some length to the counsel for the parties and hence thought it appropriate to assign the reasons substantially.

    2. In order to examine the merits and demerits of the case of the contesting parties, we have examined even the factual dispute so as to consider whether the High Court was justified in reversing the order of injunction granted by the Single Judge in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner herein to his prejudice. On scrutinising the same, it appears that an unregistered agreement was signed by one Edmond D'Mello, deceased predecessor-in-interest of the vendor of Respondent 1 on 25-7-1973 to sell the suit land comprising an area of 11,733 sq m situated at Village Ambivally, Taluka Andheri I, Mumbai and a suburban district in favour of Shantilal Prabhubhai Patel but the execution of this agreement was to be completed within a period of two years. Subsequently, Shantilal Prabhubhai Patel assigned his rights in favour of M/s Kirti Constructions Company vide agreement dated 7-8-1975. Thereafter, M/s Kirti Constructions Co. also assigned its rights in favour of V.B Patel and Co. vide the third agreement dated 21-9-1975. All these agreements admittedly were unregistered agreements which at one point of time had also been challenged by the successor/owner of the suit land, Betram D'Mello, as the original owner Edmond D'Mello had expired on 25-3-1976 leaving behind two sons, namely, Betram D'Mello and Arthur D'Mello, since deceased, and two daughters, Diana Mary Rita Chamorette and Elaine Mery Teresa D'Mello.

    3. As already referred to hereinbefore, one of the heirs of deceased Edmond D'Mello, namely, Betram D'Mello filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Bombay bearing Suit No. 7584 of 2000 on 24-12-2000 wherein it was averred that neither the plaintiff Betram D'Mello, nor during the lifetime of his deceased father had Edmond B. D'Mello executed any document creating any right, title or interest in favour of Defendant 1, V.B Patel and Co. and the said Company did not have any right, title or interest of any nature in respect of the suit land. However, this suit did not proceed further as the plaintiff Betram D'Mello did not pursue the same and the suit land remained with V.B Patel and Co.

    4. But it appears that a fresh development agreement much later was executed in favour of the petitioner herein by Defendants 1 to 8 on 30-12-2005 for the suit land for a consideration of Rupees one crore in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner, Ramesh V. Rabari. Of this amount, Rs 15 lakhs was payable by the petitioner by way of earnest money at the time of execution of the agreement, whereas the balance was payable to the owners after making out a clear and marketable title as and when the petitioner/developer obtained IOD/Intimation of Disapproval and CC/Commencement Certificate. The document was adjudicated upon by the Collector of Stamps on 21-12-2005 to have a value of Rs 21.25 crores. The agreement that was entered into between the petitioner with Defendants 1 to 8.respondents herein required the owner to make out a marketable title to the property free from encumbrance and was not subject to lis pendens or attachment. On the same date i.e 30-12-2005, a supplementary agreement was further executed between the plaintiff and Defendants 5 to 8 stating (i) that the developer plaintiff had inspected the premises and had made all necessary enquiries (Clause 1); (ii) the plaintiff/petitioner had accepted the title of the co-owners and shall not raise any question on the title or call upon the co-owners to make out a marketable title [Clauses (i) and (iii); the co-owners had agreed to assign the development rights on as-is-where-is basis (Clause 2)]. The supplementary agreement according to the plaintiff was entered into as Defendants 5 to 8 had insisted upon such an agreement.

    5. It further transpires that on 21-1-2006, a notice was published in the Free Press Journal on behalf of the plaintiff/petitioner recording that Defendants 1 to 8 had entered into an agreement allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to develop the property. This was responded to on 23-1-2006 by the advocate for V.B Patel and Co. (“V”, for short) stating that V had already entered into agreement of sale with Edmond D'Mello through the intermediaries — Shanti Patel and Kirti Construction and this was reflected even in the will which was executed by the deceased Edmond D'Mello which was duly probated as a consequence of which V was in possession of the suit land for more than 30 years and hence the petitioner had no right to purchase this land through any heir of Edmond D'Mello as the interest had been created in V. In fact, in January 2006 V had also filed a suit before the City Civil Court for an injunction restraining Defendants 1 to 8 from dealing with the suit land or entering into any agreement regarding the suit land. In the said suit, Defendants 1 to 3 through their constituted attorney filed an affidavit contending that the suit was barred by limitation and that a mere suit for injunction without a claim for specific performance was not maintainable. The plaintiff V to these proceedings confirmed that he had introduced Defendants 1 to 8 for defending the suit instituted by V. However, this suit was withdrawn in April 2006 in order to file a substantive suit. Thereafter in April 2006, V filed a suit against Defendants 1 to 8 and the plaintiff for a declaration that his agreement for purchase of the suit property was valid, subsisting and binding and for specific performance of the agreement. The plaintiff V in this suit also challenged the legality of the development agreement entered into between the petitioner and Defendants 5 to 8 dated 30-12-2005.

