Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • The Prisons Act, Jail Manual, etc.
  • Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India or any rule framed thereunder
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 142 of the Constitution, Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Jail Manual
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • The Prisons Act, Jail Manual, etc.
  • Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India or any rule framed thereunder
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 142 of the Constitution, Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Jail Manual
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, along with a co-accused, was tried for murdering four persons during the night of 20/21 August 2000 and was convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.

  • Trial Court (27-01-2005 / 05-02-2005): Conviction and imposition of the death penalty.
  • High Court (22-09-2006): Appeal dismissed; death reference affirmed.
  • Supreme Court (07-02-2013, Gurvail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 2 SCC 713): Conviction upheld but death sentence commuted to life imprisonment with the direction that the petitioner must serve 30 years without remission.
  • Review Petition: Dismissed.
  • Present Writ Petition: Filed to (i) convert the fixed 30-year term to an ordinary life sentence and (ii) declare that the Supreme Court cannot stipulate a minimum non-remittable term when commuting death to life imprisonment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Supreme Court has the competence to direct that a convict shall serve a specified minimum period (e.g., 30 years without remission) when it commutes a death sentence to life imprisonment.
  2. Whether, on the facts of the case, the petitioner is entitled to have the 30-year non-remittable term converted into a standard sentence of life imprisonment eligible for executive remission.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Court lacks power to fix a specific number of non-remittable years upon commuting a death sentence, as such a direction intrudes upon the executive’s remission authority under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution.
  • Reliance placed on Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452, where a two-Judge Bench questioned the permissibility of courts restraining the Government’s remission power.

No detailed counter-arguments of the State were recounted in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 Court may impose a special category of life sentence (beyond 14 years and up to whole life) when death penalty is commuted. Cited as the authoritative three-Judge decision legitimising fixed, non-remittable life terms.
Sangeet v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452 Expressed doubt about courts restraining remission powers. Held not to override larger-Bench rulings; observations termed “unwarranted.”
State of U.P. v. Sanjay Kumar (2012) 8 SCC 537 Upheld the “via media” of imposing long fixed terms where the death penalty is not warranted but 14 years would be inadequate. Reinforced that fixed-term life sentences do not violate clemency powers.
Sahib Hussain alias Sahib Jan v. State of Rajasthan (2013) 9 SCC 778 Re-affirmed Swamy Shraddananda and rejected the doubts expressed in Sangeet. Treated as controlling authority; case declared to “squarely cover” the present petition.
Pandit Kishori Lal v. King Emperor (1945) AIR PC 64 Early exposition on life sentences and remission practices. Referenced in Swamy Shraddananda to illustrate misuse of routine remission.
Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 600 Clarified that life imprisonment ordinarily lasts for the convict’s natural life. Cited within the chain of authorities supporting fixed-term sentences.
Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107 Discussed constitutional clemency and statutory remission. Part of jurisprudential foundation for distinguishing judicial and executive powers.
State of M.P. v. Ratan Singh (1976) 3 SCC 470 Consideration of remission in life sentences. Referenced to trace historical approach to remissions.
Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 6 SCC 296 Scope of remission for life convicts. Included among precedents canvassed in Swamy Shraddananda.
Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P. (1973) 1 SCC 20 Pre-section 433-A sentencing framework. Noted to show legislative response leading to section 433-A CrPC.
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 Constitution Bench recognising the gap between 14 years’ imprisonment and death penalty. Supports “expanded sentencing option.”
Gurvail Singh v. State of Punjab (2013) 2 SCC 713 The petitioner’s own appeal where death sentence was commuted to 30 years without remission. Forms the immediate backdrop; writ seeks alteration of this very direction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed that:

  • Larger-Bench decisions such as Swamy Shraddananda (2) and Sahib Hussain conclusively recognise the Supreme Court’s power to impose a fixed, non-remittable term when commuting a death sentence.
  • The two-Judge observations in Sangeet raised doubts but, not being referred to a larger Bench, cannot displace existing binding precedent.
  • Executive clemency under Articles 72 and 161 remains intact; the Court’s direction merely limits remission during the specified term in cases where death has been commuted, addressing the inadequacy of a 14-year de facto life term.
  • Given that Sahib Hussain squarely addresses the same contention and upholds the Court’s competence, the present petition discloses no special feature warranting departure.

Holding and Implications

Petition Dismissed.

Consequently, the petitioner continues to serve the 30-year non-remittable term fixed in Gurvail Singh v. State of Punjab. The order re-affirms the Supreme Court’s authority to craft fixed-term life sentences when commuting death penalties and leaves untouched the constitutional powers of remission; no new legal principle is created beyond reinforcing existing precedent.

