Judgement
SUBBA RAO, C. J. :-
This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the order dated 17-5-1950 of the District Transportation Superintendent (Traffic), Bezwada. The application was filed on 22-11-1954 i.e. more than four years after the date of the order sought to be quashed.
2. It is a well settled rule of practice that an application by way of writ of certiorari or other writ should be filed within a reasonable time from the date of the order which the applicant seeks to be quashed. In appropriate cases, the High Court certainly has power to excuse the delay.
3. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Nathamooni Chetti v. Viswanatha Sastry, 1950-2 Mad L J 448 : (AIR 1951 Mad 250) (A), pointed out the procedure obtaining in that Court in the following terms :
"Though there is no specific period of limitation, it has generally been the accepted practice of this Court not to exercise the extraordinary power by way of the issue of prerogative writs when there has been a long delay since the passing of the order sought to be quashed."
4. Another Division Bench of the same Court in Muthiah Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras, 1951-1 Mad LJ 417 : (AIR 1951 Mad 204) (B), re-stated the rule of practice thus at page 420 (of Mad LJ) : (at p. 206 of AIR) :
"We have held that though there is no period of limitation as such prescribed for application for the issue of prerogative writs, long delay can be one of the grounds for refusing to grant an application for the issue of such writs."
5. Govinda Menon J. of the same High Court in Venkateswarlu v. State of Madras, 1954-1 Mad LJ 244 : (AIR 1954 Mad 587) (C), after noticing the aforesaid rule and the two decisions cited above, issued the writ in spite of one years delay on the ground that, in the circumstances of that case, there was justification for the petitioner waiting for nearly a year as he
"had been knocking at the doors of his departmental superiors to find out whether from those quarters he could obtain relief."
6. Umamaheswaram J. of this Court accepted the same rule of practice in Annamalai v. The State, 1955 Andh LT 831 : (AIR 1957 Andhra Pra 739) (D). But, in that case, having regard to the transgression of a fundamental principle of civilised jurisprudence, the learned Judge thought it fit to issue the writ, though there was a delay of about 11 months. The learned Judge at p. 838 (of Andh LT) : (at p. 742 of AIR) observed :
"----There is no rigid or inflexible rule holding that a writ should not be entertained after a period of 11 months."
After citing the aforesaid decisions, he proceeded to observe :
"But I am referring to those decisions only for the purpose of showing that there is no rigid rule fettering my discretion to interfere in a gross case of this description."
7. The High Courts of Allahabad and Travancore issued writs even though in one case four years elapsed from the date of the order and, in the other, three years passed by from the date the order was made. Even in England, the period fixed for filing a writ of certiorari is six months, though under O. 64, R. 7, R. S. C. there is power vested in the Court to extend the time and excuse the delay in filing a writ of certiorari. There is no reason why this High Court should follow a different rule. In our view, applications under Art.226 of the Constitution will be entertained only if they are filed within a reasonable time from the date of the making of the order.
Ordinarily, a period of six months may be considered reasonable but, in extraordinary circumstances, this Court may, in its discretion, excuse the delay. Otherwise, while periods of limitation are fixed for every form of remedy available to a party, there will not be any time limit for the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The exercise of power under Art.226 by a Court, irrespective of any time lag will introduce complications and unsettle rights finally decided by authorities empowered to do so.
8. Learned Counsel then contends that there are clear and adequate reasons for excusing the delay in this particular case. The order was made by the District Transportation Superintendent (Traffic) on 17-5-1950 and an appeal filed against the same was dismissed by the Chief Operating Superintendent on 16-8-1950. The present application was filed more than four years after that order. The only reason which the learned Counsel could advance is that his client was sending memorials to the General Manager and to the Government of India. The fact that he sent some memorials to the Government and other superior officers cannot be a ground for ignoring this long delay.
9. It is then said that he filed an application before the Conciliation Officer for deciding the dispute between the railway and his client but the Conciliation Officer did not decide that dispute. In support of this contention, certain correspondence that passed between the Conciliation Officer and the General Secretary, M. S. M. Railway Association, Bezwada, between 10-11-51 and 25-2-1952 is placed before us.
That correspondence only shows that the petitioner wrote a letter to the Conciliation Officer and that the Secretary reminded him of that and enquired what further action he had taken therein. It does not appear from the record what happened to that application or whether the petitioner had seriously pursued it. In the circumstances, we cannot hold that any reasonable explanation has been offered for excusing this inordinate delay of four years from the date of the making of the order.
10. The application fails and is dismissed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 50/-.
Application dismissed.