    6. It further transpires that the petitioner Ramesh Vajabhai Rabari did not take any step in pursuance of the agreement for development of the property and hence the original owner of the property/Defendants 5 to 8 terminated the agreement executed in favour of the petitioner on 2-4-2007 and a notice of termination was issued by their advocate communicating that Defendants 5 to 8.co-owners of D'Mello family sought to terminate the agreement entered into by them with the plaintiff/petitioner since the petitioner Ramesh Vajabhai Rabari, did not take any steps in pursuance of the development agreement executed in his favour and hence Defendants 5 to 8 terminated the development agreement on 2-4-2007 wherein it was stated that the petitioner was aware of the transaction with V and its continuous possession on the suit land for 30 years, although the petitioner represented that he had settled the dispute with V. This however, had been alleged by the petitioner but was found to be false.

    7. After the termination of this agreement, the Defendant 9 V entered into a development agreement in respect of the suit land with Respondent 1 herein Pratiksha Real Estate (P) Ltd. In his capacity as the only surviving executor of the will of Edmond D'Mello who was the original owner of the suit land, and had executed a will in favour of his four children and also incorporated therein expressly that the suit property had been sold off to V. The agreement executed in favour of the Defendant 9 recites that it is in pursuance of the transaction dated 25-7-1973 which had been entered into between the original owner Edmond D'Mello and V, although in between the property had changed hands vide unregistered agreements of sale with Shantilal Bhai Patel and Kirti Constructions.

    8. On 19-6-2007, an ad interim order was passed by the learned Single Judge directing the parties to maintain status quo but liberty was granted to the Defendant 9 to negotiate with the tenants/occupants and to get their premises vacated. Permission was also granted to the Defendant 9 to get the plans sanctioned subject to the condition that prior permission of the court shall be obtained even before actual construction was carried out. The learned Single Judge was pleased to allow the application for injunction and restrained the defendants from selling, alienating or transferring the suit property besides which the Defendant 9 was also restrained from carrying out further development of the property.

    9. The petitioner herein on the other hand also felt seriously aggrieved with the termination of the agreement dated 2-4-2007 executed between the petitioner and Defendants 1 to 8 on 30-12-2005 and, therefore, filed a suit bearing Suit No. 1280 of 2007 in the High Court of Judicature of Bombay on its Original Side and an application for injunction by way of Notice of Motion No. 1673 of 2007 was also filed seeking the relief of injunction against the defendants from selling, alienating, transferring and creating any third-party rights, etc. during pendency of the suit. In this suit, it is an admitted position that Edmond D'Mello was the original owner of the suit property who had executed a will in favour of his four children and V/V.B Patel and Co. secured an agreement of sale in its favour in regard to the suit property and possession of the same was also delivered by the original owner in its favour which finds mention in the will executed by Edmond D'Mello in the will executed by him which was subsequently probated. Subsequent events do indicate that some of the successors of Edmond D'Mello executed another agreement of sale in favour of the petitioner which was a development agreement executed on 30-12-2005 whereby the petitioner had agreed to take the property for development on as-is-where-is basis for which Rs 15 lakhs was also plaid to the owners by way of earnest money but the same was later terminated on 2-4-2007.