    Gurvail Singh Alias Gala v. State Of Punjab .

    Order

    1. This writ petition is filed for direction to convert the sentence of the petitioner from 30 years in jail without remission to a sentence of life imprisonment; and further to declare that this Court is not competent to fix a particular number of years (with or without remission) when it commutes the death sentence to life imprisonment while upholding the conviction of the accused under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”).

    2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that: the petitioner along with the co-accused was charged for killing 4 persons on the intervening night of 20-8-2000/21-8-2000 and tried for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The trial court vide judgment and order dated 27-1-2005/5-2-2005 convicted and awarded death sentence to him along with the co-accused Jaj Singh. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 22-9-2006 dismissed the criminal appeal filed by the petitioner and affirmed the death sentence reference made by the trial court so far as the petitioner and the co-accused are concerned.

    3. Aggrieved, the petitioner challenged the said judgment and order dated 22-9-2006 by filing the criminal appeal and this Court vide judgment and order dated 7-2-2013 (2013) 2 SCC 713 affirmed the conviction. However, the death sentence was converted into life imprisonment with a direction that the petitioner shall serve 30 years in jail without remission. The aforesaid decision is reported in Gurvail Singh v. State of Punjab (2013) 2 SCC 713.

    4. Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred a review petition, which was also dismissed. Hence, the writ petition.

    5. Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted that this Court lacks the power to issue directions that convicts shall serve a particular minimum sentence with or without remission when death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment. Such an argument is being advanced in view of the judgment of this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana (2013) 2 SCC 452, wherein a two-Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with the issue considered the earlier judgments and observed:

    “55. A reading of some recent decisions delivered by this Court seems to suggest that the remission power of the appropriate Government has effectively been nullified by awarding sentences of 20 years, 25 years and in some cases without any remission. Is this permissible? Can this Court (or any court for that matter) restrain the appropriate Government from granting remission of a sentence to a convict? What this Court has done in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 and several other cases, by giving a sentence in a capital offence of 20 years' or 30 years' imprisonment without remission, is to effectively injunct the appropriate Government from exercising its power of remission for the specified period. In our opinion, this issue needs further and greater discussion, but as at present advised, we are of the opinion that this is not permissible. The appropriate Government cannot be told that it is prohibited from granting remission of a sentence. Similarly, a convict cannot be told that he cannot apply for a remission in his sentence, whatever be the reason.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    6. The issue involved herein has been raised before this Court time and again. Two-Judge as well as three-Judge Benches have several times explained the powers of this Court in this regard and it has consistently been held that the Court cannot interfere with the clemency powers enshrined under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India or any rule framed thereunder except in exceptional circumstances. So far as the remissions, etc. are concerned, these are executive powers of the State under which, the Court may issue such directions if required in the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

    7. The issue raised in this petition was elaborately dealt with by a three-Judge Bench in Swamy Shraddananda (2) (2008) 13 SCC 767 wherein it was held as under:

    “91. The legal position as enunciated in Pandit Kishori Lal v. King Emperor (1944-45) 72 IA 1, (1945) 58 LW 251, AIR 1945 PC 64, Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1961 SC 600, (1961) 1 Cri LJ 736, Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC 107, State of M.P v. Ratan Singh (1976) 3 SCC 470 and Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 6 SCC 296 and the unsound way in which remission is actually allowed in cases of life imprisonment make out a very strong case to make a special category for the very few cases where the death penalty might be substituted by the punishment of imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term in excess of fourteen years and to put that category beyond the application of remission.
    92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different angle. The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant comes to this Court carrying a death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court, this Court may find, as in the present appeal, that the case just falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence. But at the same time, having regard to the nature of the crime, the court may strongly feel that a sentence of life imprisonment subject to remission normally works out to a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate and inadequate. What then should the court do? If the court's option is limited only to two punishments, one a sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more than 14 years and the other death, the court may feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the court i.e the vast hiatus between 14 years' imprisonment and death. It needs to be emphasised that the court would take recourse to the expanded option primarily because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years' imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    8. The issue was again reconsidered in State of U.P v. Sanjay Kumar (2012) 8 SCC 537, and rejecting a similar contention the Court observed:

    “24. … The aforesaid judgments make it crystal clear that this Court has merely found out the via media, where considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case, by way of which it has come to the conclusion that it was not the ‘rarest of rare cases’, warranting death penalty, but a sentence of 14 years or 20 years, as referred to in the guidelines laid down by the States would be totally inadequate. The life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years, rather it always meant as the whole natural life. This Court has always clarified that the punishment so awarded would be subject to any order passed in exercise of the clemency powers of the President of India or the Governor of the State, as the case may be. Pardons, reprieves and remissions are granted in exercise of prerogative power. There is no scope of judicial review of such orders except on very limited grounds, for example, non-application of mind while passing the order; non-consideration of relevant material; or if the order suffers from arbitrariness. The power to grant pardons and to commute sentences is coupled with a duty to exercise the same fairly and reasonably. Administration of justice cannot be perverted by executive or political pressure. Of course, adoption of uniform standards may not be possible while exercising the power of pardon. Thus, such orders do not interfere with the sovereign power of the State. More so, not being in contravention of any statutory or constitutional provision, the orders, even if treated to have been passed under Article 142 of the Constitution do not deserve to be labelled as unwarranted. The aforesaid orders have been passed considering the gravity of the offences in those cases that the accused would not be entitled to be considered for premature release under the guidelines issued for that purpose i.e under the Jail Manual, etc. or even under Section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    9. In spite of that, a two Judge-Bench of this Court raised certain doubts about the competence of this Court to pass such orders in Sangeet (2013) 2 SCC 452. If the two-Judge Bench was of the opinion that earlier judgments, even of a larger Bench were not justified, the Bench ought to have referred the matter to the larger Bench. But without doing so, the aforesaid observations have been made.

    10. It may be pertinent to mention that the case of the petitioner Gurvail Singh alias Gala has been decided by none other than the Hon'ble Judge presiding over the Bench, which decided the case of Sangeet (2013) 2 SCC 452. However, different view has been taken from that of the case of Sangeet (2013) 2 SCC 452 which had been decided earlier and reference of the said case has also been made in the case of the petitioner.

    11. Be that as it may, this very question was raised again before this Court in Sahib Hussain v. State of Rajasthan (2013) 9 SCC 778, (2013) 6 Scale 219. This Court reconsidered the whole issue examining all the judgments including Sangeet (2013) 2 SCC 452 and ultimately held as under: (Sahib Hussain case (2013) 9 SCC 778, (2013) 6 Scale 219 & 794, paras 34-36)

    “34. … In this case [Sangeet (2013) 2 SCC 452] though the Division Bench raised a doubt about the decision of a three-Judge Bench in Swamy Shraddananda (2), yet the same has not been referred to a larger Bench.
    35. In Swamy Shraddananda (2) (2008) 13 SCC 767, after taking note of remissions by various State Governments without adequate reasons or even on flimsy grounds, in order to set right the same, a three-Judge Bench analysed all the relevant aspects including the earlier decisions and discussed them in the following paragraphs:
    36. It is clear that in Swamy Shraddananda (2) (2008) 13 SCC 767, this Court noted the observations made by this Court in Jagmohan Singh v. State of U.P (1973) 1 SCC 20 and five years after the judgment in Jagmohan case (1973) 1 SCC 20, Section 433-A was inserted in the Code imposing a restriction on the power of remission or commutation in certain cases. After the introduction of Section 433-A another Constitution Bench of this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, with reference to power with regard to Section 433-A which restricts the power of remission and commutation conferred on the appropriate Government, noted various provisions of the Prisons Act, Jail Manual, etc. and concluded that reasonable and proper course would be to expanded the option between 14 years' imprisonment and death. The larger Bench has also emphasised that: [Swamy Shraddananda (2) case (2008) 13 SCC 767]
    “92. … the Court would take recourse to the expanded option primarily because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years' imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all.”
    In the light of the detailed discussion by the larger Bench, we are of the view that the observations made in Sangeet case are not warranted. Even otherwise, the above principles, as enunciated in Swamy Shraddananda (2) (2008) 13 SCC 767 are applicable only when death sentence is commuted to life imprisonment and not in all cases where the Court imposes sentence for life.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    12. Thus, it is evident that the issue raised in this petition has been considered by another Bench and after reconsidering all the relevant judgments on the issue the Court found that the observations made in Sangeet (2013) 2 SCC 452 were unwarranted i.e no such observations should have been made. This Court issued orders to deprive a convict from the benefit of remissions only in cases where the death sentence has been commuted to life imprisonment and it does not apply in all the cases wherein the person has been sentenced to life imprisonment.

    13. The case at hand is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment in Sahib Hussain (2013) 9 SCC 778, (2013) 6 Scale 219. No further discussion is required. The petition is misconceived, and does not present any special feature warranting any interference. Thus, it is accordingly, dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Gurvail Singh Alias Gala v. State Of Punjab .
    (Aug 26, 2013)