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  • clause (vi) of sub-s. (2) of S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act.
  • S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 49 of the Indian Registration Act
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  • clause (vi) of sub-s. (2) of S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act.
  • S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 49 of the Indian Registration Act
Smart Summary

Summary of the Judgment (Second Appeal) — Bhimasankaram, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal arises out of competing claims to certain immovable properties that originally belonged to one Pydithalli, who died without issue in 1942. Kannamma, his widow, inherited and alienated the suit lands in favour of Sanni. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant (brothers and nearest reversioners) filed O.S. No. 166 of 1945 seeking a declaration that Kannamma's alienation would not bind the estate of the deceased. That suit resulted in a compromise decree dated 3 October 1945 which (inter alia) cancelled the sale deed dated 7 April 1945, allocated certain schedule items to the widow (with restrictions on alienation during her lifetime), gave the plaintiffs possession of other items after the Telugu year, apportioned crops and provided each party bear its own costs. The decree's preamble recorded that the plaintiffs had proved their claim against the ex parte second defendant and agreed to take a decree in terms of the compromise.

Despite that compromise, O.S. No. 78 of 1946 was filed by the brothers for mesne profits; it was decreed at trial but on appeal the widow was exonerated for lack of possession. While that appeal was pending, the present 1st defendant obtained a sale deed from Kannamma for the lands which the compromise had allocated to him and the plaintiff. The present second defendant is an alienee from the 1st defendant. The plaintiff seeks to recover his half-share of the suit lands on the basis of the earlier compromise decree.

One principal defence survived: that the compromise decree was inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of establishing title under S.49 of the Indian Registration Act because the compromise effectively divided immovable property and should have been registered under S.17 and was not. The central procedural vehicle is a Second Appeal directed to a Bench because of the importance of interpreting clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of S.17 of the Indian Registration Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compromise decree in the earlier suit is a decree "expressed to be made on a compromise and compromising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit" within the meaning of clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of S.17 of the Indian Registration Act.
  2. Whether, for the purposes of S.49 of the Indian Registration Act (admissibility of unregistered instruments affecting title), the immovable property divided by the compromise decree was "the subject-matter of the suit" so as to bring the decree within the exception in clause (vi) and render registration unnecessary for effecting title.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Position

  • The plaintiff sought enforcement of his half share of the suit lands on the strength of the compromise decree (i.e., recovery of his entitlement as decreed in the compromise).

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contended that the compromise decree could not be used to effect title because it divided immovable property and therefore required registration under S.17; being unregistered, it was inadmissible under S.49 of the Indian Registration Act for proving title.
  • In substance, the defence argued that the immovable properties divided by the compromise were not "the subject-matter of the suit" and so the compromise was a document compromising immoveable property other than that which was the subject-matter of the suit — thereby attracting the requirement of registration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi, ILR 39 Mad 987; (AIR 1917 Mad 512) Principle that where cause of action and relief in a second suit differ from those in the first suit, the second suit cannot be said to be in respect of the same subject-matter as the first; the court noted that the term "subject-matter" was not exhaustively defined there. The Court cited this decision for the general interpretive background about the phrase "subject-matter of the suit" but noted its limited scope and the lack of an exhaustive definition in that authority.
Ramayya v. Rangaraju, AIR 1937 Mad 504 Held that "subject-matter of the suit" in the context of registration means that specific immoveable property must be the subject of litigation — there must be a claim or right in or to the specific immoveable property asserted and relief sought in respect thereof. The court expressly concurred with this reasoning and adopted it as a relevant test: if the litigation directly and specifically concerns a right in the immoveable property, that property is the subject-matter of the suit.
Bhola Nath Seal v. Bhuthanath Sen, AIR 1925 Cal 239 Applied S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act (lis pendens) to suits where a deed of trust covering property was sought to be set aside — indicating that S.52 can apply to property directly and specifically in question. The Court referenced this case to support the proposition that S.52 can apply to suits seeking to set aside dispositions affecting immoveable property, thereby indicating those properties can be "subject-matter" for the purposes of the test.
Thakur Das v. Jai Kisan Das, AIR 1938 Lah 448 Applied the doctrine of lis pendens (S.52, Transfer of Property Act) to a suit involving declaration of title to immoveable property. The Court cited this authority to show that declaratory suits affecting title to immoveable property fall within the doctrine of lis pendens and thus such properties may be considered the subject-matter of the suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court identified the central statutory provision for interpretation as clause (vi) of sub-section (2) of S.17 of the Indian Registration Act (the exception to registration for certain decrees/orders). The key question was whether the compromise decree was a decree "expressed to be made on a compromise and compromising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit." In practical terms the court asked: did the earlier suit put in question any right to the specific immoveable property so as to make that property the "subject-matter of the suit"?