    10. But it is worthwhile to recollect that the deceased predecessor-in-title of the defendant respondents had already executed a sale deed in favour of Shanti Patel, Kirti Construction and then to V and possession also was delivered to V.B Patel and Co. who is found to be in possession of the property for the last 30 years. It is no doubt true that the title and possession of V.B Patel and Co. has been questioned by the petitioner as also the cancellation of the agreement of sale in his favour is further under challenge in the suit bearing Suit No. 1280 of 2007 which is pending trial in the High Court of Bombay. But mere pendency of the suit where the plaintiff/petitioner has failed to establish even his prima facie title as also actual physical possession on the suit land which was not proved, obviously could not establish as to how the plaintiff/petitioner in that event could be allowed to secure an order of injunction in his favour especially when he is yet to secure a decree of specific performance for the land in question and the agreement of sale in his favour itself had been cancelled on 2-4-2007 by the defendant/vendor. When the petitioner is yet to acquire the property in question by virtue of a decree of specific performance in order to develop it, he obviously has no semblance of title to the suit property and he is also not in possession of the property in question even as per his own case as he had accepted the agreement for the landed property on “as-is-where-is basis” which was not in occupation of even the defendants/vendors. Thus, the third ingredient for grant of injunction which could be considered was the balance of convenience. But when the petitioner has not yet taken possession as per agreement nor any steps to develop the property for which he merely had agreement of sale which also was cancelled and had agreed to purchase the disputed property on “as-is-where-is basis” could not take possession so as to retain the property from V, he could not possibly claim injunction in his favour as he is still to acquire title to the property since he is yet to get a decree of specific performance.

    11. It is further clear that the suit which the petitioner has filed against termination of his agreement, is yet to record a finding in favour of the petitioner that the termination of agreement was bad in the eye of the law and the decree of specific performance which he has sought by way of relief in the suit is clearly an eventuality. In that view of the matter Respondent 1 who is claiming the property in question through V.B Patel and Co. at least is at an advantage to the extent that V.B Patel and Co. has been able to prima facie establish that an agreement of sale had been executed in his favour by the erstwhile deceased owner Edmond D'Mello and possession also was delivered to him in pursuance thereof, he also adduced evidence in support of his plea regarding his possession on the same for the last 30 years.

    12. The petitioner in any case has neither established his prima facie title to the suit property as the agreement of sale stands cancelled and a decree of specific performance is yet to be passed in his favour, nor is he in possession of the property in spite of the development agreement in his favour who has not taken any steps to develop the property from 2005 to 2007 due to which the development agreement itself was terminated. The petitioner therefore cannot be conferred the benefit of an order of injunction in his favour in absence of any ingredient which can be held to be the determining factor for grant of an order of injunction. Consideration for awarding an order of injunction in favour of a party claiming it, is too well settled to be reiterated or discussed herein; suffice it to say that the three basic ingredients while considering an application for grant of injunction which are establishment of prima facie case, actual physical possession of the property in question and last but not the least balance of convenience and hardship are the three determining factors to claim an order of temporary injunction in the pending suit. The petitioner although failed to prove any of the three prime factors to claim injunction succeeded in obtaining an order of temporary injunction which the Division Bench of the High Court has reversed and rightly so as the petitioner obtained a development agreement from some of the successors of Edmond D'Mello which however was also terminated apart from the fact that the original owner Edmond D'Mello had already executed an agreement of sale in favour of V.B Patel and Co. to whom the possession was also delivered and Respondent 1 Pratiksha has obtained an agreement in its favour from V.

    13. However, the decree of specific performance as already stated is yet to be passed in favour of the petitioner whereas Respondent 1 is claiming through V in whose favour the erstwhile owner Edmond D'Mello had executed the agreement of sale in pursuance of which possession was also delivered 30 years ago. The petitioner having entered into an agreement of sale 30 years later from some of the co-sharers which agreement too was terminated on 2-4-2007 obviously cannot be granted an order of injunction restraining Respondent 1 from claiming the property through V which prima facie not only has got interest in the property but also actual physical possession of the same. On the contrary, the petitioner as of now has neither any semblance of title nor has possession on the property nor prima facie case nor balance of convenience in his favour as he is yet to take possession and develop the property.

    14. In view of these existing facts and circumstances of the matter, we are of the view that the learned Single Judge was not justified in granting an order of injunction in favour of the petitioner and the same has rightly been reversed by the Division Bench of the High Court by assigning valid reasons. We, thus find no merit in these special leave petitions to interfere with the impugned judgment and order Appeal No. 683 of 2012. Accordingly, they are dismissed.

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    Ramesh Vajabhai Rabari v. Pratiksha Real Estate Private Limited And Others
    (Apr 3, 2014)