The court examined Order 23, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code (provision for recording compromises/adjustments and passing decree in accordance therewith) and observed that if the immoveable property in question could properly be regarded as the subject-matter of the suit, then the compromise terms plainly related to the suit and the decree would be "in accordance therewith." This directed attention to what constitutes "subject-matter" for the purposes of the Registration Act's exception.

The court considered existing authorities interpreting "subject-matter." It gave particular emphasis to the reasoning in Ramayya v. Rangaraju, which articulated a concrete test: the property must be the specific object of a claim or right asserted and relief sought in relation to it. The court declared its respectful concurrence with that test.

To operationalize that test the court invoked S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act (the doctrine of lis pendens), reasoning that property to which the doctrine applies is property which is "the subject-matter of the suit." Thus, whether a transfer of the property would be hit by S.52 provides a useful test for whether the property was the subject-matter of the litigation.

The court reviewed support from two other authorities: Bhola Nath Seal (Calcutta) and Thakur Das (Lahore), both of which applied S.52 in contexts where dispositions affecting immoveable property were sought to be set aside or where declaratory relief as to title was sought. From these cases the court inferred that a suit seeking to set aside an alienation of immoveable property may directly and specifically involve a right in that property for purposes of S.52.

Applying this reasoning to the facts, the court concluded that the original suit — although formally for a declaration that the sale deed did not bind the reversioners — directly and specifically involved the right to the immoveable property whose alienation was challenged. Consequently, S.52 would apply and the properties divided by the compromise were properly to be regarded as the subject-matter of the suit. Because the decree was expressed to be made on compromise and the property divided was the subject-matter of the suit, the exception in clause (vi) of S.17 applied.

On that basis the court held that the compromise decree (referred to as Exhibit D-3 in the text) could be received in evidence and could be enforced against the defendants.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the compromise decree (Exhibit D-3) could be received in evidence and enforced against the defendants. It allowed the Second Appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Judge, restored the judgment of the learned District Munsif (with costs here and in the Court below) and directed an enquiry into future mesne profits under Order 20, Rule 12, Civil Procedure Code.

Implications:

  • The immediate consequence is that the plaintiff may rely on the compromise decree to recover his half share of the suit lands; the decree is admissible despite the contention that registration was required.
  • The Court applied and endorsed the test that an immoveable property is the "subject-matter of the suit" when a right to that property is directly and specifically in question (as elucidated by the doctrine of lis pendens under S.52, Transfer of Property Act, and the decision in Ramayya v. Rangaraju).
  • The opinion does not purport to create a broad new principle beyond applying existing authorities; its effect is to resolve the dispute between these parties by permitting enforcement of the compromise decree and ordering consequential proceedings (mesne profits enquiry). No statement in the text asserts that a novel precedent was being laid down beyond the Court's adoption and application of prior authorities.

Disposition: Appeal allowed; order for enquiry into future mesne profits; costs to the successful party as stated.

    Ankamreddi Konda v. Ankamreddi Pedademudu (Died) And Others

    Judgement

    BHIMASANKARAM, J. : This Second Appeal has been directed to be posted before a Bench by our learned brother Umamaheswaram, J., because he considered that it raised a question of importance involving the interpretation of clause (vi) of sub-s. (2) of S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act.

    2. The facts of the case are these : The plaintiff and the 1st defendant are brothers who became divided some time before suit. One Pydithalli, the son of their paternal uncle, died issue-less in the year 1942 and his properties were inherited by Kannamma, his widow, who alienated the suit lands as well as some other properties in favour of one Sanni. Thereupon the plaintiff and the 1st defendant in their capacity as the nearest reversioners to the estate of Pydithalli filed O. S. No. 166 of 1945 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Chodavaram, against the widow and her alienee, who were impleaded as the 2nd and the 1st defendants respectively, for a declaration that the alienation would not bind the estate of late Pydithalli. The suit resulted in a compromise between the alienee and the brothers. The compromise decree passed therein which is dated 3rd October, 1945, contains these terms:

    "1. That the sale deed dated 7th April, 1945, executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant do stand cancelled;

    2. that the second defendant do take only items 9 and 11 of the plaint schedule without any power of alienation during her life-time and the plaintiffs do enjoy them afterwards absolutely:

    3. that the plaintiffs do take possession of other items of the plaint schedule at the end of the Telgu Year and enjoy them absolutely; 4. that the first defendant and plaintiffs do pay 5 putties of paddy for this year to the second defendant and the rest of the crops in the suit lands be shared in equal shares between the plaintiffs and the first defendant; and

    5. that each party do bear its own costs of this suit.

    Note.- The other terms of the compromise are recorded. Compromise petition is attached to this decree as schedule thereto. Plaint schedule attached to decree."

    3. It may be noted that the preamble to this decree states -

    "the plaintiffs having proved their claim against the ex parte second defendant and having agreed to take a decree in terms of the compromise against the second defendant also, the Court doth in pursuance of the said deed of compromise order and decree"
    .

    4. Despite this compromise, the brothers had to file a second suit O. S. No. 78 of 1946 against Kannamma and Sanni for mesne profits. It was decreed against both of them by the trial Court; but on appeal, the widow was exonerated from liability on the ground that she had no possession of the properties in respect of which the mesne profits were claimed. While that appeal was pending, the present 1st defendant obtained a sale deed for the lands from Kannamma to which both he and plaintiff were entitled under the earlier compromise decree. The present second defendant is an alienee from the 1st defendant. The plaintiff now seeks to recover his half share of the suit lands from the defendants on the foot of the compromise decree.

    5. Several defences were raised of which only one now survives, viz., that the compromise decree is inadmissible in evidence under S. 49 of the Indian Registration Act for the purpose of effecting title to the suit property, because it required to be registered and was not. The contention is that the suit which resulted in the compromise was filed only for a declaration by presumptive reversioners that the property covered by the sale deed executed by Kannamma in favour of Sanni did not bind the reversion. The compromise whereby the properties in respect of which the declaration was sought were divided among the plaintiffs, the alienee and the widow, required registration because it could not be said that the immoveable property which was divided was "the subject-matter of the suit" within the meaning of clause (vi) of sub-s. (2) of S. 17 of the Act. It is necessary to quote the relevant language of S. 17 in order to appreciate the contention:

    "17. (1) The following documents shall be registered.................

    (a) * * * *

    (b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immoveable property;

    * * * * *

    (2) Nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-s. (1) applies to -

    * * * * *

    (vi) any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order "expressed to be made on a compromise and compromising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit" or proceedings."

    6. The point for consideration is whether the decree in question can be held to be a decree

    "expressed to be made on a compromise and compromising immoveable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit"
    ? To put it in other words, was the property agreed to be divided between the plaintiffs and the defendants as per the above terms, the subject-matter of the suit, though in respect of it only a declaratory relief was asked?

    7. Our attention has been drawn to a number of decisions explaining the meaning of the phrase "the subject-matter of the suit".

    8. Now, O. 23, Civil Procedure Code, which provides for withdrawal and adjustment of suit contains the phrase "the subject-matter" of the suit and it may be useful to extract R. 3 of this order :-

    "Rule 23.- (3) Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit."

    9. In the present case if the immoveable property in question can be said to be the subject-matter of the suit, it is clear that all the above terms related to the suit and the decree is in accordance therewith.

    10. Our attention has been drawn to a Full Bench decision reported in Singa Reddi v. Subba Reddi, ILR 39 Mad 987 : (AIR 1917 Mad 512(2)) (A), in which it was held that where the cause of action and the relief claimed in a second suit are not the same as the cause of action and the relief claimed in the first suit, the second suit cannot be considered to have been brought in respect of the same subject-matter as the first suit. The learned Judges, however, disclaimed an attempt to give an exhaustive definition of all that may be included in the term "subject-matter."

    11. Reference may, however, be usefully made to the decision of a single Judge of the Madras High Court reported in Ramayya v. Rangaraju, AIR 1937 Mad 504 (B). The question decided in that case arose on the following facts: The petitioner in that case filed a suit against a father and his sons to recover a sum of money due under a promissory note executed by the father alone, it being alleged that as the debt for which the pronote was executed was for a necessary purpose, the sons also were liable thereunder. The plaint sought a decree against the father personally and against the joint family properties in the hands of the sons. The suit was compromised and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise whereby the defendants were directed to pay the amount of the note in two instalments, it being secured by a charge created on two items of immoveable property specified in the schedule to the decree. The property so secured was subsequently brought to sale and the sale proceeds were deposited in Court. There were claims made for rateable distribution of that sum by holders of other decrees. The petitioners contention was that there could be no rateable distribution because he had a charge under his decree. The trial Court had negatived the contention on the ground that as the decree was not registered, it could not be put in evidence to establish the charge.

    12. Venkatarama Rao, J., discussed the matter in the following passage:

    "The question therefore is whether the two items of immoveable property which have been charged by the compromise decree......can be said to be the subject-matter of the said suit. The expression subject-matter of the suit is not defined in the Registration Act. It seems to me that what the clause contemplates is that specific immoveable property must be subject-matter of litigation. There must be a claim or right in or to the specific immoveable property asserted in the litigation and relief sought in respect thereof in order to make the said property the subject-matter of the suit."

    13. We express our respectful concurrence with the line of reasoning adopted in this passage. It is to be noted that the learned Judge used language which is substantially the same as that employed in S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. That section refers to "any suit or proceeding in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question and subjects it to the doctrine of lis pendens. There can be little doubt that property to which the doctrine applies is property which is "the subject-matter of the suit". One test therefore in order to ascertain whether any immoveable property is the subject-matter of a suit is whether a transfer of the property involved in it would be hit at by this provision.

    14. In the present case, the suit is for a declaration that the sale deed executed by the widow in respect of the property is not binding upon the reversioners. We shall have therefore to consider whether S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply to such a case. No case directly in point has been brought to our notice. But, we may refer to two cases, one of the Calcutta High Court and the other of the Lahore High Court. In Bhola Nath Seal v. Bhuthanath Sen, AIR 1925 Cal 239 (C), the learned Judges held that S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applied to a property covered by a deed of trust which was sought to be set aside in that suit. In Thakur Das v. Jai Kisan Das, AIR 1938 Lah 448 (D) a single Judge of the Lahore High Court applied the doctrine to a suit which involved declaration of title to immoveable property. We think that in a case like the present one also it could very well be said that a right to the immoveable property the alienation of which is sought to be set aside is involved directly and specifically in the suit.

    15. Hence, we hold that the compromise decree Exhibit D-3 could be received in evidence and that it could be enforced against the defendants.

    16. We therefore allow the Second Appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Judge and restore that of the learned District Munsif with costs here and in the Court below. There shall be an enquiry into future mesne profits under O. 20, R. 12, Civil Procedure Code.

    Appeal allowed.

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    Ankamreddi Konda v. Ankamreddi Pedademudu (Died) And Others
    (Dec 9, 1955)